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Abstract 
 
The thesis investigates the application of the public value notion in UK 
public service broadcasting (PSB). In the context of technological change from 
analogue to digital broadcasting and the reduction of applicable market failures, the 
notion has been used to describe the remit and assess the performance of PSB, thus 
providing sustained justification of PSB in the digital age.  
The overall research interest is to investigate the public value notion in the 
context of evolving media policy paradigms to examine whether its 
institutionalisation represents a paradigm shift in the ideological justification of PSB. 
The ideological justification is investigated in the form of economic and non-
economic regulatory rationales as different academic approaches to market 
intervention and public service provision. 
As a fundamental type of policy change, the paradigm shift concept is 
operationalised by devising an analytical framework that consists of two analytical 
strands; an ideological shift and a policy process analysis.  
Based on a case study approach of the notion’s application at the BBC and 
Channel 4, the research design employs interpretative textual analysis of documents 
and expert interviews to investigate the ideological composition of the public value 
notion and its wider policy process. 
The research finds that no paradigm shift has taken place in the 
justification of PSB as the public value notion continues the overall more economic 
than non-economic focus of the incumbent media policy paradigm.  
These findings contribute to media and public policy studies with regard to 
the understanding and classification of (media policy) paradigm shifts as a 
fundamental type of policy change and the use of economic and non-economic 
rationales as different ideologies in informing policy ideas and decisions-making in 
media policy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 The Public Value Notion and the Justification of Public Service 
 Broadcasting: A  Fundamental Shift in Ideology? 
 
Shortly after the commencement of the BBC’s Charter review in 2004, the 
corporation published a strategic document (BBC, 2004a) that set out its role for the 
digital age. The title ‘Building Public Value: Renewing the BBC for a digital world’ 
expressed the BBC’s future vision and declared objective of ‘public value creation’. 
The document further stated that the “BBC exists solely to create public value” 
(ibid., p. 28) and that “public value should be the goal for everything the BBC does” 
(ibid., p. 10). The public value notion therewith entered PSB policy discourse and the 
BBC’s Charter review, during which it was used heavily.  
While the notion – at first sight – does not appear to be very different from 
the familiar concept of the public interest, it however seems to have another 
dimension to it, which is that of justifying public service broadcasting (PSB) 
provision. The concept was not only used discursively, it was also presented as a 
performance assessment and accountability tool that would inform decisions on the 
provision of new and significantly changed services. This tool, called the public 
value test (PVT), proposed to compare the public value a BBC service creates with 
the negative impact it has on the market. Only when the positive public value created 
outweighed the negative impact on the market should the service be provided. The 
test thus proposed the rationale of net public value to justify PSB service provision, 
which due to the corporation’s public funding represents an intervention into 
broadcasting markets.  
The BBC’s application of the notion during Charter Review was clearly of 
instrumental nature, as pointed out by several critics. Oakley et al. concur with 
Crabtree (2004) that the BBC used public value as “a soft soap rationale with little 
explanatory power” (Oakley et al., 2006, p. 7). Public value is viewed as a flawed 
concept which is used as a rhetorical device, an “overarching narrative”, rather than 
as a genuinely new way of recasting BBC operations and audience relationships. 
Elstein concluded that “[f]or all its high-flown language, pledges of reformation and 
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lofty ambition, “Building Public Value” is at best a detour and at worst an obstacle 
on the journey to understanding how PSB might make sense in the digital age” 
(2004, p. 15). 
Others, such as Collins, focus less on the notion’s instrumental use and 
more on its origin in public management theory (Moore, 1995). He states that even 
though the BBC’s application represents the first explicit UK engagement of public 
value doctrine, the concept is applied as a ‘quasi-regulatory’ principle while the term 
is used in its loose and literal sense of something valued by the public, rather than 
according to its public management origins (2006a, pp. 13, 56, 2007a, pp. 171-184, 
2007b, p. 67).  
The thesis builds on these considerations of the notion’s instrumental use 
and its public value management origin but goes beyond them by focussing on its 
role in regulation and the ideological justification of PSB.  
The public value development seems to indicate that the concept’s 
application was more than a mere discursive public relations strategy devised for 
Charter review. Rather, it seems to be a deliberately and strategically crafted guiding 
or legitimising rationale for PSB provision that was intended to inform the 
justification of PSB in the new Charter – as it eventually did. The concept entered the 
regulatory practice of PSB provision with the inclusion in the BBC’s Royal Charter 
(DCMS, 2006b) and Framework Agreement (DCMS, 2006). Subsequently, it spread 
more widely in the PSB context. Channel 4 (C4) used it in its strategy review ‘Next 
on 4’ (2008b) and in the following years applied it as a public impact assessment 
(PIA) (C4, 2009a, 2010a) which had originally been called public value assessment.  
Further, the notion spread outside of the UK to the European Commission. 
A so-called ex-ante test, which is based on the BBC’s PVT, was included in the 
revised Communication on State Aid for PSB (European Commission, 2009). 
Something similar to the PVT now has to be applied by all European member states 
for certain decisions on PSB service provision. While it is important to point to this 
wider diffusion of the notion, the study however only concerns the notion’s 
introduction and institutionalisation in the UK, thus excluding the later adoption of 
the concept in the EU. 
This wider diffusion shows that the public value notion was a successful 
Charter review strategy for the BBC. The notion’s wider adoption and most 
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importantly its inclusion in the Royal Charter indicate that some type or form of 
policy change has taken place. The interesting question which arises from this is why 
this change has taken place and what kind of change it was. Was the change 
fundamental or was it in the end only a well crafted publicity strategy that seemed to 
change much but in the end did not provide anything new? 
The research assumption is that some kind of change took place that goes 
beyond a mere PR strategy. This view is based not only on the notion becoming a 
statutory concept through its inclusion in the BBC’s Royal Charter. Most 
importantly, the relevance of this development becomes evident when the concept is 
considered in the context of regulatory PSB justification and the use of different 
economic and non-economic ideological rationales.  
The term ideology
1
 is here used to refer to different academic disciplines 
such as economic and non-economic approaches that provide rationales to justify 
regulatory intervention.
 
Regulation
2
, as a type of public policy, here concerns the 
intervention into markets by providing the provision of public services in the form of 
PSB. Different academic disciplines and corresponding rationales provide different 
approaches to regulation that justify public service provision and market 
intervention.  
The concept of market failure is for example an economic rationale that 
applied widely for analogue PSB provision (see chapter 2 for a detailed analysis). In 
the switch from analogue to digital service provision, changes however occurred to 
the applicability of market failure rationales, which were reduced considerably (see 
chapter 2). These technologically induced changes to market failure justification of 
PSB can be seen as a threat to the scale and scope of traditional PSB, as the 
justification derived from the remaining market failures can be used to argue for a 
reduced scope of PSB. The few remaining applicable market failures made it difficult 
to justify not only the sustained provision of the traditional scale of PSB but also the 
expansion of PSB provision into new digital services. 
When the emergence of the public value notion is considered in this light, 
it seems as if the concept functioned as a policy idea and rationale to respond to 
                                                 
1
 See Thomson, 1990; van Dijk, 1998 on a history of ideology and its diverse uses and understandings 
from Carson et al., 2009, p. 15.  
2
 For definitions on regulation see Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 2; Selznick, 1985, p. 363 cited from 
Ogus, 2004, p. 1; Black, 2002, p. 26; Mitnick, 1980, p. 2.  
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market failure turning from a legitimising to a de-legitimising rationale in the 
technological shift from analogue to digital broadcasting. This development 
resembles an externally induced crisis which created the need and the opportunity to 
devise a new, alternative rationale.  
A central question which arises from this is whether the concept was 
indeed devised and introduced as a strategic policy idea to challenge market failure 
as the dominant ideology in PSB justification. This consequentially raises a further 
question of how exactly the concepts of market failure and public value differ from 
each other. 
Central to these questions is the dichotomy of economic and non-economic 
ideologies as two key theoretical and empirical concepts that run through this study 
and define its research interest. Here, academic disciplines are grouped into these 
two categories of economic and non-economic approaches, with the latter comprising 
disciplines such as politics, sociology, cultural studies, and law. This binary grouping 
is done deliberately to reflect commonalities and differences between these 
disciplines.  
In general and from a theoretical idealised point of view, it can be said that 
economic regulatory rationales, such as market failure, focus on markets and 
individuals as consumers while non-economic regulatory rationales, such as public 
value, focus on benefits to society and individuals as citizens. Similarly, these two 
approaches differ regarding the scale and scope of PSB intervention they justify. As 
rationales, they serve as normative and ideological frameworks or frames politicians, 
public officials, and institutions adopt to inform decision-making, perceive of policy 
problems, and devise solutions (Radaelli, 1995, p. 168; Surel, 2009, pp. 30, 33, 39).  
This rather clear cut, simplistic and idealised distinction between economic 
and non-economic ideologies is made here to introduce them as two opposing ends 
on a spectrum of theoretical approaches to regulation and as the central research 
perspective from which the public value notion is approached. A more critical and 
nuanced perspective is given in chapters 2 and 3, which qualifies this simplistic view 
by showing that bridging concepts exist between these two approaches and that they 
are used much more loosely and incoherently in policy practice than in theory.  
Still, it is important to show that economic and non-economic rationales 
differ fundamentally in terms of their theoretical origins and objectives, tools as well 
16 
 
as understandings of individuals as consumers and citizens in theory and applied 
regulation. Market failure, as a theoretical concept from economic regulatory theory, 
focuses on the efficiency of markets and consumer benefits, while non-economic 
rationales, such a public value or public interest, focus on the wider benefit to society 
and citizens. 
The central research interest of the thesis concerns the investigation of the 
public value development in this wider context of ideological PSB justification.  
This is of particular interest as the notion was introduced at a time when 
(media) policy-making and regulation tended to be ideologically more favourable of 
or biased towards economic neo-liberal rationales than non-economic approaches 
(Born, 2008, 2004; Freedman, 2005, 2008a; Leys, 2001). While non-economic 
considerations have always had a prominent standing in PSB policy, in the 1980s and 
1990s they seem to come secondary to economic considerations in informing 
regulation. This raises the question why and how the policy idea of the public value 
notion found wider acceptance in PSB policy. 
In this context, the emergence of the public value notion is an interesting 
ideological development that raises the question whether it represents a change in the 
dominant ideology that informs PSB policy, from a more economic, market- and 
consumer-focused perspective of the 1990s towards wider societal and citizen 
considerations in the early 2000s. 
In order to better understand the ideological background of the public 
value notion, the next section briefly reviews the notion’s origin in public 
management theory before a more direct connection is established between 
ideological shifts in media policy
3
 and policy paradigms. 
 
 
1.2 Public Value Management in Public Administration Theory 
 
Public value management (PVM) was introduced by US scholar Moore in 
his seminal book ‘Creating Public Value - Strategic Management in Government’ 
(1995). The approach postulates that public value creation should be the main 
objective of public managers, analogue to shareholder value maximization in the 
                                                 
3
 For a definition of media policy see Freedman, 2008b, pp. 1, 11. 
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private sector (Moore, 1995, p. 28). PVM was developed as a critique of and reaction 
to the previous public service approach New Public Management (NPM), which 
dominated since the 1980s and had in turn emerged as a response to shortcomings of 
its predecessor Old Public Administration (OPA).  
OPA was characterised through a bureaucratic and paternalistic model of 
top-down service provision in the form of command and control (Stoker, 2006, pp. 
43-45), executed by public officials supposed to act in the public interest. In reality, 
public organisations however tended to be dominated by the interests of public 
servants and providers (Stoker, 2006, p. 45). 
As a post-bureaucratic approach, NPM critiqued the inefficiencies of OPA 
by taking a market-orientated approach that argued for increased consumer choice 
and the application of private sector management to operational targets like 
efficiency and cost reduction (Stocker, 2006, pp. 42, 45; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000, 
pp. 549-551; O’Flynn, 2007, pp. 354-356; Talbot, 2009, p. 168; Bozeman, 2007, p. 
69; Alford & Hughes, 2008, p. 134).  
This in turn lead to NPM being criticized for pursuing economic targets at 
the expense of democratic processes and broader notions of public value with 
adverse effects on increased bureaucracy, accountability, and institutional 
complexity (Blaug et al., 2006a, pp. 6, 16; O‘Flynn, 2007, pp. 358, 363; Stewart, 
2004, p. 16). Viewing individuals as customers rather than citizens raised concerns 
that market transaction-like conditions imposed on this relationship could cause 
depolitisation and consumerisation (Needham, 2003; Dunleavy et al., 2006, p. 467).  
PVM therefore emerged as an alternative to incumbent NPM approaches. 
PVM focuses on public value creation for and together with the public through 
processes of deliberation and co-production. The determination, authorization, and 
evaluation of collective or public values through public deliberation and co-
production creates accountability and legitimacy which is responsive to social 
changes and reduces hierarchical top down decision-making of previous approaches 
(Stoker, 2006, pp. 41, 47; O’Flynn, 2007, p. 361; Hills & Sullivan, 2006, pp. 9, 11, 
21; Davis & West, 2009, p. 604 and van der Wal & van Hout, 2009 on public 
values).  
As PVM is developed in and relative to the circumstance of its task 
environment (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009, p. 176), it is a contested concept (Benington, 
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2009, pp. 235, 238-240) for which the public values defined through deliberation and 
co-production differ according to policy and industry. Deliberative processes also 
function as means of judging outcome-based performance, which represents a shift 
away from input and output measures, processes and aggregation scores that were 
typical of NPM regimes (Stoker, 2006, pp. 47, 52; Needham, 2003, pp. 36, 38, 39; 
Hills & Sullivan, 2006, pp. 13, 11).  
These operational elements are summarised in a “strategic triangle” which 
includes 1) public value as the overall mission, 2) support and legitimacy, and 3) 
operational capabilities (Moore, 1995, pp. 70-71; Moore & Khagram, 2004, pp. 2-3; 
Alford & O’Flynn, 2009, p. 173).  
While not dismissing either but rather integrating both, a central 
characteristic of PVM is the re-emphasis of citizen representation over consumer and 
NPM objectives. This stands in contrast to the strong consumer focus of the previous 
NPM approach. Based on the pursuit of the twin goals of democracy and efficiency, 
Collins states that “a hard characterization of public value theory might describe it as 
NPM plus co-production” (2007b, pp. 7-8). 
As a post-bureaucratic and post-competitive approach, PVM critiques the 
narrow utilitarian microeconomic assumptions of NPM and its lack of adequately 
addressing collective preferences (Stoker, 2006, p. 42; O’Flynn, 2007, p. 360). In 
contrast to its predecessors OPA and NPM, PVM provides a more holistic way of 
addressing public service goals as well as qualitative and quantitative performance.  
PVM can be understood as a hybrid approach that transcends normative 
concepts such as the public interest by addressing both the normative and the 
operational levels of defining, implementing, and assessing economic and non-
economic objectives, the latter through means of deliberative democracy (Knoll, 
2008). While the public interest concept can be understood as an ideal or starting 
point for deliberation, the public value approach facilitates the move from 
deliberation to action (Bozeman, 2007, pp. 14, 132; Alford & O’Flynn, 2009, pp. 
175-176). Public value creation takes place not only through the achievement of 
outcome but also through participatory, deliberative processes which address the 
definition, provision, and evaluation of public services. Based on this understanding, 
public service provision is not purely a reaction to market failure but much more a 
proactive search for and creation of public value. 
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Table 1.1: Comparison of Public Management Approaches
4
 
 
Features OPA NPM PVM 
Characterisation  Bureaucratic Post-bureaucratic, 
competitive  
Post-competitive 
Dominant focus Rules Results Relationships 
Managerial goals Respond to direction 
from politicians and 
follow rules and 
procedures 
Achieve agreed 
performance targets 
Multiple goals: 
responding to citizen/user 
preference, renew 
mandate and trust 
Public interest 
definition 
Paternalistic 
(politicians, experts) 
Aggregation of 
individual preferences 
(consumer choice) 
Individual and public 
preferences (public 
deliberation) 
Performance 
objectives 
Politically provided 
inputs, services 
monitored through 
bureaucratic oversight  
Management of inputs 
and outputs to ensure 
economy and 
responsiveness to 
consumer 
Multiple objectives: 
service outputs, 
satisfaction, outcomes, 
trust, legitimacy 
Dominant model 
of accountability 
Upward accountability 
(departments to 
politicians to 
parliament) 
Upward accountability 
via performance 
contracts; outward to 
customer via market 
mechanism 
Multiple accountability 
systems: citizens as 
government overseers, 
customers as users, 
taxpayers as funders 
Public 
participation  
Limited to voting in 
elections and pressure 
on elected 
representatives 
Limited – apart from use 
of customer satisfaction 
surveys 
Crucial – multi-faceted 
(customer, citizen, key 
stakeholders) 
Preferred 
delivery system 
Hierarchical department 
or self-regulating 
profession 
Private sector or tightly 
defined arms-length 
public agency 
Alternatives selected: 
public sector agencies, 
private companies, JVs, 
community interest 
companies 
 
Regarding the research interest of the thesis, the notion’s original 
conceptualisation in public management theory indicates that the application of the 
public value concept in PSB policy – while representing both economic and non-
economic rationales – puts more emphasis on citizen objectives, setting them above 
(or at par with) consumer representations.  
This focus on non-economic rationales would stand in contrast to previous 
economic consumer- and market-focused approaches of the 1980s/90s. This raises 
the research question of whether the public value development represents a shift in 
the dominance from economic to non-economic rationales in PSB justification. 
                                                 
4
 Adapted from Kelly et al., 2002; O‘Flynn, 2007; Stocker, 2006, 2003. 
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The policy change that has taken place with the institutionalisation of the 
public value notion in the BBC’s Charter and wider PSB practice therefore needs to 
be investigated with regard to the use of different economic and non-economic 
rationales in the justification of PSB provision. Broadly, this change can be described 
as a shift from correcting market failures to providing public value as an alternative 
rationale for PSB intervention. 
In investigations of policy change, processes of ideological shifts are 
addressed by concepts such as policy paradigms and paradigm shifts. The next 
section therefore takes a closer look at studies of paradigm shifts in media (1.3) and 
public policy (1.4). 
 
 
1.3 Ideological Shifts and Media Policy Paradigms 
 
In policy studies, fundamental shifts in ideologies that inform policy-
making are addressed through the concept of a paradigm shift. As the review in the 
next section shows, a paradigm shift is defined as a specific type of policy change 
that concerns the ideological level of policy-making – or more precisely, the 
underlying ideologies that inform policy-making in the form of policy goals, the 
perceived policy problems, and corresponding solutions.  
As addressed before, the term ideology is defined and used to represent 
different academic disciplines which are grouped into two categories of economic 
and non-economic approaches. The analysis focuses on the different regulatory 
rationales of these disciplines that are used to justify regulatory intervention. 
Generally, it can be said that market failure represents an economic rationale, while 
public value is seen as a non-economic rationale for intervention.  
The concepts of policy paradigms and paradigm shifts have also been used 
in studies of ideological changes in media policy by Van Cuilenburg and McQuail 
(2003), Jakubowicz (2011), and Pickard (2010).  
In a recent article, Jakubowicz (2011) addresses the interrelationship 
between ideologies, public policy and PSB by referring, amongst others, to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The following quote reflects the 
theoretical and practical relevance of media policy paradigms: “As indicated by the 
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Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: A debate about public service 
broadcasting (PSB) is in reality a debate about the philosophical, ideological and 
cultural underpinnings of society and about the role of the State and the public sector 
in meeting the needs of individuals and society as a whole (Parliamentary Assembly 
2004: 10)
5
. This is well illustrated by the evolution of media policy paradigms (from 
the phase of emerging communication industry policy, to that of public service media 
policy, and, finally, to a new communication policy approach), prompted by shifts in 
the balance of component political, social, and economic values that shape the 
definition of the public interest that the media are normatively expected to serve (van 
Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003)” (Jakubowicz, 2011, p. 210).  
Similarly, Pickard (2010) investigates the origins, ideological shifts and 
implications of media policy paradigms in the post war period in the United States by 
focussing on paradigmatic clashes and struggles between “social-democratic” and 
“libertarian” approaches to media regulation (pp. 174, 177). This ideological 
distinction corresponds to the one made here between economic and non-economic 
ideologies. 
Of most interest and relevance for this study is the work of van Cuilenburg 
and McQuail (2003), who investigate different media policy paradigms of the 20
th
 
century for Western Europe and the US. They distinguish between three phases of 
media policy paradigms according to the importance ascribed to different ideologies 
in informing policy-making. With regard to ideologies, they develop a tripartite 
division of the public interest into political, social, and economic welfare (ibid., p. 
184). These underlying ideologies are represented as component values that inform 
policy paradigms (ibid., p. 201). Those values which are more dominant in informing 
policy making (than other values) inform the overall paradigm.  
Van Cuilenburg and McQuail’s (2003) first identified paradigm of an 
emerging communications industry lasted until 1945 and was informed through 
national strategic and technological interests. It was succeeded by the post-war 
paradigm of public service media policy which lasted until the 1970s and was 
ideologically informed by socio-political objectives, with PSB being at its height. 
The third and emerging paradigm commenced in the 1980s and is characterised 
                                                 
5
 Parliamentary Assembly (2004). Public Service Broadcasting, Doc. 10029. Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc04/EDOC10029.htm. 
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through the primacy of economic and technological rationales, supplemented by 
socio-cultural and communications values.  
While van Cuilenburg and McQuail defined these three phases to reflect 
wider meta-developments in the EU, this succession of phases is also evident in UK 
media policy (see chapter 5). In the UK, the rather protective approach of the dual 
public-private broadcasting model that dominated until the late 1970s has in the 
1980s been succeeded by a neo-liberal focus on market competition and deregulation 
under the Thatcher government, which continued throughout the 1990s. The 
deregulatory approach under Thatcher coincided with new technologies such as cable 
and satellite distribution that allowed increased channels and consumer choice. With 
this service proliferation, the consumer and market perspective was favoured over 
more traditional socio-political and societal objectives that had dominated until the 
end of the 1970s. This change in dominant ideology from the 1960s/70s to the 
1980s/90s resembles the change from the second to the third phase described by van 
Cuilenburg and McQuail.  
In this context of the third, predominantly economic paradigm informed by 
consumer objectives, market failure rationales and NPM approaches, the emergence 
of the public value notion seems to indicate a shift to non-economic citizen and 
wider societal objectives. The question then arises, whether the policy change that 
has take place with the institutionalisation of the public value notion, represents a 
fundamental paradigmatic shift in ideology. 
As paradigm shifts indicate a fundamental or high degree of policy change, 
it is of general and specific interest for the policy area concerned to investigate such 
processes in detail. The central objective of such studies is to better understand these 
processes and in particular the distinction between policy changes and paradigm 
shifts, as the higher degree of change of the latter has a fundamental impact on policy 
outcomes and thus overall society.  
The concept of a paradigm shift describes these changes in the relative 
importance of different ideologies in policy-making, i.e. economic, political, social, 
cultural approaches. In the context of media policy, these phases represent media 
policy paradigms.  
It is important to emphasise that policy paradigms consist of a range of 
different types of component values. No such thing as a pure ideological paradigm 
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exists. Rather, the classification given to a paradigm describes the type of values 
which are dominant in the overall hierarchy of values that inform policy-making over 
a certain period of time. Based on this understanding, paradigm shifts are 
consequentially shifts in the hierarchy of component values. As will be shown in the 
next section 1.4, this is also the general understanding of paradigms and paradigm 
shifts in public policy studies.  
 Another aspect which should briefly be addressed is that the 
understanding of paradigms represents policy practice or more precisely policy 
decision-making which has a direct impact on policy outcomes. Purely discursive 
changes in policy debate that do not translate into policy outcomes are not defined as 
paradigm shifts.  
It can be summarised that the concept of media policy paradigms is a 
particularly suitable analytical framework to investigate the apparent ideological shift 
associated with the public value notion in UK PSB policy. Before taking a closer 
look at studies of paradigm shifts in policy analysis, some limitations of existing 
media policy paradigm studies should be addressed briefly.  
While the three studies reviewed above consistently define media policy 
paradigms as being composed of different ideologies in the form of ideological 
component values, they do provide only little clarification on when exactly a 
paradigm shift has taken place. No definition is given of how a paradigm shift can be 
identified aside from the rather general statement that paradigm shifts are shifts in 
ideology. Van Cuilenburg and McQuail provide some further information as they 
address changes in the hierarchy of component values.  
Beyond these views, the development of media policy paradigms as an 
analytical concept however remains rather limited. These shortcomings provide the 
opportunity to develop a clearer understanding of paradigms and paradigm shifts, 
their composition and how they come about for the specific context of media policy. 
These are central objectives of this research.  
While pointing to these shortcomings, it also needs to be acknowledged 
that such a lack of detail may be related to the complexity of policy changes and 
paradigm shifts. As multidimensional processes they need to be abstracted to some 
degree when studied to deal with large amounts of data. Finding the right balance 
between abstraction and complexity while avoiding the risk of reductionism 
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represents a central challenge of such investigations (Capano & Howlett, 2009, p. 4; 
Capano, 2009, p. 14).  
In van Cuilenburg and McQuail’s (2003) case, another point of critique 
and also possible reason for a high degree of abstraction is their rather broad 
approach to study paradigm shifts for both Western Europe and the US. As media 
systems, they are considerably different which raises further questions about whether 
the three phases are indeed accurate and applicable across different countries and 
media types. Care therefore needs to be taken when the classification is applied to a 
specific media context. For the UK, these three phases do generally reflect the 
overall developments in PSB and media policy (see chapter 5). In addition, the 
previous review of public administration approaches also supports the ideological 
phases outlined by van Cuilenburg and McQuail. In this context, the application of 
the public value notion in contemporary PSB policy – given its origin as a successor 
of NPM approaches in public administration theory – supports the indication of an 
ideological shift. The evolution of media policy paradigms is addressed in more 
detail in chapter 5.  
Despite these shortcomings, it can be summarised that the paradigm notion 
as well as van Cuilenburg and McQuail’s (2003) phases of media policy paradigms 
provide useful conceptual tools to study the policy change process associated with 
the public value notion in UK PSB. A central objective of this study is to address 
existing shortcoming by improving the understanding and analysis of media policy 
paradigms.  
The next section reviews paradigm shift studies in public policy analysis to 
gain insights on the use of the paradigm concept as an analytical framework. The 
thesis is theoretically positioned in the context of both media policy and policy 
analysis, thus taking an industry-focused approach to policy and paradigm shift 
analysis. 
 
 
1.4 Paradigm Shifts as Fundamental Changes in Policy  
 
The research interest concerns the emergence and institutionalisation of the 
public value notion in the context of contemporary PSB policy. As such, the study 
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addresses the wider field of policy process analysis. Here, it concentrates on the use 
of policy ideas and ideologies in policy change and paradigm shift process, in 
particular how they take place and how they can be classified or identified.  
The latter aspect of classifying policy change addresses paradigm shifts as 
a specific type of fundamental policy change. The public value notion is viewed as a 
policy idea that was introduced to facilitate such a policy change. The interest of the 
study focuses in particular on the use of different economic and non-economic 
ideologies in policy change and paradigm shift processes to investigate whether a 
paradigm shift has taken place.  
The focus of the thesis and the review below are limited to the use of the 
paradigm notion in policy-making and in investigations of paradigm shifts as a 
specific type of fundamental policy change. Kuhn’s seminal work on paradigm shifts 
in the history of science (1962, 1970) is thus addressed only indirectly regarding its 
influence on policy studies.  
To date, the central work is that of Hall (1993) who devised a three-tiered 
classification framework of policy change and paradigm shifts. As later shown in 
section 1.5, Hall’s classification provides the core of the analytical framework 
developed for this study.  
Central studies on policy paradigm shifts, which are reviewed below, 
include those of Jenson (1989), Hall (1993), Coleman et al. (1996) and Carson (2008, 
et al. 2009). While focussing on slightly different aspects of the change process, it 
can generally be said that all studies share the view of paradigm shifts being defined 
as fundamental changes in the overarching ideology that informs policy-making. The 
studies differ however regarding the attention they devote to the classification of 
paradigm shifts. 
As one of the earlier studies of policy paradigms, Jenson (1989) 
investigates state policies regulating women’s behaviour in France and the US before 
1914 and how particular identities were embedded in societal paradigms that 
followed from the institutionalisation of new social relations.  
A societal paradigm is here viewed as a “meaning system as well as a set 
of practices” which, if shared widely, is described as a hegemonic paradigm (Jenson, 
1989, p. 239). As long as a hegemonic societal paradigm exists, competing identities 
make little headway. If contradictions however intensify in the context of new 
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emerging conditions and a period of crisis, competing identities, which make better 
sense of the new situation, may be adopted as a new paradigm (ibid.). Central to this 
view is that paradigms, as meaning systems around which actors constitute collective 
identities, are “a crucial analytic focus for understanding stability and change” (ibid., 
p. 237) in policy processes. 
Jenson thus addresses change and stability between paradigms; why 
hegemonic paradigms may not offer guidance anymore in periods of crises and may 
consequentially be replaced by emerging new paradigms. One aspect the study does 
however not clarify is how a paradigm shift can be identified in the context of policy 
change, i.e. at what point exactly policy change represents a paradigm shift. 
As this question of the fundamentality of policy change is central to this 
research, the seminal study of Hall (1993) is of particular interest for understanding 
and classifying processes of policy change and paradigm shifts. 
Hall investigates social learning and the role of policy ideas in policy 
change on the empirical setting of the ideological shift in British macroeconomic 
policy-making from Keynsianism to Monetarism between 1970 and 1989. With 
regard to investigating and understanding different degrees of policy change, he 
develops a tripartite classification of first, second and third order change as “three 
distinct kinds of change” to distinguish between normal processes of policy change 
and paradigm shifts (ibid., p. 278).  
Hall views policy-making as a process which involves three central 
variables – instrument settings, instruments themselves and overarching 
ideas/ideologies/goals (ibid., p. 278). First order change in the levels or settings of 
instruments and second order change in the instruments themselves are described as 
“normal policymaking” or processes that adjusts policy without challenging the 
overall hierarchy of goals behind a given policy paradigm. Third order change in the 
form of a radical or wholesale change in overarching ideology and hierarchy of goals 
is classified as a paradigm shift (ibid., pp. 278, 281-283). Third order change, which 
occurs relatively rarely, entails simultaneous change in all three components (ibid., p. 
279).  
Hall uses the notion of a policy paradigm as a conceptual framework to 
understand degrees of policy change. Keynsianism and Monetarism were two 
economic ideologies and distinct paradigms (at that historical point) with different 
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policy prescriptions based on fundamentally different conceptions of how the 
economy worked. When one replaced the other, Hall found, there was a radical shift 
in the hierarchy of goals guiding policy, the instruments relied on to effect policy, 
and the settings of those instruments. This was accompanied by substantial changes 
in the discourse and analysis employed by policy-makers (ibid., pp. 284, 279).  
Without denying the impact of material interests in the policy process 
(ibid., p. 292), Hall emphasises the role of ideas in policy-making, stating that 
policy-makers customarily work within a framework of ideas that specifies the nature 
of the problem, the policy goals, instruments and terminology. He calls this 
interpretive framework a policy paradigm (ibid., p. 279).  
Regarding the movement or process between the different orders of 
change, Hall describes first order change as incremental and second order change as 
strategic action (ibid., pp. 279-280). These do however not automatically lead to 
third order change in form of a paradigm shift, which is much more political and 
complex in nature (ibid.).  
According to Hall, a third order policy change process leading to a 
paradigm shift is initiated by a series of new economic developments that proved 
anomalous with the terms of the prevailing paradigm. These anomalies threaten and 
discredit the existing paradigm which neither fully anticipates nor explains them. 
This leads to policy failures and incoherencies which prompts a search for 
alternatives along with experimentation and modification of policy. Such conditions 
create the opportunity for an alternative paradigm to be introduced and supported in 
the policy arena to become the new paradigm once it is institutionalised (ibid., pp. 
284-287, 291).  
By disaggregating the process of policy change into three sub-types and 
invoking the concept of policy paradigms, Hall has shown that then dominant state-
centric theories that associated social learning with the autonomy of the state needed 
to be extended to reflect that policy changed not only as a result of autonomous 
action by the state and civil servants or policy experts but also through politicians, 
the media and wider societal public debate (ibid., pp. 287-288).  
The principal contribution of a social learning perspective is to draw 
attention to the role of ideas in politics as pressures or material interests are not 
sufficient to describe such processes alone (ibid., p. 289). Hall’s article contributes “a 
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specific argument about the way in which ideas condition policymaking and how 
they change, organized around the concept of "policy paradigms"” (ibid., p. 290).  
The paradigm shift process described by Hall is similar to that of Jenson, 
regarding the occurrence of anomalies that challenge and eventually lead to the 
replacement of the existing paradigm. With its three orders of change, Hall however 
provides a more sophisticated classification that can be applied as an analytical 
framework to investigate the fundamentality of policy change processes.  
Most of the studies published after Hall have applied or built on his 
approach by modifying, adding to or criticising it. None of these studies has however 
provided a more useful approach than Hall’s three orders of change to classify 
paradigm shifts. Carson et al. (2009, p. 18) for example state that relatively little has 
been done to elaborate the paradigm concept beyond Hall‘s adaptation. In general it 
can be said that most studies analyse the complex policy change processes, often 
focussing on different variables, while not paying much attention to the question of 
when exactly a policy change process becomes a paradigm shift. Hall’s three-partite 
classification has persisted over the years as the dominant framework, or “the current 
orthodoxy”, as Howlett and Cashore (2009, p. 36) put it.  
More recent studies, like those of Oliver and Pemberton (2004) and 
Coleman et al. (1996) for example, address the temporal nature of the policy change 
process. They question whether paradigm shifts are revolutionary, as described by 
Hall and Kuhn, or rather evolutionary and incremental in nature (also Schmidt, 2011, 
p. 108). Oliver and Pemberton (2004) find that Hall’s case study is more 
evolutionary than its revolutionary typology of change allows (p. 435).  
Coleman et al. (1996) also conclude that the nature of paradigm shifts does 
not have to be revolutionary, as proposed by Kuhn and Hall, but that it can also take 
an evolutionary pattern (p. 273). Investigated on the cases of agricultural policy 
change in three countries, Coleman et al. see change leading up to paradigm shifts as 
being negotiated between state actors and group representatives. As the debate is 
largely confined to sectoral policy or corporatist networks as relatively closed policy 
communities, the results is a more managed series of policy changes that culminates 
in a paradigm shift in an evolutionary fashion. Similar to the previous studies, a 
change in the policy paradigm is defined as “a fundamental shift in the basic 
principles governing public policies” (ibid., p. 297). 
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While Coleman et al. assume a similar accumulation of first and second 
order change as Hall, they view the transition as much more gradual and without the 
requirement that significant institutional change precedes policy change (ibid., p. 
274). They conclude that the pattern of change, revolutionary/radical or 
evolutionary/incremental, depends on the type of policy and whether it is dominated 
by a pressure pluralist, state-directed (Hall) or corporatist policy network (ibid., p. 
288).  
In another study, Lida (2004) proposes paradigm theory as a think tool for 
policy-making (p., 17). A policy paradigm is referred to as the paradigm prevailing 
in the policy space in which policy-makers contemplate choices of policy 
instruments required to achieve certain policy objectives (ibid., p. 18). 
Lida distinguishes between major and minor paradigm change. A major 
change is a shift from one paradigm to another that takes place through change in the 
determinants of the paradigm, such as values, market forces, political events, 
technological innovations (ibid., p. 20). In contrast, a minor paradigm only changes 
with the passage of time. It is a historic stage of the paradigm change in the form of a 
transformation of important content of the major paradigm (ibid., p. 21). 
Further relevant studies are those of Carson (2008) and Carson et al. 
(2009). Carson (2008) defines a policy paradigm as „a cognitive-normative concept 
that permits the analysis of distinctly different, sometimes incommensurable ways of 
conceptualising the issues, problems, interests, goals, and remedies involved in 
policymaking” (p. 171).  
As a conceptual model shared by a particular community of actors, Carson 
views a policy paradigm as a socially constructed, idealized, relatively coherent 
complex of assumptions and principles upon which (institutional) rules are built, 
while the institutional rule system represents a compromised and often not fully 
implemented version of the idealized paradigm (ibid., pp. 173, 176). 
In his understanding of paradigms, he stresses the social context in which 
policy-making is embedded and in turn influenced by. The important point here is 
that cognitive-ideational factors such as those embodied in policy paradigms are a 
type of cultural phenomena (ibid., pp. 172, 180).  
Carson further distinguishes between discourse and institutionalisation of 
policy paradigms. As socio-cognitive models and shared cognitive-normative spaces 
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(ibid., pp. 176, 179-180), policy paradigms are expressed in discourses “that rely on 
conceptual categories such as ‘public problems’, distribution of ‘expert authority’, 
distribution of ‘policy authority and responsibility’, and ‘appropriate solutions’. 
Taken as a whole, they constitute the conceptual framework of a given policy 
paradigm. When institutionalized, the discourses translate into laws and written rules 
and other materials that define the location and other aspects of formal rule making 
authority, and set(s) of institutional practice or strategies for dealing with specific 
types of problems” (ibid., p. 178).  
Regarding the emergence of a new policy paradigm, Carson identifies 
three types of processes that often combined contribute to paradigm shifts: (1) crisis 
and reaction, where problems develop into crisis; (2) conversion and consolidation, 
where policy-making elites bring about incremental conversion of guiding principles 
and assumptions over time; and (3) persuasion, where a new paradigm is established 
through lobbying and framing issues in normative terms and as relevant and 
important (ibid., pp. 184-185). Replacement of an old with a new paradigm may also 
come as governing elites embrace a new paradigm or elites and paradigms are 
replaced at the same time (ibid., p. 186 refers to Burns & Carson, 2002). 
He concludes that, as a complex process, paradigm change is the result of 
an “untold number of incremental decisions” of which some are clearly path 
breaking and may have large consequences (ibid., p. 186). This “frequently-
incremental nature of paradigm shifts contributes to the difficulty of assessing just 
when it is possible to determine that an established paradigm has been replaced by its 
challenger“ (ibid.).  
In a later study, Carson et al. (2009) investigate public policy paradigms, 
within which policy ideas are embedded and on the basis of which policies are 
framed, articulated, and implemented. They view ideology as a very general level of 
a belief system while policy paradigms are the analytical level of policy-making 
(ibid., pp. 15-16). 
By investigating changes in EU policy, they aim to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical and empirical treatment of policy paradigms by 
considering their architecture, their role in framing and organizing action, and their 
transformation (ibid., p. 5). They focus in particular on the role of ideas (ibid., pp. 
19-20) formulated by actors to influence policy-making and the conditions under 
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which actors manage or fail to exercise their influence. The “policy paradigm 
concept has emerged over the past decade and a half as a useful tool for analyzing 
and comprehending the interactions between ideas, institutions, and organized actors 
engaged in political and administrative processes” (ibid., pp. 11-12). 
Carson et al. view policy paradigms as conceptual structures which frame 
and constrain public issues and problems that policy-makers are likely to consider 
and select (ibid., p. 6). As paradigms are idealized rule systems, models or blueprints 
for institutional design as well as compromised operative paradigms of these 
idealized models when they are translated into practice, Carson et al. suggest that 
paradigms should be investigated as ideas and as concrete practices (ibid., pp. 380-
381, 142). Shifts in the paradigm blueprint and the operational paradigm are seen to 
be analytically and sometime also empirically distinct as they can happen at separate 
points in time (ibid., p. 401). 
The paradigm shift itself is defined in the reconfiguration of core 
constitutional principles that guide policy, such as goals (problems, solutions), 
organisational arrangements, actors, or values (ibid., pp. 148, 167-168, 25, 378). In 
their study of EU food, chemicals, asbestos, and gender equality policy they found a 
reprioritisation from economic to social values in the form of a shift from an 
economic free market to a social, health, and environmental paradigm (ibid., pp. 359, 
375). According to their view, a reordering of core dimensions defines a paradigm 
shift, while changes in the periphery do not (ibid., p. 142). Paradigm shifts are 
described as new hierarchical rankings of already existing elements rather than the 
replacement of one paradigm by another. “Neither does a dominant paradigm destroy 
previously legitimate frames, rather it comes to constitute the reference point in 
relation to which these older structures must adapt” (Surel, 2009/ibid., pp. 42, 359). 
With regard to the question if a paradigm shift occurred, they investigate 
whether significant changes have taken place in one or more dimensions that make 
up a policy paradigm, while conclusions are more secure when several or significant 
changes have occurred (ibid., pp. 170, 379).  
Problems with this approach are that changes in a paradigm may be small 
and incremental but over time add up to a major change or that there may be 
momentary success in establishing a paradigm but no long-term endurance (ibid., p. 
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170). Incremental change makes it difficult to assess when exactly an established 
paradigm has been replaced (ibid., p. 400).  
Analytically, Carson et al. trace the process of fundamental policy change 
as it evolves from ideas and through action to become institutionalised (ibid., p. 21). 
In their study of EU policy, they operationalise the paradigm by analysing the key 
elements that constitute the paradigm which was done by “identifying how the 
different paradigms assign priority to market versus social goals, how they define 
who should participate in the processes related to policymaking, and how they define 
where, or at what level of governance the issues associated with competing goals 
should be decided” (p. 129). In a second step, they outline the “process of paradigm 
construction with consideration for the categories of actors involved, the kinds of 
problem solutions that are conceivable, and the concrete goals that are developed 
from those” (ibid.). 
They state that multiple methods are essential for analyzing paradigms and 
paradigm shifts, such as analysing discourse or statements in documents to 
investigate the architecture of paradigms as well as analysing the political process in 
which paradigm transformation takes place (ibid., p. 155). 
In comparison to the previously reviewed studies, Carson et. al’s approach 
takes a more comprehensive perspective on public policy paradigms. Studies have 
become more nuanced over the years, they generally take a more contextual view 
and agree that both radical revolutionary or incremental evolutionary change can lead 
to paradigm shifts and that a change in ideology lies at the core of a paradigm shift.  
While all studies consider different variables beyond ideology, more recent 
investigations are more exhaustive. Aside from ideology, institutions, and the speed 
of change (incremental vs. evolutionary) – which are typical variables considered in 
paradigm shift analyses – Carlson et. al (2009) for example consider actors, 
strategic/instrumental behaviour and the duration of change in their discussion. This 
more contextual perspective is reflected in their theory, which draws heavily on 
sociological neo-institutionalism (ibid., p. 21; chapter 4) and combines cognitive-
normative models, institutional analysis, and strategic interactions to reflect 
organized actors seeking both to realize their ideals and pursue their interests (ibid., 
pp. 6, 24). 
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While the different studies discuss variables in their analyses of paradigm 
shifts, they however do not directly link them to the classification of paradigm shifts. 
Those studies which address the classification of paradigm shifts refer to Hall’s 
approach, as do Howlett and Cashore (2009), who extend Hall’s classification by 
distinguishing between six instead of Hall’s three orders of policy change. Their six 
orders do however not include new variables, rather they take a more detailed look at 
Hall’s three orders of instrument settings, instruments, and goals/ideologies by 
distinguishing them into six (goals, objectives, settings, instrument logic, 
mechanisms, and calibrations) (ibid., pp. 38-39). While this study modifies Hall’s 
approach, it does not take a broader range of variables into account. 
Regarding the review of paradigm shift studies and the thesis’ focus on the 
classification of paradigm shifts, it can be summarised that while the analysis of 
paradigm shifts has continuously developed by adopting more nuanced and 
contextual perspectives, little progress has been made on adapting Hall’s 
classification. As addressed by different authors, it remains unclear when exactly the 
“tipping” (Carson et al., 2009, p. 407) or “switching points” (Schmidt, 2011, p. 110) 
are reached. This means that more work needs to be done on paradigm shift 
classification, which remains underdeveloped. 
This study certainly does not attempt to devise such a one-size-fits-all 
framework. It does however try to provide a step in this direction by extending Hall’s 
framework through including further variables as paradigm shift indicators. As such, 
the devised framework represents one possible approach to further the development 
of the classification of paradigm shifts.  
It is desirable to extend Hall’s classification as it seems insufficient to 
solely base the decision of whether a paradigm shift has taken place on the single 
variable of an ideological shift. While this remains the primary indicator, more recent 
studies have increasingly analysed paradigms in their wider policy change context. 
For example, it is questionable whether a fundamental change in ideology indicates a 
paradigm shift if however that shift does not last very long. In addition, the primary 
classification of an ideological shift remains subjective, as no commonly accepted 
understanding exists of which degree of change constitutes such a fundamental shift 
other than the generally shared view that it is a reprioritisation of core components of 
the paradigm.  
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It is therefore desirable to adapt Hall’s classification framework by 
introducing further secondary variables into the classification that can be used to 
support or undermine findings of an ideological shift. This is particularly useful 
where findings are ambiguous. A broader evidence base reduces subjectivity and 
improves the overall assessment.  
A central objective of the thesis is therefore to develop an analytical 
framework that extends Hall’s classification in order to analyse the policy change 
process associated with the public value development in UK PSB to see whether it 
represents a paradigm shift. In the framework, the central or primary indicator of a 
paradigm shift remains that of a fundamental change in ideology in the form of a 
change in the hierarchy of component values. This finding is however qualified by 
secondary evidence or indicators in the form of typical paradigm shift characteristics 
and factors that influenced the policy change process.  
In the next section, key terminologies are defined before the analytical 
classification framework is developed and the research questions are introduced. 
 
 
1.5 Definition of Key Concepts, the Analytical Framework and the 
 Research Questions 
 
As Stuart states, “Understanding why, when, and how policy does (or does 
not) change is one of the key problems of the policy sciences” (2006, p. 184). The 
public value development in UK PSB is such an instance of policy change and it is 
the objective of this study to describe, analyse and explain this policy change process 
to understand its meaning and significance of change. 
As addressed in the introductory section, the particular interest lies on 
investigating whether an ideological shift has taken place with the public value 
notion that puts more emphasis on non-economic as opposed to economic objectives. 
The analysis is approached from the perspective that the public value notion 
represents a strategic and instrumental policy idea that was introduced as a new 
rationale for public service provision. As the notion was included in the BBC’s 
Royal Charter and implemented into practice, it can be said that a policy change has 
taken place. The thesis sets out to investigate whether this policy change is a 
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fundamental change in ideology for PSB justification that would represent a 
paradigm shift.  
This is of relevance as the public value development represents a very 
interesting contemporary development in PSB justification in the shift from analogue 
to digital service provision that is embedded in a wider historical context of evolving 
media policy paradigms. As the ideological justification is directly related to the 
scope and type of PSB provision, the study is – beyond its theoretical interest – of 
wider societal and empirical relevance.  
This section briefly defines the key concepts of this study, which guide the 
analysis. These terminologies are policy idea, policy change, policy paradigm and 
paradigm shift. The concepts link the empirical object of study with the theoretical 
context of policy change analysis. The public value notion is viewed as a policy idea 
that was introduced to achieve policy change by informing policy statutes and 
practices. The investigation concerns the question of whether the policy change has 
taken the form of a paradigm shift with the public value notion representing a new 
paradigm for PSB justification.  
The literature review has shown that policy ideas and ideologies are central 
to the processes of policy change and paradigm shifts. The term policy idea is here 
used as an umbrella term to describe policy concepts or instruments which are 
introduced in policy debates but have not been institutionalised or implemented. 
Policy ideas can carry different ideologies (such as economic and non-economic 
rationales) that represent the interests and objectives of the party who introduced the 
idea. The term further suggests that the concepts proposed are not identical to those 
currently used in policy and thus have some degree of novelty. The public value 
notion is viewed as such a policy idea that was devised and introduced to convey 
certain ideological and strategic interests of the BBC as a corporate policy actor. The 
role of a policy idea as an influence factor in policy-making is addressed in more 
detail in chapter 4.  
Once a policy idea has been adopted in legislation and implemented into 
practice, one can speak of a policy change. It is important to emphasise that a mere 
discursive use of a policy idea does not count as a policy change. Policy change is 
here defined as the institutionalisation of a policy idea into policy statues and 
practices, thus impacting policy outcomes. Policy change can be of any shape or 
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form – strictly speaking any form of policy-making can be described as policy 
change. Based on this view, the inclusion of the public value notion into the BBC’s 
Charter, subsequent to its discursive introduction as a policy idea by the BBC, 
represents a policy change. Due to its institutionalisation it became a rationale 
authorised by government to make decisions on the scope of PSB provision and thus 
justification. 
In contrast to policy change, which describes an act of modification, a 
policy paradigm describes a much more static, overarching or underlying approach 
to policy-making. A policy paradigm is defined as the dominant ideology adopted to 
inform policy decision-making. More precisely, policy paradigms consist of different 
component values representing different ideologies. These component values are 
subject to an interchangeable, hierarchical order, of which those values that are 
dominant inform the paradigm’s overall ideological classification.  
In the empirical context of the public value development, the policy 
paradigm refers to the dominant ideology that informs the justification of PSB 
regarding different economic or non-economic rationales. It is investigated whether 
PSB justification based on the public value notion prioritises non-economic over 
economic rationales. In the wider context of media policy paradigms such a 
development could represent a paradigm shift from a primarily economic to a 
primarily non-economic paradigm. This is the central research interest of this study.  
Corresponding to this definition of a policy paradigm, a paradigm shift is 
defined as a fundamental change in the underlying ideology that informs policy-
making. This fundamental policy change is further defined as a reordering of the 
hierarchy of component values of a policy paradigm. This definition represents the 
generally shared definition of a paradigm shift in public policy studies, as reviewed 
above. This understanding also forms the core of the analytical framework which is 
devised for this study to classify a paradigm shift.  
The analytical framework consists of primary and secondary indicators for 
a paradigm shift classification. 
The primary indicator of a fundamental policy change or paradigm shift is 
a change in the underlying ideology in the form of a reordering of component values 
of a paradigm. This primary indicator reflects Hall’s classification framework where 
a third order change in the goals/underlying ideology is classified as a paradigm 
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shift. According to the previous definition of policy change taking place in the form 
of the institutionalisation and implementation of policy ideas, the investigation of 
whether a policy change represents a paradigm shift has to be conducted by 
analysing applied policy concepts in practice such as the implemented public value 
notion at the BBC and C4. This provides insights on the concept’s actual 
operationalisation and impact on policy outcomes.  
These findings can then be compared with the discursive definition of such 
a concept to see whether discrepancies exist between the discursive and the 
implemented form of a policy idea. This is of interest as internal contradictions or 
disconnects between words and actions (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004, p. 202) can 
negatively impact the credibility, validity, and thus wider acceptance of a policy idea. 
This is again relevant in the investigation of paradigm shifts.  
As paradigm shifts are however complicated, multilevel processes that can 
hardly be explained or classified by just drawing on one variable such as ideology, 
the analytical framework is extended to include secondary indicators in the form of 
paradigm shift process characteristics and influence factors. This wider contextual 
and procedural perspective reflects the ontological view that ideas and ideologies are 
a central but only one factor in policy change processes that should not be considered 
in isolation (see chapter 4; Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004, p. 206). 
The here adopted analytical framework therefore extends Hall’s approach 
by integrating secondary indicators to reduce subjectivity and broaden the evidence 
base for a paradigm shift classification. Secondary indicators serve to refine the 
findings of the ideological analysis.  
The secondary indicators concerns the policy change process in that they 
are typical characteristics of paradigm shift processes or influence factors that 
provide insights on explaining why this development has taken place.  
The first type of secondary indicator addresses typical paradigm shift 
characteristics. These concerns steps in paradigm shift processes, as described in the 
previous review of paradigm shift studies. Typical stages are for example a crisis of 
the existing paradigm, followed by policy failure, the introduction, debate and 
institutionalisation of a new policy idea (see Carson et al., 2009, pp. 25, 386-387 on 
paradigm shifts mechanism). Further aspects concern the tempo of such process, i.e. 
evolutionary/incremental or revolutionary/radical/novel, whereby paradigm shifts are 
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by some seen to take both forms (see Schmidt, 2011, p. 10; Capano, 2009, pp. 14-
15). Other characteristics are the duration of change, i.e. the longevity or 
perseverance after a policy change has taken place. 
As it is impossible to deductively define an exhaustive list of possible 
paradigm shift characteristics, the approach is taken to analyse the empirical policy 
process with regard to both deductive and inductive characteristics that arise out of 
the data.  
The second type of secondary indicators concerns influence factors. These 
are generally all possible factors that influence the development of the policy change 
process. As it is again impossible to define a deductive set of influence factors, the 
same combined deductive and inductive approach is adopted as before. Influence 
factors in policy-making are reviewed in detail in chapter 4. At this point they can 
roughly be distinguished into two categories; interest factors concerning the 
motivation of policy actors, and contextual factors which are wider institutional, 
cultural, and political factors that inform or constrain the interests of policy actors.  
By investigating the change process with regard to its procedural 
characteristics and influence factors, it is possible to develop a better understanding 
and explanation of the overall development. These findings are used to supplement 
the primary ideological analysis of the paradigm shift classification.  
The consideration of the historical context (Rayner, 2009, pp. 86-87), both 
short- and long-term, is of particular relevance in policy studies. The long-term 
historical context is considered by positioning the study in the wider context of 
media policy paradigms, while the short-term context is represented by this 
secondary policy process analysis.  
For analytical purposes, the process analysis is structured into three phases 
of before, at, and after the institutionalisation of the public value notion at the BBC, 
which represents the point of policy change. This segmentation is important as it 
provides a clearer structure of the policy process. It further allows to compare 
findings of the first ideological and second contextual analysis. For example, 
findings from the ideological analysis can be compared to findings of the first 
process phase, which addresses triggers of the development as well as the incumbent 
paradigm prior to the public value notion. These findings can function as an 
empirical reference point for the ideological shift analysis. The third process phase 
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addresses the post-implementation phase, which is for example of interest with 
regard to the longevity of change. The analytical framework and the corresponding 
theory are developed in more detail throughout the thesis (see chapter outline 1.6).  
It can be summarised that the analytical framework represents a more 
nuanced approach to paradigm shift classification which integrates primary 
ideological and secondary contextual process indicators. The framework directly 
informs the research questions for the investigation of whether the public value 
development represents a paradigm shift in UK PSB policy:  
 
Overall Research Question:  
 
Does the public value development in UK PSB policy represent a paradigm 
shift? 
 
Sub-questions: 
 
1. Ideological shift analysis: Does the ideological composition of the 
public value notion represent a shift in the hierarchy of component 
values from economic to non-economic rationales? 
 
2. Policy Process Analysis: Are the procedural characteristics and 
influence factors of the wider public value process indicative of a 
paradigm shift? 
 
The first research question is investigated through a detailed analysis of the 
ideological composition of the public value notion as applied at the BBC and C4. 
These findings are then discussed in the light of theoretical, primary and secondary 
evidence on the dominant paradigm in the ideological justification of PSB in the 
1990s, which functions as a reference point for the analysis of a change in the 
hierarchy of component values. This evidence is collected at various points in the 
thesis, in particular in chapters 2-3, 5, 9.  
The second research question investigates the wider policy change process 
to identify procedural characteristics and factors that influenced the overall 
40 
 
development to analyse why and how this process has taken place and whether it 
represents a typical paradigm shift process according to its characteristics.  
By integrating the findings of the first substantive-ideological and second 
procedural-contextual analyses in the concluding chapter 10, the overall research 
question can be answered as to whether the public value development represents a 
paradigm shift in the justification of UK PSB.  
Due to the qualitative and interpretative nature of the study and the rather 
contested fields of paradigm shift analysis and ideological PSB justification, the 
findings will remain to some degree subjective. A central attempt to increase 
intersubjectivity is to adopt a very transparent and detailed approach to the analysis 
that shows how research decisions were made and findings reached. The core of this 
process is the extended analytical framework, as it provides a broadened evidence 
base to inform paradigm shift classifications.  
The classification framework represents a contribution to the study of 
paradigm shifts in both media and policy studies. The study further investigates the 
role of policy ideas in facilitating policy change and paradigm shifts. It is of 
relevance to investigate such processes as they are central to stability and change in 
policy-making (Carson et al., 2009, p. 5; Coleman et al., 1996, p. 298). 
The primary focus and contribution of the thesis lies however in the field 
of media policy studies as the central interest is to improve the understanding of 
media policy paradigms and economic and non-economic rationales as different 
ideological justifications for regulatory intervention. This is of relevance as these 
concepts are frequently used in media policy and inform actual policy outcomes such 
as the scale and scope of PSB. As PSB is a central component of democratic 
societies it is of general relevance to understand how decisions about PSB service 
provision are reached.  
This is reflected in the central research interest to investigate whether the 
public value concept represents a fundamental paradigm shift or rather a temporary, 
instrumental policy change that did not have any significant impact on UK PSB 
justification and service provision.  
Finally, it is important to briefly point to the limitations of the study. While 
this rather specific public value development is more widely related to public value 
management studies, UK policy-making or other empirical contexts like the 
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concept’s application in European PSB regulation, the study is limited to the UK 
PSB context. Adjacent areas are only addressed where they are directly relevant to 
the investigation. It is further important to emphasise that the study focuses on the 
role of ideologies and ideas in policy-making. Here it is again the case that other 
policy factors are only included in the investigation where they are directly relevant 
to the analysis.  
The next section provides a chapter outline of the thesis. 
 
 
1.6 Chapter Outline 
 
The thesis consists of 10 chapters of which chapters 2-4 review theory, 
chapter 5 addresses the empirical context and chapter 6 introduces the research 
design. The empirical analysis is conducted in chapters 7-9 and a final conclusion is 
reached in chapter 10.  
Chapters 2 and 3 provide a detailed review of economic (chapter 2) and 
non-economic rationales (chapter 3), which are discussed in relation to PSB 
justification in the transition from analogue to digital distribution technologies. This 
provides theoretical evidence on the reduction of market failures in digital 
broadcasting. The different rationales are further introduced as the analytical 
categories for the ideological component analysis of the public value notion, as 
addressed in the first research question.  
Chapter 4 discusses theories on influence factors in policy-making. This 
includes public and private interest theories (motivational influence factors) and neo-
institutional approaches (contextual influence factors). Particular emphasis is put on 
sociological neo-institutionalism which addresses ideas as influence factors. To 
account for the strategic use of ideas, non-market strategy is introduced. At the end 
of chapter 4, the reviewed approaches are integrated into a theoretical framework in 
which the public value notion is considered as a policy idea, consisting of different 
economic and non-economic rationales, with the objective to achieve policy change.  
Chapter 5 introduces the empirical context by reviewing the historical 
evolution of UK PSB along three phases of media policy paradigms defined by van 
Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003). The chapter concludes by summarising the 
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contemporary developments leading up to the introduction of the public value notion 
at the BBC, which raises the research questions whether this development presents a 
new policy paradigm for the specific context of UK PSB.  
Chapter 6 presents the research design in the form of a comparative case 
study approach of the applied public value notion at the BBC and C4. Document 
analysis is introduced as the primary method for the ideological component analysis 
of the first research question. The primary method for the policy process analysis of 
the second research question is expert interviews. The overall research question of a 
paradigm shift is answered by integrating the findings of both research questions in 
the concluding chapter 10. 
The empirical analyses are presented in chapters 7, 8, and 9. The findings 
for the ideological component analyses of the public value notion are presented in 
chapter 7 for the BBC and chapter 8 for C4. A comparison is drawn at the end of 
chapter 8 to reach an overall conclusion on the ideological composition of the public 
value notion in UK PSB.  
Chapter 9 presents the findings of the policy process analysis of the wider 
UK PSB public value development. The analysis centres on the institutionalisation of 
the notion at the BBC and is correspondingly structured into three process phases (of 
before, at, and after).  
The concluding chapter 10 integrates the findings from the ideological 
component and contextual process analyses by discussing whether an ideological 
shift has taken place and whether the overall public value change process takes the 
form of a paradigm shift. The thesis concludes with a listing of contributions and a 
brief outlook. 
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2. REGULATORY RATIONALES PART I: ECONOMIC 
 APPROACHES 
  
2.1 The Role and Relevance of Economic and Non-Economic 
 Rationales 
 
The following chapters 2 and 3 review economic and non-economic 
regulatory rationales for PSB provision. The objective is to provide a thorough 
theoretical review of these two approaches, explain how they apply to the context of 
PSB provision in the change from analogue to digital technologies, and provide a 
detailed comparison of their relationship regarding their commonalities and 
differences. As introduced in the previous chapter, regulatory rationales are derived 
from different academic disciplines grouped into economic and non-economic 
approaches.  
These two chapters have a central function in the thesis as they focus on 
economic and non-economic rationales as component values and underlying 
ideologies that inform policy-making and correspondingly policy paradigms. In this 
context, economic and non-economic rationales are used as two analytical categories 
to investigate how the public value notion is informed ideologically, in order to test 
whether the notion prioritises non-economic over economic values – as assumed 
based on its discursive use in PSB policy and its theoretical origin in public 
management theory (see section 1.1).  
Chapters 2 and 3 therefore provide the theoretical background for the first 
research question, which focuses on the ideological composition of the public value 
notion. The reviews provide the basis to devise analytical categories for the empirical 
investigation of the applied public value notion at the BBC and C4 (chapters 7 and 
8).  
Further, the review in this chapter shows how the change from analogue to 
digital technologies impacts the applicability of market failure rationales and the 
corresponding effect that has on the scale and scope of PSB provision (as justified by 
the remaining market failures). In this respect the chapter also contributes to the 
second research question regarding the contextual analysis of the wider paradigm 
shift process and in particular the phase prior to the introduction of the public value 
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notion, i.e. the conditions under the previous paradigm. The review provides 
theoretical evidence on the reduced applicability of market failure rationales in the 
change from analogue to digital technologies in PSB, which is a central assumption 
and argument made in this thesis.  
This claim of reduced market failure occurring during an incumbent 
economic paradigm is an important part of the study of a policy change process (and 
a potential paradigm shift) as such an external technological change can be seen to 
represent an external crisis posed to the existing paradigm. A crisis to an existing 
paradigm opens a window of opportunity to propose alternative rationales, such as 
the public value notion, as investigated in this study.  
Market failure can be seen to have been used as the dominant rationale for 
PSB provision in analogue broadcasting as it was widely applicable and thus useful 
to justify a broad scope of PSB. While the following review provides the theoretical 
evidence for this claim, the practical perspective is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 9, where the empirical analysis investigates the time prior to the introduction 
of the public value notion and the ideologies present during that time in PSB policy.  
The fact that market failure applied widely at a time when there was a general 
tendency towards focussing on consumers and markets in media and PSB policy (as 
stated widely in secondary literature) is the foundation of the assumption that the 
incumbent paradigm at the time of the introduction of the public value notion 
prioritised economic over non-economic rationales. While this previous economic 
paradigm is defined through the dominance of economic approaches over non-
economic approaches, this does not say that all decisions about PSB were informed 
by market failure justification alone. During this period, market failure is just one 
economic concept that reveals the dominance of economic ideology in informing 
policy-making in general, which is also revealed through a strong focus on consumer 
representation and the application of economically informed public management 
approaches such as NPM (in public service and at the BBC). 
This assumption of a dominance of economic and market failure rationales in 
PSB in the 1990s does therefore not mean that no other non-economic rationales 
were part of the justification of PSB provision and thus the incumbent paradigm 
during that time. As explicitly defined in the previous chapter, the understanding of 
paradigms is that they are never ideologically pure, consisting of just one rationale. 
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Rather they consist of different rationales and ideologies, of which some are more 
important or prominent in informing decision-making and consequentially 
characterise the overall paradigm. As the relative importance ascribed to them in 
policy-making varies over time, it is possible to speak of different media policy 
paradigms as dynamic concepts. A paradigm shift therefore is a change in the 
hierarchy of component values and not a change from one pure ideological paradigm 
to another one. 
In short, the underlying argument of this thesis regarding the emergence of 
the public value notion is that a decrease in applicable market failures caused by the 
technological shift from analogue to digital service provision was the impetus for the 
introduction of the public value notion as a new policy idea that validated sustained 
and extended PSB provision; i.e. an expansion of the scope of PSB services at a time 
when the reduction in applicable market failure rationales only justifies a reduction 
in scope. 
The following reviews of economic and non-economic rationales therefore 
provide a) the theoretical background for the analytical categories used to 
investigated the ideological composition of the public value notion as stated in first 
research question, and b) theoretical evidence on the ideological conditions in the 
media and PSB policy prior to the introduction of the public value notion, which is 
part of the contextual analysis of the wider policy change process addressed in the 
second research question.  
It is important to clearly state again that the following reviews are 
deliberately focused on idealised and binary theoretical reviews of economic and 
non-economic rationales in order to understand their origins in theory, to point out 
why such distinctions are made in the first place, and how they manifest in policy 
practice.  
As these ideologies and concepts are frequently used in media policy it is 
crucial to understand their theoretical origins. This economic/non-economic 
distinction lies at the heart of media policy due to the media’s dual role as a fourth 
estate in society as well as an industry.  
In practice, these different concepts are however often conflated and not used 
according to their definition in theory. This discrepancy between theoretical origins 
and practical uses is a further reason why such a thorough review is of relevance. 
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Conflation and inconsistencies of these terminologies in practice can lead to their 
contestation, which in turn can reduce their applicability and usefulness. The review 
aims to provide clarification in this respect.  
It shall therefore be emphasised that while the thesis provides a binary review 
of these approaches to clarify the terminologies and derive analytical categories for 
the empirical study, the assumption is not that they are used in this binary idealised 
fashion in practice, where their use is much more conflated and incoherent than in 
theory. The market failure term is for example frequently used in a rather loose sense 
of markets not providing goods or services without relation to any of the four market 
failures. This incoherence between theory and practice makes it even more important 
to understand the theoretical origins and the practical applications in order to 
investigate the concepts in policy-making. 
It is also important to state that an empirical-objective epistemological 
perspective is adopted here. This means that no normative assumption is taken about 
the superiority of one of the two approaches over the other one (see Karppinen, 2006, 
p. 54, who distinguishes between three analytical levels to investigate policy 
concepts, which are normative, political-strategic, and empirical-objective). 
Similarly, no normative position is taken on how a contested concept like the public 
value notion should be defined. Rather the focus is on investigating its empirical 
application.  
The following reviews therefore focus on the theoretical definitions of 
economic and non-economic regulatory rationales and the tools they provide for 
policy practices. This distinction is in the following also referred to as the substantive 
and the procedural level of rationales.  
A further aspect that requires mentioning is that economic and non-economic 
rationales are reviewed as ideological frames that are adopted by policy-makers to 
understand policy problems and objectives. This assumes that policy-actors act in the 
public interest, rather than self-interest, when making decisions. Economic and non-
economic rationales are two different worldviews on how to best act in the public 
interest, which – simplistically stated – is either by focussing on markets and 
consumers or on society and citizens. 
The public interest notion can be described as a generally accepted guiding 
notion for regulatory intervention. It is used as a rationalization or legitimization of 
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administrative action (Mitnick, 1980, p. 279) due to its “unusual ability to ‘trump’ 
claims deriving from ownership of private property” (Feintuck, 2005, p. 2). As such, 
it functions as a regulatory mandate (Napoli, 2006, p. 280). This thesis restricts its 
consideration of the term to the specific context of PSB policy.  
Due to its lack of a shared definition (regarding its component values) it is 
however a contested concept. The concept often receives criticism for being an 
“empty vessel, filled with the values of those who define it on any particular 
occasion” (Feintuck, 2005, pp. 2, 1, 2004; see also Mitnick, 1980, pp. 242-243, 264, 
280). This shall not be elaborated on further at this point other than by referring to 
Feintuck (2004, 2005; Feintuck & Varney, 2006) and Napoli (2001, 2006, 2007), 
who have written on the public interest in media regulation.  
The public value notion, which can be seen as an analogy to the public 
interest concept, also lacks an agreed upon definition and can thus be described as a 
contested concept. For a comparison of the public interest and public value notions 
see Bozeman (2007, pp. 12-14, 132, 139) and Jørgensen & Bozeman (2007). One 
distinction which can be made is that the public interest is an ideal concept whereas 
public value is an operational approach.  
The central point to make here is that different economic and non-economic 
ideologies exist which can be used to inform the understanding and formulation of 
policy objectives to benefit the public at large, either by focussing on market or 
wider societal benefits as two views of what is in the public interest.  
Which academic discipline or ideology is adopted by policy-makers (or 
institutions) as a cognitive frame (see chapter 6) to inform policy-making is a 
normative choice or value judgment. For example, the objective to achieve Pareto 
efficiency as the primary purpose of regulation is a normative judgement which 
reflects that economic theory was chosen as the primary ideological framework 
(Helm, 2006, p. 171). The choice between different disciplines is hence a normative 
and subjective one of those in power, subject to the context and the circumstance 
surrounding them.  
This public interest view stands in contrast to private interests theories 
which view policy-makers as pursuing personal interests in policy-making that lead 
them to deviate from acting in the public interest.  
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Public and private interest theories address motivational influence factors 
related to policy-actors’ preferences in policy processes. Together with contextual 
influence factors (derived from neo-institutional approaches) they shape the wider 
context of policy-making. Both motivational (public and private interest theories) 
and contextual (neo-institutional approaches) factors influence policy actors’ 
decision-making and thus policy outcomes. They are therefore relevant contextual 
indicators that need to be investigated in a policy change analysis and are here 
reviewed in chapter 4.  
The role of contextual and motivational indicators in policy change 
processes is addressed in the second research question, which investigates why the 
public value development has taken place in the context of the wider policy 
environment and the evolution of media policy paradigms. The notion’s ideological 
composition is seen to be directly related to developments in the wider policy 
context.  
Baldwin and Cave clarify this distinction between these two strands of 
regulatory theory by differentiating between “technical justifications for regulation 
that may be given by a government that is assumed to be acting in pursuit of the 
public interest” (1999, p. 9). This refers to making regulatory decisions in the private 
interest based on the application of different ideological rationales, as discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3. These are distinguished from “motives for regulation” (ibid.), 
which refer to objectives of interest groups participating in the decision-making 
process that lead to a deviation from regulatory decision-making based purely on 
regulatory rationales, as addressed in chapter 4. These theories are of relevance as 
they can be used to understand and explain why certain claims for intervention are 
made and why these claims change over time. Both therefore need to be analysed as 
factors that influence policy and paradigm shift processes.  
In the following, the focus lies on different ideologies that are adopted by 
policy-makers to inform policy-making. This chapter reviews economic approaches 
to regulatory intervention and their application in PSB (2.3). Chapter 3 
correspondingly reviews non-economic approaches to regulatory interventions and 
provides a concluding comparison. The focus of the reviews lies on theoretical or 
substantive justifications for intervention while less attention is paid to the 
procedural characteristics and tools applied in policy practice.  
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 2.2 Economic and Non-Economic Rationales: Introduction 
 
As introduced briefly in the previous chapter, regulatory rationales from 
different academic disciplines are grouped into economic and non-economic 
approaches for the purpose of this thesis. Economic approaches refer to economics as 
a theory of social science. This includes different strands of economic theory 
(neoclassical economics/microeconomics, welfare and behavioural economics). The 
second group of non-economic approaches encompasses other theories of social 
sciences, most importantly political science but also law, cultural studies and 
sociology. The decision to group different academic disciplines based on a view of 
one discipline, economics, and a negative exclusion thereof, non-economic, has been 
made due to several reasons:  
Firstly, a central reason which supports this distinction is that much of 
economics, in contrast to most other theories of social science, is amenable to 
formalization and can thus be traced back to formal theory foundations, which means 
that the explanation of a theory can be expressed in terms of mathematics or logic 
(Bozeman, 2007, pp. 52, 126, 114). In this idealised sense, economics is distinct 
from the group of non-economic theories in that it is objective (and fact based) 
whereas non-economic rationales are value judgements derived from political 
philosophical, sociological or cultural norms.  
This is reflected in different understandings of value associated with both 
categories. Economic value
6
 can be equated to exchange or quantitative monetary 
value (expressed as price, cost) as a proxy for individual consumer utility. Non-
economic values in contrast are not linked to utility of individuals as consumers. 
Rather, values here reflect collective outcomes for society. They can be defined as 
shared societal norms and mores based on paternalistic assumptions or some degree 
of consensus among individuals as citizen on desired societal outcomes. While the 
quantitative nature of economic value allows making (objective) factual judgements, 
the qualitative nature of non-economic values means that they require (subjective, 
evaluative) value judgements (for more detail see Ng, 1972, pp. 1014-1015).  
                                                 
6
 On value in economic theory see Clark, 1995, pp. 31, 34. 
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Secondly, the economic/non-economic dichotomy represents the dual role 
of media as both economic and non-economic actors in society that simultaneously 
pursue economic, political, social and cultural goals (Napoli, 2006, pp. 276-277).  
Although communications policy is ideally committed to all of these 
rationales simultaneously, policy-makers usually make value choices when trying to 
accommodate both economic and non-economic values. The “underlying ideological 
struggle” (Just, 2009, p. 98) and conflict between economic and non-economic 
values (ibid., p. 99) results from the tension between the competing schools of 
thought of market and social liberalism as two models of media regulation (Vick, 
2006, p. 35). Their relationship is characterised by different views on the superiority 
of either the efficiency of markets or governments in achieving communications 
policy goals (Steemers, 1999; Just, 2009, pp. 98-99). The challenge lies in finding a 
balance between free-market competition and promoting political, cultural, and 
social objectives of media, as no hierarchical order exists or is generally accepted 
(Mitnick, 1980, p. 242; Rutgers, 2008, p. 109).  
Thirdly, this binary approach is the most sensible distinction as it is often 
difficult to draw clear lines between rationales of non-economic disciplines, which 
are not mutually exclusive but rather overlapping. It is also a commonly used 
distinction in relevant literature (e.g. Entman & Wildman, 1992; Ogus, 2004; Just, 
2009; Ver Eecke, 1998; van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003; Prosser, 2006; Vick, 
2006; Cowling, 2006). 
The fourth (and most important) distinction between economic and non-
economic approaches is their different view on what is best for society and 
correspondingly what the objectives of regulatory intervention are. Here the 
dichotomy between the two groups – and the commonality in the non-economic 
group in particular – become apparent: 
Economic theory assumes that the best societal outcome is achieved 
through the principle of free markets by giving individuals as consumers what they 
want, which is directly linked to the concept of individual utility (which as an 
aggregate represents collective utility). Intervention derived from microeconomic 
market failure rationales is preference-led as it is based on individuals as consumers 
as the smallest unit of account. Under assumptions of rationality, individuals assign 
preferences to choice alternatives based on the utility these alternatives provide, 
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which can be reflected in utility functions. As utility cannot be measured directly, it 
is represented through the proxy of monetary worth in the form of prices people are 
willing to pay for goods or services.  
In contrast to this stand political, social, and cultural approaches which 
oppose purely economic welfare understandings. These non-economic theories share 
the position that regulatory intervention should be based on the view that what is best 
for society is to provide goods and services which are deemed to be good for society. 
This can be based on paternalistic assumptions or deliberated views on societal 
norms as rationales to inform regulatory intervention. The individual is here viewed 
in his role as a citizen (which is independent of the individual utility concept). 
The consumer and citizen terminologies, which are frequently used in 
media policy, represent those two different ideological views. These ideologies or 
academic disciplines differ not only on the substantive (theoretical justifications) but 
also on the procedural (analytical tools and concepts used in practice) level. In 
general as well as in the case of PSB, their definitions inform the justification for 
intervention and have implications in the form of varying objectives and scopes of 
PSB provision.  
In the following, economic (2.3) and non-economic (chapter 3) rationales 
are reviewed and compared with regard to their theoretical origins, commonalities 
and differences, and application in analogue and digital PSB justification. The 
reviews serve to derive analytical categories for the empirical analysis to 
operationalise economic and non-economic rationales as component values of the 
applied public value notion (research question 1). Based on the component analysis, 
the notion can then be compared and related to the policy environment and media 
policy paradigm (research question 2). Economic and non-economic rationales hence 
serve as theoretical concepts and analytical categories.  
Again, it is important to stress that these reviews are based on theoretical, 
idealised considerations of regulatory rationales to show the dichotomy between 
them. This simplifies their relationship in practice, where they are often conceptually 
and terminologically conflated. 
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2.3 Regulatory Rationales in Economic Theory 
 
The following sections review and compare different economic rationales 
and their application in broadcasting. Different strands of economic theory
7
 are 
reviewed, which share the commonality of viewing the individual as a consumer and 
as the unit of analysis, but differ in regard to rationality assumptions of individuals’ 
behaviour. Section 2.3.1 focuses on neoclassical economics and the concept of 
market failure as the primary rationale for market intervention. Micro- and welfare 
economic theory is based on the assumption of individuals as rational actors. Section 
2.3.2 reviews the concept of merit goods and briefly addresses behavioural 
economics. Section 2.3.3 provides a summary. 
 
2.3.1 Microeconomic Theory and Market Failure Rationales 
In economic theory, markets are the preferred organising principle unless 
market failures arise, which lead to inefficient demand and supply of goods and 
services. In neoclassical economics, market failure rationales are the primary or 
default economic paradigm that legitimises market intervention. Market failure 
rationales start from the notion that markets do not function efficiently and that 
intervention is needed to correct these inefficiencies. 
In the strictest sense, intervention should only take place in cases where 
markets fail to reach Pareto efficiency. Pareto efficiency is achieved when it is not 
possible to make one individual better off without making another individual worse 
off. In microeconomic theory markets fail, when they do not efficiently organise the 
allocation and production of goods and services, in which cases Pareto efficiency is 
not achieved.  
In public discourse, the concept of market failure is often used to describe 
conditions where markets fail to provide certain types of desired goods, which 
implies that market failure refers to the lack of providing these goods or services. 
This description can be misleading since market failure primarily refers to the failure 
to achieve efficient markets. Consequentially, the primary objective is to establish 
efficiency rather than to provide specific types of goods or services. The latter can 
however be an indirect by-product since inefficiency leads to over- or underprovision 
                                                 
7
 See also Kemp, 2002, pp. 12-following. 
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of certain types of goods or services, which then are often referred to as desired 
goods. Desirability is here however linked to individual demand rather than to wider 
societal objectives.  
In economic theory, four concepts of market failure are distinguished; 
monopolies, public goods, externalities, and information asymmetries. They are 
explained in the following with regard to their applicability in analogue and digital 
PSB justification. This shows how market failure turns from a legitimising to a de-
legitimising concept in PSB justification in the transition from analogue to digital 
technologies.  
 
Monopolies 
A monopoly exists when one seller, a monopolist, produces for the entire 
market and in pursuit of maximizing profits has the power to restrict the output and 
set the marginal price above the marginal cost, which transfers income from the 
consumer to the producer. Markets fail because of a lack of competition due to 
barriers of entry into the market, which therefore keeps new market entrants from 
increasing the output and therewith driving down the price. Regulation prevents the 
restriction of output and the setting of the price above the equilibrium price (Baldwin 
& Cave, 1999, p. 9-10; Ogus, 2004, pp. 30-33). Competition or antitrust law is the 
principle instrument for dealing with monopolies (Hoskins et al., 2004, pp. 300-301). 
In the early years of broadcasting, spectrum scarcity has been a barrier to 
entry and was seen as the main technical (among other economic and political) 
justification for establishing a public monopoly (van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003, 
p. 197; Steemers, 2003; Humphrey, 1996, p. 113). Spectrum has traditionally been 
controlled and allocated by government through granting service licences to 
broadcasters. With the introduction of cable and satellite services and more recently 
digital compression technology, the spectrum scarcity rationale of analogue 
broadcasting is diminishing (Davies, 2005, p. 131; Napoli, 2007, pp. 7, 17-18).  
A further case of high barriers to entry relates to economic production 
characteristics of broadcasting goods, which due to high fixed and low marginal 
costs can be described as high fixed cost economies with high economies of scale 
and scope (Picard, 2005, p. 64; Withers, 2002, p. 5; Davies, 2005, pp. 133, 142). 
These are characteristics of a natural monopoly which have the impetus to serve 
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large markets and thus create tendencies towards consolidation and concentration in 
the form of monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures. Even though production 
and reproduction costs have decreased significantly due to digital technologies, the 
relational characteristics of high production and low reproduction costs continue to 
persist in digital broadcasting.  
The production characteristics of high fixed and low marginal costs create 
the tendency towards producing large quantities due to decreasing average unit costs. 
In the case of broadcasting, this translates into the tendency to produce programmes 
with mass appeal at the lowest possible production cost, what is often referred to as 
providing programmes with the ‘lowest common denominator’. This also means that 
programmes with smaller audiences, which are less profitable, may not be provided. 
In this context of limited oligopolistic or monopolistic competition a further 
principle, Hotelling’s principle of minimum differentiation, becomes relevant. 
Hotelling’s principle is not a market failure, but it further emphasises the conditions 
that arise under natural monopolies. It states that a limited number of competitors 
tend to provide similar goods and services that appeal to masses while neglecting 
minority interests (Brown, 1996, p. 8; Graham, 1998, p. 37; Withers, 2002, p. 6 on 
the principle of minimum differentiation).  
It can therefore be concluded that even though the spectrum scarcity 
rationale has ceased to apply, natural monopoly characteristics persist in digital 
broadcasting as relevant considerations for intervention. The implication of natural 
monopoly characteristics is that advertising- and subscription-funded broadcasting is 
biased against minority demands and high-cost programmes. In terms of regulatory 
intervention regarding natural monopolies, public ownership, price (Hoskins et al., 
2004, p. 309) and quality regulation, reduction of barriers to entry (Brown, 1996, p. 
9) or the theory of contestable markets (Baumol et al., 1982) serve as possible 
approaches (Ogus, 2004, pp. 30-31).  
In terms of the scope of intervention, the existence of a monopoly or 
natural monopoly is a legitimizing rationale but not necessarily the justification for 
heavy regulation and public provision of broadcasting. The latter, according to Ward, 
is much more based on social objectives than on spectrum scarcity characteristics 
alone (2006, pp. 52-53). Public provision is not a direct consequence of (natural) 
monopoly characteristics unless a normative judgement is made that public service 
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provision is desired or more effective than legal control of private firms (Ogus, 2004, 
p. 267). Public provision might for example be preferred over private provision to 
ensure editorial independence. In any case, monopoly or natural monopoly rationales 
primarily provide legitimacy for the provision of niche content and thus a limited 
remit of PSBs. 
 
Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric information describes situations when markets do not produce 
sufficient information for the consumer to evaluate competing goods or for producers 
to efficiently provide goods. Markets can fail to do so because information is too 
expensive and the producer of the information is not compensated by those who use 
the information, which discourages its provision. Incentives to falsify information, 
information that is not useful to the consumer, collusion in the market place, or 
insufficient competition may lead to insufficient supply of information. Regulation 
can make information available to consumers (Ogus, 2004, pp. 38-41).  
In broadcasting, asymmetric information arises on the side of producers 
and consumers. On the consumer side, information asymmetries apply since 
broadcasting goods are experience goods, which makes prior judgement about the 
utility derived from the consumption not always possible due to the unique/one-time 
consumption character (Picard, 2005, pp. 62, 64, 66; Davies, 2005, pp. 134, 145-
146). This can reduce consumption.  
In regard to producers, asymmetric information is caused through 
“advertiser-derived demand which does not reflect program consumer demand 
intensity beyond the threshold decision to watch or listen” (Withers, 2002, p. 5). In 
other words, the role of the price mechanisms to reveal hidden information about 
viewer preferences to producers is lacking in advertising-funded broadcasting. 
Viewer valuations, which are not revealed through price, are a form of asymmetric 
information. Consequentially, broadcasters’ aim is to maximize audience size to 
increase advertising revenue, which under limited competition leads to a tendency to 
underprovide less popular programming (Armstrong & Weeds, 2005, pp. 14-15, 17). 
Low viewership genres which do not allow generating sufficient advertising revenue 
to cover production costs will not be produced as consumers cannot express their 
willingness to pay (WTP) through price. Advertising funding thus creates the 
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problem of inappropriate incentives to producers since it leads to asymmetric 
information about user preferences (Brown, 1996, p. 8; Graham, 1998, p. 37). 
Viewer surveys might be conducted instead, such as WTP studies, which are 
however inferior to market information (Armstrong & Weeds, 2005, pp. 14-15).  
In the case of pay-TV, consumers can signal their utility through price 
which can assist efficient production decisions. The allocative efficiency of pay-TV 
hence exceeds that of advertising-funded TV (van Dijk et al., 2006, p. 262), despite 
limitations to price signalling due to channel bundling (as opposed to à la carte 
subscription). By charging a uniform price, it is not possible to extract the WTP of 
those who highly value a particular programme or service, which again makes the 
provision of certain programs unprofitable (Brown, 1996, pp. 8-9). Generally, 
subscription-based pay-TV services lean towards content with the lowest price 
elasticity of demand which typically are not niche programmes but rather popular 
programmes such as sporting events. Increased consumer sovereignty due to 
increased competition and price discrimination in pay-TV markets can mitigate 
problems of reduced choice that result from information asymmetries in advertising-
funded broadcasting (van Dijk et al., 2006, pp. 272-273; Armstrong & Weeds, 2005, 
pp. 18, 33-34, 43). If price discrimination is not feasible, the broadcasting market is 
biased against minority demands. 
 
Public Goods 
Market failures also arise in the form of public goods, which are goods 
characterised through non-exclusion and non-rivalry in consumption. Non-exclusion 
occurs when a buyer of a good cannot exclude another person from consuming the 
good without paying for it, which is called free-riding. The consequence is that these 
goods cannot be provided efficiently as the goods are rather costly for those who pay 
for their consumption. This can lead to reduced demand and thus provision of these 
goods. Public provision is a regulatory solution to non-exclusion since there is often 
no regulatory mechanism to exclude people from consumption (other than ex-post 
sanctions). Most of these public goods, such as military or policing, are also 
considered to be generally demanded and desired by bringing shared benefits 
(Baldwin & Cave, 1999, pp. 13, 14), which supports public provision. If it was for 
example possible to exclude people who did not pay for military or police services, it 
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would be ethically questionable to do so. Both desirability and ethics are however 
normative and not economic justifications. 
The second characteristic of public goods, non-rivalness, occurs “when a 
good possesses the property that another person can enjoy it while the person who 
purchased the good experiences no loss from such consumption” (Ver Eecke, 1998, 
p. 137). This implies that the marginal cost of supplying the good to successive 
individuals is effectively zero once the original costs of the product have been 
incurred (Davies, 2005, p. 134).  
Broadcasting goods are no longer considered pure public goods as only 
non-rivalry continues to apply as a regulatory rationale (Ogus, 2004, p. 34). For 
terrestrial broadcasting, which has typically been prone to non-exclusion, encryption 
technologies can prevent unauthorized consumption. Non-exclusion is therefore no 
longer applicable as a justification for PSB provision. Non-rivalry however continues 
to apply to broadcasting goods (as well as media content as an information good 
more generally) due to the intangible character of content and zero marginal cost of 
supplying the good to successive individuals. The consumption of a movie or 
newspaper does not physically diminish the good and therefore the opportunity for 
third party consumption (Robinson et al., 2005, p. 126; Davies, 2005, p. 135).  
According to allocative efficiency, an existing programme with zero 
marginal cost should be provided to all viewers with a positive valuation (Armstrong 
& Weeds, 2005, p. 7). This, however, only applies to existing programmes and does 
not take the production of future programmes into account. Marginal cost pricing, 
even when subsidised to cover fixed cost, gives only poor incentives for the 
production of high-quality, innovative programming and cost efficiency (ibid., p. 8), 
which means that in particular high-quality or innovative programme would be 
biased against under subsidized marginal cost pricing. In terms of regulatory 
intervention, it is the government’s role to determine the optimal level of provision 
of public goods and the corresponding public financing (Hoskins et al., 2004, p. 
309). 
  
Externalities 
The fourth market failure is external effects or externalities. These are 
positive or negative spill-over effects of a transaction on a third party, which are not 
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accounted for in the transaction and thus not reflected in the price. As the market is 
not able to price these externalities, the price of the good, which carries these 
externalities, does not reflect the true cost or benefit; it is either too low or too high 
as third party effects are not included in the consumer’s cost-benefit calculus 
(Entman & Wildman, 1992, p. 13).  
For positive externalities, prices are too high because the third party has 
the benefit of positive external effects but does not account for that share of the price. 
This means that since the consumer does not take the third party utility into account, 
from a certain point on the cost of consumption is higher than the utility derived from 
consumption. In the case of negative externalities, prices are too low as the cost to 
the third party is not taken into account, which means that the cost of consumption is 
lower than the utility derived from consumption. In both cases of positive and 
negative externalities, prices do not reflect the true cost, so that neither consumer nor 
producer bear the true cost which results in excessive consumption (negative 
externalities) or underproduction (positive externalities). Regulatory intervention 
addresses this by for example subsidising goods with positive externalities and 
increasing the prices of goods with negative externalities.  
In contrast to public goods, where in the case of non-exclusion a third party 
does consume the good but does not pay, externalities are negative or positive 
indirect effects on a third party, who neither buys nor consumes the good. The 
indirect costs or benefits are thus not related to individual utility motivations of the 
third party. They are rather involuntary impacts as exposure to them cannot be 
controlled by the third party. Market failure here relates to a lack of a mechanism in 
the market to price indirect costs and benefits.  
In broadcasting, the consumption of negative/positive content has 
negative/positive effects which manifest in changed consumer behaviour and as such 
have negative/positive spill-over impacts on third parties. The provision of content 
with positive external effects can be ensured through public funding, for example in 
the form of subsidies or tax breaks and can be provided through both public and 
private mechanisms (Ogus, 2004, p. 268; Hoskins et al., 2004, pp. 294, 309). 
Correspondingly, programming with negative external effects can be addressed 
through price increases in the form of taxation as well as restrictive content 
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regulation which limits or prohibits the provision of such content (Withers, 2002, p. 
5; Davies, 2005, pp. 133, 141-142). 
Positive externalities are a primary justification for PSB provision. Which 
content types are identified as having positive spill-over effects is however a 
normative judgement that is based on which third party impacts are deemed 
desirable. WTP studies are for example conducted in PSB to ask individuals how 
they value third party impacts. Individuals are then addressed as citizens, rather than 
consumers, as they are asked to take the positive third party effects into account in 
addition to their own individually utility and state it in the form of a combined value.  
Positive externalities are therefore often referred to as citizen rationales 
due to their third party impact, which however reflects a normative argument that 
stems from desired positive societal impacts rather than from an economic argument 
of externalising the benefit to correct pricing.  
The concept of network externalities is different from market failure 
externalities as the latter describe spill-over effects on third parties which do not 
consume the good. Network externalities however describe conditions when 
consumers of the same good experience changes in their derived utility which 
corresponds to changes in the number of consumers using the good. The 
consumption of one user has an external effect on a third party who consumes the 
same good, which leads to an adjustment of both parties’ derived utility. Shared 
programme consumption, for example, can make a programme more valuable to its 
consumers. The creation of shared experiences, a sense of community, through free 
and universal provision of important national events is a central PSB rationale to 
counter societal fragmentation (O’Hagan & Jennings, 2003, pp. 36-37). Intervention 
then takes place to create network externalities, which is not a market failure but a 
normative argument that applies generally to shared programming and can be used in 
support of universal service provision. 
 
Summary: Market Failures 
These four market failures have in common that technical and economic 
production and transaction characteristics impact market efficiency. As described for 
broadcasting, intervention is required when markets fail to operate efficiently as “the 
primary objective of the market school is to maximize the efficiency of media 
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markets in satisfying the preferences of individual consumers” (Entman & Wildman, 
1992, pp. 14, see also p. 7). Regulation is thus linked to individual utility.  
Correspondingly, on a societal level, the assumption in welfare economics 
is that each individual makes choices to maximise individual utility and that societal 
welfare is a function of individual utility (Munro, 2009, p. 93) as the sum 
(Benthamite social welfare function) or the product (Nash social welfare function) of 
individual welfare (Ng, 1990, p. 42). The notion of societal welfare in economics is 
therefore essentially individualistic (Towse, 2006, p. 158) as no concept of collective 
or societal welfare exists other than one based on individual utility.  
When economic market failure rationales are applied, the public interest 
hence equals the aggregate of individual consumer utility. Or put differently, 
justifications for regulation are only triggered through inefficient markets based on 
the individual utility concept, which correspondingly limits the scope of identifying 
the need for intervention and the definition of remedies. Non-utilitarian normative 
concepts have no methodological basis in market failure theory. The “[market failure 
rational] suggests a single type of methodological approach in assessing a wide range 
of regulatory activities, one which assumes that in principle market solutions are 
always the first-best outcomes to decision on the allocation of goods and services” 
(Prosser, 2006, p. 369). 
After reviewing the different market failure rationales, it is possible to 
summarize their applicability in PSB justification:  
Generally, it can be concluded that digital transmission technologies 
mitigate traditional market failures in analogue broadcasting (Cave, 2005, p. 20; 
Armstrong & Weeds, 2005, p. 32). Technological advances reduce market failures 
related to distribution, such as spectrum scarcity and excludability. Other market 
failures such a natural monopolies and information asymmetries, which relate to 
content, product and production characteristics, continue to apply but can be 
mitigated through increased competition in pay-TV markets and the potential of 
increased price discrimination.  
Market failure justifications for PSB are thus increasingly limited to 
provision of niche content with positive external effects as based on the public good 
non-rivalry and positive externality rationales (van Dijk et al., 2006, p. 273; 
Armstrong & Weeds, 2005, pp. 3, 44, 35). As both externalities and public good 
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rationales are based on consumer demand, these types of content have to be of such 
nature, that they are generally demanded by consumers. This represents a central 
dilemma and difficulty in PSB, which is that of ratings versus quality.  
It can thus be concluded that market failure rationales are diminishing but 
that those rationales which continue to apply, justify public provision of content with 
positive benefits. 
The central challenge in the provision of this type of content is to ensure 
that both the necessary quality, that provides positive benefits, and the necessary 
popular appeal, that ensures consumption, are given.  
In addition, it is necessary to define what kind of content is understood to 
have positive benefits. Even though this is a rather subjective definition which can be 
defined more or less narrowly, the reduction in market failures could be used to 
argue for a reduction of PSB to niche content provision.  
The changes in the applicability of market failures rationales can hence be 
viewed as a regulatory threat to the justification of the traditional scale and scope of 
PSB. Consequentially, this can be an incentive or reason for attempting to shift the 
argumentation to alternative, non-economic rationales for justification, which are 
discussed in chapter 3. The introduction of the public value notion seems to indicate 
such a shift. 
Before proceeding to the review of non-economic rationales, another set of 
economic concepts and approaches needs to be reviewed briefly as they shift away 
from the primacy of the individual utility concept in market failure rationales. Merit 
goods and behavioural economics are economic concepts which seem to be situated 
between the rather strict consumer-focus of market failure and the citizen focus of 
non-economic approaches, thus establishing a relationship between them. 
 
2.3.2 Merit Goods and Behavioural Economics 
Aside from market failure rationales, further concepts exist in economic 
theory that relate to regulatory intervention but which shift away from neoclassical 
economic assumptions of rationality, consumer sovereignty, and the primacy of 
individual utility.  
The merit good is such a concept. It was introduced by Musgrave in 1956, 
who “discovered the necessity for ethical concepts in economic thinking by 
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introducing the concept of merit want or merit good, i.e., areas in the economy where 
the government is justified in interfering in the preferences of individuals” (Ver 
Eecke, 1998, p. 134 referring to Musgrave, 1956, pp. 333-334). Merit goods refer to 
the denial of validity of some individual preferences and the imposition of some 
alternative (non-individual) judgments about what should be provided (Withers, 
2002, p. 7).  
The assumption underlying merit goods is that individuals misjudge the 
utility they derived from consuming a good. In these cases, individual preferences do 
not accord to individual welfare (Munro, 2009, pp. 3, 163-164). This leads to the 
demand of the good being below the ideally desired level of demand – hence, these 
goods are less demanded than they should be. The level of ideal demand is here 
informed through a normative judgement, passed by public authority and not the 
individual, which “stipulates that the free market does not ensure a level of 
consumption which is desirable according to that judgment” (Ver Eecke, 1998, pp. 
137-138). Musgrave later defined the merit good as “a good which is so important 
that when the competent authorities are dissatisfied with the level of consumption in 
the free market, they can intervene, even against the wishes of consumers” (Ver 
Eecke, 1998, p. 136 referring to Musgrave, 1959).  
This rationale for intervention stands in contrast with the market failure 
approach, which is based on efficiency objectives related to transaction, 
consumption, and production characteristics of goods and services. The primacy of 
individual preference is not questioned in market failure rationales whereas in the 
case of merit goods consumer wishes are disregarded when public authorities make 
paternalistic decisions to overrule individual preferences.  
The objectives of intervention of market failure and merit good rationales 
thus differ. In the case of merit goods, market processes are not corrected to achieve 
Pareto efficiency but rather to pursue paternalistically and normatively informed 
objectives related to individual and societal benefit. Merit goods can therefore be 
described as a socio-economic concept as the focus lies on individual utility, which is 
however overruled by paternalistically defined objectives. 
The normative judgments, on which overruling is based, can be of various 
kinds (moral, ethical, political, social) and are often informed by an understanding of 
what is beneficial to the individual and to society as a whole. The positive impact on 
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individual behaviour through consumption of desired goods has positive implications 
for society, which resembles a third party impact similar to externalities. The 
difference to externalities is that merit goods are misjudgements of individuals’ 
utility assumptions rather than the failure of individuals to take third party impacts 
into account, as for externalities. Since consumer sovereignty is discarded in merit 
good intervention, it is difficult to reconcile this rationale with policy frameworks 
based on rationale consumer preferences (Munro, 2009, p. 14).  
High-quality educational programmes and news are typical examples of 
merit goods in broadcasting (Graham, 2005, pp. 87-88). Merit good intervention is 
generally limited to the provision of programming that is normatively and 
paternalistically defined as desirable, which in practice often translates to high-
quality niche programming with positive effects, for which individuals are seen to 
misjudge their derived utility. Since the merit good rationale is however the result of 
consumption failure in the first place, the provision of certain programmes does not 
necessarily lead to their consumption (Entman & Wildman, 1992, p. 13). This is a 
similar problem to the one addressed before for positive externalities, which 
highlights the difficulty and inherent dilemma of providing (niche) content with 
positive benefits to mass audiences. On one hand, the argument can be made that free 
provision can increase the probability of consumption, which, however, on the other 
hand becomes less likely in an environment with increased consumer choice.  
Aside from merit goods, a further strand has developed in economic theory 
which provides alternative views on assumptions of individual utility. Behavioural 
economics criticizes rationality assumptions of neoclassical economics where 
individuals have the ability to process all information available to them in order to 
make rational, utility maximising decisions, expressed as preferences that lead to 
allocative efficiency. Neo-institutional economics instead assumes that the capacity 
of individuals to receive, store, and process information is limited and that therefore 
their behaviour is constrained by bounded rationality (Ogus, 2004, pp. 41, 38). 
Munro identifies “bounded rationality with behaviour that is not wholly explicable in 
terms of the satisfaction of complete and consistent preferences” (2009, p. 2).  
Bounded rationality assumptions provide grounds to regulate in the 
people’s best interest as bounded rationality leads to a misalignment of individual 
preference and individual welfare, similar to merit goods. According to Munro’s 
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definition, bounded rationality is a form of a merit good but is not the same as a 
merit good; in the case of bounded rationality, individuals fail to have complete and 
consistent preferences whereas in the case of merit goods preference may be 
complete and consistent (ibid., pp. 3-4, 94). This means that in merit good 
intervention individual utility is overruled, which may have been based on rational 
preference formation. In contrast to this, in the case of bounded rationality, 
individuals’ preferences are derived from bounded rationality and intervention takes 
the form of incentivising and educating individuals to adjust rather than overrule 
their utility assumptions.  
It can be concluded that for both merit good and behavioural economics 
the focus remains on the individual utility concept. The difference to neoclassical 
market failure rationales is that intervention is related to an interference with 
individual utility assumptions through either overruling or educating individuals’ 
preferences.  
The primacy of individual utility in market failure approaches is thus not 
shared in the theoretical assumptions underlying merit good rationales or behavioural 
economics. As such, they are more nuanced approaches in the wider economic field 
and can therefore be viewed as bridging concepts between economic and non-
economic rationales. 
 
 
2.3 Conclusion  
 
A brief summary of economic rationales shall be provided at this point 
before proceeding to the review of non-economic approaches in the next chapter. 
The previous review has shown how a change from analogue to digital 
distribution technologies impacted the applicability of market failure rationales in the 
justification of PSB provision. As distribution-based market failures have been 
mitigated due to falling physical barriers to market entry and widening consumer 
choice, market failure justification is limited to content-based rationales such as 
positive externalities and non-rivalry which continue to apply, but only provide 
grounds for provision of niche content with positive benefits. This can be used to 
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argue for a reduction in the scope of PSB, even though the definition of niche content 
requires a value judgement and thus leaves flexibility.
8
  
Rationales related to merit goods or bounded rationality, which are based 
on normative views of what is deemed to be good for individuals rather than what 
individuals would like to consume, similarly provide grounds for provision of niche 
content with desired benefits from the perspective of normative, paternalistic 
judgements.  
With regard to the empirical case studied here, this review provides 
theoretical evidence for the assumption that a shift in market failure rationales was a 
reason for an attempt to shift the debate to an alternative rationale such as the public 
value notion that prioritises non-economic citizen objectives over economic 
consumer representation. This is analysed in the empirical chapters 7, 8 and 9. In a 
similar context Collins states: “[...] as legitimacy declines in the ‘consumer’ area so 
legitimacy in the ‘citizen’ area becomes more important” (2006a, p. 52). 
Further, the previous review provided clarification of market failure 
rationales and their theoretical definition in theory regarding the representation of 
individuals as consumers and objectives of economic regulation. In classical 
economics, the belief is dominant that individuals are the best judges of their own 
welfare as derived from utility assumptions. Focussing on individual utility, 
economic rationales are based on a narrow value system. In economic theory, citizen 
or wider societal representations are based on the aggregate of individual utility or 
overruled/educated individual preferences as in merit goods and bounded rationality 
(deviating from the primacy of individual utility).  
In direct comparison, these different economic approaches can be ordered 
in terms of their degree of paternalism. Merit good intervention is more paternalistic 
than intervention based on bounded rationality, which tries to educate individuals 
rather than to overrule their utility assumptions. Bounded rationality again is more 
paternalistic than market failure concepts, as the latter do not interfere with 
individual utility.  
For all economic rationales, it can be summarised that the individual 
however remains the central unit of analysis, even though some nuances exist in 
                                                 
8
 This exemplifies a point made by Ng (1972), who states that factual or objective judgement, when 
identifying Pareto efficiency for example, allows deriving a diagnosis but in order to formulate policy 
recommendations based on this diagnosis, normative judgement is required (to varying degrees). 
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different economic concepts and strands. Further, economic rationales are well 
defined concepts and diagnostic tools. Standard welfare economics and market 
failure approaches have the merits of providing strong and comprehensive theoretical 
underpinnings (Cowling, 2006, p. 34) and practical guides to policy choices and 
implementation, which increases their influence in policy-making (Bozeman, 2007, 
p. 60; Munro, 2009, p. 13). Among proponents of neoclassical economics, the 
reconciliation of market failures within a free-market framework is preferred over a 
more pronounced political approach such as public provision. According to this 
view, government solutions are always second best to market solutions with the aim 
being generally to limit the scope of intervention to the smallest possible degree. 
These insights from the review of economic rationales are used to inform 
analytical categories for the empirical analysis of the ideological composition of the 
applied public value notion at the BBC and C4 (chapters 7, 8). After a review of non-
economic rationales in the next chapter, a table is provided which summarises 
analytical categories that are indicative of economic and non-economic ideologies in 
regulation.  
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3. REGULATORY THEORY PART II: NON-ECONOMIC 
 APPROACHES AND COMPARISON 
 
As the second part of the review of regulatory rationales, this chapter 
addresses non-economic approaches, which includes social, cultural, rights-based, 
and political disciplines. Economics provides a robust framework to investigate value 
in quantitative, often monetary form through different methodologies and concepts, 
which are powerful due to their high degree of standardisation and objectivity. These 
perspectives are however based on a narrow value system and correspondingly do 
not pay equal attention to other values types such as qualitative, societal 
considerations. Even though these values can be represented in economics through 
concepts such as merit goods, they are still secondary to economic objectives of 
individual utility and efficiency. In non-economic approaches, qualitative values are 
the primary objectives. 
Bozeman states that even though non-economic issues have been a 
supplement to economic analysis, they do not operate at commensurate levels of 
theory and application (2007, pp. 65, 2002, pp. 145-146). Economics can hence be 
criticised for neglecting the full range of political, social, and cultural concerns, in 
particular in contexts such as communications policy. It is therefore of interest to 
explore non-economic values in more detail, especially since they are central 
regulatory rationales in PSB.  
In the following, socio-cultural, rights-based and in particular political 
approaches are reviewed (3.1) before economic and non-economic rationales are 
compared (3.2) by addressing their theoretical and practical differences and 
commonalities. A summary concludes the chapter (3.3). 
 
 
3.1 Non-Economic Rationales: Social, Cultural, Legal, and Political 
 Approaches 
 
In contrast to economic rationales, which have the objective to achieve 
efficient markets, non-economic approaches have the objective to create benefit to 
society as a whole, which is guided not by individual utility but by a consensus in the 
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form of norms that define desired outcomes in society. Society is seen as the 
benefactor of regulatory intervention and different ideological approaches to societal 
organisation – political, social, cultural or rights-based – provide the grounds for 
deriving norms and values which are drawn on to define and legitimise regulatory 
action.  
The normative assumption is that there is a common benefit that is 
different from or additional to the aggregate of individual utility, independent of 
whether it provides individual utility or even goes against the interest of some 
individuals. These values, described by Ogus as “community values”, are not 
commodities individuals want to consume but rather relate to the expansion of the 
social, intellectual, and physical environment they live in as well as the increased 
participation in decision-making processes of collective affairs (2004, p. 54). The 
focus lies on the wellbeing of society, whereby individuals are represented as citizens 
rather than consumers. Citizenship can be viewed as the central organising concept 
for cultural, social, and political concerns (Helm, 2005, p. 4). Citizenship is often 
presented in highly normative terms as a positive counterpoint to commercialism and 
the market (Flew, 2009, pp. 983, 978), with the market having only limited capacity 
to achieve citizen-related goals.  
The understanding of value is correspondingly here not linked to individual 
consumer utility or a shared unit of account such as quantitative, monetary value but 
rather reflects collective outcomes in society. Non-economic values are statements of 
qualitative, anecdotal, verbal nature. They can be defined as shared collective norms 
and mores based on paternalistic assumptions or deliberated consensus among 
individuals as citizens defining societal outcomes. 
The different theories of social science grouped under non-economic 
approaches each yield different norms according to their theoretical assumptions. 
Non-economic values generally address fundamental structures and conditions of 
society and are often related to the intrinsic value of sharing and being part of a 
community. Objectives can be numerous and can be related to issues such as 
distributional justice, paternalism, community values (Ogus, 2004, pp. 46-54), the 
protection of rights, the maintenance of social solidarity (Prosser, 2006), order and 
security, public mores, cultural quality, government needs and the justice system, 
public sphere benefits, human rights and international obligations (McQuail, 2003, p. 
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20), public opinion formation and provision of public functions such as socialization, 
orientation, recreation, articulation, education, critique and control (Just, 2009, pp. 
97-99). 
Bozeman provides a definition of public values which reflects the here 
described understanding of non-economic values: “A society’s ‘public values’ are 
those providing normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and prerogatives 
to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the obligations of citizens to 
society, the state, and one another; and (c) the principles on which government and 
polices should be based” (2007, p. 13). Individuals as citizens hold public values as 
individual values about things public (ibid., p. 14). In comparison to economic value 
as a monetary concept, non-economic values as societal outcomes are much more 
diverse in nature.  
A central difference to economic rationales is that methodological 
frameworks such as market failures, which identify the need for regulatory action, do 
not exist for non-economic rationales. Similarly, the lack of a value measure makes 
the assessment of the success and performance of regulatory intervention difficult 
(Bozeman, 2007, pp. 97-98). Ver Eecke, for example, negatively defines a non-
economic problem simply as “a problem that cannot properly be addressed by 
economic methods of analysis” (1998, p. 134). The lack of a shared framework often 
leads to the criticism that these values are “the result of arbitrary political decisions, 
rather than reflecting any general philosophy of what is required for a good society” 
(Prosser, 2006, p. 377). 
Values from political, social, and cultural approaches are often ambiguous 
or essentially contested concepts that lack a generally agreed upon definition (Gray, 
2009, pp. 574, 576) both in their respective disciplines as well as in policy discourse 
more generally. They are context specific, develop over time and are subject to 
interpretation. Aside from definitional limitations of non-economic values, further 
problems exist in regard to their causality (effect), their attribution (claim and 
evidence of attributed effects) and their technical measurement (lacking a common 
unit of account, incommensurability, outcome assessment) (ibid., pp. 575-580; 
Throsby, 2001, pp. 27-30, 159). In comparison to well defined economic paradigms, 
non-economic concepts are diffuse and less coherent (Helm, 2005, p. 3).  
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In broadcasting, non-economic values are based on the role of media in 
society in relation to political, social, and cultural objectives. Before reviewing 
political theory, as the core of non-economic approaches, socio-cultural and rights-
based approaches are briefly addressed. 
 
3.1.1 Regulatory Rationales from Social and Cultural Studies 
Social and cultural values can be distinguished from political values in that 
they do not directly relate to political processes. Rather, they stem from more general 
conditions and objectives in society. A distinction between these two is not 
necessarily clean cut but can be made by positioning cultural values more in the 
context of identities of societies and sub-groups, representing the traditional art and 
language of a nation, region or group in society (van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003, 
p. 198), whereas social values seem to refer to the interaction in society by 
addressing social cohesion, social order, inclusion, and belonging.  
The term ‘culture’ itself is undefined, lacking a tangible or agreed upon 
meaning. It encompasses attitudes, beliefs, mores, customs, values and practices 
shared by any group as well as more functional activities related to intellectual, 
moral, artistic aspects of life “which draw on the enlightenment and education of the 
mind” (Throsby, 2001, pp. 3-4). Cultural values subsist either in specific or general 
terms in certain properties of cultural phenomena (ibid., p. 20). They tend to be 
positive rather than negative and from a humanist perspective are universal, 
transcendental, objective, and unconditional characteristics of culture and cultural 
objects (ibid., p. 27). Regarding socio-cultural values, the assumption is that 
broadcast media are instrumental to social orientation and cohesion as well as to the 
representation of culture and identity of nations and different groups of society. 
  
3.1.2 Regulatory Rationales from the Field of Law 
The field of law represents a rights-based approach to non-economic 
rationales. Communications rights are tightly intertwined with the role of the media 
in the democratic process (Napoli, 2007, p. 6 referring to Sunstein, 1995) as 
communication is a fundamental right, a social process and the foundation of social 
organisation (Hamelink, 2003, p. 1 cited from Livingstone & Lunt, 2007, p. 12). 
“Communication rights are based on a vision of the free flow of information and 
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ideas which is interactive, egalitarian and non-discriminatory and driven by human 
needs, rather than commercial or political interests. These rights represent people’s 
claim to freedom, inclusiveness, diversity and participation in the communication 
process” (ibid., p. 1). This includes freedom of speech as a negative and positive 
right; freedom from government censorship and freedom to communicate (Just, 
2009, p. 103; Vick, 2006).  
Aside from specific communication rights, the rights-based perspective 
more generally relates to the promotion of citizen rights through media. The key 
characteristic of citizenship is equal status and treatment (Helm, 2005, p. 4). 
Citizenship constitutes a set of different rights held equally by all members of society 
that enable complex and diverse societies to function together (Tambini, 2006, pp. 
112, 121-123). “Membership of the society is, in the citizen sense, not dependent on 
initial wealth or income. It accrues to each person on the same basis, and this in turn 
translates into the democratic ideal, which gives each member of the society an equal 
say. Much of the welfare state is designed on this principle of equal status: from 
health and education services, through to the nationwide definition of most 
entitlements” (Helm, 2005, pp. 4-5). This differs from the market system, where 
people are treated unequally, depending on their willingness and ability to pay.  
An example of a citizen right is property right, which is not only a 
foundation of democracy but also a central element of capitalist systems and 
therefore relates to both political and economic values. A distinction here can be that 
citizen rights are inherent or fundamental rights whereas consumer-orientated 
economic rights are based on specific transactions and are therefore temporary. 
Citizenship in general entails the rights to vote, to participate fully in society, to 
equality, and to information about the law and government of society (Graham, 2005, 
pp. 88-89).  
Collins (2006b) compares citizenship, as advanced by Marshall (1950) and 
his successors, to an onion, where “each bundle of citizenship entitlements and 
attributes surrounds the other concentrically and nonconflictually” (p. 24). Marshall’s 
triadic bundle of civil, political, and social rights is extended for example by 
Murdock (1999, pp. 29-30) to include information and cultural rights in the context 
of PSB and citizenship (Collins, 2006b, pp. 23).  
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Rights-based rationales related to citizenship and PSB hence span across 
different disciplinary approaches. For Graham (2003a, 2003b cited from Tambini, 
2004, p. 58) the justification of PSB is more fundamental than the correction of 
market failure since it is basic to civil and political rights and non-negotiable. 
 
3.1.3 Regulatory Rationales from Political Science 
Political Science is the most important disciplines discussed in regard to 
non-economic rationales. Political theory can be attributed a special role as it not 
only – as the other disciplines – provides substantive values, here informed through 
democratic theory. It also provides means to authorize and define collective values 
through democratic deliberative processes. 
First, let’s turn to values derived from democratic theory. Political values 
used in PSB justification are informed through normative underpinnings of 
democratic theory and the role of broadcasting in public opinion formation and 
democratic processes (Napoli, 2007, p. 12; Flew, 2009, p. 977; Armstrong & Weeds, 
2005, pp. 25-26). Political values associated with the democratic process are for 
example informed citizenry, universality of access, internal (content) and external 
(provider) plurality. Broadcasting has the objective to promote deliberative 
democracy as “a system in which citizens are informed about policy issues and able 
to make judgements on the basis of reason” (Sunstein, 2000, p. 501). The facilitation 
of a democratic process requires free access to and circulation of reliable, pluralistic 
information relevant to the issues for public opinion formation and collective 
decision-making (McQuail, 2003, pp. 15-16; Graham, 2005, pp. 88-89).  
According to this view, PSB has a central role in facilitating deliberative 
processes and citizen participation. It is in these processes that the distinction 
between individuals as consumers and citizens becomes evident according to their 
different value understandings. The citizenship concept has always been subject to 
interpretation but in its core meaning it “designates membership of a political 
community” (Needham, 2003, pp. 11-13). Equality of citizenship within democracy 
is derived from the civic republican tradition, as is the concept of participatory 
citizenship, according to which citizens derive preferences from deliberation about 
the needs of the community as a whole (Needham, 2003, p. 14), rather than from 
individual utility. Deliberative processes identify societal needs and how they can be 
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supported. They address the questions of ‘what is important’ and ‘how important is 
it’.  
Processes of deliberation and contestation function as shared methods of 
non-economic approaches to establish norms and values. They are desired, 
meaningful, and valid procedures and alternatives to paternalistic decision-making 
(Entman & Wildman, 1992, pp. 14, 17). Deliberation allows participatory decision-
making and dynamic adaptation of values to societal developments. The theoretical 
validity and legitimacy of deliberated values is based on the democratic principle and 
their normative appeal rather than empirical evidence (Just, 2009, p. 13 referring to 
Baker, 2007, p. 8). Similarly, regulatory intervention in pursuit of these values 
should be assessed in deliberative processes, which in part relates to their 
incommensurability. 
Deliberative processes therefore provide a mechanism to identify and 
define non-economic values which are of importance to society as a whole. In these 
processes, individuals develop values as citizens based on information provided to 
encourage reason, argument, and education of opinion formation in a direction that 
increases collective benefits.  
The practicality of deliberation is however limited. Even though it can be 
argued that there is a pervasive difference between what people want as viewers or 
consumers of broadcasting and as citizens (Sunstein, 2000, p. 520), altruistic 
behaviour and individuals’ willingness and ability to distinguish between individual 
and collective benefits is questionable, as it requires high degrees of information and 
altruism that are rather unattainable in practice (Graham, 2005, p. 92). Complex 
policy-making processes, which are often limited to a few policy actors, further 
reduce the practicality of participatory processes and the theoretical ideal of ‘hearing 
all voices’, even if exercised through representative civic groups. According to 
Stoker (2006, p. 53), however, participation of all is not required in a democratic 
system; rather, its defining characteristic is its openness.  
A further limitation of deliberative processes is their majoritarian 
character, which creates the need for additional paternalistic representation of non-
majoritarian interests. Social political choices are made through the voting system 
similar to the market where economic choices are made. The difference between 
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them is that political majoritarian processes can represent citizen and consumer 
objectives, while economic transactions focus on consumer value.  
Non-economic values can hence be developed bottom-up through 
deliberation and top-down through paternalism (Throsby, 2001, pp. 85-86), while the 
latter is the more realistic procedure. Aside from these conceptual and procedural 
difficulties of determining non-economic values, normative ideals are increasingly 
challenged in policy through shifts towards neo-liberal ideology (see chapter 5). 
 
3.1.4 Non-Economic Rationales and PSB Justification 
To conclude this section, it is of interest to address non-economic 
rationales in PSB justification. All objectives which are defined paternalistically or 
deliberatively as desired societal values or outcomes can be used as non-economic 
rationales for PSB provision. In regard to political values, niche programming such 
as high-quality impartial news and factual programming represent the information 
required to facilitate functioning democracies. Similarly, cultural and social 
programming that addresses social cohesion or national identity typically falls in the 
same category of niche programming. Other societal objectives such as shared 
experiences can be used to counter fragmentation and segmentation by catering for 
mass appeal tastes with popular programming such as sports and entertainment. It 
can however also be argued that these programmes are likely to be provided by the 
market (Armstrong & Weeds, 2005, p. 25) due to their popular demand.  
Due to the lack of a clear framework for non-economic values, there is 
hardly any limitation to the creation of normative, value-based arguments for 
intervention. Everything that can be positioned as desirable and beneficial to society 
can be argued for on a normative basis. The possible scope of intervention based on 
non-economic arguments is thus much more flexible and less prescribed than for 
economic market failure rationales.  
PSB remits generally reflect different non-economic values such as 
preserving national culture, heritage, democracy, language, identity, and community. 
Even though national PSB models and remits differ across Western Europe 
(Jakubowicz, 2003, p. 49), some commonly shared understandings and obligations 
can be identified (aggregated from Betzel & Ward, 2004, pp. 48-49; Iosifidis, 2007, 
p. 8):  
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 Universality of content, access 
 Programmes that contribute to social cohesion, cultural diversity  
 High-quality programming (journalistic standards, editorial 
independence, accountability) 
 Contribution to political pluralism, democratic processes 
 Preservation of and contribution to national culture, heritage, history, 
arts, science 
 Innovation, risk-taking, originality 
Some of these values relate to distributional aspects, such as infrastructure 
and coverage, whereas others address content types and characteristics. The 
difficulty with non-economic rationales concerning their definition and assessment 
arises primarily with content-related objectives, rather than with more technical, 
distributional notions. 
 
 
3.2 Comparison of Economic and Non-Economic Rationales: 
 Substantive and Procedural Characteristics 
 
As previous chapters have shown, economic and non-economic rationales 
are abstract concepts, which are based on different sets of theoretical assumptions 
and ideals. In practice, these two approaches are more integrated and less opposing 
than in theory. In order to fully understand the tension between them, it is important 
to identify their theoretical commonalities and differences. 
The fundamental difference between economic and non-economic 
rationales lies in their different starting points and points of impact. Non-economic 
rationales start from desired outcomes in society, whereas economic market failure 
rationales follow the primacy of markets and efficiency as reasons for regulatory 
intervention. The sought regulatory impact hence lies on societal outcomes versus 
market conditions.  
The individual functions as a unit of account in both contexts, however in 
different capacities. In economics, the (rational or bounded rational) individual is 
viewed as a consumer focused on maximising utility. In non-economic approaches, 
individuals are citizens whose decision-making is informed by non-individualistic 
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benefits based on norms and desired societal outcomes. No defined unit of account, 
such as individual utility, exists here. Societal benefit, as the guiding notion, is 
undefined in its component values, which change according to context. This differs 
from the understanding of societal benefit in welfare economics as the aggregate of 
individual utility. 
Briefly summarized, the understanding of the public interest from an 
economic perspective is the aggregate of individual consumer utility, whereas from a 
non-economic perspective the public interest is based on deliberatively or 
paternalistically derived normative values, whereby citizens develop preferences on 
societal benefits independent of their individual utility. Thus, depending on the 
perspective taken in policy processes, certain values are neglected or secondary in 
importance. What is of utility to the individual is not necessarily beneficial to 
society, and vice versa. 
Even though socio-economic concepts such as merit goods and 
assumptions of bounded rationality function as bridging concepts between economic 
and non-economic approaches – by diverting from the primacy of rational 
preferences and individual utility – the main difference persists that no concept of 
individuals as citizens exists in economic theory other than the aggregate of 
individual consumers. In economic theory, the role of individuals is reduced to their 
status as consumers whose individual preferences can be overruled or educated based 
on normative paternalistic judgement. In the case of merit goods, individual 
preferences are overruled whereas in behavioural economics, behavioural change 
intervention is pursued through educating consumers with the intent to change their 
preferences.  
It can thus be summarised that merit goods, externalities, and behavioural 
approaches focus on the individual consumption process to correct misjudged 
consumer utility or inefficiencies. In the case of market failures, behavioural 
implications on individuals and third parties resulting from intervention are only 
secondary or indirect effects, whereas in non-economic approaches societal 
outcomes are the primary objective of intervention.  
In non-economic approaches, individuals can represent their own personal 
interests as well as deliberatively and interactively inform societal objectives in their 
role as citizens. Even though normative considerations can be represented in 
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economic theory through merit goods, they are different in that they are imposed 
paternalistically while individuals remain consumers in a transactional relationship.  
In economic and non-economic approaches, individuals, as decision-
makers, assume different roles as consumers and citizens, while their roles are 
informed by different sets of values. From this perspective, economic and non-
economic approaches are complements rather than rivals, as they are based on 
different value sets and capacities of representing individuals as consumers and 
citizens. The distinction between economic and non-economic approaches is hence 
not merely a lexical one.  
The distinction between individuals as consumers and citizens is relevant 
for the process of defining values, objectives, and regulatory action. As shown for 
the change from analogue to digital broadcasting, the justification and scope of 
intervention is reduced for market failure rationales to the provision of niche content 
with positive benefits. These types of content are also primary objectives of non-
economic rationales. In this specific case, the justifications derived from economic 
and non-economic rationales are very similar.  
This can be exemplified by looking at the means and ends of regulatory 
intervention. Even though economic and non-economic rationales differ in regard to 
the end objectives, similar regulatory activity can be derived to achieve these ends. 
For example, in PSB, free access can be derived from the economic public good 
rationale and the non-economic political rationales of universal access and 
participatory democracy. In the case of economic rationales, free access is a means to 
address market failure (non-rivalry), rather than the objective, which it is however in 
non-economic rationales. Similarly, the provision of niche content can be a 
regulatory outcome of both, but in the context of economic rationales it is a 
regulatory means not because of its desired impact on society but rather as a 
regulatory solution to market failure. Even though the means are the same, the ends 
remain different: Non-economic approaches focus on the positive societal outcomes 
with the consumer being the intermediary, whereas economic concepts focus on the 
consumption transaction and efficiency.  
The difference is thus that neo-classical economic rationales are 
conditional upon the existence of market failure, whereas non-economic rationales 
are not. If market failures cease to apply, reasons for intervention similarly disappear. 
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Generally, it can be said that intervention is reactive to market conditions under 
economic approaches but rather proactive and independent of market conditions in 
non-economic approaches. 
 
Table 3.1: Regulatory Rationales in Analogue and Digital Broadcasting 
 
 
Under current conditions, where economic and non-economic rationales 
apply and lead to similar results in terms of service provision, it can be not always 
obvious why it is necessary to distinguish between PSB justification based on both 
approaches. The importance lies in the different scope of intervention that can be 
derived from economic and non-economic rationales. Economic market failure 
rationales are limited to specific, well prescribed market failures, whereas for non-
economic rationales the discretionary scope in argumentation and thus intervention is 
hardly limited and rather arbitrary.  
Even though the primary objective of non-economic rationales focuses on 
niche content with positive societal benefits, the lack of a defined conceptual 
framework allows extending the argumentation to anything that can be defined as a 
desirable societal outcome. With the decrease in market failures, justification for 
intervention is thus likely to be based increasingly on merit good and non-economic 
rationales. In economics, the objective is to have the least possible intervention, 
Rationale Analogue Digital 
MARKET FAILURE 
Monopoly (spectrum scarcity led to monopoly conditions) Yes No 
 Natural Monopoly  
(Economies of Scale, high fixed, low marginal cost) 
Yes Yes 
Public Good 
- non-rivalry 
- non-exclusion 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No 
Information Asymmetry 
Advertising-funded TV 
Pay-TV 
 
Yes 
Mitigated 
 
Yes 
Mitigated / No 
Externalities, positive and negative  
(third party impact of consumption) 
Negative externalities 
Positive externalities 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Socio-Economic 
Merit good (level of demand) Yes Yes 
NON-ECONOMIC  
Social, cultural, political, rights-based values Yes Yes 
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whereas in non-economic approaches the desired outcome is primary and the scope 
of intervention is not prescribed. 
This rather loose and open nature of non-economic rationales is certainly 
of instrumental value in policy processes. While they provide the opportunity to 
justify larger PSB remits, they are however also more contested in particular in 
policy environments which are biased towards neo-liberal economic paradigms, due 
to their qualitative nature and lack of defined frameworks. 
The limited acceptance of non-economic rationales in practice is related to 
their procedural characteristics, i.e. how different rationales are dealt with in the 
regulatory process. So far, the considerations focused on substantive characteristics 
in the form of theoretical assumptions and values as foundations of economic and 
non-economic rationales. The procedural methods and tools these rationales provide 
for the regulatory process are however also of importance.  
In general, economic rationales and methodologies are much more clearly 
defined than and analytically superior to non-economic rationales and methods, 
which supports their status as the dominant paradigm in practice. The quantitative 
nature of economic concepts, such as market failure, allows the development of 
methodologies (modelling, statistical analysis) that provide objective evidence for 
decision-making. As Zerbe and McCurdy state, the concept of market failure, which 
appeared as a normative explanation in economics for why the need for government 
expenditure arises, has developed into a quasi-scientific, full-scale diagnostic tool of 
cures by which policy-makers learned how to objectively determine the exact scope 
and type of intervention (1999, pp. 559-560).  
Methods such as contingent valuation, for example, serve to quantitatively 
elicit individual preferences and valuations of non-traded or non-market goods or for 
individuals with bounded rationality (Munro, 2009, pp. 2, 13-14). Individuals are 
asked how they value certain characteristics (stated preferences) of a good by stating 
their willingness to pay (WTP). As an economic method based on welfarism (Munro, 
2009, p. 259), WTP focuses on consumer valuation of non-market goods. The 
method can be extended to ask individuals as citizens about a good’s value to 
society. Stated preferences can hence take individual and societal value into account 
to reflect total value (ibid.). In contrast, revealed preferences through consumption 
are limited to consumer value and thus only reflect a proportion of total value.  
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As addressed for deliberative processes, the ability and willingness of 
individuals to alternate their roles from consumers to altruistic citizens who 
subordinate their individual utility to that of society is however also questionable for 
these methods. Further, the accuracy of economic values elicited from stated 
preferences can be questioned as they often do not reflect what individuals would be 
willing to pay (revealed preferences) if these goods were actually tradeable. 
Contingent valuation is also prone to framing biases and the understanding of value 
is limited to monetary value to determine the price of non-market goods rather than 
to discuss or define societal citizen values, as in non-economic approaches.  
Irrespective of these difficulties, the method attempts to elicit total value 
beyond consumer value, which shows that economics offers a tool to address total 
monetary value stated by individuals as citizens even though no theoretical concept 
of individuals as citizens exists in economic theory. The method hence can be 
described as a helpful bridge between economic and non-economic approaches. This 
does, however, not replace the deliberative determination of citizen values.  
A further method rooted in neoclassical economics, which often uses findings 
from contingent valuation, is cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA compares costs and 
benefits of intervention to inform decisions on whether to intervene after the need for 
intervention has been established (Helm, 2006, p. 177; Bozeman, 2007, pp. 53-54). 
The existence of market failure, for example, does not directly lead to or justify 
intervention when the cost of intervention is higher than the benefits derived from it. 
Further, it should be considered whether market failure outweighs the potential 
failure of regulatory techniques (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 16).  
Once intervention has been decided and implemented, performance 
assessment methodologies serve to identify regulatory success or failure. 
Government or regulatory failure describes conditions when government fails to 
intervene, intervention fails to improve imperfect market conditions, or the cost of 
intervention is greater than the cost of failure or the benefits derived from 
intervention (Hoskins et al., 2004, p. 304).  
The application of all of these methods is easier for quantifiable objectives 
with short- to mid-term impacts, as in the case of economic rationales and 
consumption processes, rather than for qualitative, long-term and often 
incommensurable societal outcomes, as in non-economic approaches.  
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Non-economic approaches generally lack a methodological framework and 
shared definitions of core concepts and values. Paternalism, which can be criticised 
for its elitist nature and interference with individual rights (Sunstein, 2000, pp. 522-
523; Ogus, 2004, pp. 52-53; Munro, 2009, pp. 114-121), and deliberative processes, 
which lack practicality, are the only accepted procedures for the definition and 
assessment of non-economic outcomes. Incommensurability, incomparability, 
contestation, the lack of objective, quantifiable ‘hard’ empirical evidence and long-
term impacts focused on outcome rather than input and output make the transition 
from theory to practice and the integration of normative values into established, 
standardized economic decision-making and assessments processes difficult if not 
impossible.  
A further difference between methodologies of the two approaches is that 
deliberative methods, such as citizen juries, focus not only on outcomes but also on 
the process itself as a source of value creation (Munro, 2009, pp. 16, 259). Even 
though these processes have the advantage of decreasing information asymmetries by 
informing participants, they are highly susceptible to framing biases. 
Differences between economic and non-economic rationales therefore exist 
in regard to their substantive and procedural concepts for policy analysis and 
formulation (also Ng, 1972, pp. 1015-1017). Economic frameworks allow for a more 
objective, quantitative analysis with subjective judgment limited to the interpretation 
of quantitative evidence for policy formulation. Economics generally refrains from 
value judgements as far as possible. For non-economic concepts, quantification is 
limited and a high degree of value judgement is required for both policy analysis and 
formulation, which increases contestability.  
Policy formulation thus always, for both economic and non-economic 
approaches, requires some form of value judgment. In the case of PSB, for example, 
the provision of content with positive benefits, an objective derived from both 
economic and non-economic rationales, requires value judgements in order to define 
what type of programming is seen to provided these benefits. Value judgements are 
thus present in economic and non-economic approaches, however less prevalent in 
the former than the latter. 
The following table summarises these key characteristics of both 
approaches which are later used as analytical categories in the empirical analysis. 
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of Economic and Non-Economic Rationales
9
  
 
Characteristics Political, Social, Cultural  
Citizen Perspective 
Economic  
Consumer Perspective 
Rationales, 
objectives  
 Wider social, cultural, political 
benefits  
 Equality, distributional objectives, 
access to communication, 
universality  
 Deliberation, democratic 
processes, participation 
 Diversity, pluralism  
 Objectivity, editorial independence 
 Information, education, freedom of 
communication and speech 
 Control, accountability 
 Industrial policy, sectoral, regional  
 Social order, cohesion, interaction, 
integration 
 Cultural heritage, identity 
 Prevention of harm, public offence 
 Primacy of individual utility 
 Consumer sovereignty 
 Supply and demand 
 Efficiency 
 Competition 
 Choice 
 Profit 
 
Individual as...  Citizen, member of society Consumer, market participant 
Preferences and 
decision-making 
Preferences on desired societal 
outcomes, derived from deliberation 
or paternalism 
Self-regarding, rational, preferences 
derived from individual utility,  
Value Shared norms, values, wider societal 
outcomes, qualitative 
Quantitative monetary, consumer 
value, utility 
Public Interest Aggregated citizen values on desired 
societal outcomes  
Aggregated preferences based on 
individual utility 
Interaction Participatory, long-term  Transactional, short-term, voluntary  
Accountability Political accountability, democratic 
process, downward (to the public), 
upward (to elected representatives)  
Market accountability, downward 
and bilateral (providers through 
competition and complaint) 
Power Voice as discussion (not complaint), 
loyalty towards community based on 
common citizenship 
Exercised passively through 
aggregate signalling, exit and voice 
as complaint 
Allocation Public sector Market  
Trigger for 
regulation  
Paternalistically and deliberatively 
defined societal outcomes (social, 
cultural, political) 
Market failure, merit good, bounded 
rationality 
Scope of 
intervention  
Whatever is commonly valued as a 
desired societal outcome 
Market failures, merit good, bounded 
rationality 
Assessment of 
Intervention  
Outcome, impact Input, output, efficiency  
Decision-making Qualitative, deliberative, value 
judgement  
Quantitative, positive (economic) 
analysis, facts, evidence-based 
Value Chain Input  Output  Consumption  
Outcome 
Input  Output  Consumption 
                                                 
9
 Aggregated in part from van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003, pp. 184-185, 202; Bardoel & d’Haenens, 
2008, p. 343; Needham, 2003, pp. 5, 11, 14; Livingstone et al., 2007a, p. 629. 
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In direct comparison, both economic and non-economic approaches 
possess theoretical validity as competing ideologies. In regard to their practical 
validity, however, a hierarchy exists as economic approaches dominate regulatory 
practice due to their more elaborate and well defined conceptual and methodological 
frameworks, which generate quantitative evidence for decision-making. The 
challenge of non-economic approaches is therefore that their theoretical validity 
cannot as easily be translated into empirical validity as for economic approaches, 
which claim both theoretical and empirical validity. Due to their analytical 
inferiority, non-economic rationales are often marginalized in regulatory practice, 
which is emphasised through a general tendency towards economic ideology as the 
dominant paradigm in regulation. 
One possible and often attempted solution to or consequence of this 
methodological discrepancy between economic and non-economic rationales is 
technocratisation, “i.e. attempts to bring closure to the political contestation in the 
name of empirical objectivity or expert knowledge” (Karppinen, 2006, p. 54). 
Technocratisation stabilizes or diminishes political contestation and antagonism by 
imposing common criteria or conceptual frameworks based on the individual upon 
normative values, which can be seen as an attempt to establish certain criteria and 
concepts as hegemonic (ibid., p. 59). It can further be assumed that the assessment of 
non-economic values through economic concepts increases their acceptance in neo-
liberal policy environments. 
Critics of technocratisation however say that attempts to quantify 
normative concepts do not live up to the expectations which are associated with the 
use of quantitative methods, such as objectivity, reliability, scientific empirical 
evidence and replicable causal generalization. Positive analysis is thus considered 
insufficient for normative values (Just, 2009, p. 113). Technocratisation fails to 
reflect the complexity of normative concepts when they are reduced to single 
quantitative values or evidence. Further consequences can be consumerisation and 
depolitisation (Needham, 2003), weak public debates on normative issues as well as 
arbitrariness and unintentional consequences when political processes inherent to 
normative concepts are disregarded (Karppinen, 2006, p. 59). Critics further say that 
technocratisation can be an instrument to shift policy debates to other policy 
domains, such as from sector specific regulation, e.g. communications regulation, to 
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functional regulation, e.g. competition regulation (Just, 2009, p. 113 referring to Just, 
2007).  
Decision-making based on normative judgement in deliberative or 
paternalistic form, which applies not only to non-economic rationales but also to 
merit and non-market goods, is much more challenging in practice than outlined in 
theory. Merging non-economic and economic rationales through technocratisation in 
discourse and practices does not solve this problem but rather creates the danger of 
making non-economic rationales even less applicable, accepted and credible as they 
lose some of their unique characteristics. The contestation inherent to concepts such 
as public value requires negotiation between different interests and conflicting 
values. The latter exist typically between choice and equity, equity/democracy and 
efficiency, and efficiency and universality (Hills & Sullivan, 2006, pp. 21-22; Stoker, 
2003).  
The question then remains how these value conflicts between economic 
and non-economic rationales should be addressed in practice. The danger exists to 
create the illusion that non-economic objectives can become uncontested by 
approaching them with technical means. Instead, technocratic and deliberative 
approaches should co-exist, which requires openness and awareness of policy actors 
on both sides to extend their often narrow disciplinary foci.  
A conclusion to the reviews can therefore be that a balance needs to be 
found between economic and non-economic priorities. “[…] if we are serious about 
striving for theoretical completeness and operational validity, it is essential to admit a 
concept of cultural value alongside that of economic value in assessing the 
phenomena under study” (Throsby, 2001, pp. 160, 158-160). Cowling similarly 
argues that “The challenge for public policymakers is to define the relevant questions 
and issues in such a way that captures all the economic and non-economic aspects of 
an individual’s decision-making process, and to best utilise these techniques in the 
decision-making process” (2006, p. 34).  
The underlying thought is thus that different rationales and values should 
be seen as complements rather than opposites. Collins and Sujon for example state 
that the terms citizen and consumer have been articulated as rival and mutually 
exclusive categories even though there is no necessary or intrinsic incompatibility 
between the systems of values they represent (2007, p. 40). The complementarity of 
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economic and non-economic values has also been pointed out in the comparison 
above. The challenge is therefore to integrate both approaches and utilizes their 
different characteristics to derive regulatory objectives from both. For PSB, this 
translates into a justification derived from both economic and non-economic 
rationales. 
 
 
3.3 Conclusion: Economic and Non-Economic Rationales 
 
To summarise, chapters 2 and 3 reviewed economic and non-economic 
rationales regarding their substantive and procedural characteristics in the context of 
PSB. The role of these reviews was twofold:  
Firstly, theoretical evidence was provided to show how a decrease in 
applicable distribution-based market failures from analogue to digital broadcasting 
turned them from legitimising rationales in analogue broadcasting to de-legitimising 
rationales in digital broadcasting (as only content-based market failures persist, 
which reduces the scope of PSB justification). This provides theoretical evidence and 
a reference point for the analysis of a paradigms shift, as it indicates that changes in 
the regulatory justification took place in the transition from analogue to digital 
broadcasting which might provide the impetus to develop an alternative rationale to 
market failure in the form of the public value notion. The wider context of the public 
value change process and characteristics typical of paradigm shifts are investigated 
empirically in chapter 9.  
Secondly, the chapters provided a detailed review of economic and non-
economic rationales in the justification of PSB with regard to their commonalities 
and differences. The key characteristics of both economic and non-economic 
rationales summarised in table 3.2 function as analytical categories. It could be 
shown that their main distinctions are the opposite (substantive) foci on consumers 
and markets versus citizens and society, as well as their different degrees of defined 
(procedural) concepts and available methodologies. The intention was to develop a 
better understanding of their often conflicting relationship and distinctiveness in the 
regulatory process.  
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These reviews inform the use of economic and non-economic rationales as 
analytical categories in the component analysis of the public value notion to 
investigate its ideological composition with regard to the hierarchy of economic and 
non-economic rationales. This component analysis investigates whether the assumed 
prioritisation of non-economic over economic rationales with the public value notion 
is indeed the case, which is investigated on the applied notion in PSB practice in 
chapters 7 and 8. According to Hall’s 3rd order classification of a paradigm shift, 
which is adopted here, a shift in ideology indicates a paradigm shift.  
These findings therefore provide theoretical backgrounds and analytical 
categories for the investigation of the first and second research questions. The first 
research question is addressed with regard to the provision of analytical categories 
for the ideological component analysis of the public value notion. The second 
research question is addressed with regard to the wider context of the public value 
policy change process and typical characteristics of paradigm shift processes. 
The next chapter now provides further theoretical background for the 
investigation of the wider policy change process as stated in the second research 
question. Here different motivational and contextual influence factors as well as 
institutions and strategies are reviewed that play a role in influencing policy-making.  
These influence factors are reviewed as the investigation of an ideological 
shift alone is not sufficient to classify a paradigm shift (chapter 1). Further, while the 
focus lies on the investigation of the ideological composition of the public value 
notion as a policy idea to influence policy-making, the possible change in ideology 
cannot be seen as the only explanatory factor for the public value change process. 
This view is based on the ontological position that policy change is always the 
outcome of a variety of factors which need to be considered even if the focus lies on 
one specific characteristic like ideological change. 
Further, the wider contextual review investigates the occurrence of typical 
paradigm shift characteristics in the policy change process, which provides 
secondary evidence to classify a paradigm shift beyond evidence of a shift in 
ideology. 
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4. THEORIES ON INFLUENCE FACTORS AND INFLUENCE 
 TAKING IN POLICY-MAKING 
 
The previous two chapters have reviewed economic and non-economic 
regulatory rationales with regard to investigating the ideological composition of the 
public value notion, as outlined in the first research question. This chapter now 
reviews relevant literature for the wider contextual analysis of the public value 
change process, as addressed in the second research question. The investigation of 
the wider policy change process provides further evidence to inform a paradigm shift 
classification by investigating the reasons for change and the characteristics of the 
process.  
This chapter reviews the relevant theory that explains policy-making and the 
role of different factors that influence policy processes. The public value notion is 
investigated as such a policy idea that is used to influence policy-making in order to 
achieve policy change.  
The review focuses on different strands of theory that, taken together with the 
theories reviewed in the previous chapter, inform the conceptual framework of this 
study (and its epistemological and ontological position), which is developed at the 
end of this chapter.  
The first theoretical strand reviews literature on different influence factors in 
policy-making (section 4.1). This includes public and private interest theories as 
factors that concern the motivation of policy-makers to act in public or private 
interests (section 4.1.1). Beyond these motivational factors, different neo-
institutional approaches are reviewed which address wider contextual factors, or 
institutions, that influence the behaviour of policy actors independent of their own 
motivations (section 4.1.2).  
In the review of neo-institutional approaches, particular attention is paid to 
sociological neo-institutionalism (section 4.1.2.3) which addresses policy ideas as 
influence factors in policy-making. The public value notion is investigated as such a 
policy idea that was devised to influence policy-making and facilitate policy change.  
These two strands of interest theories and neo-institutional approaches 
represent the context in which policy-making takes place. They roughly reflect the 
often made distinction in policy analysis between agency (interests) and structure 
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(institutions). Policy processes are “both structured – circumscribed by institutions, 
economic, technological and governmental dynamics – and actor-driven in the 
pursuit of different norms and goals” (Freedman, 2008b, p. 4). 
In order to theoretically reflect the formulation of a policy idea, such as the 
public value notion, in the context of own interests (interest theories) and contextual 
institutional constraints (neo-institutional approaches), the approach of non-market 
strategy (NMS) is introduced in section 4.2. NMS postulates the integration of 
competitive (market) and regulatory (non-market) strategy, as both market and non-
market contexts determine the competitive advantage of companies.  
For the purposes of this thesis, NMS is particularly suitable to address the 
strategic formulation of policy ideas in the context of market and non-market 
environments, or put differently in the context of own interests (operational 
objectives) and contextual constraints (policy contexts). As a theoretical approach, 
NMS can bring the two perspectives of agency and structure together with regard to 
the formulation of strategic influence taking in policy-making.  
These theories on influence factors and policy strategy reflect the ontological 
position that policy-making is a highly complex process which is always the result of 
a variety of factors that need to be considered even if the investigation concentrates 
on one specific characteristic like policy ideas and ideological change. This further 
reflects the position outlined in the first chapter that the investigation of an 
ideological shift associated with a policy idea, as addressed by the first research 
question, is not sufficient to explain a policy change process or classify a paradigm 
shift. The second research question therefore investigates the wider policy change 
process and different influence factors and process characteristics to explain and 
investigate whether a paradigm shift has taken place.  
Similar to the reviews in the previous two chapters, which yielded analytical 
categories for the ideological component analysis of the public value notion, this 
review provides the understanding of motivational and contextual influence factors 
and strategy formulation in policy-making as the theoretical background for the 
contextual analysis of the wider policy change process of the public value notion, as 
outlined in the second research question. This contains the analysis of influence 
factors to explain why the process has taken place as well as an analysis of the 
process regarding its characteristic as a policy change or paradigm shift process. 
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The chapter concludes with developing a conceptual framework that 
integrates the theories reviewed in chapters 2-4. It can be summarised that the 
investigation of the policy change process associated with the public value notion 
lies at the intersection of different bodies of literature, comprising reviews of 
economic and non-economic rationales (chapters 2, 3) as well as motivational and 
contextual influence factors that provide the context for the strategic formulation of 
policy ideas to influence policy-making (chapter 4). 
It is typical for the analysis of policy change processes to adopt such a 
complex theoretical and conceptual framework as it is necessary to reflect the 
empirical complexity of such developments (see for example Carson et al., 2009, pp. 
12-26). The framework thus incorporates ideologies, interests, structures and strategy 
as drivers of policy processes, while the overall focus lies on policy ideas and 
ideologies represented through economic and non-economic rationales. 
This conceptual or theoretical framework needs to be distinguished from the 
analytical paradigm shift framework devised in chapter 1. The paradigm shift 
framework is used to derive a conclusion on whether the policy change which took 
place with the public value notion can be classified as a paradigm shift. The 
paradigm shift classification is an analytical framework whereas these theoretical 
reviews provided in chapters 2-4 represent the conceptual framework in which the 
thesis is positioned theoretically and which inform its ontological and 
epistemological position. 
 
 
4.1 Influence Factors in Policy-Making: Interest Theories and Neo-
 Institutional Approaches 
 
As briefly addressed in the introduction, this section reviews public and 
private interest theories regarding the motivation of decision-makers (section 4.1.1.). 
In addition to these motivational influence factors, wider contextual influence factors 
are reviewed along different neo-institutional approaches, which impact the 
behaviour of all policy actors, both decision-makers and influence-takers (4.2.1). 
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4.1.1 Public and Private Interest Theories  
Interest theories address motivational factors that influence decision-
making in policy processes. They can be divided into public, group, and private 
interest theories.  
Public interest theories assume that decision-making takes place based on a 
functional assessment of the nature of the problem. Decision-makers are motivated to 
serve in the best interest of the public – rather than the pursuit of personal interests. 
The latter is addressed in private interest theories, where decision-makers deviate 
from the functional or ideal policy position in order to accommodate own interests.  
A further difference between those two strands is that public interest 
theories do not make rational actor assumptions whereas private interest theories do. 
Public interest theory is a normative theory that describes how regulatory 
intervention ought to be, i.e. in the interest of the public at large. In contrast to this, 
private or group interest theories are positive theories that attempt to explain how and 
when government intervenes. Both types of theories are appropriate for explaining 
certain aspects of government intervention as policy-making in practice reveals both 
patterns (Hoskins et al., 2004, pp. 306, 310). 
 
4.1.1.1 Public Interest Theories  
The public interest theory was the dominant belief and traditional 
assumption of government behaviour, stating that elected officials or policy-makers 
act to protect and pursue the public interest. In comparison to the previous chapters, 
where different ideological compositions of the public interest were discussed, the 
focus here shifts from the term to motivations of actors and the context in which the 
concept is applied.  
According to Baldwin and Cave, public interest theories may be seen as a 
“complement to ‘functionalist’ accounts of regulatory origins and developments, in 
so far as functionalism sees regulation as largely driven by the nature of the task at 
hand (as identified in terms of public needs and interests) rather than by private, 
individual or self-interests” (1999, p. 19). Regulatory decisions are taken in the 
public interest and are based on different ideological rationales for intervention. As 
discussed previously, rationales differ in their understanding of the public interest as 
either the aggregate of individual utility (economic rationales) or societal values and 
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outcomes (non-economic rationales). Despite these differences, both rationales 
postulate that intervention should take place in the public interest rather than policy-
makers’ self-interest.  
The public interest theory emerged in the context of the Economic Theory 
of Regulation (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976), which, as a private interest theory, 
revised the view that regulation was intended to serve the public interest (Quirk, 
1988, p. 33). According to Hantke-Domas, the distinction between the political 
concept of the public interest and the public interest theory remains however unclear 
as no source, origin or author constructing a theory on regulation based on public 
interest can be found (2003, pp. 182-183, 188).  
Irrespective of these uncertainties regarding its status as a theory or its 
disciplinary origin, regulation in the public interest, whether informed by economic 
or non-economic rationales, signals the pursuit of intervention in the best interest of 
the public – rather than any other interest of policy actors or interest groups.  
Criticism of the public interest theory arises with regard to the difficulty of 
defining the concept of the public interest, due to its various understandings in 
different ideological approaches. Further criticism addresses the assumed expertise 
of regulators to yield these public interest ends, the understatement of the influence 
of economic and political power on regulatory institutions, and the competition for 
power among different interest groups (Baldwin & Cave pp. 20-21). The assumption 
that paternalistic decisions are superior to individual decisions can also be a point of 
contestation. 
The main criticism however is that the theory takes a simplified view by 
assuming that political actors act according to the functional nature of the problem 
and are free from personal interests. 
 
4.1.1.2 Private and Group Interest Theories 
Private and group interest theories developed out of the critique of public 
interest theory and its assumption that public actors serve in the best interest of the 
public. The Economic Theory of Regulation (Stigler, 1971), also known as capture 
theory, was the first private interest theory to revise the view that regulation always 
serves the public interest (Quirk, 1988, p. 33). Public choice theory was applied to 
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the policy process by assuming neo-classical conditions of rational choice and utility 
maximization for all policy actors; policy-makers, voters, interest groups, and others.  
Under these assumptions, the regulatory process is viewed as the result of 
supply and demand of policy. The interaction between policy actors is understood as 
a political market place where the policy process is conceptualized as an exchange 
between interest groups demanding favourable policies and policymaker supplying 
public policy (Bonardi et al., 2005, p. 398; Ogus, 2004, p. 59; Hoskins et al., 2004, 
pp. 304-305). As regulators and political actors value monetary or informational 
resources that interest groups provide to take influence, they may support a policy 
other than the ideal policy in exchange for these resources. 
Since only large groups such as corporations, labour, and trade associations 
represent significant demand and exert more influence than other groups, Stigler 
concluded that regulation can only be created for the benefit of the regulated industry 
(Quirk, 1988, pp. 32-33; Ogus, 2004, p. 71). Economic theories of regulation place 
emphasis “on the propensity of [such] actors to circumvent official regulatory goals 
and substitute ends that are self-serving and to act in pursuit of such ends as job 
retention, aggrandizement, re-election, or the accumulation of personal wealth” 
(Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 23).  
Capture theory thus states that regulation does not protect the public at 
large but instead furthers economic interests of specific groups who ‘capture’ 
regulators to regulate in ways favourable to those groups (Hoskins et al., 2004, p. 
306; Bonardi et al., 2005, p. 398). As such, the theory has rather specific implications 
not only on policy-making but also on policy change. As interest groups dominate 
policy-making, policy change only occurs as a result of changes in interest groups’ 
demands, which are again determined by changes in economic conditions. The 
theory therefore implies that economic change is a principal cause of policy change 
(Quirk, 1988, p. 34).  
With regard to its limitations, the private interest theory is criticized for 
neglecting influence factors other than wealth maximization. “The rational model is 
so concerned with efficiency in decision-making that the influence of [...] social and 
political forces are ignored” (Marinetto, 1999, p. 8). For those who support the 
smallest possible scope of government intervention, the capture theory however 
remains popular as it shows regulatory action in support of private rather than public 
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interests. As capture theory describes a form of regulatory failure, opponents of 
regulation use it to argue against regulation in the first place.  
Since private interest theory focuses on the influence of industry groups 
and economic interests of policy-makers, refined approaches have developed that 
address the interplay between different interest groups. These so called group interest 
theories address the extent to which policy-making and change are driven by 
interrelationships between different groups and between such groups and policy-
makers (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, pp. 21, 33).
 
 
It can be summarised that private and public interest theories address 
motivational factors that influence decision-makers’ preferences and thus policy 
outcomes. With their focus on the interplay between different policy actors, both 
strands can be criticized for ignoring or neglecting non-motivational or contextual 
influence factors which impact individual decision-making or group behaviour in 
regulatory processes. These limitations have been addressed by neo-institutional 
approaches, which focus on contextual influence factors in policy-making. 
 
4.1.2 Neo-Institutional Approaches 
Public and private interest theories can be criticised for having an 
oversimplified view of decision-making as they only take self-interested, 
motivational factors into account. The application of scientific principles to social 
phenomena, as in public choice approaches, has analytical and predictive potential 
but also a limited view of individuals as rational, welfare maximising actors (Walters 
& Sudweeks, 1996, p. 426). Aside from these motivational factors, further external 
or contextual factors exist which influence policy outcomes.  
Neo-institutional approaches critique and extend the one-dimensional 
motivational focus of interest theories by adopting a more holistic, systemic 
perspective, which sees regulation operating in the wider context of various factors 
that impact policy outcomes. These factors have largely been excluded in interest 
theories. Neo-Institutionalism centres on the notion that institutional structures and 
arrangements, as well as social processes and concepts significantly shape regulation 
(Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 27). 
The shared understanding among neo-institutional schools is that policy-
making is grounded in dynamics and characteristics of institutions, which are 
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dominated by ideas, rules and meta-rules established at the constitutional level as 
well as more specific rules associated with the policy process, procedural routines 
and roles, organisational structures and strategies (Knoepfel et al., 2007, p. 17; 
Fischer, 2003, p. 29). All these taken together “constitute an ‘institutional 
construction of meaning’ that shapes actors’ preferences, expectations, experiences, 
and interpretations of actions. As a dominant force determining meaning they shape 
the ways people communicate and argue with one another” (Fischer, 2003, p. 29). 
Institutional theories thus address how actors’ interests are shaped and constrained by 
institutions as influence factors.  
Neo-institutional approaches come from different disciplines and can be 
grouped into three main strands of rationale choice, historical and sociological neo-
institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 936; Fischer, 2003, p. 28; Baldwin & Cave, 
1999, pp. 29-31; Koelble, 1995). All schools share the view that institutions matter in 
political and social outcomes as institutions provide the structures in which these 
processes occur. “Institutions comprise cognitive and moral structures, rules or 
norms which are regarded as socially or legally binding but which are not self-
enforcing. They have a behavioural dimension, providing norms or rules of 
behaviour […]” (Black, 1997, p. 54). 
These shared behavioural assumptions reflect the critique of atomistic 
accounts of rational individuals in public choices approaches as well as of old 
institutional approaches of the 1950s, which saw political and legal structures as 
responsible for guiding political outcome in the public interest (Black, 1997, p. 56). 
Behavioural approaches thus take a position between these two extreme views of 
actors’ self-interest (private interest theories) or political and legal structures (public 
interest theory) as the underlying assumptions of policy-making by instead 
promoting the view that these different motivational aspects are of importance but 
that their pursuit is again influenced by a further set of formal and informal 
contextual institutions. “Supplying them with regularized rules, standards of 
assessments, and emotive commitments, institutions influence actors by structuring 
or shaping the political and social interpretations of the problems they have to deal 
with and by limiting the choices of policy solutions that might be implemented. The 
interests of actors are still there, but they are influenced by the institutional 
structures, norms, and rules through which they are pursued. Such structural 
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relationships give shape to both social and political expectations and the possibility 
of realizing them” (Fischer, 2003, p. 28). 
Bounded rationality assumptions further reflect the reciprocal nature of the 
relationship between institutions and individual behaviour, as institutions shape 
individual preferences and their interpretation of the world around them and are in 
turn shaped by them (Black, 1997, pp. 63, 68). In shaping both preferences and ways 
to pursue them, institutions provide a varying scope of choice for individual or 
organisational action which means that individual or organisational action can only 
be explained in its social context (ibid., p. 68). “Institutionalism thus offers, at its 
simplest, an analysis which posits that institutions structure actions, and perhaps 
preferences, and are themselves shaped by the actions of individuals and 
organizations” (ibid., p. 74).  
Despite these shared assumptions of behaviouralism, differences exist 
between neo-institutional schools regarding their understanding of and focus on 
institutions and the weight ascribed to them in terms of impacting individuals’ 
preferences. The spectrum ranges from shaping (rational choice), to constraining 
(historical), and defining/dominating (sociological) preferences. The schools further 
differ regarding explanations for and assumptions of the origin and development of 
institutions. 
Therefore, neo-institutionalism as such does not constitute a unified but 
rather a disparate and diverse body of thought that lacks a central analytical structure 
(Black, 1997, p. 54; Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 936). Its strength of providing different 
disciplinary approaches on influence factors in policy-making can, due to its broad 
nature, also be interpreted as a weakness. A point of critique here is that definitions 
of institutions are vague and ambiguous within as well as across the different schools 
(Black, 1997, pp. 58-59). Further, questions arise in how far different institutional 
explanation can be balanced with other influence factors in accounting for policy 
outcomes (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 33).  
The schools have different strengths and weaknesses and focus on different 
aspects of institutions and human behaviour, providing a partial account of the 
contextual environment and its many factors that influence policy actors’ 
preferences. As such, they are complements. Even though they have remained rather 
distanced, increasing interdisciplinary exchange is seen as a positive development as 
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approaches can learn from each other to resolve remaining issues (Hall & Taylor, 
1996, pp. 955-957). Since all institutions have a place in explaining phenomena in 
political processes (Koelble, 1995, p. 242), an integrated view comprising all 
approaches comes closest to real-life conditions.  
The different schools are briefly reviewed in the following. The focus is on 
sociological neo-institutionalism and the role of ideas as institutions in policy 
processes. 
  
4.1.2.1 Rational Choice Neo-Institutionalism  
Rational choice neo-institutionalism draws on rational choice concepts 
such as property rights, rent seeking, and transaction costs to explain the operation 
and development of political institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 943). It addresses 
how institutions influence the formulation of individual preferences. Individuals are 
assumed to act in their own interest to maximize individual utility in a strategic 
manner (ibid., p. 944). Individuals are however bound in their rationality, which 
means that they have cognitive limitations, incomplete information, and difficulties 
in monitoring and enforcing agreements (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, pp. 28-29). They 
are bound through institutions, systems of rules and inducements of behaviour, which 
structure their strategic behaviour and therefore also their interaction with other 
individuals in political and social processes (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 945; Black, 
1997, p. 55).  
Under cognitive limitations, individuals may act rationally in the sense that 
they act purposefully to achieve their preferred outcome. They do this however based 
on limited information and alternatives which they cannot process fully (Simon, 
1957 cited from Black, 1997, p. 63). Since actors are not capable of processing all 
available information, they take contextual factors into account when formulating 
their preferences to make up for imperfect information (Henisz & Zelner, 2003, p. 
451). The knowledge they have and the way in which they see alternatives is 
subjectively constructed and imperfect because information is filtered and 
alternatives are seen and assessed according to individuals’ perceptions and 
interpretations, which are again shaped by institutions (Black, 1997, p. 56). 
Individuals’ ‘decision frames’ are therefore of crucial relevance to the decision-
making process (ibid., p. 63). 
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In regard to the relationship between institutions and behaviour, rational 
choice neo-institutionalism emphasises instrumental, self-interested behaviour based 
on strategic calculations and preferences, which are influenced by institutions (Hall 
& Taylor, 1996, p. 951). As intervening variables, institutions influence the 
formulation and pursuit of individual preferences and actions but do not determine 
them (Koelble, 1995, p. 232). For policy-making, this implies that institutions 
influence individual preferences and strategic behaviour in policy processes. 
Explanations regarding the origin, existence, and change of institutions in 
rational choice neo-institutionalism address the function institutions perform and 
benefits they provide, whereby this functionalist view works well to explain the 
existence of institutions but is limited in terms of explaining their origins (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, pp. 952-953).  
As a critique of rational assumptions in interest theories, neo-
institutionalism introduces bounded rationality, which makes it possible to retain 
assumptions of utility maximization as a central motivational factor while it also 
allows for the inclusion of other factors that influence preferences beyond mere 
motives of welfare maximization. Rational choice institutionalism thus provides a 
central framework upon which other neo-institutional approaches build to include the 
influence of non-motivational factors on actors’ preference formation and thus 
policy-making. 
 
4.1.2.2  Historical Neo-Institutionalism 
Historical or political neo-institutionalism developed in response to group 
theories and structural-functionalism in political science (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 
937). In regard to group theories, historical neo-institutionalism accepts the notion 
that group rivalry for scarce resources lies at the heart of politics and explains 
inequality of outcomes through conflicts between the institutional organisation of 
policy and economic structures. The focus thereby lies on the importance of political 
institutions; which of them matter and how they matter. The approach is especially 
concerned with the nature of collective action and the way in which political 
structures, institutions, and decision-making processes shape political outcomes 
(Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 29).  
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With regard to structural functionalism, historical neo-institutionalism 
accepts the idea of policy as an overall system of interacting parts. Historical neo-
institutionalism however sees the structuralism implicit in institutions of the polity as 
the main factor structuring collective behaviour and generating distinctive outcomes, 
rather than functionalism, which views political outcomes as a response to the needs 
of the system.  
In regard to institutional development, historical institutionalism addresses 
path dependency of organisations and unintended consequences; how past decisions, 
practices and procedures influence future behaviour and thus regulatory 
developments (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 30). The institutional structures of 
governments are themselves significant players in the policy process, as political 
institutions have the capacity for autonomous action and thus shape the interests of 
political actors and structure their actions in pursuing those interests (Black, 1997, p. 
56). The understanding of how exactly institutions affect behaviour is however less 
developed than in other schools (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 950).  
Historical institutionalism further tends to conceptualize the relationship 
between individuals and institutions in relatively broad terms while also attempting 
to integrate the institutional analysis with other influence factors, such as ideas and 
their impact on political outcomes (ibid., p. 938). This approach does not deny that 
individuals attempt to calculate their interests but it argues that outcomes are the 
product of the interaction among various groups, interests, ideas, and institutional 
structures, so that preferences are formed by the institutional contexts within which 
they emerge and should thus not be treated as fixed (Koelble, 1995, p. 232). 
Institutions play a determinant role as they shape the actions of individuals but are at 
times affected by collective and individual choices (ibid.). In comparison to rational 
choice institutionalism, institutions are here ascribed greater weight in influencing 
actors’ preferences as they are seen to determine rather than influence preferences. 
  
4.1.2.3  Sociological Neo-Institutionalism 
Sociological neo-institutionalism is the most relevant approach for the 
study of the public value notion, as it addresses ideas and ideologies as institutions 
that influence organisations and individual preferences. Sociological neo-
institutionalism arose primarily within the subfield of organisation theory (Black, 
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1997, p. 57). It challenges traditional distinctions between efficiency/rationality and 
cultural understandings of the social world by addressing the importance of culture in 
bureaucratic structures. The argument is that many of the institutional forms and 
procedures used by organisations were not adopted due to their efficiency in 
addressing organisational goals, but that these forms and procedures should be seen 
as culturally-specific practices that were assimilated into organisations due to 
processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally (Hall 
& Taylor, 1996, pp. 946-947). Organisational forms, procedures, symbols and their 
diffusion are explained in cultural terms.  
The sociological school is relatively distinctive from the other schools in 
terms of its much broader definition of institutions, which does not include concrete 
organisations but instead focuses on institutions as socially constructed routine-
reproduced programme or rule systems, norms and conventions with rule-like status 
in social thought and action (Black, 1997, p. 58). Institutions are not just formal 
rules, procedures or norms, but also symbol systems, cognitive scripts, ideologies 
and moral templates that function as frames guiding actors’ preferences (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 947). The focus lies on cognitive processes, cultural frameworks of 
perception and the relationship between different institutions (which need to be 
conformed to) and practical responses.  
This broader definition is significant as it redefines culture itself as an 
institution and thus breaks down the conceptual divide between institutions and 
culture; that is between institutional explanations based on organisational structures 
versus cultural explanations based on culture as shared attitudes or values (ibid., pp. 
947-948). Institutions are themselves seen to be dependent upon larger macro-level 
variables such as society and culture (Koeble, 1995, p. 232). They are societal or 
sectoral – but not organisational – forms, structural components or rules that affect 
organisations in their world views and thus create a certain level of homogeneity 
among organisations and their actors (Black, 1997, p. 57).  
With regard to the origin and change of institutions, sociological neo-
institutionalism assumes that organisations adopt specific institutional forms or 
practices because they are widely valued and accepted within a broader cultural 
environment and therefore enhance the social legitimacy of the organisation (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 949). Legitimacy or social appropriateness can be conferred through 
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public authority in the form of regulation or shared cognitive maps among actors that 
embody a sense of appropriateness of institutional practices (ibid., p. 950). The 
origin and change of institutions is affected by already existing institutions, which 
structure or inform the development of new institutions (ibid., p. 953). This stands in 
contrast to rational neo-institutionalism, where organisations adopt practices and 
develop to advance their means-ends efficiency.  
Sociological neo-institutionalism also has a stronger view on how 
institutions influence actors’ preferences. The view shifts from old sociological 
assumptions that individuals’ action is influenced through norms that are attached to 
their organisational roles, often described as the normative dimension, to the 
cognitive dimension of institutional impact, where institutions influence behaviour 
by providing cognitive scripts, categories and models that are indispensable for 
action and the interpretation of others’ behaviour and the world around them (ibid., 
p. 948). Institutions here not simply specify what individual action should be but also 
what individuals can imagine doing in a given context. This is a social 
constructionist, interactive and mutually constitutive view, where institutions provide 
terms through which meaning is assigned to social contexts.  
The central difference to rational choice neo-institutionalism is that 
institutions not simply shape or affect individuals’ preferences and constrain their 
strategic pursuits. Instead, individuals’ basic preferences and identity are determined 
by structural and cultural macro-institutions. Individuals are still self-interested. 
Their decisions are however embedded in cultural and organisational fields that 
determine the concept of self-interest and utility. What individuals see as rational 
action is itself socially constituted whereby interests are conceptualized in much 
broader terms than welfare maximization, such as definition and expression of 
identity in socially appropriate ways (ibid., p. 949).  
A central difference between rational economic and sociological neo-
institutionalism is thus preference formation. In the economic form, preferences are 
exogenously derived and their pursuit is constrained through institutions – how 
individuals get what they want is constrained not what they want (Black, 1997, pp. 
64-67, 70). Sociological approaches instead emphasise (internal) cognition and 
external normative formation of preferences, whereby institutions not only shape 
individuals’ pursuit of but also the preferences themselves – individuals lose their 
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autonomy in form of their own normative structure (ibid.). Sociological neo-
institutionalism therefore underlines the role of culture, society, organisational 
identity and industrial sectors in the definition of individual interests, while the 
individual is largely dependent and a rather unimportant variable (Koelble, 1995, p. 
232).  
This view is particularly relevant for the analysis of the public value notion 
as ideologies are seen to influence both organisations and individual preferences. 
According to these assumptions, the public value notion, as a policy idea informed 
by different economic and non-economic ideologies, is the product of individual, 
organisational, and wider cultural and societal preferences. This approach thus 
provides a theoretical framework for investigating not only the ideological 
composition of the public value notion. It also encompasses the influence of the 
contextual environment on organisations and individual preferences. A media policy 
paradigm, as the dominant ideology that informs policy decision-making, is for 
example a contextual institution that influences organisations and individual 
preferences.  
It can be concluded that sociological neo-institutionalism addresses ideas 
and ideologies, among others, as institutions that affect and determine individual 
preferences and that can also be used by instrumental actors to choose strategies to 
affect policy-making (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 951). Or in Schmidt’s words: “The 
institutional setting, moreover, constitutes both that which structures agents’ ideas, 
discourse, and actions and that which is constructed by agents’ ideas, discourse and 
actions” (2011, p. 119, also pp. 119-122). 
For this research, it is of interest to address the relationship between ideas 
and ideologies as institutions that influence strategic policy interests and policy-
making in more detail, as the public value concept is such a policy idea that draws on 
different ideologies to promote specific interests.  
Ideas and ideologies can be understood as cognitive frameworks through 
which policy issues can be perceived and conveyed (chapter 6.1). They can be used 
to pursue own interests by conveying objectives in shared idioms to enhance their 
acceptance. Ideologies can however also constrain decision-making if certain 
ideologies are hegemonic in organisational or policy contexts and thus need to be 
conformed to. 
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Different views exist on the influence of ideas and ideologies. They range 
from idealist views that exaggerate the role of ideas at the expense of economic and 
political interests, to those who see ideas as little more than rationalization of 
political interest where popular ideas are seized on to propagate and legitimize 
interests without the ideas themselves playing a critical role (Fischer, 2003, pp. 23-
24). In discourse analytical approaches to policy analysis, language and discourse 
play a more fundamental role by shaping social action and the meanings upon which 
ideas are constructed, rather than just mirroring them (Fischer, 2003, p. 41, also 
Walters & Sudweeks, 1996, p. 434). This post-empiricist perspective reflects an 
argumentative turn towards policy analysis, which stands in contrast to the moderate 
view of ideas-based research in the policy mainstream, where ideas are in large part 
seen as one of many variables influencing policy (Fischer, 2003, p. 41).  
More nuanced approaches between discourse analytical and neo-
institutional views on ideas and discourse in policy-making can be summarised under 
the umbrella term discursive institutionalism (see Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004, p. 184, 
197 refers to Schmidt 2002b; Schmidt, 2010, 2011). This rather new field of study 
deals with dynamics of change by focussing on the substantive content of ideas and 
interactive processes of discourse in institutional contexts (Schmidt, 2011). 
In this thesis, a neo-institutional perspective on ideas and discourse is 
adopted, as they are considered as one factor among many others, or as distinguished 
by Schmidt as intervening rather than independent variables (2002, 2001 cited from 
Fischer, 2003, p. 30; also Baldwin & Cave, 1999, pp. 26, 33). The public value 
notion is viewed as a policy idea that is mainly seen to reflect the strategic interests 
of the policy actor. This ontological view resembles a positivist rather than a 
constructivist approach, as ideas and discourse are seen to constitute interests in the 
latter (see also Fischer, 2003, pp. 44-45).  
Sociological neo-institutionalism therefore provides the ontological 
framework for investigating the influence and use of ideas in policy-making. 
Individuals are assumed to act strategically in their self-interest according to their 
preferences, while their preferences are determined through cultural institutions such 
as ideas and ideologies, among others. At the same time, in the attempt to pursue 
their preferences, policy actors behave strategically by employing for example 
cultural institutions such as ideas and ideologies in the policy process.  
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The assumption therefore is that a policy actor’s behaviour is determined 
by cognitive templates (cultural approach) and strategic considerations of the 
environment (calculus approach). The environment is in turn made up of and 
therefore also defined by preferences of other policy actors, which are again 
determined through institutions. From the perspective of a policy actor, the scope of 
strategic action is therefore constrained on various levels; on the level of own 
preferences as well as on the level of other policy actors’ and in particular decision-
makers’ preferences.  
Based on these assumptions, a policy actor’s objectives and the constraints 
in achieving them influence the composition of a policy idea such as the public value 
notion. This means that the ideological composition of the public value notion in the 
form of economic and non-economic rationales is the result of strategic pursuits 
(policy actor’s preferences) and contextual constraints (decision-makers’ 
preferences). Therefore, the investigation of the public value notion should 
encompass a compositional and a contextual analysis.  
Since sociological neo-institutionalism, as a framework for analysing the 
role of ideas and ideologies in policy-making, does however not extend to address 
the strategic composition and use of ideas and ideologies, the next section introduced 
the approach of non-market strategy, which addresses strategy formulation in the 
context of own interests and contextual constraints. As such, non-market strategy 
functions as a conceptual extension to sociological neo-institutionalism by focussing 
on the interrelationship between a policy strategy, here a policy idea, and its 
contextual policy environment.  
 
 
4.2 Non-market Strategy: Policy Ideas and Policy Environments  
 
Now that the ontological position has been defined in sociological neo-
institutionalism, it is of interest to introduce a more analytical perspective to the 
relationship between policy ideas and policy environments. The focus thus shifts 
from motivational and contextual factors that influence policy-making, as addressed 
previously, to the strategic process of influence-taking by corporate policy actors in 
the constraints of theses interests and context.  
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Non-market strategy (NMS) is a suitable approach for such a consideration 
as it provides a perspective to understand strategy formulation that takes both market 
objectives, i.e. the operational interests of an influence-taker, and the political 
environment, i.e. the constraining context, into account.  
With shifting the perspective to the business side, the relevant theoretical 
field is corporate political activity (CPA), which addresses business government 
relationships and the extent to which politics impact business and how businesses 
react to influence politics (Bach & Unruh, 2004, p. 1; Hillman et al., 2004; Baron & 
Diermeier, 2007, p. 539). In the pursuit of business interests, CPA aims at 
maintaining the status quo or effecting change in the prevailing institutions and 
ideologies (Getz, 1997, p. 62).  
As an umbrella term, CPA entails various approaches on business-
government relationships such as political science (Lamberg et al., 2004; Holburn & 
Vanden Bergh, 2002, p. 5; Lindeque et al., 2007, p. 6; Bach & Unruh, 2004, p. 3), 
sociology, finance, organisational theory, and strategic management (Shaffer, 1995, 
p. 495; Hillman et al., 2004, p. 838; Lindeque et al., 2007, p. 7). 
As an approach from the strategic management branch of CPA, NMS 
postulates the integration of market strategy and strategy directed at the non-market 
environment in the form of policy and regulatory contexts (Baron, 1995, 1997, 1999; 
Hillman et al., 2004). The central insight behind integrated strategy is the recognition 
that business environments are composed of market and non-market components and 
that therefore the competitive strategy of a firm must integrate market and non-
market considerations to seek superior performance (Baron, 1995, pp. 47-48, 1997, 
pp. 145-146, 163; Shaffer et al., 2000, p. 139) and competitive advantage (Bach & 
Crainer, 2007; Bach & Brown, 2007, pp. 55-56). 
The return or effectiveness of NMS is related to the ability to achieve a 
policy closer to the desired policy, to block proposals that move policy from that 
position, or to realize opportunities blocked by non-market environments (Bonardi et 
al., 2006, p. 1209; Baron, 1995, p. 61).  
NMS is particularly important in highly regulated industries (Baron, 1995, 
pp. 48-49) like broadcasting. Analogue to the theory of competitive strategy, NMS 
must be tailored to non-market environments and competencies of the firm to be 
successful (ibid.). These non-market environments and strategies depend to a high 
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degree on country-specific issues, interests, institutions, and information – which 
Baron describes as the ‘4Is’ (1997, p. 146, 1995, p. 61). 
 
Table 4.1: Non-market and Market Strategy
10
 
 
 Market  Non-market 
Strategy  Concerted pattern of action taken in 
markets to create value by improving 
economic performance 
 Purpose: create economic value 
 Competitive strategy: tailored to 
structures and dynamics of markets 
and firm competencies 
 Concerted pattern of action taken in 
the non-market environment to create 
value by improving overall 
performance  
 Purpose: shape market environment 
and improve market and non-market 
position  
 NMS: Tailored to the non-market 
environment and firm competencies  
Environment  Voluntary interactions between firms 
and other parties  
 Intermediated by market or private 
agreement  
 Involves economic transaction and 
exchange of property 
 Voluntary or involuntary interactions 
between firms and other parties 
 Intermediated by the public, 
stakeholders, government, media, 
public institutions (social, political, 
legal arrangements) 
 Through majority rule, collective 
action, due process, publicness 
 
NMS tactics are those typically employed in CPA (i.e. lobbying, political 
action committees, constituency building, supply of expertise and information, public 
relations, public advocacy, grassroots activity, judicial strategies; Shaffer, 1995, p. 
495; Aggarwal, 2001, pp. 105-106). The primary difference between NMS and other 
CPA approaches is, however, the analytical, procedural, and systematic focus on 
strategy development in the context of market and non-market environments. In 
addition, NMS assumes a broader understanding of non-market environments and 
policy actors than most other CPA approaches (Bonardi et al., 2006).  
Corresponding to this extended scope, NMS also functions as an umbrella 
term for normative approaches like corporate social responsibility or corporate 
citizenship (Baron & Diermeier, 2007), which ascribe companies a special 
responsibility towards society. As self-regulatory mechanisms to improve company 
performance, they tend to address consumers rather than governments. NMS itself is 
not a normative but an analytical approach (Bach & Brown, 2007, p. 58). 
                                                 
10
 Definitions adapted and extended from Baron, 1995, p. 47. 
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For this research, NMS is a particularly suitable extension to sociological 
neo-institutionalism as it establishes an analytical relationship between changes in 
markets, market strategy, non-market strategy, and non-market environments. In the 
case of the public value notion, this framework allows connecting market and 
technological changes to the development of the notion as a policy idea in its non-
market environment.  
Based on ontological assumptions of sociological neo-institutionalism, 
where decision-makers’ preference frameworks are determined by formal and 
informal institutions, integrated with the view that decision-makers’ preferences 
represent the non-market environment, it can be argued that the success of NMS 
depends on its fit with decision-makers’ preference frameworks. “Many analysts take 
a pluralist view of government–business relations, seeing nonstate actors as 
competing for government attention. More sophisticated approaches to the 
relationship between state and societal actors focus on the formulation of the 
interests of state actors. According to this analysis, institutions are not simply arenas 
for the political activity of governments, firms, and other nonstate actors; the norms, 
rules, and practices of institutions also influence the interests of major actors. That is, 
the motivations and capabilities of state actors both by themselves and within 
international institutions form an essential part of non-market analysis and strategy” 
(Aggarwal, 2001, p. 97). The characteristics of non-market environments consisting 
of formal (legislation) and informal (norms, ideologies, codes of conduct) institutions 
thus need to be addressed when devising, analysing or explaining NMS.  
In this research, the public value notion can be described as a non-market 
strategy in the form of a policy idea, which draws on economic and non-economic 
rationales as informal institutions to reflect the influence-taker’s strategic interest in 
the constraints of decision-makers’ preferences. 
NMS therefore functions as an analytical extension to sociological neo-
institutionalism which addresses ideas and ideologies as factors that convey and 
influence policy actors’ preferences but stops short of addressing strategic 
interactions between them. NMS provides a framework to analyse the 
conceptualisation of non-market strategies, such as policy ideas, in the context of 
strategic interests and the contextual constraints in policy environments. 
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After having developed these ontological assumptions of ideologies as 
factors influencing preference frameworks of policy actors and strategic actions 
between them in non-market environments, a full conceptual framework can now be 
developed which integrates the above elaborations on policy-making with the 
previous reviews of economic and non-economic regulatory rationales as informal 
institutions in policy processes. 
 
 
4.3 The Conceptual Framework 
 
The interest of this research lies on investigating how the public value 
notion, as a policy idea, is informed ideologically by different economic and non-
economic rationales and how its conceptualisation relates to ideological 
characteristics of the policy environment and the dominant media policy paradigm. 
The objective is to investigate how the justification of PSB is informed ideologically 
and whether this composition represents a paradigm shift from economic to non-
economic justifications (the evolution of media policy paradigms is reviewed in 
chapter 5).  
The previous chapters have reviewed theories on economic and non-
economic rationales as different ideologies for market intervention (chapters 2, 3) 
and theories on influence factors in policy-making (chapter 4). These theoretical 
approaches are now integrated into a conceptual framework which represents the 
ontological assumptions and provides a structure for the empirical analysis. In the 
following, a brief summary of the reviewed theory precedes the integration into a 
conceptual framework.  
Chapters 2 and 3 reviewed different ideological approaches to justify 
market intervention in general and for the context of broadcasting. Grouped into 
economic and non-economic approaches, the substantive justifications for 
intervention and the methodological or procedural characteristics of the rationales 
were reviewed. Economic and non-economic rationales differ with regard to their 
objectives, scopes of intervention, and methodological characteristics. It could be 
shown that the two ideological approaches have different implications for policy 
outcomes and decision-making processes in general and in the case of PSB. 
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The purpose of these reviews was to identify commonalities and 
differences of economic and non-economic rationales. These insights inform and 
provide the theoretical background for the empirical component analysis of the 
applied public value concept. In order to understand the role of the notion in the 
context of regulatory paradigms, the notion needs to be unpacked to identify its 
component values, i.e. its underlying regulatory rationales. The component analysis 
is a prerequisite for relating and comparing it to the policy environment and the 
incumbent media policy paradigm.  
In chapter 4, the focus was then shifted from ideological justifications of 
regulation to policy-making and factors that influence policy actors, strategies, 
environments and outcomes. Different approaches were reviewed which provide 
explanations on how policy-making is shaped and influenced.  
The first group of approaches were interest theories of regulation, 
beginning with a normative perspective on regulation in the public interest, where 
intervention is based on functional objectives derived from economic or non-
economic rationales. The second group were private interest theories which describe 
how motivational factors such as welfare maximization influence self-interested 
policy actors to take decisions that deviate from policy outcomes in the public 
interest to pursue private or interest group objectives.  
Since these theories were narrowly focused on motivational influence 
factors, neo-institutional approaches were reviewed next as they address wider 
contextual factors that influence policy-making by impacting policy actors’ 
preference formation and their pursuit of these preferences. Based on shared 
assumptions of behaviouralism, each of these neo-institutional schools assumes self-
interested policy actors whose actions and preferences are influenced to varying 
degrees by different institutions. The subfield of sociological neo-institutionalism in 
particular addresses the influence of ideas and ideologies as informal institutions on 
preferences of policy actors and their pursuit of strategic interest.  
Based on these assumptions, ideologies as informal institutions in the form 
of different regulatory rationales define or determine policy actors’ preferences and 
can also be used strategically in policy processes. Since sociological neo-
institutionalism is however limited to identifying and describing the influence of 
informal institutions on policy actors’ preferences and policy outcomes, it falls short 
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of addressing the inter-relationship between decision-makers’ and influence-takers’ 
preference frameworks and the context these set for the pursuit of strategic interests.  
In order to develop a conceptual framework which not only focuses on the 
role of different ideologies in the form of economic and non-economic rationales as 
informal institutions that influence policy actors’ preference frameworks, but also on 
the inter-relationship between preference constraints and the pursuit of strategic 
interests, the analytical framework of NMS was incorporated. 
NMS is a subfield of the CPA strand in management theory, which shifts 
the focus from decision-makers to policy actors as influence-takers. This shift is 
helpful to focus on the formulation of strategy in the context of preference 
constraints of both influence-takers and decision-makers. NMS serves as an 
analytical framework and extension to sociological neo-institutionalism to address 
the formulation of policy strategies, here a policy idea, in the context of ideologically 
constrained preference frameworks of influence-takers and decision-makers in the 
policy environment.  
By integrating ontological assumptions of sociological neo-institutionalism 
with the analytical NMS approach, it is possible to investigate economic and non-
economic rationales as different ideologies in policy processes and how they inform 
preference frameworks and strategic interests of policy actors. This makes it possible 
to analyse the composition of the public value notion as a policy idea on the level of 
different economic and non-economic rationales (first research question) while 
taking into account ideological preferences frameworks and strategic interests of 
policy actors as well as ideological conditions in the policy environment (second 
research question). 
Based on these assumptions, strategic policy ideas are a product of 
institutionally defined preferences of influence-takers and decision-makers. Ideas are 
employed by influence-takers to pursue strategic interest while decision-makers’ 
preference frameworks (such as a certain ideological worldviews) constrain the 
scope of strategic action, which in turn influences the idea as a policy strategy. 
Consequentially, the view can be formed that for a policy idea to be successful, it has 
to represent the strategic interests of influence-takers while also complying or fitting 
with the preference framework of decisions-makers in the policy environment. This 
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leads to the assumption that a non-market strategy’s fit with its policy environment 
increases its success to become institutionalised. 
In those cases, however, where the preference frameworks and thus 
interests of influence-takers and decision-makers diverge in terms of the underlying 
ideologies, it is more difficult for policy ideas to find acceptance in policy 
environments and thus successfully represent the interests of influence-takers. This is 
the case in situations where influence-takers pursue policy changes which diverge 
from the dominant paradigm. The introduction of the public value notion seems to be 
such a case, as the notion seems to be a policy idea based on non-economic 
rationales which has successfully been institutionalised in a policy environment that 
is primarily informed by economic rationales.  
The next chapter now introduces the empirical context of media policy 
paradigms in PSB. 
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5. THE UK BROADCASTING ECOLOGY: THE PUBLIC 
 VALUE NOTION AND THE HISTORY OF EVOLVING 
 MEDIA POLICY PARADIGMS 
 
After the previous chapters have reviewed theories that inform the 
conceptual framework, this chapter now turns to the empirical context. In order to 
understand shifts in the ideological justification of PSB, it is necessary to examine 
the historical context in which they arose and evolved. This empirical review 
therefore provides the background for the detailed ideological (chapters 7, 8) and 
contextual (chapter 9) analyses of the public value notion.  
The evolution of the UK PSB ecology is reviewed along the three-phased 
media policy paradigm classification of van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003). Each 
phase is briefly introduced by drawing on the general characteristics identified by 
van Cuilenburg and McQuail. The main focus for each phase lies on reviewing the 
corresponding developments in the UK broadcasting ecology to show how the 
generalized paradigm characteristics of van Cuilenburg and McQuail apply to the 
UK context. This shows that van Cuilenburg and McQuail’s paradigm classification 
can be used as a historical and contextual stepping stone for the study of the public 
value notion.  
In this context, the developments in UK PSB policy around the turn of the 
century are reviewed to provide some information on the time prior to the 
introduction of the public value notion at the BBC in 2004. This leads to the question 
of whether the policy change associated with the public value notion represents a 
paradigm shift in the justification of UK PSB. The research question is restated at the 
end of the chapter before the research design is introduced in chapter 6.  
 
 
5.1 The First Media Policy Paradigm: Early 20th Century until 
 1940s 
 
The first paradigm of emerging communications industry policy lasted 
until World War Two. Media and communications policy addressed emerging 
technologies of telegraphy, telephony, and wireless, and was mainly in pursuit of 
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state and financial corporate interests (van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003, pp. 186-
191). As infrastructure was seen to be too strategically essential to be left to free 
markets, European policy created telegraphy, telephony, postal, and communications 
services as public monopolies. Their status as branches of civil services was 
supposed to underline their conception as non-political and non-consumer goods.  
During the first phase, a separation into different regulatory regimes took 
place according to the underlying technologies of print, common carriers (telegraphy, 
telephony), and broadcasting (radio, television). Common broadcasting features 
across Europe and the US were strong regulation of access and content, restricted 
freedom of expression, some form of monopoly or oligopoly, a notion of public 
service (in socio-political terms), and pressure towards universal provision. 
Similarly, the creation of the radio and broadcasting monopoly in the UK 
was dominated by social-political rather than economic considerations (Vick, 2006, 
p. 46). The BBC enjoyed monopoly status until the 1950s. After its inception as a 
private radio manufacturer, producer, and broadcaster in 1922, it was incorporated as 
a public organisation in 1927 with its first Royal Charter. This had been 
recommended by the Crawford Committee (1926, p. 14 cited from Collins, 2006b, p. 
10), which had rejected competition and channel choice for early radio (Tambini, 
2004, p. 47). The BBC was funded through a licence fee and supervised by a self-
regulatory Board of Governors.  
The BBC’s remit to ‘entertain, educate, and inform’ was based on its first 
Director-General John Reith’s belief of cultural homogeneity, which did not assume 
that everybody was the same, but much more that culture was single and 
undifferentiated and that broadcasting served to educated the public according to 
paternalistic assumption about what should be provided, rather than what their actual 
interests were (Curran & Seaton, 2003, p. 149). The BBC’s mixed programming 
approach was based on generally recognizable cultural values which addressed 
average listeners rather than different groups with different interests, which was also 
useful for the BBC to defend its broadcasting monopoly (ibid., p. 150). 
Continuous television broadcasting started in 1936 with the first channel 
BBC One (Cave, 1996, p. 18). Television broadcasting was interrupted throughout 
the Second World War (during which the BBC focused on radio) but resumed as 
full-time broadcasting after the war (Coppens & Downey, 1998, p. 279). During the 
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war, the BBC shifted its programming focus from Reith’s ‘cultural unity’ approach 
initially temporary to a from 1946 onwards permanent so called ‘light programming’ 
approach, which for the first time acknowledged that different programmes were 
appropriate for different occupations, thus recognizing distinct group tastes and 
interests (Curran & Seaton, 2003, pp. 154, 156). 
With regard to ideological characteristics of this first phase, it can be 
summarized that van Cuilenburg and McQuail’s (2003) first paradigm of emerging 
communications industry was informed by technological, state/national strategic, and 
socio-political interests. This also applies for the early years of the UK PSB ecology, 
where scarce frequency was not left to the market and socio-political objectives as 
well as strong views on cultural values (Reith’s cultural homogeneity) informed the 
paternalistic approach towards PSB.  
 
 
5.2 The Second Media Policy Paradigm: 1945 until 1980s 
  
The second policy paradigm of public service media ranges from the post 
war period to the 1980s. It is characterized through socio-political normative 
objectives derived from democratic, representative, and participatory politics rather 
than economic, national strategic or technical concerns (van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 
2003, pp. 181, 191-197). In contrast to the pre-war period, where normative 
considerations had predominately been put in negative terms due to the fear of new 
electronic media and its impact on the masses, the post-war period pursued more 
deliberated media polices and formulated purposes in more positive terms (Bardoel 
& d’Haenens, 2008, p. 343).  
Across Western Europe, shared normative commitments included universal 
service, diversity of content in political, social, and cultural terms, non-profit goals of 
service to the general public and minority groups (van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003, 
p. 193). Editorial independence from government, accountability to society and 
audiences through elected officials, and political and social diversity became more 
important, though decisions concerning the expansion of broadcasting remained 
political ones (ibid., pp. 193-194). The second phase media policy was largely 
coextensive with PSB policy.  
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In the 1960s/70s, PSB reached its height in Britain and Western Europe 
(Leys, 2001, p. 110). Government intervention in communications markets was 
legitimised for social purposes as the role of mass media in regard to national 
coherence and stability for political and social life in ‘mass democracy’ – especially 
positive social benefits of broadcasting for public service goals – were recognised 
and seen to offset the political bias of newspapers (van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003, 
pp. 192, 194-195). The values guiding policy during the second phase were derived 
from ideas of freedom, equality and solidarity, and policy was expected to create 
institutional expression of these and related values (ibid., p. 200).  
For three decades after the war, most European countries operated a public 
radio and broadcasting monopoly, with Britain being the only significant (and 
partial) exception (ibid., p. 193). In the post-war period, the BBC enjoyed high 
popularity and confidence. It had gained great public affection during the war as the 
voice of Britain and had become a cherished national symbol (Coppens & Downey, 
1998, p. 279). This was reflected by its renewed licence of 1946, which gave it the 
remit to reach everyone and to provide a mix of programmes that satisfied all tastes 
(Robinson et al., 2005, p. 103). This reflected the light programming approach the 
corporation had adopted during the war and can also be seen as a first and slight 
change in the perception of the BBC’s purposes from a paternalistic approach to 
acknowledging different audience interests. 
After the war, increased consideration was given to the BBC’s monopoly. 
Commissioned by the Labour government, both the Coase report (1950), which 
dismissed technical spectrum scarcity, finance, and efficiency arguments (Collins, 
2006b, p. 129), and the Beveridge committee (1951) reported in majority to maintain 
the BBC’s monopoly (Cave, 1996, p. 18; Collins, 2006b, p. 13). 
With a Conservative government in power in 1951, the BBC’s presumed 
left-wing orientation or “red bias” (Curran & Seaton, 2003, p. 170) and its perception 
as bureaucratic, complacent, unresponsive and elitist (Vick, 2006, p. 49), led to the 
demise of its monopoly with the 1954 Television Act, which introduced commercial 
broadcasting in the form of Independent Television (ITV). Aside from being a 
counterweight to BBC One, the Conservative government believed that commercial 
television would promote industry, commerce, and free markets (Curran & Seaton, 
2003, p. 161).  
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As a state-regulated network, ITV pursued commercial objectives through 
regional production and advertising monopolies while also fulfilling public service 
obligations (Coppens & Downey, 1998, p. 280; Vick, 2006, p. 49; Curran & Seaton, 
2003, pp. 165-166; Leys, 2001, p. 111). ITV companies were granted access to 
scarce spectrum in exchange for providing services to all parts of the UK and 
supplying a balanced mix of programming for all tastes (Robinson et al., 2005, p. 
104).  
This comfortable duopoly re-enforced PSB as it was characterized by 
programme competition without financial competition and a smaller than expected 
impact of ITV on BBC’s audience size and programming. It further recognised 
independence of content from financing sources, reflected by the BBC’s public and 
ITV’s advertising funding, and pursued new objectives with ITV’s regional diversity 
of content, production, and advertising that countered BBC’s London-centricity 
(Curran & Seaton, 2003, pp. 159-160).  
In 1962, the Pilkington report (1962) reviewed broadcasting and led to 
further changes in the ecology. It saw television as a major influence shaping social 
and cultural values and identified programmes as the focus for the assessment of 
broadcasting (Curran & Seaton, 2003, p. 175). It dismissed programme preferences 
of the public as unreal and the product of commercial manipulation and instead 
approved demanding and rigorous programming with cultural purpose, which 
reinforced paternalistic views on programming and quality. The audience was 
considered as vulnerable and in need of protection by broadcasting authorities 
(Collins, 2006b, p. 14, there also Milland, 2004). The report further recognized 
structural interrelations between advertising and content, an original contribution at 
that time (Curran & Seaton, 2003, p. 177), and recommended giving the BBC a third 
channel to mitigate the impact of advertising (Coppens & Downey, 1998, p. 280).  
BBC Two started broadcasting culturally-innovative minority 
programming in 1964. Even though the Pilkington report was criticized for false and 
misleading conceptions of working-class life, it was a central step in broadcasting as 
the BBC was now “for the first time attempting to make programme something like a 
quality popular newspaper” (Curran & Seaton, 2003, pp. 171-174, 177), trying to be 
both of high quality and popular appeal. In 1967, a network of BBC local radio 
stations went on air (Collins, 2006b, p. 14). 
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The 1960s were quite revolutionary in terms of programming, with the 
BBC becoming more adventurous after the Pilkington report and ITV becoming 
more profitable and secure. ITV’s franchises consolidated through their reallocation 
in 1967, which enhanced oligopolistic tendencies encouraged by government and 
free-market principles (ibid., p. 183). By then, television had taken the mass 
working-class audience over from cinemas, which created the challenge of reaching 
large audiences while meeting public service objectives. This was reflected in a 
destabilization of the value hierarchy between high culture genres on one hand and 
entertainment and popular drama on the other (Born, 2003b, p. 776). 
With a new Conservative government taking office in 1970, the ITA 
insisted on the introduction of a further broadcaster, which was initially rejected. The 
introduction of commercial regional radio broadcasters however ended the radio 
monopoly of the BBC, while national commercial radio broadcasters where still not 
allowed (Coppens & Downey, 1998, p. 280). The 1972 Sound Broadcasting Act 
replaced the ITA with the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), which became 
responsible for commercial television and new regional commercial radio (Curran & 
Seaton, 2003, pp. 180, 192; Millwood & Shaw, 2009, p. 131).  
In the mid-1970s, the character of the second phase began to change as the 
debate became increasingly preoccupied with the financing and viability of PSB’s 
monopoly status and the incorporation of new media such as cable and satellite 
transmission into the existing regulatory system (van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003, 
p. 194). Economic and technological developments made it increasingly possible to 
allow more competition into broadcasting. Both ITV and BBC had become more 
cautious in regard to programming, as they had become more vulnerable to 
government threats over a broader range of issues (Curran & Seaton, 2003, p. 193). 
Regarding the ideological characteristics of this second phase, it can be 
summarised that van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003) classify the paradigm as 
dominated by socio-political objectives of democratic, representative, and 
participatory politics. This reflects a departure from the previous focus on technical 
and state interests, which were considerably reduced while socio-political objectives 
were emphasised.  
These characteristics are reflected in UK PSB policy, where PSB was at its 
height. The socio-political and cultural objectives of the first phase were emphasised 
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more strongly with regard to political and social diversity. While the BBC’s 
monopoly was ended, the comfortable duopoly re-enforced PSB due to programme 
competition without financial competition and ITV’s PSB obligations. Diversity was 
increased by providing high-quality and popular content for different audiences.  
Before proceeding to the next paradigm phase, it is of interest to briefly 
turn to public administration approaches. During these first two phases, the 
relationship between PSB and government has been characterised through old public 
administration (OPA) principles such as upward, hierarchical accountability to 
government, as reflected in various broadcasting reviews over the years (Collins, 
2006a, pp. 16-17). The Ullswater report (1936) talked about ‘control’ of the BBC 
through government, while the Pilkington report (1962) made paternalistic 
assumptions by establishing a command and control relationship between the BBC 
and its audience. OPA and hierarchical governance continued to dominate until the 
1980s, even though alternative models such as governance through markets 
(Beveridge, 1951) or the public (Annan, 1977) had been considered.  
In the 1980s, the replacement of OPA with NPM doctrines took hold. This 
shift to a more economic perspective began at the end of the second phase. Policy 
debate was increasingly concerned with the PSB monopoly and its financing as 
economic and technological developments allowed for more competition in 
broadcasting markets. The wider adoption of NPM doctrines in the 1980s is a further 
indicator of a stronger economic approach in government in the third phase.  
 
 
5.3 The Third Media Policy Paradigm: 1980s until 2000 
 
The third phase started in the 1980s and is by van Cuilenburg and McQuail 
(2003) described as the new and emerging communications policy paradigm. 
Technological convergence, free-market economics, government and corporate 
interests to benefit from economic opportunities were reasons for a shift towards 
deregulation, which challenged the legitimacy of the old socio-political, normative 
second paradigm (ibid., pp. 181, 197-203). A shift from centralized broadcasting and 
mass press to diversity and audience fragmentation created a new socio-political 
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environment, which lead to a move away from earlier normative ideas prescribed 
through a political system (ibid., p. 196). 
The impact of technological and economic convergence as well as 
globalisation accelerated in the 1990s. This led to convergence of communications 
sectors, geographies, and policies at the turn of the century. Until then discrete policy 
arenas such as telecommunications, communications, information, and cultural 
policy became more interdependent, which increased the appearance of 
commonalities but also of value conflicts (Just, 2009, p. 103; Napoli, 2007, p. 2; van 
Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003, p. 197). Similarly, harmonization with EU regulation, 
which is primarily concerned with market-focused fair trading, competition and 
industrial issues, created tension with national cultural policies (Steemers, 1999; 
Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2008, p. 339; Murdoch & Golding, 1999; Jakubowicz, 2011, 
p. 221). 
The composition of the public interest in the third paradigm reflected a 
change in its ideological underpinnings as it was mainly driven by economic and 
technological values with a reduced presence of normative values. Economic welfare 
rose in salience in comparison with political welfare (van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 
2003, pp. 200-201, 198). The remaining normative components cover a wide range 
of values that are however less exclusively supported by democratic political theory 
but instead represent more socio-cultural objectives as social welfare has been 
redefined with greater reference to communications values such as serving social 
integration and cohesion, cultural bonding and bridging (ibid.; Bardoel & d’Haenens, 
2008, p. 343; Bardoel & Brants, 2003; Just, 2009, p. 99). In comparison to the 
second paradigm, which was dominated by socio-political objectives, the third 
paradigm is characterised by the primacy of economic principles supplemented with 
socio-cultural and communication values.  
In Britain, the broadcasting ecology was about to change considerably with 
the Conservative Thatcher government taking office in 1979, which set an end to 
“the golden age of PSB” (Leys, 2001, p. 122). Strong free-market views led to 
increased competition in broadcasting (Iosifidis, 2007, p. 33) and changed regulatory 
objectives, which created pressure on public and private broadcasters. The rather 
protective approach of the dual public-private broadcasting model until the late 
1970s was succeeded by a neo-liberal focus on market forces and deregulation. 
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In 1977, the Annan report (Annan, 1977) had criticised the duopoly, 
arguing for greater pluralism and recommending a new TV network, while 
maintaining that the BBC remained the main national instrument of broadcasting 
(Collins 2006b, pp. 15-16; Born, 2003b, p. 777). A new TV network had also been 
lobbied for by producer and advertiser groups to create alternative sources of airtime 
to BBC and ITV (Leys, 2001, p. 114; Curran & Seaton, 2003, pp. 185-186).  
Plans for a new channel were finalized under the Thatcher administration 
with the 1980 Broadcasting Act, which introduced C4 and its Welsh counterpart SC4 
(Coppens & Downey, 1998, p. 280). The recommendations of the Annan report 
represented a shift in elite sentiment from the Pilkington report, as Annan viewed 
audiences not in need of protection but rather justified control of programme 
standards by acknowledging audience wishes for programme regulation (Collins, 
2006b, pp. 16-17). Free-market principles and the commodification of broadcasting 
became further apparent as the Act required ITV companies to become publicly 
listed within eight years of starting a franchise, what made them liable to takeovers 
and sensitive to shareholder pressure (Leys, 2001, p. 114). 
C4 began broadcasting in 1982 with the mission to provide cultural, quality 
and innovative programming for niche audiences, in particular ethnic minorities 
(Coppens & Downey, 1998, p. 281). Its distinct minority-based remit had a number 
of origins. Firstly, it served as a counterpart to BBC Two, analogue to ITV and BBC 
One. Secondly, as a publisher-broadcaster, C4 did not produce programming but 
solely relied on commissions, which was supposed to create a new competitive 
market for independent British production companies outside of BBC and ITV 
(Leys, 2001, p. 115). Even though C4 was incorporated as a subsidiary of the IBA, 
and thus as a public institution, it was fully commercially funded through 
advertising. It handed over all of its airtime to ITV in exchange for a set sum ITV 
paid in return, which not only retained ITV’s advertising monopoly but also made C4 
less vulnerable to advertiser influences (ibid., p. 114).  
The success of C4 reinforced plans of the Thatcher government to open-up 
broadcasting markets to cable and satellite TV (Cable and Broadcasting Act, 1984; 
Millwood & Shaw, 2009, p. 133; Vick, 2006, p. 50). Generally, C4’s programming 
and financial success was a central step in the ideological legitimization of 
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commercial broadcasting and lead to questioning of the BBC’s role and licence fee 
funding (Coppens & Downey, 1998, p. 281).  
The breakdown of the social-democratic consensus in Britain in the 
1970s/80s and the emergence of consumer culture under the neo-liberal agenda of 
the Thatcher government challenged the public service ethos and led to a debate 
about deregulation and the future of the BBC. This was most evident in the Peacock 
report (Peacock, 1986), which represented a strong shift in views from the previous 
Annan report (Annan, 1987). 
The Peacock report had been commissioned by the Thatcher government to 
investigate the BBC’s funding. It recommended to free-up television to market 
competition, challenged the corporation’s role and advocated, however without 
success, to replace the licence fee with a subscription service (Graham, 2005, p. 79; 
Coppens & Saeys, 2006, p. 262; Murdock, 2000, p. 131). Even though the BBC 
retained its licence fee, the report led the government to exert financial and political 
pressure on the corporation by setting the licence fee increase below the rate of 
inflation, requiring cost-cutting, and appointing conservative businessmen to its 
board (Leys, 2001, p. 117).  
By mobilising notions of consumer sovereignty and consumer choice, the 
report introduced the concept of the consumer to broadcasting policy, while 
emphasising accountability through markets and the price system (Peacock, 1986, 
para. 592, 547 cited from Collins, 2006b, pp. 17-18). The notion of consumer choice 
was picked up prominently a few years later by the BBC in its Charter review 
publications (BBC, 1992, 1996). The assumption was further that technological 
change would reduce spectrum scarcity and thus the need for intervention in the near 
future.  
In 1989, the first satellite service was launched with four Sky channels, 
which was little later followed by British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) (Coppens & 
Downey, 1998, p. 281). In 1990, Sky took over BSB to form the satellite pay-TV 
provider BSkyB. Barriers to entry in the broadcasting market had come down 
significantly in the 1980s through cable and satellite services. This meant that the 
public sector no longer controlled the gateway to viewers through terrestrial 
distribution due to channel proliferation on cable and satellite platforms and 
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conditional access technology, which reduced analogue characteristics of scarcity 
and non-excludability (Robinson et al., 2005, pp. 104-105).  
The 1990 Broadcasting Act was a further turning point with far reaching 
changes (Coppens & Downey, 1998, p. 281), which were based on free-market 
beliefs advocated by the Peacock report. The Act increased financial competition for 
advertising between ITV and C4, as C4 was now responsible for selling its airtime 
what made ITV lose it advertising monopoly and thus in part its financial security. 
National commercial radio stations were permitted and the Radio Authority was 
established as a regulator. The Act also set a 25% external production quota for all 
terrestrial broadcasters, introduced a new ITV franchise system where the licence 
was given to the highest bidder, and included plans for a fifth terrestrial channel 
(Leys, 2001, pp. 115, 126). Channel 5 launched in 1997 as a private commercial 
publisher-broadcaster with lighter public service obligations than ITV companies 
(ibid., p. 127; Curran & Seaton, 2003, p. 202).  
In the early 1990s (chapter 9.1.1), government green and white papers 
(DNH, 1992, 1994) confirmed the BBC as the UK’s main PSB but required the 
corporation to increase its commercial operations and expand into foreign markets 
(Cave, 1996, pp. 27-28; Steemers, 1999, pp. 52-53; Iosifidis, 2007, p. 78). The BBC 
published Charter review documents (BBC, 1992, 1996) which prominently focused 
on the notion of consumer choice, which had been introduced into the broadcasting 
debate by the Peacock report (Peacock, 1986).  
In 1996, the BBC’s Charter was renewed (DNH, 1996). In the same year, 
the 1996 Broadcasting Act introduced digital terrestrial television (DTT) and relaxed 
cross-media ownership rules (Coppens & Downey, 1998, p. 297; Fleming, 1997, p. 
378). The improved carrying capacity of channels on DTT, satellite and cable 
networks increased consumer choice and audience fragmentation. By the end of 
1999, all terrestrial broadcasters offered their channels via digital and analogue 
transmission (Leys, 2001, pp. 120-121). The two key legislative landmarks of the 
decade, the 1996 Charter and Broadcasting Act, were characterised by a “more 
muted market-led” approach which acknowledged broadcasting’s unique 
contribution to cultural and democratic life in Britain (Barnett, 2004, pp. 34-35). 
In 1997, a New Labour government came into power after 18 years in 
opposition. Little later, in 1999, a review was conducted into the funding of the BBC 
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by a panel chaired by Gavyn Davies, a senior city economist and long-time Labour 
advisor. The Davies report considered funding options and viewed persisting market 
failures as the primary rationales for PSB provision (Davies, 1999, annex 8; Graham, 
2005, p. 88; Elstein, 2000, p. 14). The government granted the BBC a generous 
licence fee settlement in 2000 of RPI +1.5% p.a. until 2006 (Leys, 2001, pp. 120-
121) but asked for cost savings, which continued the BBC’s efficiency and cost 
reduction drive of the 1990s.  
To comply with the changes of the 1990s, the BBC adopted New Public 
Management (NPM) informed economic, managerial, production, and scheduling 
practices to maintain audience share and legitimacy of its public funding (Steemers, 
2004, p. 102). Director-General John Birt led the BBC with a strict economic NPM 
regime. He introduced internal markets between BBC departments through initiatives 
such as ‘producer choice’ and the 1996 ‘broadcasting-production split’ (Iosifidis, 
2007, p. 100; Kanter & Raymond, 2003a, p. 6; Born, 2003a, p. 67). 
 A general shift of power and thinking was taking place within the BBC 
from a programme-led to a management-led hierarchy which shifted the focus from 
the production to the delivery of programmes (Curran & Seaton, 2003, p. 221; Born, 
2003a, pp. 65, 68, 74, 77). Principles such as value for money, efficiency, consumer 
choice, and performance measurements became more important. NPM-informed 
performance assessments shifted from traditional qualitative, content-focused 
considerations of the social, cultural, and political role of PSB to quantitative, 
economic, managerial, and financial assessments along with increased accountability 
and evidence to legitimize the role and funding of PSB (Picard, 2003, pp. 32-34). 
This further indicates the dominant position of economic approaches in the 1990s. 
While these initiatives improved the BBC’s bottom line, they also created 
tension between commercial and cultural goals with negative impacts on programme 
quality, ratings, and staff moral (Steemers, 2004, p. 102; Born, 2008, p. 695). At the 
turn of the century, the BBC was viewed as internally and externally out of touch 
(Kanter & Raymond, 2003a, pp. 6-7, 13; Leys, 2001, p. 122). Others, however, 
praised Birt’s strong leadership and accredited the BBC’s survival and successful 
1996 Charter renewal under a rather hostile government to him (Curran & Seaton, 
2003, pp. 217, 231; Born, 2003a, p. 68).  
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Classical NPM objectives had first been recommended in the 1986 
Peacock report (Collins, 2006a, pp. 16-17). Increased competition and downward 
accountability through markets and consumer sovereignty stood in contrast to OPA 
doctrines that dominated until the 1980s. The 1999 Davies report also based its 
however more benevolent analysis on economic rationales of market failure. 
The shift from OPA to NPM is also more generally reflected in the 
consumerisation of the citizen during this third phase. It describes the attribution of 
the citizen with consumer characteristics in language and practice, which took place 
under the Conservative Thatcher and Major governments (Needham, 2003, pp. 5, 9). 
New Labour had challenged Conservative policy while in opposition and upon 
arriving in power in 1997 signalled a change towards a more active and substantive 
conception of citizenship. Contrary to this, New Labour continued and even 
intensified its predecessors’ trend towards a narrow and instrumental citizenship 
model in an overall economic framework (Needham, 2003). New Labour embraced 
the idea that public interest in communications is best served through effective 
competition (Freedman, 2003, pp. 176-177).  
This is reflected in the passing of the 2003 Communications Act. The Act 
was New Labour’s solution to industry and policy convergence and can be described 
as a “groundbreaking programme of deregulatory reform” (Doyle & Vick, 2005, p. 
86; also Feintuck & Varney, 2006, pp. 111-116, 126 et seq.). Aside from 
deregulating cross-ownership rules, the sector-wide communications regulator 
Ofcom was introduced to pursue light-touch regulation that encourages self-
regulation and places greater emphasis on markets to achieve policy goals (Doyle & 
Vick, 2005, pp. 75-82, 87-89; Iosifidis, 2007, pp. 11, 85). Ofcom’s regulatory 
principles state that it operates with a bias against intervention to seek the least 
intrusive regulatory mechanisms and that intervention should be evidence-based, 
proportionate, consistent, accountable and transparent in both deliberation and 
outcome, informed through market research and consultation.
11
  
Ofcom was created by merging five existing regulators; the Independent 
Television Commission, the Broadcasting Standards Commission, the Office of 
Telecommunications, the Radiocommunications Agency, and the Radio Authority. 
The merger broke down the historic divide between structural and content regulation 
                                                 
11
 http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/what-is-ofcom/statutory-duties-and-regulatory-principles/. 
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and posed challenges to the balancing of economic and non-economic objectives. 
During the passing of the Bill, concerns arose that economic objectives could preside 
over civic concerns due to reduced regulatory diversity and Ofcom’s conception as 
an economic regulator (Vick, 2006, pp. 59, 63-64; Doyle & Vick, 2005, pp. 77, 86).  
During the mid-1990s, the idea of a single regulator had grown inside the 
Labour party and was explored by the centre-left think tank IPPR (Smith, 2006, pp. 
932; Collins & Murroni, 1996; Collins & Purnell, 1995). Shortly after taking office, 
the new government’s green paper spoke of viewers as consumers and favoured an 
evolutionary approach to regulation, based on free-market principles and intervention 
confined to the minimum necessary to achieve policy objectives (DTI & DCMS, 
1998, para. 1.23, 3.26 from Smith, 2006, p. 934; Freedman, 2003, pp. 173; 
Livingstone et al., 2007a, p. 617). 
Shortly after that, the communications white paper (DTI & DCMS, 2000) 
proposed the sector-wide regulator Ofcom, defining its objectives as representing the 
interests of citizens, which had not been mentioned in the green paper, consumers, 
and the public (Livingstone et al., 2007a, pp. 617-619; Freedman, 2003, p. 174). 
Several discursive shifts occurred during the drafting and passing of the Bill 
regarding the interests Ofcom should represent (Livingstone et al., 2007a, pp. 620-
626; Livingstone, 2008, p. 2): 
The Draft Communications Bill replaced the citizen and consumer with the 
customer (DTI & DCMS, May 2002a, clause 3; Livingstone et al., 2007a, p. 619; 
DTI & DCMS, June 2002b). This was criticized in a report by the Joint Committee 
of the House of Commons and House of Lords (2002), which advocated that Ofcom 
should have two principal duties of furthering the interests of citizens and consumers 
(Livingstone et al., 2007a, pp. 620-621). 
The Communications Bill did not take notice of this (2002, clause 3) as it 
shifted Ofcom’s remit to the single obligation of serving the consumer, thus 
replacing the customer and omitting the citizen, while adding a new clause stating 
that Ofcom should further the interests of the community as a whole (Livingstone, 
2008, p. 2; Livingstone et al., 2007a, pp. 622-623).  
As the Bill reached the House of Lords, the Joint Select Committee led by 
Labour Peer Lord Puttnam, proposed an amendment to clause 3, reiterating that 
Ofcom should further the interests of citizens and consumers. This was incorporated 
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into the 2003 Communications Act as Ofcom’s statutory duty after the House of 
Lords had voted in favour of the proposed amendment (ibid., pp. 623-626). The 2003 
Communications Act states that “it shall be the principal duty of Ofcom, in carrying 
out their functions – (a) to further the interests of citizens in relation to 
communications matter; and (b) to further the interests of consumers in relevant 
markets, where appropriate by promoting competition” (clause 3(1)). The last minute 
concession won from government was intended to strengthen the public service 
dimension of communications policy (Doyle & Vick, 2005, p. 77). 
Even with the included citizen notion, many felt that “the Bill’s central 
thrust of economic policy as the prime motivator” for regulatory reform meant that 
“public service broadcasting [would become] a secondary concern” and that “the 
Bill’s effect, by strengthening rather than containing market forces, could be to put 
public service broadcasting on the margins” (Vick, 2006, p. 53). As proposals to 
elevate cultural and political citizen interests over economic consumer interests were 
rejected, it was left to Ofcom to reconcile these interests (ibid., p. 54).  
Despite their inclusion, the 2003 Communications Act did not clearly 
define the terms consumer and citizen (Collins & Sujon, 2007, p. 47). Similarly, 
Ofcom’s understanding and balancing of consumers and citizens remained difficult. 
Upon inception, Ofcom hyphenated the terms to the ‘citizen-consumer’ (Livingstone 
et al., 2007a, pp. 627-628). This created further confusion and critique that citizen 
interests were subordinated to consumer interests and that civic values were 
primarily of discursive nature whereas economic rationales provided the policy tools 
and thus dictate outcomes.  
Livingstone et al. (2007b, p. 84) have argued that several years after the 
2003 Communications Act, exactly what is meant by citizen and consumer interests 
remains unresolved and that the terms citizen and consumer, as used in the Act, have 
not succeeded in containing and managing the different concerns and interests at 
stake. Rather, these conflicts are of ideological nature, centring on tension between 
Ofcom’s technical role as an economic regulator and its broader public role. Their 
research found that Ofcom’s conception of citizen is that of a vulnerable minority in 
need of protection rather than the public as a whole, whereby the majority of the 
public has to express their citizen interests primarily through their role as consumers 
in the marketplace (ibid., p. 85). 
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Consumer interests are far more clearly defined, structurally represented 
through a consumer panel and characterised through public-facing policies and 
engagement in the form of consumer education and market research, giving more 
responsibility to individual consumers while reducing regulatory supervision of 
corporations (Lunt & Livingstone, 2007b, pp. 22-24). In contrast to this, citizen 
policies are far less developed (Lunt & Livingstone, 2007a, pp. 4-5). Issues such as 
universal access and increasingly the protection of vulnerable consumers are 
positioned as citizen interests (Lunt and Livingstone 2007c, p. 24).  
Livingstone et al. (2007a) who further investigated whether citizen 
discourse has been subordinated to the consumer in the market discourse, suggest 
that a two-stepped discursive process has occurred. The first discourse, which 
occurred between 1998 and 2003 and culminating in the 2003 Communications Act, 
was a struggle to resolve a “plethora of everyday notions of ‘the public’ into the 
‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’, two distinct terms that supposedly divide the semantic 
terrain neatly between them in order to close down previous ambiguities and reframe 
the regulatory domain so that conflicting interest could be accommodated” (ibid., p. 
617). This has been followed by an “almost immediate unravelling of the two-term 
solution, as ambiguities re-emerged and boundary disputes problematized proposed 
regulation, requiring remedial action of various kinds on the part of the regulator and 
others” (ibid.). 
Due to Ofcom’s evidence-based regulation drawing on market and 
consumer research, Lunt and Livingstone (2007a) conclude that its regulatory 
approach is economic and biased towards the quantifiable (pp. 5-6). Also, Doyle and 
Vick see good reasons to believe that New Labour’s strategy will in the long-term 
gradually but ineluctably propel media policy toward a market-dominated regulatory 
approach, away from moderating influences of non-economic considerations (2005, 
pp. 87-91).  
In regard to the development of the policy regime, incorporating both 
citizen and consumer interests appears to have been a discursive solution to divide 
interests of the public into citizen and consumer categories. Difficulties and 
insufficiencies however arise on the practical level in regard to the implementation 
and representation of citizen interests, due to the lack of clear definitions of citizen 
interests and corresponding methodologies. Despite the apparent equality of citizen 
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and consumer interests on the discursive level, the practical representation is biased 
towards consumer interests. 
In terms of the overall characteristics of the third paradigm, it can be 
summarized that van Cuilenburg and McQuail’s (2003) media policy paradigm as 
well as UK broadcasting policy were dominated by economic approaches and 
regulatory objectives since the early 1980s.  
The Annan report (1978) can be described as the last formal, systematic 
attempt to address broadcasting in cultural rather than economic terms (Barnett, 
2004, p. 34). It coincided with a historical turning point from Old Labour 
corporatism of the 1960s/70s (“private bad, public good”) to 1980s Thatcherite 
market liberalism (“public bad, private good”) (ibid.).  
The 1986 Peacock report set the consumerist tone of the discourse for the 
following two decades, which under both Conservative and New Labour 
governments was characterised by NPM doctrines, economic consumer and market 
objectives, as well as market failure justifications. This economic focus was qualified 
by social and cultural considerations as calls for full deregulation of communications 
industries were dismissed (Vick, 2006, p. 52; Barnett, 2004, pp. 37-38). Freedman 
describes this as the commercialization of the broadcasting system while 
championing institutions which are not solely driven by market considerations (2003, 
p. 181). 
Broadcasting regulation can therefore be described to have shifted from the 
allocation of scarce spectrum to the control of market power to ensure competition. 
In the last decade, concepts such as information society and convergence were 
fundamental to the ideological repositioning of New Labour to provide an 
intellectually coherent explanation for the party’s adoption of free-market principles 
(Smith, 2006, pp. 931-932). This development culminated in the 2003 
Communications Act which was characterized by a shift from broadcasting to 
communications policy, from sector-specific ownership restrictions to general 
competition law and industrial policy supplemented by content regulation. 
The merged communications regulator Ofcom represents the institutional 
embodiment of New Labour’s “competition policy plus” approach to UK 
broadcasting regulation, where the plus, according to Smith, is however only a 
“minimal plus” (2006, pp. 935-937).  
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The Act is the latest manifestation of an on-going process of philosophical 
accommodation or reconciliation of market and social liberalism, which has been 
characteristic of British post-war media policy (Vick, 2006, pp. 26, 29). This 
reconciliation attempt under the New Labour government can also be described as 
“third way” politics (ibid., p. 63; Wheeler, 2001, p. 30).  
While economic and non-economic approaches have enjoyed pre-
eminence at different points in time, neither has ever enjoyed unchallenged 
hegemony (Vick, 2006, p. 58). Paradigms always consist of a range of values of 
which some are however more dominant than others and therefore tend to inform 
policy-making. PSB has always been and will always be “ideologically ambivalent” 
(Tambini, 2004, p. 57).  
Tensions between these approaches will persist, while clear signs are 
emerging that economic approaches are becoming the principal ideological basis for 
communications policy (Vick, 2006, pp. 29, 60, 64; Jakubowicz, 2003, p. 48; 
Murdock & Golding, 1999, p. 118; Freedman, 2003, pp. 190-191, 1; Barnett, 2004, 
p. 35). 
Regarding the ideological justification of PSB, these developments mean 
that in an increasingly economically informed regulatory and policy environment a 
reduction in the applicable market failures becomes a de-legitimising threat to the 
scale and scope of PSB. This represents a crisis and thus an impetus to provide an 
alternative rationale, such as the public value notion, to shift the debate in PSB 
justification.  
 
 
5.4 The Contemporary Context and the Research Interest: 
 Emergence of a New PSB Policy Paradigm? 
 
The dominance of market-orientated discourse and economic approaches 
in media policy and regulation in the 1980s/90s and early 2000s is uncontested. The 
question however arises, whether the contemporary conditions relating to 
technological and market changes and discursive developments such as the citizen-
consumer dichotomy of the 2003 Communications Act are the beginning of a shift 
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towards a re-emphasis of non-economic values in broadcasting policy, incorporated 
through the public value notion. 
After the 2002 Cabinet Office Strategy Unit publication (Kelly et al., 2002; 
Cabinet Office, 2002) addressed public value as a potential new public management 
concept, the Charter review was initiated in late 2003 (DCMS, 2003), at the 
beginning of which the BBC (2004a) published its manifesto ‘Building Public Value’ 
in June 2004. The publication represents the most extensive application of the public 
value notion in the UK public sector to date. It served as the corporation’s main 
contribution to the Charter review debate by stating its strategic mission and 
propositions for the next Charter period.  
At the point of its publication, the BBC was faced with a multitude of 
challenges. Externally, digital media had increased competition among broadcasters 
and new media outlets, which enhanced audience fragmentation and allowed pull in 
addition to linear push consumption. These conditions made it more difficult for the 
BBC to sustain its reach and share while ensuring quality and popularity of its 
programming without ‘dumbing down’. At the same time, its secured funding and 
expansion raised concerns that it was crowding out competition. The domestic 
regulatory environment changed with Ofcom as a light-touch, evidence-based 
regulator while regulatory attention also increased in the EU, where the European 
Competition Commission received an increase in complaints from commercial 
broadcasters on PSB’s scope, remit, and expansion into new digital services.  
Internally, Director-General Greg Dyke had succeeded John Birt in 2000. 
Dyke led the corporation through an organisational restructuring and cultural change 
programme to renew relationships with employees and the public while restoring the 
commitment to creative, high-quality programming with mass appeal (Kanter & 
Raymond, 2003a, 2003b). An above inflation licence fee settlement allowed a 
comfortable expansion into new digital services, while commercial broadcasters 
were faced with decreasing advertising revenues. Director-General Dyke and 
Chairman Gavyn Davies were, however, forced to resign in early 2004 over the 
BBC’s conflict with government over justifications for Britain’s involvement in the 
Iraq war and the related suicide of weapon expert Dr David Kelly. The Hutton report 
investigated the dispute and found that the BBC’s editorial system was ‘defective’ 
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(Hutton, 2004, p. 322). This initiated a wider debate on BBC self-regulation and 
governance.  
Director-General Mark Thompson and Chairman Michael Grade took over 
shortly before the publication of ‘Building Public Value’ (BBC, 2004a) in June 2004. 
The public value notion was used extensively in the publication and throughout 
Charter review (Collins, 2006a, p. 12). The BBC stated that its sole purpose was to 
create public value, which it defined as democratic, cultural and creative, 
educational, social and community, and global value (2004a, p. 8). The BBC further 
proposed a new governance framework with a public value test (PVT) at its centre to 
make decisions about changes to and expansion of services. 
The utilisation of the public value notion represented the BBC’s latest 
attempt to create legitimacy by defining its remit based on a set of public values and 
introducing the PVT as a methodology to assess public value creation of services.  
The BBC’s publication has generally been praised as an exhaustive and 
unprecedented effort to make a case for Charter renewal, even by its critics (Elstein, 
2004). It initiated debates in policy and regulatory circles on the definition, 
usefulness, and longevity of the public value notion with equal numbers of 
proponents and opponents (ibid.; Crabtree, 2004; Oakley et al., 2006). Despite these 
efforts, it was also seen to run short of real transformation, being described as strong 
on intent and broad principles but much weaker on detail (Steemers, 2004, p. 103).  
Similarly, the scope and depth of pre-legislative Charter review 
consultation and scrutiny was unprecedented (Freedman, 2005, p. 10; Collins, 2006a, 
p. 25). The green and white papers (DCMS, 2005, 2006a) embraced most of the 
proposition made in ‘Building Public Value’ (BBC, 2004a) with only minor changes. 
So did the Royal Charter and Framework Agreement (DCMS, 2006b, 2006c), which 
came into effective on January 1
st
 2007. The renewed Charter was favourable as it 
extended the corporation’s responsibilities of service provision and self-regulation 
while it also incorporated the remit definition and performance assessment 
framework proposed by the BBC. The application and customisation of the public 
value notion was thus a successful Charter review strategy for the corporation. 
Other parallel developments during Charter review (chapter 9.2) were 
Ofcom’s first public service television broadcasting review (2004a, 2004c, 2005), 
which explored PSB funding alternatives. In 2006, The Work Foundation think tank 
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published a series of papers on public value and developed its own public value 
framework. Prior to that, in 2004, a BBC-sponsored publication from the New 
Labour centre-left think tank IPPR addressed the legitimacy of PSB provision based 
on economic and non-economic justifications (Tambini & Cowling, 2004). The 
editors state that “It is only through a reconceptualisation of the fundamental 
justifications for intervention in communications markets that a new case for public 
service communications can be built. This book provides a rationale for renewal of 
the role of public service in the digital age” (ibid., p. 4). “As several authors in this 
book have noted, the debate about public service communications is moving on. It is 
no longer concerned merely with narrow market failure but returns to first principles, 
and the civic role of communication” (Cowling & Tambini, 2004, p. 172).  
This development stands in contrast to the 1999 Davies report, which 
firmly based PSB justification on market failure rationales. As shown in chapter 2, 
digital technologies however reduced market failures. Cave (2005), for example, 
proposed that since market failure rationales lost relevance, “intervention must 
therefore increasingly rest on such constructions as the ‘citizen rationale’ developed 
by Ofcom” (p. 27). The “burden of proof” seemed to have shifted to proponents of 
public intervention (Tambini, 2006, p. 114).  
One response was that of a “standard defence” (Collins, 2006b, p. 20, 
2004, p. 130), which saw market failure as both endemic and structural in 
broadcasting despite technological change (Davies, 2004; Graham, 1999; Graham & 
Davies, 1997). The standard defence is however itself vulnerable to criticism as it 
does not address the degree of failure or appropriate level of intervention.  
Another approach is to shift the discourse from market failure to notions of 
citizenship in political, cultural, and social contexts to emphasize that PSB provision 
is more fundamental than a response to market failure. Barwise (2004a), for example, 
asked whether the high tide of unquestioned free-market ideas had been reached, 
expecting that the intellectual and ideological climate would become more balanced, 
pragmatic, and fact-based in the coming years (pp. 31-32).  
The adoption of the public value notion by the BBC thus seems to reflect 
this ideological development. As Steemers describes: “Countering accusations of 
commercialisation ‘Building public value: Renewing the BBC for a digital world’ 
puts the ‘public interest’ back at the heart of what the BBC does, placing public 
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value and citizenship above private value and individual consumer choice […]” 
(2004, p. 103). Collins sees “the commitment expressed in ‘Building Public Value’ 
to ‘wider public purposes’ [...] clearly consonant with Mark Moore’s notion of public 
value as an institutional doctrine committed to ‘citizens acting through politics, 
rather than consumers acting through markets’ (Moore, 1995, p. 44)” (2006a, p. 19). 
After its widely publicised adoption by the BBC and its subsequent 
institutionalisation in the Royal Charter, the concept became more popular and 
spread to other public service institutions.  
C4 turned to the notion in its 2008 ‘Next on 4’ publication (2008b) by 
proposing a public value performance assessment framework, which was later 
applied in its 2008 and 2009 annual reports (2009a, 2010a). Similar to the BBC’s 
approach, C4’s publication was part of a review process. Ofcom’s first PSTB review 
had established that C4 would run into financing difficulties, which started a debate 
about funding alternatives and a separate review into C4’s financing (Ofcom, 2007b, 
2007c).  
These developments show that the public value notion, as interpreted and 
applied by the BBC in its dual form consisting of a remit definition and a 
performance assessment framework, gained relevance beyond the BBC in UK PSB. 
The increasing need to redefine justification less dependent on market failure appears 
to have lead to an ideological shift from economic to non-economic rationales, 
facilitated and expressed in the form of the public value notion.  
 
 
5.5 The Research Questions 
 
The reviews of economic and non-economic rationales (chapters 2, 3) as 
well as of media policy paradigms (chapter 5) have shown that the public value 
notion was introduced and institutionalised at a time when market failure rationales 
had become de-legitimising concepts in the change from analogue to digital 
distribution technologies, at a time when the incumbent media policy paradigm was 
dominated by economic rather than non-economic objectives.  
This constellation creates a regulatory threat to the BBC which can be seen 
as an impetus to devise an alternative rationale such as the public value notion, which 
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seems to be prioritising citizen over consumer objective. As it was institutionalised in 
the Royal Charter and spread more widely in the context of UK PSB, the question 
arises whether this change is a fundamental ideological change in the hierarchy of 
economic and non-economic values and therefore a paradigm shift. As stated in the 
first chapter, the objective of this study is to investigate the overall research question:  
 
Does the public value development in UK PSB policy represent a paradigm 
shift? 
 
Sub-questions: 
 
1. Ideological shift analysis: Does the ideological composition of the 
public value notion represent a shift in the hierarchy of component 
values from economic to non-economic rationales? 
 
2. Policy Process Analysis: Are the procedural characteristics and 
influence factors of the wider public value change process 
indicative of a paradigm shift? 
 
The empirical analysis is structured along these two research questions. 
The next chapter addresses the research design for the ideological component 
analysis (first research question) and the contextual public value process analysis 
(second research question). 
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6. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
This study is based on two main case studies structured around the two 
research questions. They address the ideological composition of the public value 
notion and its development in the wider PSB and media policy context. The findings 
inform the classification of whether the public value development represents a 
paradigm shift. According to the analytical framework defined in chapter 1, a 
paradigm shift is primarily indicated by a shift in the underlying ideology, which is 
supplement by secondary indicators of policy process influence factors and paradigm 
shift characteristics.  
The findings on the compositional analysis of the public value notion are 
provided in chapters 7 (BBC) and 8 (C4), as addressed in the first research question. 
Chapter 9 presents the contextual analysis of the wider policy change process 
associated with the public value notion, as stated in the second research question. 
The final paradigm shift or policy change classification is reached in chapter 10.  
This chapter introduces the research design, starting with a review of the 
comparative case study approach (6.1). The analytical and methodological 
approaches of document analysis for the compositional analysis (6.2) and expert 
interviews for the contextual analysis (6.3) are addressed and integrated (6.4).  
 
 
6.1 A Comparative Case Study Approach: Interpretative Policy  
 Analysis and Epistemological Considerations 
 
As a research methodology, case studies are used to contribute to our 
knowledge of individual, group, organisational, social, political, and related 
contemporary phenomena within their real-life context, in particularly to address 
‘how’ or ‘why’ questions (Yin, 2003a, pp. 1, 9, 13). The power of the case study 
approach comes from its qualitative nature that emphasizes the description of 
complex, often longitudinal organisational processes and interdependencies (Shaffer, 
1995, p. 510). The ability to trace changes over time is a major strength of the 
approach (Yin, 2003a, p. 123). 
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These characteristics reflect the objectives of the thesis, which is to analyse 
the application of the public value notion in the context of PSB policy paradigms. As 
a single-outcome case study, it servers to investigate specific circumstances related 
to the public value notion as a policy idea rather than circumstances in general 
(Gerring, 2007, pp. 187, 190). The research design is situated between a descriptive 
and an exploratory approach, as it provides a chronological description of what 
occurred and explanations for how events occurred, the latter however without 
establishing cause-effect relationships (Yin, 2003b, pp. 5, 29, 67). Generalisability is 
therefore neither given nor intended. 
The case study approach consists of two cases, the BBC and C4, in which 
the public value notion, as the unit of analysis, is investigated in a multiple case 
study design that replicates the analytical structure across the cases to ensure 
comparability (Yin, 2003a, pp. 14, 46-53, 22-23).  
A case study approach is particularly suitable for policy change studies as 
it allows covering contextual or complex multivariate conditions and interactions 
between a phenomenon and its temporal context by relying on multiple sources of 
evidence (Yin, 2003b, pp. xi, 4). Evidence for case and paradigm shift studies should 
come from various primary and secondary sources like documents, archival records, 
interviews, and historical context tracing to ensure triangulation and mitigate validity 
problems of case study research (Carson et al., 2009, pp. 155-160; Yin, 2003a, pp. 
83, 97, 99; Shaffer, 1995, pp. 590-510; Schmidt, 2011, p. 113). Here, the primary 
sources are documents and expert interviews.  
The advantage of a case study approach, as a rather open and loosely 
defined research design, also has disadvantages. The possible lack of routine and 
rigor due to large amounts of data, the length of the study period and final reports can 
be addressed by providing clear systematic and analytical procedures to ensure 
validity and reliability (Yin, 2003a, pp. 10, 26, 34, 37, 109).  
Epistemologically, this qualitative study is an interpretative policy analysis 
as it focuses on motives of policy actors and how policy issues are framed (Yanow, 
2000, p. 11; Fischer, 2003, p. 160). In contrast to traditional positivist policy 
analysis, where analysts’ assessments are understood to be made objectively and 
value-free from an external point of view that mirrors the social world, interpretative 
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methods instead assume that knowledge is acquired through subjective and multiple 
interpretations of the social world (Yanow, 2000, pp. 5-7, 14-15, 20). 
The methods of this study, document analysis and expert interviews, are 
central interpretative methods. Analytical processes such as the selection and 
summary of large amounts of data through reading and re-reading as well as writing 
of reports, contribute to shaping the way the policy issue is perceived through the 
analyst’s interpretative frame which is shaped by own values, feelings, education, 
family, society position, and experience (ibid., pp. 31, 87, 90, 6). Based on this view, 
policy meaning is indeterminate as there are multiple readers and readings of text 
(ibid., p. 60). 
In this research, the meaning studied through textual policy artifacts 
addresses economic and non-economic regulatory rationales in policy ideas and 
processes. The identification of meaning through analysing document and interview 
texts is dependent on the researcher’s knowledge of the subject matter, here in 
particular economic and non-economic regulatory rationales. The degree of 
intersubjectivity is primarily related to the degree of knowledge on the subject, 
whereby the assumption is that people with comparable knowledge read texts in a 
similar way due to the commonly accepted understanding, distinction and meaning 
of economic and non-economic academic disciplines. 
Further, the objective is solely to analyse the clearly specified application 
of the public value notion in PSB and interpret this in the context of generally 
accepted knowledge on media policy paradigms. It is not the objective to take a 
normative approach to advocate any one position over another. Rather, the aim is to 
acknowledge the interpretative nature of policy analysis while attempting to conduct 
the analysis “dispassionately with reason and logic” (ibid., p. 90).  
A (reduced) critical realist perspective is adopted, which assumes that the 
objective detection of (a socially constructed) reality is qualified by interpretative 
construction. The ontological understanding is that different socially constructed 
regulatory rationales are used by policy actors to construct and negotiate social 
realities (Fischer, 2003, p. 168). The epistemological position can thus be understood 
as a combination of objective discovery and reality construction.  
In the following, document analysis and expert interviews are reviewed as 
the primary methodologies for the two research questions. The application of these 
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methods differs in scope and for the two case studies, while the analytical steps are 
the same aside from slight case-specific variations. 
 
 
6.2 Component Analysis: Ideological Classification of the Public  
 Value Notion 
 
This section reviews the method of document analysis (6.2.1) and the 
analytical steps used (6.2.2) to investigate the first research question, which focuses 
rather narrowly on the ideological composition of the public value notion applied at 
the BBC (chapter 7) and C4 (chapter 8). 
The analysis focuses on how economic and non-economic ideologies 
inform the public value notion. The research assumption and interest is to investigate 
whether non-economic rationales are prioritised over economic rationales in the 
definition and assessment of the public value notion as a justification for PSB 
provision. This is investigated in the context of a reduction in applicable market 
failures in the transition to digital technologies, which raised the question whether a 
shift to non-economic rationales and objectives has taken place with the public value 
notion.  
The compositional analysis of the public value notion at the BBC and C4 
provides findings on whether non-economic rationales are prioritised over economic 
rationales. These findings are then discussed in the context of economic market 
failure justification of PSB provision for analogue and digital broadcasting as well as 
the 1980s/90s as the reference point for the incumbent paradigm for PSB justification 
prior to the introduction of the public value notion. The understanding of the 
reference point is informed by theoretical evidence on market failure reduction in the 
transition to digital (chapter 2), phases on media policy paradigms and the 
classification of the third incumbent paradigm of the 1990s as primarily economic 
(chapter 5), secondary literature, unsystematic document analysis of BBC and 
government publications of the 1990s and most importantly evidence from expert 
interviews (chapter 9.1). 
By firstly identifying whether economic or non-economic rationales are 
dominant in informing the public value notion and secondly discussing and 
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comparing it to the reference point of the incumbent paradigm of the 1980s/90s, it is 
possible to say whether an ideological shift has taken place, as the primary indicator 
of a paradigm shift. The focus of the analysis lies on the ideological composition of 
the notion, as described in the following. 
 
6.2.1 Document Analysis  
Document analysis is the appropriate method to analyse official public 
accounts for policy studies as the administrative document can provide the basis for 
studies of organisations and policy processes (Hakim, 2000, p. 48). Here, documents 
are used to investigate regulatory rationales which are assumed to manifest in these 
texts. Written records are particularly suitable as empirical objects of study when the 
political phenomenon of interest cannot be measured through personal interviews, 
questionnaires, or direct observation (Johnson et al., 2001, p. 237). As Hakim (2000) 
states, administrative records are used in their own right, for the research of the 
policy process itself and as such as “part of the reality being studied, rather than 
being regarded as a poor substitute for data that would ideally be obtained in other 
ways” (ibid., p. 49). 
A central advantage of document analysis is that data is “nonreactive” 
towards the researcher and that subjects of the past can be investigated through 
accessing original, full data sets unchanged by time (Johnson et al., 2001, pp. 263-
264).  
Disadvantages such as the selective survival, low retrievability or limited, 
incomplete or difficult access to written records (ibid., p. 265; Yin, 2003a, p. 86) do 
not apply here, as the documents of interest are official and publicly accessible 
company records. The possibility that the records may be biased and thus “may tell 
more about political interests than empirical facts” (Johnson et al., 2001, p. 266) is 
also not of concern, as it is explicitly the interest to study different regulatory 
positions of policy actors.  
For each case study, the ideological composition of the public value notion 
is analysed in its applied form in performance assessment frameworks and in its 
more theoretical use in remit definitions. The point of entry to the empirical research 
of the rationales is therefore textual in that the text itself is not the research object but 
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rather serves as the meta-category or carrier which conveys the notion’s ideological 
components.  
Ideologies are social constructs that perform social functions by providing 
meaning that is conveyed through text or discourse. According to Schmidt (2002, 
cited from Fischer, 2003, p. 31) discourse has an “ideational dimension” which 
supplies policy with substantive arguments of empirical and normative nature that 
provide the logic and premises of a particular policy discourse and serve to define or 
redefine actors’ perceptions of their self-interest and the general interest of society.  
Economic and non-economic ideologies are thus viewed as meta-narratives 
or frames in document texts. Basic to interpretive analysis is the study of frames that 
define and attribute meaning to policy problems and the ways different participants 
understand them. “A frame […] sets up an interpretative framework within which 
policy related artifacts make sense” (Yanow, 2000, p. 11, also p. 12). Frames are 
often expressed through language and entail courses of action. They direct attention 
towards or away from values which contend for public recognition and validation. 
Frame conflicts occur because different interpretive communities focus cognitively 
and rationally on different elements of a policy issue (ibid., pp. 11-12).  
Economic and non-economic ideologies can hence be detected on the 
discursive level where they serve as “discursive resources” or “idioms” through 
which claims can be advanced (Fischer, 2003, pp. 80, 168). Underlying ideologies 
thus manifest in texts of policy documents where they can be operationalised by 
analysing specific textual elements.  
Document analysis therefore allows to study economic and non-economic 
ideologies as discursive resources which serve as cognitive frameworks to conceive, 
convey, and inform the presentation and construction of regulatory rationales in 
policy discourse and decision-making. 
 
6.2.2 Analytical Steps: Sampling, Data Collection and Analysis 
The BBC and C4 used the notion in the definition of their purposes and 
performance assessment frameworks. The BBC defined five types of public value 
creation (2004a, p. 8) and introduced the public value test (PVT) to assess the 
performance of services. Similarly, C4 defined four purposes and introduced a public 
value framework, which was later renamed to public impact assessment (PIA).  
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The combined utilization of the notion as a discursive device and a 
performance assessment tool provides the opportunity to assess its ideological 
composition based on both its rather abstract discursive and operational, applied 
form. The notion’s composition is thus analysed on two levels, which are described 
as the theoretical and the practical definition of public value. The theoretical 
definition refers to the term as introduced in strategy documents of the case study 
organisations. These are high-level definitions relating to public purposes and remits. 
The practical definition refers to the definition of the notion as derived from public 
value performance assessment frameworks.  
The analysis focuses on the latter as the interest lies on how the public 
value notion is actually applied in decision-making as this (rather than discourse) has 
a direct impact on policy outcomes.  
Correspondingly, the notion’s ideological composition is primarily derived 
from its applied use, which is then juxtaposed to the notion’s theoretical definition to 
see how the applied and discursive notions relate to each other. This understanding 
informs the focused sampling rationale. 
 
6.2.2.1 Sampling 
Due to the potentially high volume of relevant documents in a case study 
approach, it is crucial to develop a precise sampling rationale. As a non-probabilistic 
approach, focused sampling involves “knowing and intentional selectivity” (Hakim, 
2000, p. 172) and can be described as “the selective study of particular persons, 
groups or institutions, or of particular relationships, processes or interactions that are 
expected to offer especially illuminating examples [...]” (ibid., p. 170).  
For the two levels of analysis, two types of documents were sampled for 
each case study; strategy and legislative documents for the theoretical definition and 
performance assessment documents for the practical definition.  
The relevant documents for the theoretical definition are those in which the 
public value notion was first introduced. For the BBC this is the Charter review 
publication ‘Building Public Value’ (2004a) and for C4 it is ‘Next on 4’ (2008b), 
which was published in the context of Ofcom’s financial review of C4. Both 
organisations described their documents as strategic publications. As such, they had 
the purpose to provide a view and vision of PSB’s future role. In addition to these 
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company documents, statutory remit definitions in legislation, the Royal Charter and 
Framework Agreement, the 2003 Communications Act, and Ofcom’s understanding 
of PSB are also of interest.  
As explained below, the documents sampled for the theoretical definition 
were used differently than the second set of performance assessment documents. The 
theoretical public value and remit definitions were simply extracted from legislative 
and strategy documents to discuss and juxtaposed them with the practical definitions 
derived from performance assessment frameworks.  
The focus of the analysis lies on the practical public value definition from 
performance assessment documents. As the latter are continuous publications, time 
boundaries were set to mark the case study period (Yin, 2003a, p. 26). To include as 
many documents as possible while considering the time frame of this project, all 
relevant documents were chosen which had been published by the end of 2010.  
C4’s performance assessments are published in the annual reports. Until 
the end of 2010, two performance assessments were published in the 2008 and 2009 
annual reports, which were included in the analysis together with two accompanying 
publications, which describe the underlying methodology. 
A further sampling logic needed to be employed for the BBC case study, 
since the performance assessment framework consists of different steps and 
corresponding documents. The PVT includes a public value assessment (PVA), 
conducted by the BBC Trust, and a market impact assessment (MIA), conducted by 
Ofcom. Weighted against each other, they yield the outcome of the PVT (see 
Appendix A for an outline of the PVT process). As the research interest lies on the 
composition of the public value notion, only PVAs were sampled as performance 
assessment documents.  
The PVT came into effect with the Royal Charter in January 2007. Until 
the end of 2010, four PVTs have been conducted, of which the four PVAs were 
selected for the analysis. Supporting documents were excluded due to feasibility 
considerations and the understanding that PVAs are final or nodal documents which 
incorporate the most important information from supporting documents.  
The decision was also taken that it is not necessary to sample the MIAs for 
a systematic document analysis as the focus lies on the public value notion. Further, 
the assessment of market impact can much more easily be classified as overall 
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representing either an economic or a non-economic perspective according to how 
much focus is put on the consideration of negative (economic) or positive (economic 
and/or non-economic) market impact.  
The assessment of negative impacts of PSB services on markets can be 
classified as an economic rationale while positive impacts on markets can be argued 
to represent wider societal citizen value. An ideological classification of MIAs is 
thus derived by conducting a non-systematic document analysis that looks at how 
much focus is put on negative and positive market impacts in all four MIAs and 
assessment guidelines (see table below). Identifying the generally required or 
standardised assessment structure of MIAs, classifying the measures, and reaching a 
decision on the overall ideological classification is sufficient for the purposes of the 
thesis.  
 
Table 6.1: Sampled Case Study Documents 
 
Cases Sampled Documents 
 Practical definition Theoretical definition 
Performance assessment documents Company, legislative, and regulatory 
documents 
BBC  On Demand Service (BBC Trust, 2007a; 
Ofcom, 2006)  
 HDTV (BBC Trust, 2007c; Ofcom, 
2007e) 
 Gaelic Digital Services (BBC Trust, 
2007d; Ofcom, 2007f) 
 Local Video Proposal (BBC Trust, 
2008; Ofcom, 2008c)  
 Building Public Value (BBC, 2004a) 
 Royal Charter, Framework Agreement 
(DCMS, 2006b, 2006c) 
 Ofcom PSTB Review (2004a, 2004c, 
2005) 
 Ofcom Methodology MIA (2007d)  
C4  Report and Financial Statements 2008 
and Methodology (C4, 2009a, 2009b) 
 Report and Financial Statements 2009 
and Methodology (C4, 2010a, 2010b) 
 Next On 4 (C4, 2008b) 
 2003 Communications Act  
 Ofcom PSTB Review (2004a, 2004c, 
2005) 
 Ofcom Financial Review of C4 (2007b, 
2007c) 
 
At this point it shall further be addressed that the sampled documents, C4’s 
PIAs and the BBC’s PVAs, differ as types of performance assessment frameworks 
and thus in scope, structure, and content. While the BBC’s PVAs are ex-ante single 
service assessments, C4’s PIAs are ex-post annual assessments of all services. Both 
frameworks inform decisions on PSB performance and PSB provision, however with 
different immediacy.  
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While it is acknowledged that different performance assessment 
frameworks can impact public value assessments, possible differences resulting from 
different assessment types are not considered to be reason enough that these 
documents cannot be analysed and compared in the ideological component analysis 
of the applied public value notion.  
This decision was taken as the sampling rationale for the documents was 
not their status as performance assessment frameworks. Rather, they were sampled as 
they assess public value creation. Comparing for example C4’s PIAs with annual 
reports of the BBC as direct equivalents in terms of assessment frameworks would 
not contribute to answering the research question which focuses explicitly on how 
the public value notion is informed ideologically in its applied use at the BBC and 
C4. The research interest is not to investigate different types of performance 
assessments. Therefore, inclusion of further assessments would not clarify findings 
but would instead increase complexity without contributing to the research question.  
There are further reasons why these differences are not viewed as 
problematic for a comparative analysis of the public value notion: 
Firstly, the fact that the public value notion was introduced by both 
corporations in their strategic reviews as a future vision about their PSB contribution 
supports the direct comparability of the PVT and PIA assessments.  
Secondly, while it is acknowledged that smaller differences in the 
ideological composition of the public value notion at the BBC and C4 may exist due 
to their different natures as performance assessment frameworks, these impacts are 
considered to be minor and thus not significant in terms of their comparability. Also, 
the fact that the assessments have very similar components and build on each other 
further supports their comparability.  
 
6.2.2.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The sampled documents for the theoretical definitions as well as of the 
MIAs were not subject to the same systematic analysis applied to performance 
assessment documents. Instead, these documents were subject to non-systematic 
document analysis that focused on extracting text passages of interest concerning 
theoretical definitions of the public value notion and the assessment structure of 
MIAs.  
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The analysis focused on applied public value assessments. The sampled 
documents were subject to a systematic qualitative content analysis which, in a first 
analytical step, identified text passages that represent assessment components of 
public value in order to then, in a second step, analyse these components from the 
perspective of different economic and non-economic rationales.  
The ideological composition of the public value notion refers to its 
definition based on different assessment components such as value types, rationales 
or measures that describe or assess the notion. 
 
First Analytical Step: Data collection and reduction 
As discussed previously, economic and non-economic rationales manifest 
in texts and can be operationalised by investigating textual elements that carry 
information about the understanding and definition of public value. By analysing the 
framing of these text elements, it is possible to derive conclusions on the underlying 
economic or non-economic ideologies. These textual elements were identified as 
assessment components of public value, as they inform the understanding of public 
value and thus the objective and underlying justification of PSB.  
The assessment components were operationalised in the form of the 
measures used to assess public value. For the BBC, this is the RQIV framework, 
which stands for reach, quality, impact, and value for money. For C4, the assessment 
components comprise the four public purposes inspire, challenge, nurture, champion, 
and three scale & impact measures. Even though no formal coding process was 
conducted, the document was the unit of analysis, “the entity on which the 
interpretation of the study will focus”, and the assessment component was the unit of 
coding, “the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can 
be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. xi). 
The process of data collection and reduction was iterative in nature. Four 
rounds of reading and text reduction were applied. An initial, close reading served to 
develop familiarity with the text. In a next step, assessment components were 
identified in the sampled documents for one case study at a time. For each 
assessment component, the relevant text passages were selected for all performance 
assessment documents. For example, all text passages on quality measure were 
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selected and aggregated from all four BBC PVAs. The compiled data for each 
measure was exhaustive as it included the information from all sampled documents.  
After the relevant text passages had been aggregated, three further rounds 
of iterative text reduction and analysis were applied to the aggregate texts for each 
measure. As the documents and selected text passages are of quite extensive length, a 
high degree of content reduction was required to condense the data. Each round of 
content reduction was applied to the aggregated texts for each assessment component 
before moving on to the next round. By following this process, rather than applying 
all text reduction rounds to one assessment component at a time before moving on to 
the next one, it was possible to develop a comparative sense of the full data set. The 
aggregate texts were saved as word documents and reduced in this format. Each 
round of text reduction was saved for the records and notes were taken for each case 
study.  
The process of text reduction isolated text passages which provide 
information on, firstly, what is assessed for each assessment component, which refers 
to its substantive level or definition. Secondly, the objective was also to focus on 
how this assessment is made, which refers to the procedural level of methods, 
arguments, and evidence used to assess the stated substantive objective. For example, 
in the analysis of the quality measure the objective was to look at the 
operationalisation of quality in the form of the aspects considered in the assessment, 
referring to the substantive definition of quality and the methodological assessment. 
With the focus lying on text passages that address ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions, it was 
possible to eliminate unnecessary and lengthy examples and repetitions. 
The distinction between ‘what’ and ‘how’ reflects the distinction made in 
chapters 2 and 3 between substantive and procedural characteristics of regulatory 
rationales. The reason for making this distinction for public value assessment 
components was that both substantive and procedural characteristics provide insights 
to classify the components as representing citizen or consumer objectives. This 
distinction offers the structure to operationalise economic and non-economic 
rationales in the data for each measure and thus the public value notion as a whole.  
For each measure, the reduced data contains information on the substantive 
‘what’ and procedural ‘how’ of the assessment. These sub-components were 
compiled in aggregate tables for each measure. The tables contain condensed 
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information from several performance assessments, four PVAs for the BBC and two 
PIAs for C4, on how component measures of public value are assessed with regard to 
their substantive and procedural sub-components.  
Together with document text, the aggregate table for each measure 
provides the basis for the ideological analysis and classification of the measure as 
representing citizen or consumer objectives. Based on the classified measures it is 
then possible to draw a conclusion on the overall ideological composition of the 
public value notion. The ideological classification was the second analytical step. 
  
Second Analytical Step: Data analysis, classification, and interpretation  
Once the data had been compiled for each assessment component in the 
aggregate tables, the information was analysed together with citations from the 
documents. The classification and interpretation of the measures and the public value 
notion as a whole is presented in chapters 7 and 8. The analysis focused on whether 
the assessment components represented an economic perspective, focussing on 
consumer interest, or a non-economic perspective, focussing on citizen interest.  
Both classification and interpretation required a solid understanding of the 
characteristics of economic and non-economic rationales, which was gained through 
the detailed reviews in chapters 2 and 3. As it is important to discuss and classify the 
measures in the context in which they were applied, and since it is also impossible to 
develop an exhaustive list of distinguishing economic and non-economic 
characteristics, the classification and interpretation was based on the set of core 
characteristics for both economic and non-economic rationales outlined in table 3.2. 
In addition to these predefined, deductive categories, further inductive categories 
were included in the classification as they came up in the analysis. Deductive coding 
alone would have limited the findings. In section 7.1, further guidelines are discussed 
for the classification of economic and non-economic rationales in broadcasting 
performance assessments.  
Despite a very high degree of knowledge in this area, the classification was 
sometimes challenging due to ideologically ambiguous data or simply the possibility 
to argue both ways. Measures were frequently ideologically ambiguous in that their 
sub-components focused on both economic and non-economic objectives. In those 
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cases the dominant ideology was identified to inform the classification of a measure. 
These situations are addressed in the analysis.  
Once all measures were classified, the ideological composition of the 
public value notion was classified as economic or non-economic based on all 
measures taken together and was similarly informed by the dominant perspective that 
informed the measures and thus the public value notion. Here it was of interest to see 
how economic and non-economic rationales were integrated and how inherent 
difficulties in their integration, value conflicts, and hierarchical issues were 
addressed. Of particular interest was the transition of non-economic rationales from 
their theoretical definition to their practical measurement with regard to processes of 
quantification and technocratisation (Karppinen, 2006, p. 64).  
In a next step, the ideological composition of the applied public value 
notion was compared to discursive public value definitions from company and 
legislative documents. The comparison addressed commonalities and differences in 
the ideological composition of theoretical and practical definitions.  
After the analysis had been conducted for both case studies, a comparison 
was drawn between them to provide a cross-case characterisation of the notion’s 
ideological composition in the context of UK PSB. This ideological composition was 
then discussed and compared to the incumbent paradigm as the reference point to 
discuss whether fundamental change in the form of a shift in the underlying ideology 
has taken place, both at the end of the compositional analysis and in the concluding 
chapter 10 (see also section 6.4). For ‘Piloting and Methodological Reflexions’ see 
Appendix B. 
 
 
6.3 Contextual Analysis: The Public Value Notion and the wider 
 Policy Change Process 
 
This section reviews the methodology for the second research question, 
which investigates the wider policy process associated with the public value notion. 
In contrast to the previous, narrow focus on the ideological composition of the 
notion, a broader, contextual view is adopted here.  
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The focus lies on investigating factors that influenced the public value 
development as well as characteristics of the policy process that could be indicative 
of a paradigm shift. According to the analytical framework to classify a paradigm 
shift (chapter 1), these policy process influence factors and characteristics function as 
secondary indicators to supplement findings from the ideological component analysis 
of the public value notion as the primary indicator of a paradigm shift. This 
secondary contextual analysis provides process-orientated data that is used to support 
or refute the conclusion of whether a paradigm shift has taken place in the 
justification of PSB with the adoption of the public value notion.  
This analysis of the second research question adopts a historical and 
process-orientated approach typical of policy change and paradigm shift studies, 
which provides background information on the context in which this development 
took place. “In general, the analytical strategy is to trace the process of fundamental 
policy change as it evolves from ideas and through action to become 
institutionalized” (Carson et al., 2009, pp. 21-23; also Pickard, 2010, p. 172; Schmidt 
& Radaelli, 2004, p. 191).  
The public value process is distinguished into three phases of before, at, 
and after the institutionalisation of the notion at the BBC, which represents the point 
of policy change (i.e. the inclusion of the notion in the BBC’s Charter and Charter 
Agreement). Structuring the process into three phases allows to identify and relate 
developments to each other.  
The contextual analysis is based on expert interviews as the primary 
method. Expert interviews are a typical source of evidence in case study research as 
case studies are about human affairs, which “should be reported and interpreted 
through the eyes of specific interviewees [...]” (Yin, 2003a, p. 93). Supplementary 
data is collected by applying non-systematic analysis of selected policy documents 
and secondary literature, which is integrated into the interview analysis.  
In the following, the method of expert interviews is briefly reviewed 
(6.3.1) before the analytical processes of data collection (6.3.2) and analysis are 
presented (6.3.3).  
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6.3.1 Expert Interviews  
The second research interest addresses the take-up and conceptualisation of 
the notion in the context of the wider policy environment. This exploratory interest is 
investigated by conducting semi-structured, in-depth expert interviews that allow 
covering a spectrum of aspects related to media and PSB policy. “Elite interviewing 
is an excellent form of data collection when the behaviour of interest can best be 
described and explained by those who are deeply involved in political processes. It 
often provides a more comprehensive and complicated understanding of political 
phenomena than other forms of data collection, and it provides researchers with a 
rich variety of perspectives” (Johnson et al., 2001, p. 275).  
The interviewees are experts with specific knowledge in the areas of 
interest, which includes the policy environment and the case study organisations. 
Experts or elites are selected for holding former or current roles in organisations or 
expertise of interest. Elites generally have more knowledge, money, and status and 
assume higher positions than others in the population (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001, p. 
299) and the interviewer. Since the term ‘elite’ is linked with notions of power and 
privilege (ibid., p. 301), certain hierarchical issues need to be considered in the 
interview process, which are address in the methodological steps. 
Elite interviewing is a special form of a personal interview which ideally 
involves face-to-face questioning based on an individualized or non-standardized 
interview guide. A corresponding way of defining ‘elite’ is Dexter’s understanding, 
where anyone “who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is given 
special, non-standardized treatment” is described as an elite (1970, p. 5 cited from 
Johnson et al., 2001, p. 272, also p. 274). Non-standardized treatments allow the 
interviewer to tailor questions specifically to the interviewees’ expertise. 
The advantage of a non-standardized interview is that it allows the 
interviewer to guide the discussion enough to focus on the topic of interest while it 
provides enough freedom for respondents to address the matters they consider 
important (Hakim, 2000, p. 35). A further strength of applying the method in case 
studies is that it provides information on perceived causal inferences (Yin, 2003a, p. 
86). Interviews serve to test research assumptions and to provide open questions to 
gather information the researcher might be unaware of. 
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Even though personal interviews are an “effective method of data 
collection for research on elite subjects and culture” (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001, p. 
300), some limitations of the technique need to be addressed. Interviews should, 
according to Yin, always be considered “verbal reports only” (2003a, p. 93), which 
are subject to the common problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate 
articulation. As this project focuses on events that go back several years, issues of 
memory and accuracy need to be addressed. Even though the objective is to get 
individual accounts of the events from interviewees, it is still necessary to check the 
validity and meaningfulness of interview data, which may be biased, evasive or 
untruthful. This can be done by examining the plausibility, checking internal 
consistency, or corroborating information with accounts of other interviewees, 
secondary sources, and established facts (Johnson et al., 2001, p. 275; Thomas, 2003, 
p. 7). A further disadvantage of the method is that interview data is reactive to 
interactions and proceedings in the interview. A poorly constructed questionnaire can 
for example lead to response bias. These aspects are addressed in the following. 
 
6.3.2 Data Collection: Selecting Interviewees, Preparing the Questionnaire,  
 and Conducting Interviews 
The three steps of selecting interviewees, preparing the questionnaire, and 
conducting interviews were iterative in nature and thus subject to modifications 
throughout the interview process to incorporate new information from interviews or 
secondary sources. 
 
Identifying and Contacting Interviewees 
The designation of whom or what is elite varies according to the area of 
inquiry, which makes it necessary to define parameters of the group in question to 
operationalise the term elite (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001, p. 301). Here, the 
understanding of elite is derived from the research interest, which lies on 
investigating the development of a policy idea applied by different actors in the 
context of the wider policy environment. Accordingly, three areas of interest were 
defined, from which interviewees were recruited.  
The first area of interest is the non-market or policy environment. As the 
dominant rationale which informs media policy, media policy paradigms are created 
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by those in power who decide on policy outcomes according to their ideological 
preferences. The policy or non-market environment is therefore defined in the 
narrow sense of governmental institutions which are responsible for or inform 
decision-making. Since individuals are interviewed as role holders in these 
organisations, they are understood to represent, on behalf of their organisation, these 
ideological preferences which frame decision-making. Interviewees do not have to be 
the actual decision-makers. It is sufficient that they belong to and speak for an 
institution which is in charge of informing or making decisions. In the empirical 
context, this first group of interviewees comes from government departments and 
agencies which are responsible for media and PSB policy and regulation.  
The second and primary area of interest focuses on the application of the 
public value notion at the two case study organisations. Interviewees are current and 
former role holders at the BBC and C4 with positions related to the application of the 
notion. The purpose of the expert interviews is in particular to focus on the use of the 
public value notion at the two case study organisations to gather information on the 
background, the wider context and motivations for its application. A central objective 
is to address the role of ideological justifications such as market failures in the public 
value development.  
The third area of interest focuses on the policy process more generally. It 
encompasses individuals with expertise on the public value notion and UK PSB and 
media policy. These industry and policy experts are current or former role holders in 
institutions which are neither cases-study nor governmental organisation. They are 
for example representatives of interest groups, civil society organisations, media 
companies, think tanks, or are academics, consultants, and industry experts.  
While the interviews also address wider contextual developments, the 
focus is in particular on internal developments at the case study organisations. The 
objective of the interviews thus goes beyond the level of merely viewing or 
describing the public value notion as a Charter review or PR strategy by focussing on 
underlying ideologies in the development. A list of all interviewees and their group 
designations can be found in Appendix E. 
After having defined the relevant organisations and roles, the identification 
and contacting of interviewees was sometimes challenging and often informed 
through document and internet research or referral by other interviewees and people 
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with insider knowledge. All interviewees were asked about recommendations on who 
to interview, which was not only very helpful for identifying and approaching new 
interviewees, but also allowed cross-referencing individuals to make sure that all key 
individuals had been identified. For each interviewee, background information was 
compiled (Johnson et al., 2001, p. 272) to develop interviewee-specific questions that 
supplement general questions applicable to all interviewees. Interviewees were 
ranked and contacted via email (see Appendix E) according to their seniority (ibid., 
p. 274).  
A total of 45 individuals were approached, out of which 33 agreed to be 
interviewed. The response time was usually one day, in most cases less than one 
week. All interviewees were contacted and interviewed in the time between January 
2009 and August 2010. No pilot interviews were conducted due to the high-profile 
character of interviewees and the constant adjustment of the interview guide 
throughout the process. 
 
The Questionnaire 
The development of the questionnaire was a continuous and iterative 
process which ran parallel to the interviews to incorporate new information. Similar 
to the grouping of the interviewees in three panels, the structure of the questionnaire 
was informed by the above outlined definition of the policy environment and the 
research objective of the ideological relationship between the public value notion and 
its policy environment. Interviews were exploratory and semi-structured to address 
interviewees’ perceptions of the public value notion in the non-market environment 
and to corroborate research hypotheses (Yin, 2003a, p. 90).  
The research interest was reflected in three interview blocks. The first 
block focused on the ideological characteristics of the policy environment. The 
second and main block addressed the application of the notion at the case study 
organisations BBC and C4. The third block integrated both previous blocks by 
looking at the public value notion and its relationship to the policy environment.  
Further detail on the three interview blocks and the questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix F. 
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Conducting the Interviews 
The majority of interviews were around one hour in length. Several were 
longer than one hour while only a few lasted from 30-45 minutes. All locations were 
chosen for the interviewees’ convenience. Most took place at the interviewees’ 
offices. Other places included restaurants, interviewee’s homes, and private member 
clubs. All phone-interviews, but one, were conducted face-to-face. The quality of 
data from interviews in private spaces was generally better. If permission was given, 
interviews were recorded and later transcribed (see Appendix G).  
 
6.3.3 Data Analysis: Thematic Content Analysis 
The collected data was analysed in a three-stepped process: After the 
transcription of the interviews, relevant text passages were coded and clustered into 
themes related to influence factors and policy process characteristics. 
 
Step 1: Interview Transcription 
The transcription of interviews was the first analytical step and prerequisite 
for the textual analysis. Since a total of 33 mostly one hour long interviews were 
conducted, the transcription of all interviews was not feasible. Based on notes for 
each interview and an initial round of listening to the recordings, 21 interviews were 
selected for full transcription. Of the remaining interviews, which were considered 
less relevant, only selected text passages were transcribed. The transcription 
followed a standardised layout which included the interviewer’s and the 
interviewee’s initials, group, date, duration, location, and notes for the analysis. One 
interview transcript can be found in Appendix G. 
 
Step 2: Thematic Analysis  
The method of thematic analysis was selected as it captures the richness of 
qualitative information while it also provides the methodological precision and 
discipline of content analysis to structure large amounts of data. A theme can be 
described as a pattern in the data that at the minimum describes and organises 
possible direct observations in texts, which would be an explicit, manifest theme, or 
at the maximum interprets aspects of an underlying phenomenon of texts, which 
would be an implicit or latent theme (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 4). Themes function as 
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categories of analysis for the phenomenon studied. The process of coding can be 
described as indexing text passages with descriptive themes. Good codes capture the 
qualitative richness of the phenomenon studied and once developed become the 
original themes the researcher uses in the analysis, interpretation, and presentation of 
findings (Boyatzis, 1998, p. x). 
A further reason for employing thematic analysis was the need to apply 
exploratory inductive coding in addition to deductive coding (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006), as the interest was to extract interviewees’ insights and 
perspectives on developments related to the public value take-up at the case study 
organisations and the wider policy context. An inductive approach allows condensing 
extensive and varied raw text into brief summary format whereby research findings 
emerge from the frequent, dominant or significant themes inherent in the raw data 
(Thomas, 2003, p. 2). Limitations of the method are reduced intersubjectivity due to 
its interpretative character.  
The interview transcripts were analysed by applying both inductive and 
deductive coding. The single transcribed document was the unit of analysis and 
relevant text passages were the units of coding. The amount of text coded varied in 
terms of length from as little as one paragraph to more than one page. The data was 
analysed with regard to motivational and contextual influence factors as well as 
process characteristics.  
Five deductive codes were derived from the chronology (chapter 5) and the 
questionnaire blocks in the form of predefined meta-themes of interest. Two meta-
themes took the form of central points in the chronological development, here 
referred to as nodal points. Two further meta-themes were motivational aspects 
related to the application of the notion at the BBC and C4. One theme addressed 
parallel developments in the form of Ofcom’s PSTB review. In a close reading of 
interview texts, passages which contained references to these deductive meta-themes 
were identified and coded accordingly by assigning them to a meta-theme.  
In addition to this deductive approach, four recurring topics in the form of 
sub-themes pertaining to parallel developments in the policy environment were 
identified inductively in interview texts and aggregated according to their 
commonalities to be later developed into three inductive meta-themes. 
155 
 
The first round of text analysis thus encompassed the identification and 
coding of relevant text passages into meta-themes and sub-themes. Hierarchical 
coding in the form of meta-themes, which are more abstract and representative of 
overall data, and sub-themes, which are less abstract and more specific, makes it 
possible to analyse texts at different levels of specificity (Cassell et al., 2005, p. 10; 
Attride-Stirling, 2001, pp. 388-389).  
A second analytical step then encompassed the systematic reduction of the 
aggregated texts for deductive meta-themes and inductive sub-themes by identifying 
sub-themes for deductive meta-themes or developing inductive-meta themes by 
clustering sub-themes according to similarities and differences. This process was 
conducted through applying iterative rounds of reading and text reduction in which 
meta-themes were described based on the information provided in the interview text, 
while particularly meaningful quotes were marked to be later used to elaborate on 
meta-themes.  
The development of themes was thus conducted top-down, with deductive 
meta-themes being split into sub-themes, and bottom up, with sub-themes being 
aggregated to inductive meta-themes. In total, nine meta-themes were identified 
which represent three different types of themes.  
 
Table 6.2: Meta-Themes in Chronological Order  
 
No. Meta-Theme Type Coding Label 
1 Nodal Point Deductive 1999 Davies report and the 1990s 
2 Nodal Point Deductive 2003 Communications Act 
3 Parallel Development Inductive Assessment of wider societal benefits in media policy  
4 Motivational Aspects Deductive Adoption of the Public Value Notion at the BBC 
5 Parallel Development Inductive Dissemination of the Public Value Notion and Existing 
Procedures and Methods 
6 Parallel Developments Deductive Ofcom’s PSTB Review  
7 Parallel Developments Inductive Personal Relationships 
8 Motivational Aspects Deductive Adoption of the Public Value Notion at C4  
9 Parallel Development Inductive The Diminishing Role of Public Value 
 
Step 3: Interpretation and Presentation of Findings  
The main purpose of extracting information from expert interviews was to 
develop an understanding of the wider policy process as an interpretative context in 
which the adoption of the public value notion took place. Particular emphasis was 
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put on identifying the chronology and characteristics of the policy process as well as 
factors that influenced the development.  
The themes, which represent the core development stages of the public 
value process, were presented in a chronological composition (Yin, 2003a, pp. 141, 
153) of three process phases of before, at and after the adoption of the notion at the 
BBC. This structure was chosen in order to more easily distinguish between different 
phases of the policy change process which centres on the institutionalisation of the 
public value notion at the BBC. It was also introduced to develop a better 
understanding of the sequence, tempo and interrelationship of events and decisions 
taken.  
The themes were discussed together with findings from the non-systematic 
document analysis of policy documents for the different phases (Appendix H) as well 
as insights from secondary literature.  
The labels of the meta-themes are used as main headings in the 
presentation of findings. Each theme is described and a combination of quotes and 
paraphrases from the data is used to convey the meaning of the themes and to 
elaborate on specific aspects (Thomas, 2003, p. 8). Longer quotes were written in 
italics, font size 11, with double quotation marks to clearly distinguish them from the 
rest of the text. To ensure the anonymity of interviewees, quotes were attributed to 
group members designated by their organisation or profession, rather than to 
individuals.  
The findings, as presented in chapter 8, provide a chronological narrative 
of central stages and characteristics of the public value process as well as insights on 
motivational and contextual factors that influence this development, as outlined in 
the second research question. As secondary indicators, these findings are used to 
support or undermine the findings from the compositional analysis of the public 
value notion with regard to whether an ideological and thus a paradigm shift has 
taken place.  
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6.4  Integration of Findings 
 
For each of the two research questions, preliminary findings are 
summarised at the end of the respective chapters. A conclusion for the first research 
question on the ideological composition of the public value notion and the question 
of whether an ideological shift to non-economic rationales has taken place, is 
provided at the end of chapter 8. Findings to the second research question are 
provided at the end of chapter 9, with regard to influence factors and characteristics 
of the wider public value process.  
The integration of the findings takes place in chapter 10, where a final 
conclusion is reached on whether the public value development represents a 
paradigm shift in the justification of UK PSB.  
This conclusion is based mainly on findings from the compositional 
analysis of the public value notion with regard to whether an ideological shift has 
taken place. The occurrence of an ideological shift was defined as the primary 
indicator of a paradigm shift in the analytical framework devised in chapter 1. As it 
was however considered necessary but insufficient to solely base a paradigm shift 
classification on an ideological shift, a set of secondary indicators were included in 
the analytical framework in the form of policy process influence factors and 
paradigm shift process characteristics to provide further evidence.  
In chapter 10, a final conclusion on the overall research question of 
whether a paradigm shift has taken place is reach by discussing the findings from 
both the compositional ideological and the contextual procedural analyses of the 
public value notion. In addition, the contributions of the thesis in the fields of media 
policy and paradigm shift studies are addressed.  
 
 
  
158 
 
7. COMPARATIVE COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC 
 VALUE NOTION – PART 1: BBC CASE STUDY 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 address the ideological composition of the public value 
notion at the BBC and C4. The notion’s practical and theoretical definitions are 
investigated with regard to their representation of citizen and consumer objectives. 
The analysis does not critique the often contested nature of the methodologies used 
or conclusions drawn, as the focus lies on the investigation of assessment 
components and their representation of citizen (non-economic rationales) and 
consumer (economic rationales) interests. 
According to the first research question, the ideological composition of the 
applied public value notion is investigated to ascertain which of the rationales is 
more important or dominant in the assessment of public value. This analysis is 
conducted to see whether the indicated prioritisation of citizen or non-economic 
rationales over economic rationales in the public value notion is indeed the case. This 
is of interest in order to investigate whether the hierarchy of component values in 
PSB justification has altered with the adoption of the public value concept.  
A shift in the hierarchy of component values would be the primary 
indicator of a paradigm shift, as defined in chapter 1. The final assessment of 
whether a paradigm shift has taken place with the public value notion is conducted in 
chapter 10. 
As the component analysis focuses on the practical public value definition 
in assessment frameworks, broadcasting performance measurements are briefly 
reviewed (7.1) to provide further guidelines for the operationalisation of economic 
and non-economic ideologies in assessment components (in addition to table 3.2). 
For each case study, BBC and C4, a review of the regulatory regime (7.2.1, 8.1.1) 
proceeds the presentation of findings from the component analysis (7.2.2, 8.1.2) and 
the conclusions drawn (7.2.3, 8.1.3). A cross-case comparison and characterisation of 
the public value notion as applied in UK PSB concludes the analysis (8.2). 
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7.1  Performance Assessments in Broadcasting  
 
This section provides a brief overview of different assessment methods in 
broadcasting as background information for the identification and ideological 
classification of different public value measures. As units of analysis, public value 
component measures are analysed in regard to what they assess (objectives of the 
assessment) and how the assessment is conducted (methodology used). This 
information is helpful to operationalise citizen and consumer interests in 
assessments, representing non-economic and economic rationales. By analysing and 
classifying these assessment components, it is possible to derive an ideological 
composition of the public value notion as the overall rationale for PSB provision.  
Since the number of possible measures or methodologies to assess 
consumer and citizen values is vast, the review only provides a meta-level 
description of different performance measurement categories, which are intended to 
function as rough guidelines for the empirical analysis.  
Public service broadcasters have always been subject to some form or type 
of assessment as their legitimacy not only derives from their statutory remits but also 
from the assessment of their performance against these objectives (Betzel & Ward, 
2004, p. 49). It is especially for abstract objectives, such as public value creation, 
helpful to look at the operationalisation in assessment processes, as this provides 
information on the interpretation of such concepts in practice.  
PSB performance assessments have changed in line with the evolution of 
public administration approaches and media policy paradigms, as described in 
chapter 5. A basic distinction can be made between “traditional” and “economic 
measures” (Picard, 2003, pp. 33-41).  
Past assessments tended to involve traditional performance measures 
which were narrowly defined towards content, coverage, and audience measures that 
focus on the social, cultural, and political role of PSB (ibid., pp. 33-34). As output 
measures, they can be grouped according to specific characteristics, such as output 
quantity (volumes/hours), content type (genre/geography/audience group), 
procurement and scheduling (original programming/commissions, first-/re-runs, 
time), medium (TV/radio/online), coverage (universality/access), viewing numbers 
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(reach/share), and audience research on demand and appreciation 
(quantitative/qualitative).  
More recently and in particular in the context of NPM, PSB objectives 
were increasingly defined to address managerial, economic, strategic, and 
operational objectives (ibid.). This reflects broader trends of public sector 
performance assessments and accountability intended to create legitimacy (ibid., pp. 
30-32). PSB similarly adopted new economic, financial, and managerial measures to 
demonstrate that public resources were used in the best possible way (ibid., p. 31). 
This includes productivity, efficiency (how well resources such as personal, capital, 
assets are used to produce output), effectiveness (how well outputs achieve set 
objectives), financial, operational and market share measures (ibid., pp. 34-41).  
As an NPM successor, PVM adds another layer of objectives and 
corresponding measures to assessments by emphasising citizen values and societal 
outcomes. The approach comprises a more holistic set of objectives and measures 
that includes NPM, traditional output and new outcome or impact assessments. 
Examples of typical outcomes are social cohesion, wellbeing, quality of life, and 
equity. Generally, outcomes are defined context-, sector-, or service-specific. 
Problems associated with the assessment of outcomes and impacts such as broad and 
contested definitions, causality, incommensurability, and long-term horizons were 
addressed in chapter 3.  
Different participatory methods can be used to assess societal outcomes 
through public opinions, perceptions, and attitudes. Examples of methods are 
surveys, (deliberative) opinion polling, consultations, focus groups, public meetings, 
consensus conferences, complaint and suggestion schemes, citizen panels and juries 
(Hills & Sullivan, 2006, pp. 34-48). These methods are qualitative or quantitative 
and allow varying degrees of expression in monetary value. Stated preference studies 
(WTP, contingent valuation) for example assign monetary value as a price proxy to 
non-market items. These methods are useful for valuation purposes, as for the 
inclusion of non-market goods in value for money or cost-benefit analyses. 
The central question in the application of these methods is whether 
individuals participate in their roles as citizens or consumers. Since consumers, by 
definition, misjudge utility derived from merit goods, it is important to make this 
distinction. The ability of individuals to distinguish between own consumer utility 
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and collective citizen benefits remains however questionable, as addressed in chapter 
3.  
Due to the complexity of outcome assessments, output measures are 
frequently used as proxies for outcomes as correlations exist between some outputs 
and outcomes (Horner et al., 2006, p. 39). As a traditional managerial measure, 
outputs can be used to indicate consumption, while they do not assess outcomes. 
Traditional output and economic measures are primarily quantitative. Quantifiability 
and expression in monetary value is often used to indicate economic and consumer 
objectives, whereas incommensurability is equated with non-economic objectives. 
This distinction is helpful but solely a rough guideline as the focus lies too narrowly 
on the methodology applied without paying sufficient attention to the actual 
objective assessed.  
As addressed in the previous chapter, it is helpful to base the primary 
distinction between citizen and consumer objectives on a set of core characteristics 
outlined in table 3.2. These substantive and procedural characteristics need to be 
interpreted together and in the context they are applied in. Due to the complexity and 
context-dependency of assessments, it is neither possible nor sensible to develop 
standardised guidelines on the classification of assessment components as 
representing citizen or consumer objectives. Therefore, the reasoning behind 
classifications is outlined in the analysis.  
With public value frameworks integrating citizen and consumer values, the 
question remains how conflicts between non-economic and economic objectives are 
resolved. In integrating them, the danger exists that more emphasis is put on 
objectives which are easy to assess, i.e. economic measures. In the case of PSB, such 
behaviour could result in strategic choices closer to those of commercial firms and 
thus a loss in distinctiveness and unique purposes (Picard, 2003, p. 43). This would 
question the legitimacy of PSB provision. 
With regard to the empirical analysis, this review of performance 
assessments in broadcasting implies that frameworks claiming to assess public value 
should exhibit different types of assessment components, such as traditional output, 
economic input, and outcome measures. This is investigated in the following. 
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7.2 BBC Case Study: Public Value Component Analysis 
 
7.2.1 The Regulatory Framework  
As an introduction to the case, a brief overview is given of the regulatory 
framework, which is defined as comprising a remit, a system to measure compliance 
to obligations set in the remit, and institutional arrangements for assessing 
performance (Betzel & Ward, 2004, p. 58). These elements are addressed as 
proposed in the BBC’s Charter review publication ‘Building Public Value’ (2004a) 
and as defined in the Royal Charter and Framework Agreement (DCMS, 2006b, 
2006c).  
The Charter and Framework Agreement constitutionally establish the BBC 
by setting out its purposes, editorial independence, and obligations of its executive 
and regulatory bodies. The formal authorisation and regulation of the BBC is divided 
between the DCMS, HM Treasury, Ofcom, and the BBC Trust as the governing self-
regulatory body, which replaced the BBC Governors in 2007.  
In its Charter review publication, the BBC proclaimed that “Public value 
should not be seen as a broad justification for what the BBC does but as a practical 
test that can be applied by the BBC itself, by its Governors and by the public, to 
decide what it should do – and how well it does it“ (2004a, p. 8).  
The public value notion is used heavily throughout the document. Five 
different types – democratic, cultural, educational, social, and global – and three 
levels – individual, society, economy – of public value creation are distinguished 
(ibid.). Five public purposes are introduced and a sixth one is later included in the 
Charter. Further, a new governance framework is proposed and described as “a new 
framework of rigorous and transparent scrutiny rooted in public value” (ibid., p. 
123), which comprises assessment components such as a public value test (PVT), 
service licences, and purpose remits (ibid., pp. 129-130, 83-86). 
Most of the elements proposed by the BBC for its governance framework, 
such as the creation of two distinct boards, the public purposes, the PVT, services 
licences, and purpose remits were included in the Charter and Framework 
Agreement, which came into effect in January 2007. The BBC Trust was introduced 
as a new governing body and given the responsibility to implement an assessment 
framework which contains these stated components (DCMS, 2006b, article 
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24(2)(b)(c)(l)). Of these framework components, purpose remits and services 
licences are ex-post performance assessments. As an ex-ante assessment, the PVT is 
applied to new or significantly changed services. For all three, public consultation is 
required in either the definition of objectives or the assessment process (DCMS, 
2006c, clauses 5, 19, 28). This can be interpreted as an indication that emphasis is 
put on participatory and audience research methods. 
In regard to the assessment, no specification is made in the Charter, which 
only states that the Trust needs to define “suitable performance criteria and measures 
against which the effective promotion of the Public Purposes will be judged” 
(DCMS, 2006b, article 24(2)(b)). The BBC (2004a, pp. 83, 87) hence adopted the 
RQIV measures reach, quality, impact, and value for money, which had been 
proposed in the Charter review publication as the universal performance measure of 
public value. The creation of public value is therefore conceptually linked to the 
delivery of the public purposes as assessed through the RQIV framework.  
With the RQIV measures at its core, the governance framework is highly 
standardised, what might seem to be at odds with the general difficulties of assessing 
the various value types associated with the public value notion. It is therefore of 
interest to explore how the RQIV drivers are assessed. This sheds light on the 
ideological composition of the public value notion and the hierarchy of citizen and 
consumer objectives.  
Even though the RQIV framework is used in all three ex-post and ex-ante 
assessments, its use in the ex-ante PVT is most relevant to the research interest, as 
considerations of significant changes to existing service or the introduction of new 
services directly address justifications of service provision and thus rationales for 
intervention. Ex-post assessments, in contrast, simply measure past performance. In 
addition, and most importantly, the PVT contains a dedicated PVA, which is 
consequentially the focus of the analysis.  
Regarding the PVT, the Charter solely states that the BBC Trust should 
devise an approval framework (DCMS, 2006b, article 24(2)(l)). PVT specifications 
and more detail on its process are provided in the Framework Agreement (DCMS, 
2006c, clauses 23-33), supplemented by Trust guidelines (2007b). 
In general, a PVT must be applied before a decision is taken to make any 
significant change to an existing or to introduce a new UK public television, radio or 
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online service (DCMS, 2006c, article 25(1)). After the BBC Executive has submitted 
a proposal to the Trust, the Trust judges the proposal’s significance to decide 
whether to launch a PVT based on criteria such as impact, financial implication, 
novelty, and activity duration (ibid., clauses 25(2)(a)-(d), (3); BBC Trust, 2010, p. 
69). 
If a PVT is launched, the Trust Unit prepares a public value assessment 
(PVA) of the proposal (DCMS, 2006c, clause 28), while Ofcom prepares a market 
impact assessment (MIA) overseen by a joint steering group (ibid., clause 29(1)-(8)). 
The PVA and MIA are the central two assessments of the PVT. As already 
outlined in chapter 6, the component analysis focuses on the PVA to investigate how 
the PSB objective of public value creation is operationalised in practice. The MIA by 
definition functions as a corrective to the PVA by assessing the market impact of the 
service and comparing these costs (MIA) to the benefits created (PVA). While the 
MIA is part of the overall PVT rationale of net PV that justifies service provision, a 
detailed component analysis of the MIA is not conducted for two reasons:  
Firstly, the analysis focuses on the public value notion to investigate 
whether it prioritises citizen over consumer objectives in the operationalisation of 
public value creation as the BBC’s declared primary objective of PSB provision.  
Secondly, the ideological focus of the MIA is fairly obvious as it assesses 
market impacts. While these can be both negative and positive impacts on markets 
and consumers and citizens (ibid., clause 30-31; BBC Trust, 2010a, p. 73; Ofcom, 
2007d, pp. 2-3, 2008c, pp. 35-36), a non-systematic document analysis of the four 
MIAs and their methodological guidelines (Ofcom, 2006, 2007d, 2007e, 2007f, 
2008c) has shown that the primary focus lies on consumer surpluses and market 
conditions as classical economic objectives. Positive market impacts, which can be 
viewed to represent wider societal and citizen value, are addressed as well but the 
focus lies on negative market impacts, supply, demand, and consumer harm (Ofcom, 
2007d, pp. 2-3, 10-11, 2006, p. 23). 
According to Ofcom, the “[...] PVT is most similar to a cost-benefit 
analysis” as the “PVA identifies the key benefits of the BBC’s proposal, while the 
MIA is largely – though not exclusively – focussed on assessing the costs. In most 
cases, the MIA considers the extent to which the BBC’s proposals are likely to 
induce substitution away from competing services and the way in which that 
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substitution may reduce investment in new services and thereby reduce choice for 
consumers and citizens” (Ofcom, 2006, pp. 18-19). While MIAs also address that 
proposals may complement other services and thereby drive increased investment, 
“[...] on balance, the substitution effects are likely to be more significant. As a result, 
the outcome of the MIA is almost certain to be negative: its net position will set out 
the negative implications of the BBC’s services” (ibid., p. 19). 
This clearly shows that the MIA primarily functions as a correction to the 
PVA, focussing on market and consumer objectives and thus reflecting primarily an 
economic perspective. This is also evident in the standardised assessment procedure 
of MIAs, as outlined in table 7.1, which focuses primarily on negative market effects 
and consumer harm rather than positive market creation effects. Overall, it can 
therefore be said that MIAs represent economic assessments of primarily negative 
market impacts. 
  
Table 7.1: MIA Standard Approach
12
  
 
Assessment steps 
1) Identification of products and services likely to be affected by the BBC proposal 
2) Analysis of take-up and usage of proposed service  
3) Static market impact analysis 
Direct impact of BBC service on the demand for other services without taking service providers’ 
possible response into account 
Negative substitution and where relevant positive market creation effects, counterfactual  
Quantitative welfare approach (estimating gross reduction in consumer/producer surplus) 
4) Dynamic market impact analysis 
Qualitative assessment of likely competitive responses of service providers, short-term (often 
positive market creation effects) and long-term (often negative effects, five year horizon) 
Investment, innovation, market structure, competition, concentration, choice for citizens and 
consumers  
5) Wider impact assessment 
Qualitative assessment of effects on up-/downstream markets/value chain stages, complementary 
services 
6) Analysis of possible service modifications/recommendations 
Reduction of potentially adverse market impacts without corresponding reduction of public value 
and usage to increase net public value 
 
For both reasons – the analytical focus on the operationalised public value 
notion and the obvious economic market focus of the MIA – the following 
component analysis focuses only on PVAs. The role of MIAs in reaching final PVT 
                                                 
12
 Aggregated from Ofcom, 2006, pp. 24, 8-9, 2007d, pp. 11-14, 2-3, 2007e, pp. 13-15, 32-35, 56-57, 
5, 9, 2007f, pp. 10-16, 2008c, pp. 35-36. 
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conclusions is however included in the discussion of the PVA findings to develop a 
full picture of the PVT as a rationale for service provision – in addition to the 
detailed PVA analysis.  
The PVA runs parallel to the MIA and is conducted by the Trust Unit, 
which reports to a Trust committee. The Framework Agreement (DCMS, 2006c, 
clause 28(1),(2)(a)-(c)) requires the PVA to ascertain the likely public value of the 
proposed change by including an assessment of 1) the value which licence fee payers 
would place on the proposed change as individuals, 2) the value which the proposed 
change would deliver to society as a whole through its contribution to the BBC’s 
public purposes, and 3) the value for money of the proposed change and its cost. 
These requirements reflect in part the BBC’s (2004a) public value definition 
regarding the three levels of individual, citizen, and economic value (p. 84).  
Since the nature of potential public value creation may differ widely for 
proposals, the Trust is required to consider at the outset 1) the aspects of public 
value, which may be relevant, and 2) how these aspects should be explored and 
evaluated, always including public consultation (DCMS, 2006c, clause 28(3)). The 
statutory requirements thus seem to recognize the difficulty of defining and assessing 
public value by giving discretionary scope to the Trust to identify the relevant public 
value aspects specific to the assessment of each proposal.  
On this, the Trust’s guidelines state that the extent to which a proposed 
change promotes the public purposes and creates public value is usually assessed 
with reference to a certain key driver of RQIV, whereby the exact definition of 
public value drivers is determined in the PVA and may vary depending on the nature 
of the proposal (BBC Trust, 2007b, pp. 13-14). In the following, the public value 
assessment components are analysed and classified in regard to their representation 
of consumer and citizen interests. 
 
7.2.2 Ideological Classification of Public Value Assessment Components 
At the point of writing, four PVTs had been conducted by the BBC Trust, 
which were analysed for this study. Two of the proposals, the on-demand and the 
HDTV services, can be characterised as new delivery mechanisms for existing 
content. The other two, Gaelic Digital Service and Local Video provide original 
content in addition to addressing new distribution mechanisms. 
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Table 7.2: Public Value Tests 
 
Proposal PVAs (BBC Trust) MIAs (Ofcom) Decision (BBC Trust) 
On-demand 
services (OD)  
Would create public 
value (2007a) 
Substantial market creation 
effects (2006) 
Conditional Approval 
(2007e) 
High Definition 
Television (HDTV) 
Would create public 
value (2007c) 
Some small market impacts 
(2007e) 
Conditional Approval 
(2007f) 
Gaelic Digital 
Service (GDS)  
Could deliver public 
value (2007d)  
significant positive but also 
negative impacts (2007f) 
Partially approved 
(2008b) 
Local Video (LV)  Low to medium 
public value (2008) 
Significant negative market 
impact (2008c) 
Not approved (2009) 
 
The following analysis is the result of a multistep text reduction process of 
PVA documents (chapter 6.2). The objective was to isolate text passages on RQIV 
assessment components. As a further assessment component, the fit with public 
purposes is considered, which is described as a prerequisite for service approval 
(BBC Trust, 2007a, p. 31). The condensed information on the objectives assessed 
and the methodologies used for each driver was aggregated in tables, which can be 
found in Appendix C. These aggregate tables list the main assessment or sub-
components for each driver across the four PVAs. This does however not imply that 
all listed sub-components were assessed in all PVAs. Depending on how much 
information was provided in PVAs, the listed metrics are not necessarily exhaustive 
but rather indicative or representative of the majority of sub-components. 
Together with text passages from PVAs, the aggregate tables provide the 
basis for the ideological classifications of the RQIV measures, which are derived in 
the following analysis based on the representation of consumer and citizen objectives 
in the assessment of each driver. Throughout the analysis, the interpretation of 
drivers is removed from the specifics of service proposals, where possible, to 
improve the generalisability of the classification. 
The analysis found that the assessment of the drivers in the PVAs follows a 
pattern, with some variations. Generally, one or two core sub-components are 
assessed for each driver, on top of which further aspects are considered such as risks 
to the driver’s delivery of public value or the counterfactual.  
In direct comparison of the four PVAs, consistency exists in particular 
between the first two (OD, HDTV) and the last two assessments (GDS, LV). The 
overall structure of the assessment, addressing RQIV and fit with public purposes, 
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remains similar throughout all PVAs but differences exist in regard to the overall 
length and depth of the assessment as well as the structure of assessing the separate 
drivers. The differences are more pronounced for some drivers than for others, which 
is addressed in the discussion.  
A further central aspect in the analysis is the weight ascribed to each driver 
in the PVAs. The drivers are weighted according to their perceived importance to 
each specific proposal. One or two drivers are designated as key drivers for each 
PVA. This relative weight introduces a hierarchy among the drivers. For each driver, 
the level of public value creation is assessed and categorised as low (no material 
impact), medium (material impact), and high (substantial impact) (ibid.). The overall 
level of public value creation is thus the weighted aggregate of the public value 
ascribed to these four drivers. 
This means that the higher the public value creation and weight ascribed to 
a driver, the more important the driver is in the public value assessment. Based on 
the below derived classification of the drivers as representing predominantly 
economic consumer or non-economic citizen objectives, it is then possible to 
combine this ideological classification with the weighting attached to the drivers to 
identify the ideological composition of the public value notion and thus the 
justification for PSB provision.  
In terms of the ideological classification of the drivers, the analysis found 
that three of the four drivers, reach, value for money, and impact primarily assesses 
consumer objectives related to the individual consumption process of the service, 
rather than wider societal considerations, which would be indicative of citizen 
objectives. The fourth driver quality represents both citizen and consumer objectives. 
The ideological classification of the public value notion is developed in the 
conclusion.  
 
Reach 
Reach is the measure most prone to representing consumer aspects as it 
directly addresses the consumption process. Generally, reach assessments consider 
reach projections, the likely number of people accessing the service, and likely 
consumption volumes (BBC Trust, 2007a, pp. 65-81, 2007c, pp.70-84, 2007d, pp. 
43-55, 2008, pp. 31-40). 
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The assessment of the reach driver differs slightly for the four PVAs. For 
the latter two (GDS, LV), reach is assessed more closely in relation to the impact 
driver, whereby the distinction between reach and impact is sometimes not clear and 
the assessment of reach seems less detailed than in the first two PVAs (OD, HDTV).  
Standard metrics are used for the assessment of reach and consumption for 
a range of variables such as audience groups, genres, time horizon (long/short-term), 
services and platforms (BBC as a whole, individual services, delivery platforms), 
consumption modus (on-demand, linear), and geography. In addition, drivers of and 
risks to reach are considered for different variables and underlying assumptions. 
For some PVAs, depending on the proposal, particular attention is paid to 
the assessment of reach for audience groups, especially minority and underserved 
audiences, and genres, like minority or niche content (2008, p. 35, 2007a, p. 67, 
2007d, p. 43). For all PVAs, the assessment of underserved audience, as for example 
the young, is of particular relevance to the assessment of future reach. In these 
contexts, the assessment of reach can be viewed as an indirect consideration of 
citizen objectives as it concerns output types like minority and niche content, which 
are typically associated with societal objectives.  
With considerations such as audience groups or niche content, a direct 
connection is established to the promotion of specific public purposes (2007d, p. 50). 
Beyond that, the general rationale of reach is the promotion of public purposes and 
thus public value (2007a, p. 66). The rationale here is that consumption of high-
quality content is described as the prerequisite for the promotion of the BBC’s public 
purposes, which is the corporation’s main objective: “More generally, it is the BBC’s 
main objective under Article 3(2) of the Charter to promote its public purposes. This 
necessarily involves increasing the number of people consuming its content overall. 
But reach is not just about the total number of people using BBC services. On-
demand delivery makes it easier for audiences to access content at a time of their 
choosing and public value is generated if this helps to maintain or increase 
consumption levels” (2008, p. 34, also 2007d, p. 54). “It is only through ensuring the 
consumption of its programmes that the BBC ensures that public value in its content 
is realised” (2007a, p. 13). The rationale therefore is: the higher the reach, the higher 
the promotion of public purposes and thus the creation of public value. 
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Further, reference is made to Clause 12 of the Framework Agreement in 
direct relationship to the reach driver: “6.5.10 Reach measures the number of people 
who access BBC content. It is a key driver of public value. Clause 12 of the 
Framework Agreement requires the BBC to do all that is reasonably practicable to 
ensure that audience groups can access public services in a range of ways.“ (2008, p. 
34). The reference to this clause in this context implies that access is equated to reach 
and that it is the mandate of the BBC to drive reach. The rationale that reach is 
central to the promotion of public purposes becomes more explicit in the last two 
PVAs, where reach and impact are assessed more closely related to each other (see p. 
166 et seq.).  
Methodologically, the majority of the assessment is based on quantitative 
audience reach and usage data from reach projection models. In addition, quantitative 
and qualitative audience research is provided on likely usage and consumption. 
Usage and consumption measures can be classified as traditional output metrics that 
are used to assess the demand for a service. The consideration of audience size and 
the objective of maximising audience can – aside from the given rationale to promote 
public purposes – also be characterised as a central economic measure and objective, 
in particular for high fixed cost economies. 
Overall, the reach driver can therefore be classified primarily as a 
consumer or user-orientated measure, as the focus lies on the consumption of output. 
In those cases where reach is considered in regard to output types that typically 
represent citizen objectives, or in direct relation to the achievement of public 
purposes, reach can also be viewed as an indirect assessment of citizen objectives. 
Since the focus lies however on increasing reach rather than assessing reach for 
different output types, reach overall remains a measure of consumption.  
The relative importance of the reach driver in the final assessment of 
public value becomes apparent when considering its designation as a key driver in 
three out of four PVAs (table 7.4, p. 189). Since high consumption levels lead to high 
levels of public value creation, the high weighting attached to the driver shows that 
consumption is a central consideration which drives public value creation. 
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Cost & Value for Money  
A further driver which can be characterised as a consumer-orientated 
measure is cost & value for money (VfM). The driver assesses how much the 
proposal costs and whether it delivers good VfM by adding value over and above the 
cost (BBC Trust, 2007a, pp. 82-98, 2007c, pp. 85-99, 2007d, pp. 55-59, 2008, pp. 
51-55).  
Both cost and value estimates are required for theses assessments. Cost 
estimates, as economic measures, are not of particular interest here and are thus not 
discussed in more detail aside from referring to the aggregate table (Appendix C.2) 
for an overview of cost metrics.  
The interest lies on the assessment of value, which is here based on 
consumer value, audience usage numbers, and output data. The difficulty of 
assessing value in itself and as a quantitative measure is acknowledged by the Trust: 
“Whilst it is possible to measure the costs of services in financial terms, it is much 
harder to measure the value created by proposals numerically” (2007a, p. 94).  
Since the assessment of VfM requires the comparison of two quantitative 
measures, it is necessary to assess value quantitatively to compare it to costs. This 
can lead to a bias of assessing value in the form of consumer value, as this may be 
more susceptible to quantification than citizen value. Whether this is the case 
depends however on the definition of value in the specific assessment context and the 
corresponding methods applied to assess it. In WTP studies, for example, it is 
possible to assess both citizen and consumer value by phrasing questions differently.  
In the PVAs, three different measures are used in VfM assessments, which 
are value yield, cost per user hour (CPUH), and payback period.  
The value yield is a worth-based measure which is defined as the 
incremental consumer value (ICV) divided by cost. The measure assesses the value 
generated per pound spent and as such is a measure of return on investment. ICV is 
defined as the average value per household multiplied by reach minus costs (2007c, 
pp. 96-97). The understanding of value is therefore based on the perceived or 
attributed monetary worth as a proxy for the value of the service to the consumer 
(2007a, pp. 96-98).  
Value as consumer value, here assessed as ICV, represents individual value 
expressed monetarily as a proxy for prices. In contrast to this, an assessment of 
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citizen value would reflect the benefit to society expressed monetarily as a proxy for 
the considered societal importance of such services. The focus in PVAs lies on the 
former. The ICV measure is also used in the consideration of the payback period, 
which is the amount of time it takes for the value to exceed the costs (2007c, pp. 86, 
96-97). This is a typical economic or managerial cost and investment measure. 
A second measure in VfM considerations is the cost per user hour (CPUH). 
CPUH is an output-based measure, where the costs of the service proposal are 
divided by the hours of output consumed. Aside from cost estimates, the assessment 
includes an estimation of the hours of output likely to be consumed under the 
proposal, derived from different consumption scenarios. The measure of the output 
consumed is thus used as a proxy for the value generated and is compared with the 
cost incurred for providing the service. This yields the costs per unit of output 
consumed. Whether the CPUH reflects VfM can be established by comparing the 
result to benchmark industry quotes (2007a, p. 96). 
CPUH can thus be described as a managerial cost measure which is user- 
and output-based. In general, the objective attached to such measures is the reduction 
of cost per unit of output, which is an efficiency assessment of how well inputs are 
used to produce outputs. This is a typical economic measure (Picard, 2003, p. 34).  
Efficiency is generally in the interest of consumers, as cost reductions can 
lead to price reductions. On a larger scale, the efficient use of public funding can also 
be of interest to citizens. In general, however, the citizen interest is that public remits 
or objectives are fulfilled, whereby the efficient fulfilment is a desired but only 
secondary objective. Further, as efficiency involves yielding the largest possible 
output for the lowest possible input, achieving efficiency can stand in conflict to 
citizen objectives (such as equity). As an economic measure, efficiency is thus 
classified here as more closely aligned to consumer rather than citizen objectives.  
The value yield measure is applied in the first two PVAs (OD, HDTV). 
The latter addresses in addition to that the payback period whereby the former 
focuses on CPUH as the second measure (2007c, p. 85 et seq., 2007a, p. 82 et seq.).  
In the last two PVAs (LV, GDS), the VfM assessment is less elaborate and 
does not include the value yield measure. Here more focus lies on CPUH which is 
based on the output consumed. In addition to that, more direct references are made to 
reach and impact as proxies for value creation. The cost of the service is compared to 
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the predicted reach for audience groups and the impact (which in one case is the 
long-term survival of the Gaelic language, 2007d). Value is thus linked to reach as a 
consumer measure and citizen objectives through impact, whereby the conclusions 
on VfM focus on reach, as it is argued that increased expenditure cannot be justified 
for better coverage of existing audience without extending reach to current non-users 
(2007d, p. 58). The assessment of value is therefore primarily informed by a cost- 
and output-based efficiency perspective (2008, p. 52). Further, value is equated with 
reach according to the concluding remarks: “[…] local video does not deliver value 
for money, especially given the limited uplift in reach to key audience groups and 
access issues for non-broadband users” (ibid., p. 55). The likely reach is here not 
seen to justify the level of investment.  
The equation of value with consumption and reach means that VfM, and 
thus also the public value creation accredited to the VfM driver, becomes larger with 
an increase in reach (again, in particular due to fixed cost economics). In those cases 
where value is equated with reach, a clear relationship is established between the two 
drivers VfM and reach, whereby the former is dependent on the latter. This has the 
consequence that the reach driver indirectly determines the outcome of the VfM 
measure. In those cases, two out of four drivers are informed by reach in the overall 
assessment of public value.  
The overall manner in which value is assessed in PVAs shows that 
consumer rather than wider citizen values provide the basis for VfM considerations. 
Value is defined as perceived consumer value or indirectly represented through the 
proxies of output, consumption or reach. With taking the cost metrics into account as 
well, VfM can be described as a managerial or operational measure of efficiency and 
effectiveness. As a traditional NPM measure, VfM is not a new concept. 
Due to its character as an operational measure, VfM cannot be described as 
a rationale for intervention per se. This is true in general as well as for this specific 
context. VfM is a procedural measure which addresses economics of service delivery 
but is in itself rarely a reason to justify intervention. In the specific context of PVAs, 
this becomes apparent in that VfM is not directly linked to the promotion of public 
purposes, which represents the primary rationale for service provision. VfM is a 
secondary measure or a condition of service provision rather than a primary measure 
that justifies intervention. In regard to its relative importance in the overall public 
174 
 
value assessment, VfM is less important than reach, as it is only in one out of four 
PVAs designated as key driver (table 7.4, p. 189). 
 
Quality & Distinctiveness 
The classification of the next driver, quality & distinctiveness, is mixed or 
inconclusive, as both consumer and citizen objectives are considered in the 
assessment (BBC Trust, 2007a, pp. 39-49, 2007c, pp. 41-54, 2007d, pp. 60-63, 2008, 
pp. 48-49).  
The quality & distinctiveness driver assesses proposal features and 
characteristics. As such, it is a consideration of output. Whether the assessment of 
output is conducted from the perspective of assessing consumer or citizen objectives 
depends on the definition of quality & distinctiveness. Since it was not possible to 
classify the driver as a measure of consumer or citizen objectives, the assessment 
components are discussed in the following by pointing out how they represent both.  
In the discussion of the driver, it needs to be taken into account that two 
out of four PVAs address proposals which focus on new ways of distributing existing 
content (HDTV, OD) while the other two (LV, GDS) describe the provision of 
original content on different delivery platforms. Correspondingly, quality & 
distinctiveness assessments contain both technical and content features.  
Throughout the PVAs, the distinctiveness of proposals is assessed 
consistently on two levels. One level addresses whether the proposed service is 
currently offered in the market. For proposals of new delivery technologies, these 
markets are often emerging, which makes a comparative assessment difficult. The 
rationale that a service is distinctive when it is not offered in the market can relate to 
citizen objectives, when the lack of provision is for example the result of lacking 
demand, e.g. pertaining to merit goods. At the same time it can represent consumer 
interests, when market failures prevent the provision of a demanded service, e.g. 
natural monopoly conditions.  
On a second level, proposals’ distinctiveness is assessed based on 
accessibility and funding. Proposals are considered distinctive when they are 
accessible free at the point of use and are free from advertising or subscription. This 
could be interpreted as a benefit to consumers, however only when the payment of 
the licence fee as a form of price for access is not taken into account. This level of 
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distinctiveness pertains more to citizen considerations derived from societal 
objectives such as equity and universal access.  
Aside from these core distinctiveness characteristics, two PVAs address 
further criteria of distinctiveness. This includes seven criteria of distinctiveness 
devised by the Trust and 17 features of distinctiveness developed in a commissioned 
PWC report (2008, p. 88, 2007a, p. 41). Some of the seven criteria of distinctiveness 
concern content characteristics which are typically associated with content quality in 
relation to citizen objectives. These are editorial values, content origin (UK), level of 
creative and editorial ambition, and originality. In the concluding statements on 
distinctiveness, assessments are however based on whether proposals are distinctive 
from markets regarding features such as free access and free from advertising and 
subscription, which seem to be central in the assessment of the driver.  
The assessment of quality & distinctiveness is conducted separately for the 
first three PVAs (OD, HDTV, LV). Since the first two address proposals on new 
delivery mechanism for existing content, the assessment of quality is focused on 
technical delivery features and the underlying content is discounted in assessments. 
Correspondingly, the additional benefit in the user experience from the improvement 
in quality of overlying technical features is addressed (2007a, p. 40), which reflects 
consumer value. As the underlying content is discounted, it is not clear if an 
assessment of quality focused on content features would put more emphasis on 
citizen aspects such as content features that relate to the achievement of societal 
benefits. The content range, availability, and relevance to audience groups are also 
assessed, which also directly relate to individual consumption. The quality 
assessment is thus based on consumer-orientated indicators like user experience and 
audience appeal. Methodologically, assessments are based on quantitative and 
qualitative audience research and trial data on perceptions of quality & 
distinctiveness in the first two PVAs (2007a, p. 42, 2007c, p. 34). In the overall 
assessment, these findings seem to be secondary to proposals’ distinctiveness from 
the market and their free use.  
In general, quality can be defined and assessed in two ways. Quality can be 
assessed depending on whether content and user experience lead to an increase in 
usage, which would reflect a consumer focus and the driver would create high levels 
of public value when reach and consumption are high. In contrast to this, quality can 
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also be assessed depending on whether the content and its characteristics lead to 
desired societal outcomes, which would reflect citizen considerations.  
It can be concluded that measures such as quality & distinctiveness can 
only be characterised by looking at their definition and representation of citizen and 
consumer considerations. Aspects listed as counterfactuals – such as lack of 
relevance, lack of impact, risk to the BBC’s reputation in regard to content quality 
and technological progress as well as risk to universality – show that the quality & 
distinctiveness driver represents both consumer and citizen aspects and can therefore 
not be classified.  
In general, quality can be classified as a traditional output measure as it 
concerns the evaluation of service features. It can also function as a rationale for 
intervention on its own, when it pertains to content features which are related to 
wider societal objectives and outcomes. Quality & distinctiveness understood as 
consumer appeal does in contrast to this not offer an (equally strong) rationale for 
intervention. The Trust states that quality & distinctiveness are minimum 
requirements for any BBC service, which are very important but unlikely to be 
sufficient drivers of public value on their own (2007c, p. 42). This is reflected in the 
driver’s weighting in the public value assessment, as it is not once designated as a 
key driver (table 7.4, p. 189). 
 
Impact 
As addressed previously, the Framework Agreement sets out that the 
benefit to the individual and to society as a whole need to be addressed. The impact 
driver reflects this obligation as it assesses whether the proposal creates consumer 
and citizen benefits (2007a, p. 31, 2010a, p. 71). Since the driver is thus already 
classified as representing citizen and consumer objectives, the discussion below 
focuses on addressing their proportionality in the assessments to identify a possible 
tendency of the driver into one direction or the other. 
The assessment of consumer and citizen benefits differs for the first two 
and last two PVAs. In the first two PVAs (OD, HDTV), consumer and citizen 
benefits are addressed separately. This distinction is not made in the last two PVAs 
(LV, GDS). It is therefore sensible to first address the separate assessment of citizen 
and consumer benefits in the first two PVAs.  
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According to the BBC Trust, consumer benefit “refers to the benefit that an 
individual user would directly gain from using the proposed service; for example, 
whether individuals find a proposed new service engaging or challenging. This 
would also include an assessment of the value which licence fee payers would place 
on the proposed change as individuals” (2007b, pp. 14-15, 2010a, p. 71).  
The assessment of consumer benefit reflects this outline as it focuses on 
consumption modalities. Benefit is derived from an improved user experience due to 
improved technological quality and free access to services (when licence fee 
payments are excluded). Also, time and shift qualities of proposals are considered in 
regard to increases in user control and flexibility as well as potential increases in 
consumption of content normally positioned at the margins of the schedule, i.e. 
special interest and niche content. The latter touches on citizen objectives while it 
also reflects the assumption that this content is demanded by consumers but that 
scheduling has inhibited consumption. Benefit reducing factors, such as cost, access, 
substitutional or additive use, are addressed as well (2007c, p. 60).  
The citizen assessment is structured differently. According to the Trust, 
citizen benefit “refers to the benefits which the proposal may create for society as a 
whole; for example whether a service would result in a better functioning democracy 
or understanding and respect between different communities” (2007b, pp. 14-15, 
2010a, p. 71). This definition directly links societal outcome to citizen benefit and 
thus goes beyond consumer benefit associated with the consumption process. 
Generally, citizen benefit can be described as the societal outcome resulting from the 
consumption process, whereas consumer benefit is the individual outcome resulting 
from the consumption process (utility, gratification).  
Citizen benefit is assessed as the proposals’ contribution to or fit with the 
BBC’s public purposes. The fit with public purposes is a separate assessment in 
PVAs, which is not part of the four core RQIV drivers. As both the citizen impact 
measure and the fit with public purposes assess the contribution against public 
purposes, and often refer to each other in the assessment, they are in the following 
discussed together to avoid repetition. In addition, the fit with public purposes 
measure is briefly discussed below in regard to the fit of the proposal with BBC 
strategy, which provides insights on rationales for the proposition of new services.  
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According to the Trust, “an individual service is not required to promote 
all six purposes, but would be expected to be able to demonstrate a strong 
contribution to the public purposes overall” (2007a, p. 33). 
 
Table 7.3: BBC’s Six Public Purposes13 
 
1. Sustaining citizenship and civil society  
2. Promoting education and learning 
3. Stimulating creativity and cultural excellence 
4. Representing the UK, its nations, regions and communities 
5. Bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK 
6. In promoting its other purposes, helping to deliver to the public the benefit of emerging 
communications technologies and services and, in addition, taking a leading role in the 
switchover to digital television 
 
In the PVAs, the public purposes are distinguished into content purposes 
one to five and the digital purpose number six. The purposes relevant to the 
respective proposal are identified and the proposal’s contribution to the respective 
purposes is addressed and classified as direct or indirect, or primary and secondary 
(2007a, p. 32). 
When proposals include the provision of original content, then this is seen 
as a direct contribution to content purposes. If proposals contain new technological 
features, here in particular new delivery methods, then this is viewed as a direct 
contribution to the sixth digital purpose. If proposals contain both original content 
and new technology, then this equates a direct contribution to both content and 
digital purposes. If proposal only contain new technology and thus contribute 
directly to the digital purpose, they also contribute indirectly to content purposes, as 
the rationale is that new ways of accessing content can increase reach of existing 
content (if usage is additional and not substitutional). So even if no direct 
contribution to content purposes is made (i.e. no original content is provided), 
proposals can still contribute to content purpose indirectly if technological features 
allow for a possible increase in reach of existing content.  
Direct contributions to the digital purpose are for example the provision of 
technologically new and universally available access to content and the stimulation 
of markets through technology take-up (2007a, p. 36, 2007c, pp. 62-63). Universal 
                                                 
13
 DCMS, 2006b, articles 3, 4. 
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access to consumer benefits derived from proposals is also listed as an example of a 
contribution to the digital purpose, whereby the citizen benefit is the universal access 
and the prevention of digital divide (2007c, pp. 56, 64, 8). Universality is a 
fundamental principle of the BBC (2007c, p. 37). Factors limiting such impacts are 
access costs (such as set-top boxes) and infrastructure constraints (spectrum, 
broadband rollout) (ibid., p. 65). The potential of new technology to increase 
programme consumption, in particular niche or specialist programme, is an indirect 
contribution to content purposes (2007a, p. 13).  
Direct contributions to content purposes are addressed for individual 
purposes (2007a, pp. 35-36, 2007c, p. 65). For the first purpose sustaining citizenship 
and civil society contributions for example include media literacy and the creation of 
societal value through shared viewing experience and major events. For the second 
purpose promoting education and learning the delivery of educational benefits to 
society is assessed through deliberative research. Further listed contributions are 
more effective learning through consumption of certain programmes (niche, off-
peak) and educational benefits from immersive consumption experiences that 
increase the impact of programming. For the third purpose stimulating creativity and 
cultural excellence the stimulation of programme creativity, the potentially increased 
reach of specialist programmes, such as arts, and the potential for licence fee payers 
to self-publish content are named. The fourth purpose representing the UK, its 
nations, regions and communities addresses diversity reflected in mainstream and 
specialist content. Finally, contributions to the fifth content purpose bringing the UK 
to the world and the world to the UK are the competitiveness of the UK creative 
industries and the commercial use of BBC content (through BBC Worldwide). 
Contributions are not always listed exclusive to one purpose. Market stimulation, for 
example, is addressed as a contribution to both digital and content purposes.  
Risks to citizen benefits are listed as well, such as solitary consumption, 
long-term spectrum constraints and increased competition, public value foregone 
through negative impacts on other BBC services, alienation of late technology 
adopters, and dangers of underage exposure to inappropriate content due to changes 
in delivery technologies (2007a, p. 37).  
The assessment of the contribution to public purposes is based on different 
types of evidence. Quantitative and qualitative audience research on consumer and 
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citizen benefits addresses the recognition, appreciation, and valuation of proposal 
features and alternative investments (2007c, pp. 56-58, 61). The monetary worth of 
proposals to citizens and consumers is for example assessed through WTP 
methodologies (2007a, p. 56, 2007c, pp. 57, 9, 66). Audience research is also 
conducted on the perception of proposals’ contribution to public purposes, the BBC’s 
fulfilment of public purposes and the principle of the BBC providing a proposal. 
Other types of evidence include stakeholder statements, third party reports, and 
expert evidence (2007a, pp. 32-33).  
In the last two PVAs, this explicit distinction between the assessment of 
citizen and consumer value is not continued. It is hence not made clear in these 
assessments when citizen and when consumer objectives are assessed.  
In the LV PVA, the value to individuals and society is discussed along 
different proposal components rather than along consumer and citizen benefits, as 
done in the previous two PVAs (2008, p. 41 et seq.). No explicit distinction is made 
between consumer and citizen benefits. The component parts discussed here are the 
interest in local news, the expansion of the BBC’s local remit, and demand for 
broadband delivery.  
Interest in local news is assessed by drawing on usage numbers of regional 
news by medium, audience research on attachment to local TV programming, 
demand for local news, by age group, with regard to editorial agendas and the genre 
mix (ibid., pp. 41-42). It is stated that “when assessing the appeal of a local news 
offering, reach is related to relevance“ and that “the real value lies in coverage of a 
breadth of interests and issues that will appeal to a broad spectrum of users“ (ibid., p. 
42). 
As a next point, the expansion of the BBC’s local remit is addressed. This 
mainly reflects audience views on the proposal and support for the expansion of 
news gathering, current local provision, satisfaction with BBC coverage and 
programmes for different regions, audience expectations, and the appeal of the 
delivery platform (ibid., pp. 42- 45). 
The final component considered is the demand for broadband delivery. 
Demand or usage is addressed in comparison to other sources of local news, for 
demand drivers such as immediacy, ease of use, and convenience, by assessing 
audience views on the support for the proposal as an effective way to improve 
181 
 
coverage, the time spent online by genre, and active and passive consumption of 
local news (ibid., pp. 45-47). 
These three assessment components are to some degree overlapping and do 
not address any of the public purposes. Rather, all three components mainly consider 
reach and output, thus implicitly reflecting consumer benefits. The second 
component could also, to some degree, be characterised as addressing audience 
views from a citizen perspective in regard to the support and importance of the BBC 
to provide the service. These characterisations are however only implicit or 
indicative as the assessment does not distinguish between citizen and consumer 
benefits.  
In general, it can be concluded that the assessment emphasises the 
importance of reach. It is stated that “relevance is a determinant of reach” (ibid., p. 
41) and that “the real value lies in coverage of a breadth of interests and issues that 
will appeal to a broad spectrum of users” (ibid., p. 42). This can lead to the 
conclusion that consumer benefit is assessed in the form of appeal and demand and 
that the potential reach is correspondingly the focus of the assessment. The overall 
conclusion on the impact driver reflects this focus on consumer objectives as it is 
stated that “based on the analysis our overall view is that local video has low appeal 
and hence limited impact”, or “limited impact due to limited reach” (ibid., p. 40). 
The level of reach thus directly determines the level of impact in this assessment.  
An indirect reference to the proposal’s contribution to public purposes and 
thus citizen benefits can be found in the introduction to the section: “Relevant local 
news has valuable social currency and may allow the BBC to reconnect with 
underserved groups who currently regard it as too remote” (ibid., p. 40). Elsewhere it 
is stated that “locally produced news plays a significant role in forming a sense of 
place […]” (ibid., p. 20). Valuable social currency and a sense of place can be 
interpreted as a contribution to the purposes sustaining citizenship and civil society 
and representing the UK, its nations, regions and communities.  
The public purposes are more explicitly addressed in a separate section on 
public purposes and the performance gap, which reflects an assessment of the fit 
with public purposes. Here it is stated that the proposal contributes to the two content 
purposes sustaining citizenship and civil society and representing the UK’s nations, 
regions and communities (ibid., p. 25). While it is not addressed how the proposal 
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contributes to them, it is said that the proposal is expected to contribute to closing the 
purpose gaps for these purposes (which are gaps between the importance audiences 
attach to the BBC's local role and audiences’ views of the BBC’s current 
performance).  
These purpose gaps are also a rationale of the BBC Executive to propose 
the service. “An expanded local newsgathering operation would, it maintains, help 
sustain the reach and impact of the BBC’s local news provision and safeguard the 
delivery of the citizenship and community purposes” (ibid., p. 25). As the purpose 
gap is assumed to be related to a shift in consumption from linear to on-demand and 
an increased demand for local news, the proposal has the purpose to increase local 
reach through on-demand provision and thus close the purpose gap (ibid., p. 27). 
This shows again that the assessment focuses on the proposal’s potential reach.  
It can be summarised that outcome in the form of a contribution to the two 
purposes is assumed, rather than assessed, and viewed as a prerequisite. Little 
attention is paid to the consideration of citizen benefit. The decisive factor in the 
assessment is reach. “The key question for this PVA is not, therefore, whether the 
aims are important, but rather, whether this proposal will enable the BBC to address 
local issues and close the purpose gap” (ibid., p. 7). The question is thus not whether 
there is impact but rather how large the impact is. This is related to the BBC 
Executive’s overall strategy to maintain reach. “We can see that there is potential for 
proposals to fit with and further the BBC's public purposes and wider strategy, a 
possible remedy to the twin challenge of reach and relevance” (ibid., p. 27).  
The assessment of impact in the GDS PVA is also not structured around a 
distinction between citizen and consumer benefits. Instead, impact is assessed 
together with reach and the assessment is structured along different audience groups.  
The assessment of reach and impact for different audiences groups is 
conducted to assess claims made in the BBC Executive proposal on the proposal’s 
potential reach (2007d, pp. 42-43). Similar to the assessment in the previous PVA, 
reach is here viewed as the primary component for the assessment of the impact 
driver, based on the rationale that impact is only high when reach is high. Since the 
objective of the proposal is to contribute to the long-term survival of the Gaelic 
language, the Trust’s view is that this is only given when the service achieves high 
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reach for different audience groups (ibid., pp. 38, 42) by retaining and recruiting 
existing and non-speakers.  
The impact assessment therefore consists of reach and consumption 
considerations for these audience groups, considering variables such as access, 
distribution platforms, content appeal, content characteristics, quality, and 
operational considerations (production, commissioning, marketing, time scale) (ibid., 
pp. 43-46). The assessment is primarily based on audience research in addition to 
which third party reports and qualitative expert advice are used, the latter on the 
impact of Gaelic programming on non-speakers (ibid., pp. 47- 48).  
 In a next segment, reach and impact are considered in regard to the public 
value of other BBC services. Here it is stated that the “[…] service most obviously 
delivers the BBC’s purpose to ‘represent the UK, its nations and communities’ by 
reflecting the life and culture of the Gaelic area to that language community” as well 
as to other audience groups (ibid., p. 50). At this point, no further attention is paid to 
how the service contributes to the purpose. It is however stated that a purpose gap 
was assessed in the Trust’s 2007 purpose remit survey. 
The majority of the impact assessment is thus focused on reach. Citizen 
considerations are only briefly addressed with reference to expert advice on the 
impact of the service on non-speakers, the wider public policy context and the 
proposal’s contribution to the content purpose representing the UK, its nations and 
regions and its purpose remit priority of supporting the UK’s indigenous minority 
languages (ibid., pp. 41-42).  
Similar to the structure of the LV PVA, the public purposes are in more 
detail addressed in the fit with the strategic context and the public purposes. It is 
stated that the proposal primarily contributes to the purpose reflecting the UK’s 
nations, regions and communities. In support of this, expert evidence is provided in 
some depth on how the proposal contributes to the survival of the language (ibid., p. 
39). This reflects an attempt to address the achievement of outcome. The discussion 
goes beyond the level of previous PVAs, which compared how proposals relate to 
public purposes without addressing specific outcomes or their achievement in more 
detail. Reference is also made to the wider public policy landscape and five criteria 
developed by the Trust to assess the appropriate level of provision for indigenous 
minority languages (ibid., pp. 35-36).  
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A range of evidence form audience research is provided on the perceived 
importance of the proposal for Scottish culture, heritage, and identity as well as on 
the general support for the principle of the BBC providing the service and the 
proportionate representation of minority language in the proposal (ibid., pp. 37-39). 
This primarily reflects audience research from a citizen perspective, while some 
research on personal use was also included. It is further stated that the proposal will 
help to achieve secondary contributions to the remaining five public purposes, while 
“the extent to which the service proposal contributes to these other public purposes is 
reflected in the services reach and impact” (ibid., p. 59).  
It can therefore be concluded that the assessment of citizen benefit is 
primarily conducted in the fit with purposes, rather than the impact section, and is 
also considered in greater detail with regard to outcomes than in any other PVA. The 
impact assessment mainly focuses on reach, which can be interpreted as a reflection 
of consumer benefit. The overall level of public value creation accredited to the 
impact driver is correspondingly informed by the level of potential reach. 
This development towards focussing on reach seems to reflect a pattern 
across the different impact assessments in all four PVAs, as reach functions as a 
central component in the assessments of impact. This is increased even further for 
the last two PVAs, where the focus in the assessment lies on aspects of reach and 
consumption while the consideration of citizen benefit is conducted almost entirely 
in the fit with purposes assessment. This has the advantage that a certain degree of 
duplicity in PVAs is eliminated. On the other hand, since impact is a core driver and 
thus contributes to the overall public value assessment but fit with purposes is not, 
the assessment of citizen benefit under fit with purposes has the consequence that it 
is not counted towards the final assessment of public value and that the impact driver 
is primarily informed by reach, representing consumer benefit.  
For the first two PVAs, where citizen and consumer benefits were 
considered jointly in the impact assessment, citizen benefit was also treated 
secondary to consumer benefit, as reach was the decisive element in the final 
assessment of the driver’s public value.  
Considering that impact is the only driver where citizen objectives are 
explicitly taken into account, the fact that citizen benefits are subordinated to 
consumer benefits in the assessment of the driver reduces the proportion and 
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importance of citizen considerations not only in the impact driver itself but also in 
the overall public value assessment. This is even more pronounced for the last two 
PVAs, where the impact assessment is dominated by reach considerations and the 
assessment of citizen benefits is almost entirely conduct in the fit with purposes 
section, which does not count towards the final public value assessment. The weight 
assigned to the impact driver in the overall assessment further enhances this 
imbalance as impact is in three out of four PVAs designated as a key driver (table 
7.4, p. 189). 
 
Fit with public purposes 
The last PVA assessment component is the fit with public purposes, which 
is not part of the universal public value RQIV measure and is therefore also not part 
of the final assessment of public value creation, aside for the first OD PVA where it 
is included (2007a, pp. 114-117). The fit with public purposes considers which 
purposes are addressed by proposals and how proposals fit with BBC strategy. In the 
following, only the latter shall briefly be addressed as the fit with purposes has been 
discussed together with the impact driver. The fit with BBC strategy is of interest as 
it reveals information on the underlying rationale for the proposition of proposals.  
The BBC’s “twin challenge of reach and relevance” (2008, p. 17) is given 
as a central rational in PVAs. The objective is to “maintain reach and relevance” 
(2007a, p. 38), “to maintain and strengthen the reach and impact” (2008, p. 8), “to 
maintain the relevance and appeal of the BBC’s output” as a precondition for the 
effective delivery of public purposes (2007c, p. 36). Proposals are assumed to 
mitigate the decrease in reach and relevance by ensuring audience appeal of both 
content and technology of BBC services. In the HDTV PVA, for example, it is stated 
that “there is therefore a real potential long-term risk to reach and content 
consumption, and thereby the BBC’s ability to promote its public purposes, if the 
BBC does not have an HD service in a relatively short time frame” (2007c, p. 36). 
This primary strategy of achieving reach is linked to ensuring the 
promotion of public purposes directly and indirectly, as discussed above. The overall 
rationale here is that if proposals promote public purposes, they must be provided 
free and as widely as possible in order to maximise public value.  
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For the GDS proposal, the rationale to ensure the survival of Gaelic as an 
indigenous language seems to be the primary rationale for the proposition of the 
service rather than, as for the other PVAs, the rationale to achieve reach and 
relevance. In the end, the level of public value creation in the GDS PVA is however 
also conditional upon reach: “[…] if supporting the future of the language is the case 
for intervention, it is essential that the service can make a significant impact in both 
retaining and, crucially in the case of a language that appears to be in decline, 
recruiting Gaelic speakers” (2007d, p. 38).  
These primary rationales of reach and relevance are supported by referring 
to further rationales which are often more specific to the different proposals. A 
further rationale is that of meeting audience expectations due to, for example, 
changes in consumption habits from linear to on-demand and consumer exposure to 
similar services offered in the market (2007d, p. 7). For the LV proposals, audience 
expectations are specifically referred to in the form of perceived purpose gaps. “A 
growing appetite for on-demand content and heightened interest in local issues form 
the rationale for Local Video” (2008, p. 20). This shows again that central rationales 
for the proposition of services are consumer-focused aspects such as reach and 
demand. 
Contextual aspects are addressed as well, such as public policy or market 
developments (2007d, pp. 35, 26, 2007c, p. 38) in regard to the stimulation of 
technological progress and creative industries. A further rationale is to fill in where 
markets might not provide, as for the case of LV where “regional media markets 
have different competitive frameworks and characteristics which may provide some 
justification for BBC expansion at a local level” (2008, pp. 24, 20-21). These aspects 
can be related to wider societal or citizen objectives. 
Universality is a further citizen rationale and a fundamental principle of the 
BBC. It supports the free and platform-neutral provision of services as widely as 
possible. “Because of the way it is funded, the BBC is required by its Charter and 
Framework Agreement to make its services available to the whole UK public. In 
considering universality, we have borne in mind that a service must pass the test of 
promoting the BBC's public purposes. If it does so, then it must be made available 
free at the point of consumption to as much of the UK population as possible” 
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(2007c, p. 37). In the PVAs, universality if often used in the context of increasing 
reach.  
Overall, the primary strategic rationales address relevance and reach as 
well as the fulfilment of audience expectations and demand.  
 
7.2.3 Discussion and Conclusion: Ideological Composition and Regulatory 
 Justification  
A recent BBC Trust publication states that “the very concept of ‘public 
value’ implies that it differs from the conventional sense of value, which is usually 
taken to mean the purely economic concept of market value” (2010a, p. 27). The 
previous review of different components in public value assessments has shown that 
this is indeed the case for the RQIV drivers. As an aggregate, PVAs comprise a set of 
different economic and non-economic, old and new measures, which have up until 
then not been assessed and packaged together in this form or context.  
Based on the previous review, it is possible to develop an ideological 
classification of the public value notion as derived from the ideological classification 
of the drivers, representing citizen and consumer objectives, and their ascribed 
weight. Together with the findings from the component analysis for C4 and the 
process analysis in chapter 9, a conclusion can then be drawn on whether the 
ideological composition of the public value notion represents a paradigm shift in the 
justification of PSB.  
For the BBC, it can be summarised that the assessment of public value, and 
thus the rationale which informs decisions on service provision, is overall consumer-
focused. Two out of four drivers directly address consumer value, reach and value 
for money. The other two drivers are mixed and inconclusive, as in the case of 
quality & distinctiveness, or as the impact driver address both citizen and consumer 
benefits, with the latter however dominating the former. Three out of four drivers can 
thus be classified as focussing on consumer objectives. 
The classification of representing consumer or citizen objectives is based 
on the dominant of the two rationales that informs the drivers’ assessments, which is 
identified according to the focus of the assessments and the measures used. The 
classification can also be described as a driver’s ideological tendency. The drivers’ 
influence in informing the ideological composition of the overall public value 
188 
 
assessment is correspondingly a combination of what the drivers assess (consumer or 
citizen benefits) and how much weight is attached to them.  
As table 7.4 below shows, not only is the overall public value assessment 
consumer-focused, the consumer-focused measure reach and the mixed but 
consumer-dominated measure impact are three out of four times designated as key 
drivers. Further, value for money as another consumer-focused measure is described 
twice as a second (key) driver while quality & distinctiveness, a mixed measure 
which addresses both consumer and citizen interests, is not once designated as key 
driver. 
In terms of the drivers’ ideological classification, the consumer-focus is 
obvious for the reach driver. Reach is a typical measure of output and usage (access, 
volume) and is thus directly linked to the individual consumption process. Reach is 
also a component in the value for money assessment, where value is defined as 
perceived consumer value (attributed worth) or indirectly represented through the 
proxies of output, consumption or reach. As a typical NPM measure, value for 
money is a managerial and economic, cost and consumer-focused measure. The 
quality & distinctiveness driver was classified as mixed and inconclusive, as both 
citizen and consumer objectives are considered. In general, quality can be classified 
as a traditional output measure. Reach, value for money, and quality & 
distinctiveness are traditional consumption, NPM, and output measures. 
Impact is the only new measure among the four drivers. As the second key 
driver aside from reach and the driver which is defined to assess both citizen and 
consumer benefits, impact is clearly dominated by the latter. In addition to direct 
assessments of consumer benefit (in the first two PVAs), the assessment of citizen 
benefit in the form of the direct and indirect contribution to public purposes is also 
dominated by reach, as the rationale is that the impact of the public purposes, i.e. 
outcome, is higher the higher the reach is. This is in general true. The question 
however is whether the focus lies on the scale of the impact, i.e. reach, or the 
materiality of impact, i.e. outcome. Reach considerations end with the consumption 
process while materiality considerations go beyond this by focussing on the outcome 
derived from consumption. As impact assessments focus on reach, while outcomes 
are only marginally addressed, it can be said that impact is here understood in terms 
of scale (reach) rather than materiality (outcome). The focus lies on the scale of 
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contributions to public purposes rather than substantive contributions to them. This is 
also evident through the joint assessment of reach and impact in later PVAs. 
 
Table 7.4: Weighting and Ideological Classification of Public Value Drivers
14
 
 
 Reach Quality & 
Distinctiveness 
Impact Cost & Value for 
Money 
Weight ascribed to drivers  
OD Key Less important Important Prerequisite for 
approval 
HDTV Less 
important 
Very important but  
low weighting 
Key Key 
GDS Key Very important but  
low weighting 
Key Important 
LV Key Important Key Highly relevant 
Overall ideological tendency 
 Consumer Consumer and citizen  Consumer dominates 
citizen  
Consumer 
Primary measures that inform assessments 
  Consumption 
metrics 
(reach, share, 
volume), 
output 
 
 Output features 
(technical and 
content, consumer 
and citizen) 
 Universality (free 
access) (citizen) 
 Distinctiveness from 
market (citizen and 
consumer) 
 Consumer benefit 
(variables in the 
consumption 
process) 
 Citizen benefit 
(contribution to 
public purposes) 
 Scale (reach) 
dominates 
materiality 
(outcomes) 
 Contribution to 
public purposes / 
outcomes assumed 
not assessed  
 Cost metrics  
 Value: Consumer 
value (worth), output 
and consumption 
(reach) metrics 
inform value  
 
In general, contributions to public purposes are only briefly addressed by 
pointing out how proposals relate to public purposes (potential materiality), rather 
than how proposal features achieve desired outcomes (actual materiality). An 
exception is the GDS PVA, where direct relationships between the proposal and the 
desired outcome are addressed. Generally, the contribution to public purposes seems 
to be assumed rather than assessed.  
                                                 
14
 BBC Trust, 2007a, p. 31, 2007c, pp. 12, 32, 2007d, pp. 13-14, 2008, p. 15. 
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These limitations in the impact assessment can be explained by pointing to 
methodological challenges associated with outcome and impact assessments, which 
are acknowledged by the Trust (2007c, p. 61, 2007a, p. 53, 2010a, p. 63) as well as in 
the Charter review publication (BBC, 2004a, p. 84). The difficulties associated with 
addressing the relationship between service features and outcomes often lead to 
assessments being conducted by drawing on proxy indicators. Here, in particular 
reach (appeal, relevance, usage, demand) and output are used as proxies for outcome. 
The use of proxies such as reach shows a certain level of technocratisation 
of non-economic considerations of citizen benefits. When proxy indicators are used, 
the focus of the assessment lies on the indicator itself, here reach, rather than on the 
object they attempt to measure, here outcome. This indicates a form of value 
conflation as the assessment of outcome is conflated with that of measuring output 
and consumption. 
To a high degree, contributions to public purposes are also not addressed in 
the impact but rather in the fit with public purposes section, which does not count 
towards the final assessment of public value creation (with the exception of the OD 
PVA). For the impact driver, as the only driver with the explicit task to assess citizen 
benefits, it can be concluded that citizen benefits are subordinated to consumer 
benefits. 
In terms of the overall assessment of public value, reach can be described 
as the central driver but also as a central measure that informs other drivers, in 
particular impact and value for money. Reach seems to become more prominent over 
the course of the four PVAs, indicated through the conflation of reach and impact in 
later PVAs, while the importance of distinguishing between citizen and consumer 
benefits seems to decrease as they are no longer assessed separately. In comparison 
to other drivers, reach is thus strongly if not over-represented, which is a 
consequence of both the weighting as well as the interrelationship between the 
drivers. 
This importance or dominance of reach means that proposals are ascribed 
high public value when they exhibit high potential reach. If proposals are required to 
achieve high reach in order to achieve high overall public value, then this creates a 
bias against proposals which focus on typical citizen objectives, as these are 
normally not associated with high reach. According to this understanding, if 
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proposals exhibit citizen value but not enough likely reach, they might not be 
considered to create a sufficiently high level of public value in order to pass.  
The inclusion of citizen benefits into the assessment of public value shows 
that the notion is based on a mix of citizen and consumer values and that more 
emphasis is put on a distinction between them. At the same time, a clear hierarchy is 
introduced between them, in which consumer value is more important than citizen 
value, while over the course of the four PVAs their distinction also seems to erode. 
In terms of the overall PVA, it can thus be concluded that the combination 
of the ideological classification and the weighting of the drivers in the PVAs lead to 
a more consumer- than citizen-focused public value notion.  
In terms of the overall ideological composition of the PVT, the economic 
consumer focus of PVAs is enhanced by the primary economic consumer and market 
focus of MIAs. Negative market impacts clearly represent an economic perspective. 
Positive market creation effects of MIAs are also focused on consumer/producer 
surplus and market conditions. While they contribute directly to consumer and 
market objectives, they could also be viewed as contributing indirectly to wider 
societal and citizen benefits. Overall, positive market creation effects still remain 
economic measures. It is also clearly stated that market creation effects tend to be 
positive in the short- but negative in the long-turn.  
Consequentially, the individual PVAs, MIAs and thus the joint PVT 
decisions are dominated by economic consumer objectives, concepts, and 
methodologies. Overall, the PVT resembles a CBA. 
In the end, as long as the PVA outweighs the MIA, i.e. net value is created, 
services are given the go ahead. Therefore, the ultimate rationale remains one of net 
PVA creation, which is increased if a positive MIA is assessed and decreased or 
corrected by a negative MIA.  
In regard to the level of importance ascribed to citizen and consumer 
objectives, it is of interest to briefly shift the focus from the practical assessment of 
public value to the theoretical definition of the term in the Charter review 
publication. There, public value is defined according to five value types – 
democratic, cultural and creative, educational, social and community, and global –
which are described as “the BBC’s public purposes” (BBC, 2004a, p. 8) and were 
later incorporated into the Framework Agreement (DCMS, 2006c, clauses 6-10).  
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The theoretical or discursive definition of public value creation and 
correspondingly also the public purposes as the statutory remit of the BBC primarily 
reflect citizen objectives. The focus on citizen objectives in the public purposes is 
further evident in that the assessment of the contribution to the public purposes is 
conducted under the assessment of citizen benefit in the impact driver.  
Since the purposes define the BBC’s objectives, this creates the impression 
that the BBC’s remit is primarily one of pursuing citizen objectives, rather than 
consumer interests. In the PVAs, consumer benefits are not assessed against public 
purposes. A further interesting aspect, which supports this view, is the absence of the 
consumer terminology from the Charter and Framework Agreement while citizenship 
is mentioned several times. Consumer benefit is however not entirely excluded from 
the remit in the Charter review publication or the Charter and Framework 
Agreement, where it is included implicitly in the form of individual value as one of 
three levels of value creation alongside citizen and economic value (BBC, 2004a, p. 
84; DCMS 2006c, clause 28(2)). 
It can therefore be concluded that the centrality of citizen benefits in the 
theoretical public value definition and public purposes stands in contrast to the 
ideological characterisation of the practical public value definition derived from 
PVAs, where consumer objectives dominate the assessments. According to the 
BBC’s definition of the drivers, citizen benefits only account for one eighth of the 
assessment (as 50% of the impact driver) and are then still subject to reach 
considerations.  
Even though the theoretical definition of public value signals a strong 
focus on citizen obligations, the actual practical assessment of public value creation 
is dominated by consumer interests or user-orientated considerations. The dominance 
of citizen benefits and marginalisation of consumer aspects in the theoretical 
definition seems to be inverted in the practical assessment. The validity between the 
theoretical and the practical definitions of public value is thus limited. An ideological 
discrepancy exists between discourse and practice.  
As a first part of addressing the first research question on the ideological 
composition of the public value notion as applied at the BBC and C4, these case 
study findings have shown that consumer objectives dominate the practical definition 
while citizen objectives dominate the discursive definition of public value. As the 
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practical definition informs decision-making on PSB justification, it can be viewed 
as more indicative of the actual, operationalised understanding of public value in 
practice than the theoretical definition. As a first indication in terms of a possible 
paradigm shift, the findings show that citizen and consumer objectives are both 
considered, but that citizen rationales dominate discourse while consumer rationales 
dominate practice.  
The composition of the public value notion in PSB is explored further in 
the next chapter on the C4 case study, before a final conclusion is drawn. 
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8. COMPARATIVE COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC 
 VALUE NOTION – PART 2: C4 CASE STUDY  
 
This chapter presents the second case study on the application of the public 
value notion at C4 (8.1). The structure is similar to that of the BBC study. The case is 
introduced by a contextual review (8.1.1) before the empirical findings are presented 
(8.1.2) and discussed in regard to the overall ideological composition of the notion as 
applied by C4 (8.1.3). The findings from both case studies are compared and a 
conclusion is drawn on the ideological composition of the notion in UK PSB (8.2). 
 
8.1 C4 Case Study: Public Value Component Analysis 
 
8.1.1 Contextual Review: History and Recent Developments  
C4 is a publicly owned, commercially funded non-profit public service 
broadcaster which was established with the Broadcasting Act of 1980/81 (Chapter 
68, section 11; Hobson, 2008, pp. 10, 2). The Channel Four Television Company was 
incorporated as a wholly-owned, autonomous subsidiary of the regulator the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA). The IBA was responsible for ensuring 
C4’s special remit to provide programmes that appeal to tastes and interest not 
catered for by ITV, programmes that are of educational nature, to encourage 
innovation and experiment in the form of content and programmes, and to develop a 
distinct character (Broadcasting Act 1981, chapter 68, section 11(1)(a)).  
Aside from its special remit to cater for minority interests, C4’s status as a 
publisher-broadcaster made it responsible for stimulating the independent production 
sector as it does not produce its own content but commissions it from independent 
producers.  
C4 ended the duopoly of the BBC and ITV while ITV’s role as a 
monopolist seller of advertising airtime was maintained. C4 had been removed from 
the pressure of financing its programmes as it did not sell its own advertising space. 
Instead, it was financed through a levy on the commercial ITV companies, which had 
the right to sell advertising on C4 in return for funding the corporation (Hobson, 
2008, p. 3).  
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The funding mechanism was about to change with the 1986 Peacock 
report’s recommendation that C4 should sell its own airtime (C4, n.a., p. 1). The 
1990 Broadcasting Act abolished the Channel Four Television Company and 
replaced it with the Channel 4 Corporation, which remained publicly owned but had 
to sell its advertising space upon becoming operational in 1993 (Broadcasting Act 
1990, sections 26-27; C4, n.a., p. 2).  
In contrast to its early years, where the financial stability from the ITV 
funding mechanism allowed the corporation to focus on programming and worry less 
about attracting audiences (Hobson, 2008, pp. 190-191), the new financial 
responsibilities made C4 more susceptible to commercial pressures and advertisers’ 
interests. It now directly competed for advertising revenue with ITV, cable and 
satellite providers, and the later launched fifth terrestrial broadcaster Channel 5. 
A continued revenue sharing agreement with ITV gave C4 initial downside 
protection since its advertising revenue was supplemented by ITV companies if C4’s 
share was below 14%. If its share was above 14%, C4 had to donate 50% of its 
surpluses to ITV (Curran & Seaton, 2003, p. 194). The 1996 Broadcasting Act 
amended the revenue sharing agreement by handing the decision over to government 
which percentage of surplus should be given to ITV. This made C4 dependent on the 
goodwill of government (Coppens & Downey, 1998, p. 288), which can be seen as a 
threat to its independence and was only little later abolished as the corporation was 
allowed to retain its profits in full from 1998 onwards (C4, 2008b, p. 100).  
With the 2003 Communications Act, C4’s regulator the Independent 
Television Commission (ITC), which had replaced the IBA with the 1990 
Broadcasting Act, was merged with other regulators to form the sector-wide 
communications regulator Ofcom (Communications Act, 2003, section 266).  
Ofcom reports every five years on the public service broadcasters’ 
fulfilment of the purposes of public service television broadcasting (ibid., section 
264; 2010 Digital Economy Act, section 2). 
Ofcom’s first review of Public Service Television Broadcasting (PSTB) 
found that C4 would face difficulties in the future to generate sufficient funding 
through advertising revenue to fulfil certain elements of its public service mission 
(Ofcom, 2004a, pp. 12, 77, 2004c, pp. 6, 85, section 6, 2005, pp. 54-67). Ofcom 
concluded that C4 should remain a central part of the UK PSB ecology as a not-for-
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profit, commercially funded broadcaster to ensure competition for quality with the 
BBC (Ofcom, 2004c, pp. 6, 10-11, 92-93, 2005, pp. 10). The government similarly 
stated that C4 had an important role alongside the BBC in the future provision of 
PSB (DCMS, 2005, p. 105, 2006, p. 64).  
Different short-, medium- and long-term funding options were considered 
in the first PSTB review, ranging from operational efficiency and self-help measures 
to market-based initiatives, regulatory support, direct/indirect public funding and 
institutional options (Ofcom, 2004a, pp. 12, 2004c, pp. 11, 6, 60 et seq., 84, 93, 
2005, pp. 62- 66). During the review, C4 had announced that an expected funding 
deficit could approach £100 million per year by 2009 and had requested indirect 
regulatory and direct financial public support in combination with a commitment to 
self-help to ensure the provision of its PSB remit (Ofcom, 2005, pp. 54, 36). The first 
PSTB review concluded that C4 should develop its self-help proposal in the short- to 
medium-term, that government should consider options for funding one-off 
exceptional costs, and that Ofcom would consider the case for regulatory assistance 
(ibid., pp. 10-11).  
Ofcom stated that questions on the corporation’s independence, culture, 
regulation, accountability, and State Aid raised by direct and indirect funding were 
strong arguments against either (ibid., pp. 11, 67, 2004c, p. 84). An allocation of 
BBC licence fee funding to C4 for its digital transmission costs was for example 
rejected by the European Commission. C4 would have to submit itself to greater 
regulation and accountability to justify the public money received and spent (ibid., p. 
66). Ofcom proposed to work with C4 on developing a new regulatory framework 
based on a creative dialogue and Ofcom’s proposed new approach to measuring PSB 
with a sharper focus on public purposes (Ofcom, 2004c, p. 84).  
Regarding long-term funding, Ofcom proposed to monitor C4’s 
performance with a financial review in 2006/2007 (Ofcom, 2005, pp. 11, 67, 93). 
The first phase of Ofcom’s financial review comprised an assessment of C4’s 
delivery of its PSB remit (Ofcom, 2007b), a commissioned report from LEK 
Consulting (2007) on C4’s future financial prospect, and a submission by C4 (2007) 
on its public service contribution. 
 LEK’s report (2007) concluded that there was a high degree of uncertainty 
about C4’s forecast performance, which was likely to deteriorate and to make a loss 
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beyond 2010 (Ofcom, 2007a, 2008a, p. 106). Ofcom’s (2007b) parallel analysis of 
C4’s remit fulfilment, accompanied by C4’s (2007) assessment of its remit delivery, 
showed that a basket of different measures – many of those presented in C4’s and 
Ofcom’s reports – would be required to capture C4’s future remit delivery and PSB 
contribution (Ofcom, 2007b, p. 54). According to Ofcom, an important next step 
would be to present these measures in the context of the public value framework C4 
was developing at that time (ibid.). 
C4 had started to develop a new monitoring regime to assess its PSB 
contribution (Duncan, 2007, pp. 12-13). In autumn 2006, the C4 Board had initiated 
an internal review of the corporation (ibid., pp. 8, 5). Parallel to this, the public value 
notion had been used in public speeches with regard to the delivery of public value in 
the PSB ecology, the BBC and more specifically C4’s contribution (Duncan, 2006, 
pp. 3, 14, 2007). The notion was also used in C4’s (2007) remit assessment 
submitted to Ofcom’s financial review. 
Ofcom’s financial review (2007c) concluded that growing competitive and 
financial pressure would undermine C4’s remit delivery and PSB contribution if no 
new model of public support was found.
15
 The regulator suggested that the current 
monitoring and reporting framework should be developed significantly to fully 
measure C4’s PSB contribution and proposed to work with C4 on its implementation 
(Ofcom, 2007c, p. 6). Ofcom would further continue to monitor C4’s financial 
performance and remit delivery and review the case for future intervention in the 
context of the second PSB review (ibid., pp. 4-6; 2008a, 2008b, 2009). It also 
recommended that the C4 Board publicly articulated its vision of the corporation’s 
future PSB role, governance, and funding to inform its second PSB review and 
government’s long-term decision-making (Ofcom, 2007c, pp. 5-6). 
Shortly after Ofcom’s financial review, C4 announced a major internal 
review of its PSB role and purpose in the digital age, which it described as “the most 
thorough and far-reaching review of the organisation's fundamental raison d’être 
since the original debates about the establishment of a fourth channel in the late 
1970s”16 (also C4, 2008b, p. 4, 2008a, p. 1). The review resulted in the ‘Next on 4’ 
publication (C4, 2008b) which was intended to inform Ofcom’s second PSB review 
and government thinking (Duncan, 2007, pp. 9-10). 
                                                 
15
 http://www.channel4.com/about4/next_on4.html.  
16
 http://www.channel4.com/about4/next_on4.html.  
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As C4’s strategic blueprint, ‘Next on 4’ (2008b, p. 82) outlines a multi-
media vision and remit, setting out “plans to transform C4 into a public service 
network delivering public value on-air, online and off-air, developing a new 
generation of talent and supporting a new wave of creative businesses” (ibid., closing 
remarks). At the heart of the new vision lies a fresh articulation of C4’s public 
service role, which “describes the positive impact it aims to have on the lives of 
viewers as well as wider society” (C4, 2008a, p. 1). The remit is for the first time 
defined along four core public purposes, which “give practical expression to the end 
benefits that result from the delivery of its remit” (C4, 2008b, pp. 77, 3): 
 To nurture new talent and original ideas  
 To champion alternative voices and fresh perspectives  
 To challenge people to see the world differently  
 To inspire change in people’s lives (ibid., pp. 78-81).  
These purposes capture C4’s distinctive on- and off-screen PSB role (ibid., 
pp. 76-77)
17
 and “express what the public expects of C4, and what C4 believes its 
role should be” (C4 2009b, p. 2). They further give new expression to its legislative 
remit and link to Ofcom’s PSB purposes (C4, 2008b, p. 77, 2009b, p. 2, 19; 
Communications Act, 2003, section 264(4), (6)). C4’s legal remit can be described as 
innovation, diversity, education, and distinctiveness (Communications Act, 2003, 
section 265(3)). 
In contrast to the legal remit, which is only applicable to C4’s core 
channel, the new public purposes apply across all platforms (C4, 2009b, pp. 2, 82). 
The understanding here is that digital media will allow the corporation to pursue the 
public purposes with greater impact (C4, 2008a, pp. 2-3). ‘Next on 4’ 
correspondingly called for a new legislative framework to reflect C4’s transition to a 
multi-media public service network (C4, 2008b, pp. 83, 1, closing remarks). This 
platform-neutral definition was later incorporated into C4’s legislative remit with the 
2010 Digital Economy Act (section 22 (4)), which enshrines the four purposes 
defined in ‘Next on 4’ and requires the corporation to participate in a broader range 
of cross-platform activities.  
A second central element of the ‘Next on 4’ publication is a new 
accountability system, which is related to a general increase in public service 
                                                 
17
 http://www.channel4.com/about4/next_on4.html. 
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accountability and possible changes to its funding model (C4, 2008b, pp. 103, 105, 
107, 10).  
Part of this new accountability system, which comprises three initiatives 
(ibid., pp. 105-106), is a proposed public value framework. For C4 “public value 
provides a mechanism for articulating the wider social benefits arising from an 
organisation’s activities, thereby engendering trust and legitimacy among key 
stakeholders” (ibid., p. 106). The public value notion is used throughout the 
publication to represent the overall contribution of the corporation. In addition, a 
definition is given, which distinguishes three levels of public value delivery:  
 “to individuals, by offering a wide range of high-quality programming 
and other forms of content that entertain and enlighten viewers, 
 to society as a whole, by providing a platform for the widest possible 
range of voices within the UK, offering fresh perspectives on the world 
and by posing new possibilities, 
 and to the creative economy in the UK, forging new partnerships that 
give the most creative people a platform for their talents” (ibid., p. 75). 
The public value framework is intended to capture the organisation’s cross-
media contribution, ensure the fulfilment of the legal remit and licence requirements, 
assess performance, prioritise investments, and improve the dialogue with end-users 
(ibid., pp. 84, 106). It comprises an annual assessment in the form of a public value 
report on the corporation’s performance against its purposes, which is assessed 
through a basket of existing and new measures as well as enhanced audience research 
(ibid., pp. 106-107).  
At the publication of ‘Next on 4’, C4 was in the process of developing the 
components of its public value framework (ibid., p. 106). The framework was later 
renamed to public impact assessment (PIA) and published as a public impact report 
alongside the annual report and financial statements of 2008 and 2009 (C4, 2009a, 
2010a).  
The next section analyses the assessment components of PIAs with regard 
to their representation of citizen and consumer objectives. The public impact notion 
is viewed as a synonym for the originally used public value notion. 
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8.1.2 Ideological Composition: Public Impact Assessments  
At the point of writing, two PIAs had been published by C4 in its annual 
reports (C4, 2009a, 2010a). The two PIAs show a high degree of consistency in 
regard to the overall assessment structure, the assessment components and their sub-
components. Only minor variations exist, which is intended by C4 to enable year-on-
year comparisons (C4, 2010b, pp. 3-4).  
Conceptually, PIAs are structured around seven assessment components, 
comprising the four public purposes, nurture, challenge, champion, inspire, and three 
scale & impact measures, viewer impact, output & spend, and creative economy 
impact. The assessment of the seven components is clearly defined through sets of 
sub-components. Taken together, they capture the public impact of all C4 services, 
including C4 as the core channel, the digital channels More4, E4, Film4, and digital 
media and film (C4, 2009b, p. 2). 
Two PIAs (2009a, 2010a) and two accompanying publications, describing the 
underlying methodology (2009b, 2010b), build the basis for the analysis. For each of 
the seven assessment components, the indicators and measures were aggregated from 
these four documents with regard to the objectives assessed and methodologies 
applied. The data was then consolidated and the key measures, or sub-components, 
were aggregated in a separate table for each component.  
Based on this analysis, the measures were grouped into four main types; 
output measures, usage measures, monetary measures, and audience perceptions. 
Each measure type was assigned a colour code to provide a graphic display of the 
assessment composition in the aggregate tables (Appendix D). 
The characterisation of the seven assessment components in the following is 
based on document texts and information in the aggregate tables. They are discussed 
with regard to the objectives assessed and methodologies used, which provides 
insights on the representation of consumer and citizen objectives in the components 
and thus the overall assessment. In the PIAs, no direct reference to or distinction is 
made between individuals in regard to their different roles as citizens or consumers.  
The analysis is structured into two parts; the first part focuses on the 
assessment of the four purposes and the second part focuses on the assessment of the 
three impact & scale measures. Once all seven components have been addressed, an 
overall characterisation of the PIA is provided in the discussion. In support of this, a 
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table was compiled, which gives a comparative overview of all seven assessment 
components and their respective key measures (table 8.2). 
 
Four Public Purposes: Nurture, Challenge, Champion, and Inspire  
In the following discussion of each of the four purposes, a brief description 
of each purpose’s definition is given, as provided in the ‘Next on 4’ publication, 
before the assessment of the purpose is addressed.  
In the assessment of each purpose in the PIAs, an introductory text 
passages presents programme highlights and seasons of the year, supported by 
testimonials and narrative on how those programme examples relate to the respective 
purpose. For select programmes, bespoke research is presented on audience usage 
and audience perceptions of programme characteristics as well as the programmes’ 
influence on people’s attitudes and behaviours (C4, 2010b, p. 3, 2009b, p. 3). Then, a 
set of key measures is presented for each purpose.  
The discussion below firstly addresses the definition of the purpose and 
then reviews the key measures as the central means of assessing the purpose. 
Programme-specific research listed in the introductory and programming highlights 
text for each purpose is addressed as well. 
 
In the definition of the first purpose, to nurture new talent and original 
ideas, C4’s role is described as encouraging risk-taking, innovation and experiment 
in everything it does, to support talent and the creative economy by promoting 
plurality of sources and supporting activities across the nations and regions and in 
creative sectors beyond television such as in particular the film industry (C4, 2008, p. 
5).  
This definition of the purpose states objectives in the form of 
characteristics of C4’s programming output (risk-taking, innovative, experiment) and 
operational objectives related to the procurement of output (supporting talent, 
plurality of commission sources, activities in the nations and regions and film 
industry). The support of talent and the creative economy beyond television can be 
viewed as an outcome. 
This is reflected in the assessment (Appendix D.1, C4, 2010a, pp. 18-19, 
2009a, pp. 20-21, 2009b, pp. 4-5, 2010b, p. 5) in which three out of four measures 
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address output volumes, such as the number of programmes and hours of 
programming related to on- and off-screen talent as well as the number of feature 
films. The fourth measure, channel reputations, comprises audience research on the 
perception of C4 output characteristics such as innovation, novelty, and risk.  
Aside from the key measures, the introductory text to the assessment also 
emphasises these three aspects. Here narrative evidence is given in the form of 
programming examples for new and established talent on C4 (2010a, pp. 12-15), 
support of creativity through investment in on-screen and off-screen talent initiatives 
across the UK (2009a, p. 11, 2010a, pp. 16-17), and examples of Film4 productions 
(2009a, pp. 13-19, 2010a, p. 10-11, 2010a, p. 9).  
According to these key measures, the purpose nurture primarily relates to 
traditional output measures in terms of volume (number and hours of programming) 
and output characteristics (innovation, talent). In regard to a characterisation of the 
assessment, output measures are in general operational considerations and thus 
neither directly related to an assessment of citizen or consumer interests. It could 
however be said that theses output considerations indirectly relate to citizen 
objectives due to the type of output that is considered. Output in the form of 
innovative programming and programming which supports talent can be said to 
relate to societal objectives. The latter concerns the promotion of creative industries, 
which reflects the objective of economic value creation. Economic value is one of 
the three value types comprised in C4’s public value definition. 
It can thus be concluded that the nurture purpose is primarily assessed 
through output measures. These output considerations can be characterised as an 
indirect assessment of citizen objectives due to the type of output considered and the 
comparatively little attention paid to viewing numbers (which are only addressed for 
one measure), which indicate a consumer focus. This is consistent with the definition 
of the purpose, which states output-related objectives and outcomes. Impact 
assessments are here not conducted. 
 
The next purpose to challenge people to see the world differently is 
described as helping individuals to make sense of the world and encourage them to 
see things in new and surprising ways by questioning assumptions, interrogating 
203 
 
orthodoxies, with new ideas and ideologies, and by opening up the debate on global 
issues (C4, 2008, pp. 9 or 80).  
In contrast to the previous purpose nurture, which focuses primarily on 
output characteristics, the definition of challenge addresses objectives related to the 
impact or outcome at the level of the individual. In the assessment (Appendix D.2, 
C4, 2009a, pp. 32-33, 2009b, pp. 6-7, 2010a, pp. 34-35, 2010b, pp. 4, 10), this is 
reflected in the measure channel reputations, which addresses outcomes in the form 
of changes in viewer behaviour and attitudes (e.g. “show programmes that make me 
stop and think”, “challenge prejudice”).  
The remaining five key measures focus on output. Three of them assess the 
number of news and current affairs programming, hours of programming for 
documentaries and programmes covering international topics, as well as hours of 
film programming with origin other than UK and US. The output genres considered 
here, news, current affairs, and documentaries, can be characterised as typical genres 
related to citizen objectives.  
Output characteristics are also assessed through audience research in the 
channel reputations measure (“being provocative”) and through a second audience 
research measure, which addresses audience perceptions on the independence of TV 
news from government and big business. One measure assesses usage in the form of 
audience reach for C4 news for different audience groups. The majority of the key 
measures hence concerns output volumes and characteristics which according to the 
genres and output features assessed, can be characterised as an indirect consideration 
of citizen objectives.  
In the programme highlights section (2010a, pp. 22-33, 2009a, pp. 22-31), 
programming examples of news, current affairs, and documentaries are presented 
together with testimonials. In addition, programme-specific data and research is 
provided on output and usage, audience perceptions of programme characteristics 
(e.g. “trust the news programme they watch regularly to be accurate and fair”), the 
impact of programming on viewer attitudes and behaviour (e.g. “[…] talked about 
issues raised in the programmes”), and the importance of issues for society (e.g. “the 
welfare of children in care”) (2010a, p. 25, 2009a, p. 29). 
Overall, the majority of the key measures of the challenge purpose consist 
of considerations of output volumes and characteristics, whereby the output types 
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considered here relate to societal benefits. The output consideration can thus again be 
characterised as an indirect assessment of citizen objectives. Outcomes are assessed 
through two measures which focus on audience research. Outcome measures are 
however less strongly represented than output measures and therewith 
underrepresented in the key measures, in particular when considering that the 
definition of the purpose primarily focused on outcomes (rather than outputs). 
Consumption measures are also only secondary. Overall, citizen objectives are 
assessed both indirectly (output measures) as well as directly (outcome measures) for 
this purpose.  
 
The third purpose to champion alternative voices and fresh perspectives 
(C4, 2008, pp. 7, 79) is described as exploring the rich diversity of cultures and 
lifestyles in Britain today, encouraging people to look at themselves and others in a 
fresh light, and seeking non-judgemental ways of illuminating parts of society that 
are rarely seen in mainstream media. The aim is further to present unvarnished 
accounts of real lives and concerns, of different ethnic or racial groups, people with 
disabilities or different cultures or lifestyles, and to shine light on uncomfortable 
areas, examining social tension that arise from the diversity of different belief or 
value systems (2010a, p. 38). This purpose can thus be described as primarily 
addressing the representation of diversity in society, which is a typical citizen 
objective. The definition also addresses desired outcomes in the form of changed 
viewer attitudes on diversity issues.  
In terms of the assessment of the purpose (Appendix D.3, C4, 2009a, pp. 
44-45, 2009b, pp. 7-8, 2010a, pp. 46-47, 2010b, p. 11), only two key measures are 
defined which both focus on output. One measure addresses the volume of 
programmes which cover diversity issues. The second measure, channel reputations, 
refers to audience perceptions of the distinctiveness of output and minority 
representation in programmes.  
The consideration of outcome in the form of changed viewer behaviour 
(“encouraging people to look at themselves and others in a fresh light”, purpose 
definition above) is addressed through bespoke research on programming highlights 
(2010a, pp. 38-45, 2009a, pp. 35-43). Programme-specific research is here presented 
on audience perceptions of both output characteristics, in the form of the 
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representation of minorities in programmes, as well as changes in audience attitudes 
and behaviours, in the form of the creation of awareness among people of different 
groups in society (2010a, pp. 39, 43, 2009a, pp. 37, 39). In addition, selected 
programming, film, online examples and testimonials are presented in the 
introduction, which focus on minority representation (e.g. Islam Unveiled season, 
other topics include race, religion, sexuality, disability, lifestyles, crime). The 
promotion of off-screen diversity is mentioned as well (2009a, p. 35, 2010a, pp. 38-
39). 
Without taking the programme-specific research into account, the 
assessment in the form of the key measures represents again an indirect consideration 
of citizen objectives as they are assessed through output measures. The assessment of 
outcomes derived from the consumption of these programmes reflects a direct 
assessment of citizen objectives, which is here not conducted as part of the key 
measures but in the form of bespoke programme research listed throughout the 
programming highlights section. The key measures on their own thus do only 
partially reflect the objectives defined in the purpose since assessments of outcomes 
are not addressed by them. Overall, the key measures address citizen objectives 
indirectly, while bespoke research on programming highlights provides a more direct 
consideration of citizen objectives by addressing outcomes. 
 
The fourth purpose, to inspire change in people’s lives (C4, 2008, pp. 11, 
81), is described as encouraging personal development in ways that are both 
accessible and distinct from traditional public service approaches by using popular 
lifestyle formats to open peoples’ horizons, giving people new ideas, sparking new 
interests, encourage people to re-evaluate their lives, illustrate social dilemmas to 
help people deal with new experiences and issues in their lives, empower people to 
make choices, and inspire changes in their behaviour that impact directly on their 
quality of life.  
Similar to the challenge purpose, the definition of this purpose 
encompasses primarily outcome objectives in the form of changes in people’s lives. 
In the assessment (Appendix D.4, C4, 2009a, pp. 56-57, 2009b, pp. 8-9, 2010a, pp. 
58-59, 2010b, pp. 10-12), outcomes are addressed through the key measure channel 
reputations, where audience perceptions on changes of viewer attitudes and 
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behaviours (“gives me new ideas”, “makes me think about things in new and 
different ways”) are addressed. Three out of the four remaining key measures focus 
on output volumes of programming (covering leisure, life skills, hobbies) and film 
(British, international). These programming types are not typically representations of 
citizen objectives as their direct significance for wider social impact seems to be 
limited and they rather seem to be of more direct relevance to individuals as 
consumers. A fourth measure addresses the engagement of viewers online in the 
form of online usage (comments posted, conversion rate TV audience to website), 
which represents a measure of consumption. 
In terms of the composition of the key measures, the assessment of 
outcome seems to be underrepresented in comparison to the definition of the 
purpose. Aside from that, a further interesting aspect is that the type of the outcome 
assessed is less representative of societal but much more of individual value. The 
nature of the outcome, both as defined and assessed, primarily addresses individual 
benefits such as personal interests, hobbies, or the viewers’ re-evaluation of their 
lives. Generally, outcome measures are associated with the consideration of citizen 
value in the form of impacts on individuals which are of societal relevance, as for 
example becoming more tolerant. Here, the focus of the outcome assessment 
however seems to lie more on individual impact in the form of consumer utility 
rather than citizen value. Also, measures of online engagement address consumption 
which similarly represents an individualist perspective on consumer benefit. The 
assessment hence reflects a slightly more popular character of the purpose than 
outlined in its definition.  
It can thus be stated that based on both the definition of the purpose as well 
as the key measures used, the assessment can be characterised as leaning more 
towards a consumer rather than a citizen focus due to the nature of the output and 
outcomes addressed. The bespoke research conducted on programming highlights is 
however of much broader nature (2010a, pp. 50-57, 2009a, pp. 48-55). Here, 
audience perceptions as well as online usage and engagement are assessed on a range 
of issues of both societal and individual dimensions. Overall, it can thus be 
concluded that outcomes are addressed both indirectly through output measures and 
directly through research on audience perception in regard to both consumer and 
citizen values. 
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Impact & Scale: Viewer Impact, Output & Spend, Creative Economy 
Impact 
The second half of the assessment comprises three impact & scale 
measures, which are viewer impact, output & spend, and creative economy impact. 
The assessment of these three components is based on sets of defined key measures. 
Aside from these three components, additional aspects relevant to impact & scale are 
considered in the assessments in separate text sections. Both are discussed in the 
following.  
According to C4, the overall impact & scale is included in the assessment 
since the corporation’s distinctive role derives in part from the scale of its investment 
in high-quality UK-originated content and its ability to reach large audiences (2009b, 
p. 2). Correspondingly, scale is here defined in terms of the level of expenditure in 
UK-originated output and the consumption level of output (2009a, p. 59). The 
combination of both is seen to contribute to the impact of C4. 
In contrast to the consideration of impact thus far in the assessment of the 
different purposes, where the focus lay on outcome in the form of changed attitudes 
and behaviour, a new perspective on impact is introduced here, where the focus does 
not lie on the materiality or nature of impact, as in the case of the purposes, but rather 
on the dimension of impact. Correspondingly, the assessment is less focused on 
specific programmes genres. 
The first two measures, viewer impact and output & spend, address this 
combined understanding of impact in the form of consumption (viewer impact) and 
investment in programming (output & spend). Viewer impact is a typical usage or 
consumption measure. It is assessed (Appendix D.5, C4, 2009a, pp. 60-65, 2009b, 
pp. 9-12, 2010a, pp. 62-67, 2010b, pp. 14-18) through the standard measures share 
and reach for the TV channel portfolios of C4 and the other public service 
broadcasters. Variables in the assessment include output in the form of network 
originations, time horizons such as medium-term and daily, different audience 
groups by age and ethnicity, as well as different platforms such as TV, on-demand, 
and online.  
The measure viewing to network originations, which is the only variable in 
the consumption assessment with regard to a specific output type, is described by C4 
as providing “a useful performance measure of public value, by focusing on the 
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impact of UK-originated content commissioned by C4” (2009b, p. 10, 2010b, p. 15). 
The term network origination, defined by C4 for the PIAs, refers to any programme 
commissioned by C4 and transmitted on any of its TV channels (2010b, p. 27). The 
measure viewing to network originations thus directly reflects the two components of 
impact; commissions and consumption.  
Aside from the consumption measures, channel reputation is a further 
measure used to assess viewer impact. The focus here lies on audience perceptions of 
output characteristics such as youthfulness and distinctiveness of C4 compared to 
other channels. The perception of youthfulness and distinctiveness of C4’s output 
reflect traditional remit obligations of C4, which are to focus on younger audiences 
and distinctiveness of its programming from those of other public service 
broadcasters. Channel reputation can here be characterised as an output measure 
since it assesses output characteristics. 
In terms of a characterisation of viewer impact, its focus on consumption 
generally indicates the consideration of consumer rather than citizen interests. Since 
no distinction is made in regard to different programme genres, it is not possible to 
characterise the assessment indirectly according to the output types considered. The 
stated objective of reaching large audiences can however be used to derive a 
characterisation, since high reach generally indicates that the output provided has to 
be of popular appeal. Such forms of output are of value to the individual in its role as 
consumer rather than as citizen. The viewer impact measure can thus be 
characterised as leaning towards consumer interests due to its consumption focus. 
The second component, output & spend, is assessed through four key 
measures (Appendix D.6, C4, 2009a, pp. 66-67, 2009b, pp. 12-13, 2010a, pp. 68-69, 
2010b, pp. 19-20). Of these four measures, three assess the volume, composition, and 
genre of output with regard to originations. One measure addresses the total 
expenditure on originated content. Originations are defined as all programmes shown 
on TV, either commissioned by the broadcaster or purchased (2010b, p. 27). Since 
the assessment of output is here conducted for all different genres without 
emphasising a specific output type, it is also here not possible to characterise the 
output measure in regard to indirectly representing either citizen or consumer 
interests. This rather neutral character also applies to the spend measure, which 
addresses the total expenditure on originations. 
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The third component in the assessment of scale and impact is the creative 
economy impact. The assessment consists of six key measures (Appendix D.7, C4, 
2009a, pp. 68-69, 2009b, pp. 13-14, 2010a, pp. 70-71, 2010b, pp. 21-22). All six 
address the monetary value invested in output. Variables in the assessment include 
C4 and other public service broadcasters, UK origin, external commissions, nations 
and regions, in and outside of London, independent production companies 
(investment in and number of supplier), and UK film productions.  
The assessment of the total gross value added in the creative economy is a 
more comprehensive measure, as it goes beyond the direct investment made by C4 
(2010a, p. 70, 2009a, p. 68). The measure summarises the direct expenditure of C4 
and the indirect impact in the form of an estimation of the wider benefits in the 
independent sector that have accrued over time. A further measure listed is the 
estimated number of jobs supported by C4 across the UK (ibid.). Both of these 
indirect assessments are based on multiplier effects resulting from C4 expenditure. 
The assessment of such wider economic benefits can be described as considerations 
of wider societal citizen objectives.  
Aside from these key measures, additional issues are highlighted which 
relate to the creative economy impact. Investments made and examples of initiatives 
and projects are listed for the two issues ‘investment in talent’ and ‘digital 
innovation’ (2009a, p. 70, 2010a, pp. 72-75). C4’s investment is described to often 
act as a “catalyst for much larger interventions across the creative industries – not 
just in television and film, but in other forms of arts, design and digital media”, 
which leave a tangible legacy that endures beyond the lifetime of TV programmes 
(2009a, p. 59). This addresses again off-screen impacts of C4. So does partnership, 
as a further aspect (2009a, pp. 71-72, 2010a, pp. 76-77), which is a central issue for 
C4 due to its status as a publisher-broadcaster. Partnership is described as “the most 
effective – and cost-effective – way for us to develop talent, to foster skills, to 
empower individuals and families, to reach out to communities and to explore new 
ways of delivering public benefit in every part of the UK” (2010a, p. 76).  
For these different issues, the multiplier effect of C4 projects and 
initiatives is highlighted with regard to their impact on the creative economy. The 
focus of these assessments includes but also goes beyond the direct monetary and on-
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screen activities of C4 as they address indirect impacts beyond the consumption 
process or the production of output.  
As a final aspect, television and film awards won by C4 are listed (2009a, 
pp. 72-75, 2010a, pp. 78-81). This “provides an indicator of the excellence of its 
output, as recognised by industry practitioners both in the UK and internationally” 
(2009a, p. 59). The listing of awards can be described as a proxy or indirect 
assessment of quality. In the assessment of the purposes, quality has also been 
considered through audience perceptions of programme characteristics and 
testimonials. A dedicated quality measures does not exist in PIAs.  
The creative economy impact component can hence be described to 
address a third form of impact which is neither directly concerned with the outcome 
in the form of changed attitudes and behaviours, as assessed for the purposes, nor the 
dimension of impact in the form of consumption levels, as addressed by the previous 
two measures. Impact here concerns the off-screen impact in the form of economic 
activity. As a publisher-broadcaster, the support of the independent production sector 
is a central obligation of the corporation; “Its contribution to the creative economy 
generates significant benefits across the whole of the UK” (2009a, p. 59). This can 
also be described as economic value, which is one of the three value types included 
in C4’s public value definition. 
In terms of a characterisation, it is difficult to classify creative economy 
impact as either representing citizen or consumer value. On one hand, economic 
stimulation of sectors is beneficial to society in regard to job creation or the global 
presence and representation of the UK. On the other hand, economic value creation 
or growth in the sense of the stimulation of an industry can be classified as a typical 
free-market concept as it increases competition and choice and thus consumer value.  
Creative economy impact can hence be interpreted as representing both 
citizen and consumer objectives. Since the impact in the creative economy, as the 
objective or desired outcome, is not directly concerned with the consumption 
process, it can be characterised as leaning more towards citizen than consumer value. 
 
8.1.3 Discussion and Conclusion 
C4’s PIAs show a high degree of consistency and detail in regard to the 
assessment structure and the key measures defined for each of the seven assessment 
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components. As addressed previously, a direct distinction between consumer and 
citizen objectives is not made in PIAs.  
For this second part of the investigation of the first research question on 
the ideological composition of the applied public value notion in PSB, the public 
impact or public value as assessed in PIAs can be classified as representing both 
citizen and consumer value, with a slight tendency toward citizen objectives as the 
dominant rationale. 
 
Table 8.1: Generalized Classification of PIA Components 
 
Assessment Components 
Public Purposes Impact & Scale 
Nurture Challenge Champion Inspire Viewer 
impact 
Output & 
spend 
Creative 
economy 
impact 
Overall Classification 
Citizen Citizen Citizen  Consumer  
and citizen  
Consumer 
 
Consumer 
 
Citizen and 
consumer  
Assessment 
Indirect 
through 
output 
Indirect 
through 
output and 
consump-
tion, direct 
through 
outcome 
Indirect 
through 
output and 
direct 
through 
outcome 
Indirect 
through 
output and 
consump-
tion, direct 
through 
outcome 
Consump-
tion and 
output 
measures 
(genre 
neutral) 
Output and 
spend 
(genre 
neutral) 
Spend, 
wider 
economic 
benefit  
Theoretical definition 
Output, 
outcome 
Outcome Outcome  Outcome    
 
Of the seven assessment components, the four purposes can be 
characterised as representing citizen objectives in their definition and their 
assessment. One of the purposes, inspire, also more explicitly focuses on consumer 
interests. Of the three impact & scale measures, viewer impact and output & spend 
represent consumer interests due to their focus on output, consumption, and spend 
(without a specific genre focus). Creative economy impact, the third component, 
represents both citizen and consumer objectives, however with a slight tendency 
towards the former. 
This means that three purposes focus on citizen objectives – while one 
purpose and creative economy impact address both citizen and consumer objectives – 
and the viewer impact and output & spend measures focus on consumer objectives. 
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The overall assessment is thus mixed or nearly balanced. It can be described as 
having a slight tendency toward citizen objectives, which could however also be 
discounted again as citizen assessments are conducted primarily indirectly through 
proxies such as output and consumption volumes for specific genres related to 
societal objectives while only a few direct assessments of outcome are made. The 
discussion below addresses the components and their classification in more detail.  
The four public purposes can be characterised as definitions of citizen 
objectives as they are primarily defined in terms of outcomes.  
For all four purposes, the assessment is to a great extent conducted 
indirectly through the consideration of proxies such as output volumes and 
characteristics, whereby in the majority of the assessments the type of output 
considered, in the form of programming genres or characteristics, relates to citizen 
objectives. Nurture addresses output in regard to innovation and talent, challenge 
focuses on news, current affairs and documentaries, and champion assesses diversity 
output. Direct assessments of outcomes related to citizen objectives are conducted 
through audience research on perceptions of changes in attitudes and behaviours 
resulting from output consumption. More individualist consumer interests are 
addressed as well. The inspire purpose relates to consumer value due to its focus on 
personal interests. Consumer value is however less strongly represented than citizen 
objectives in the overall definition of the purposes and their assessment.  
In the second part of the assessment of the three measures of scale & 
impact, viewer impact and output & spend represent a consumer perspective while 
creative economy impact reflects both consumer and citizen considerations, the latter 
however more so.  
Viewer impact assesses consumption levels of output in the general form of 
originations. The output & spend measure addresses levels of output and investment 
also with a general focus on originations in all genres types. Impact is here assessed 
not in regard to the outcome on the level of the individual but rather in regard to the 
scale of impact as a combination of both output and consumption. The third 
assessment component, creative economy impact, focuses on a further dimension of 
impact in the form of direct and indirect value generated in creative industries.  
As can be seen in the aggregate table 8.2 (p. 214), a distinction between the 
assessment of the four purposes and the scale & impact measures is that the latter 
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focus much more strongly on consumption and monetary measures and thus 
represent a more economic than non-economic perspective. The purposes, in 
contrast, focus much more on different output types and characteristics, often 
pertaining to citizen objectives, thus reflecting an indirect assessment of citizen 
objectives.  
Output is the most frequently applied measure in PIAs, both for the entire 
table as well as for the assessment of the delivery against the four purposes. Out of a 
total of 17 different key measures used for the assessment of the purposes, twelve 
assess levels of output in the form of programming hours and numbers of 
programmes. Here output measures tend to focus on genres which are associated 
with citizen benefits and thus can be described as indirect or proxy assessments of 
citizen objectives. Consumer objectives are considered as well, however less so. The 
channel reputations measure also focuses in part on output characteristics.  
Consumption measures are the second most frequently applied measure. 
They encompass assessments of consumption, engagement, and interaction levels. 
The assessment remains rather unspecific with regard to the genres considered, 
which means that it should here be viewed as a consumer measure. Both output and 
consumption measures are traditional quantitative on-screen measures. 
The assessment of economic value with input measures is the third most 
frequently applied measure. Monetary value is addressed in the form of investments, 
costs, and other indicators related to the creative industries such as job creation. Here 
impact is not a direct result from the consumption of programming but is rather 
derived from direct monetary investment in creative industries and indirect impact 
derived from multiplier effects. A consumer-citizen classification can here be argued 
for in both ways. 
Channel reputations, as the least frequently used measure, assesses 
audience perceptions of both output characteristics and outcomes in the form of 
changed viewer attitudes and behaviours (further outcome-focused audience research 
is provided in programming highlights sections in PIAs, which is not part of the key 
measures). Audience perceptions are provided for five out of seven measures; the 
four purposes and viewer impact.  
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Table 8.2: Full Aggregate Table of the Assessment Components  
NURTURE CHALLENGE CHAMPION INSPIRE VIEWER IMPACT OUTPUT&  
SPEND 
CREATIVE ECO-
NOMY IMPACT 
New and one-off 
programmes 
Number of 
programmes, feature 
films  
Commitment to long-
form journalism  
Number of 
programmes  
Diversity output on 
the core channel  
Hours of programming  
Programmes 
covering leisure, life 
skills, and hobbies  
Hours of originated 
programming  
TV viewing share 
Across TV portfolio 
Volume of first-run 
originations 
Hours of programming 
Broadcasters’  
expenditure on UK 
originations 
Programming in-
vestment, job creation 
Audience reach 
Average monthly 
reach  
Programming mix on 
core channel 
% of programming New talent strands 
on C4 
Programming hours  
Audience reach 
Viewers 15min per 
month 
Channel reputations 
Audience perceptions 
of C4 characteristics 
UK and foreign 
language films 
Number of films 
Viewing to network 
originations % of 
total TV viewing 
Broadcasters’  
investment in the  
independent sector 
Expenditure on 
originated content 
Total expenditure  Independence of TV 
news 
Audience perceptions 
of news programme 
characteristics 
Diversity of Film 4 
channel schedule % 
of output 
Medium-term view-
ing trends % change 
share 
C4’s  
investment in the 
nations and regions  
Investment and 
volume of output  
Originations on E4 
Programming hours   Originations by 
genre on core 
channel  
Total expenditure, 
programming hours  
Engaging viewers 
online Number of 
comments online, page 
views, visits, TV 
conversion rate 
Average daily TV 
viewing In minutes 
Broadcasters’  
investment in the 
independent sector 
outside London 
Expenditure on 
production companies 
Medium-term view-
ing trends young 
audience % change 
viewing share 
Channel reputations 
Audience perception 
of C4 characteristics  
Commitment to 
documentary films 
Programming hours  
Viewing by ethnicity 
Viewing share  Diversity of supply 
base Number of  
Independent 
production companies 
Channel reputations 
Audience perceptions 
of programming 
impact on viewer 
attitudes & behaviour 
Making programmes 
available on demand 
Avg. monthly number 
of programme views 
 Range of intl. pro-
gramming Hours of 
first-run programming 
& intl. film Engagement with C4 
content online Avg. 
monthly visits, page 
views 
Contribution of 
Film4 to UK film 
production 
Production budget, 
funding sources for 
Film4 productions 
released theatrically 
Channel reputations 
Audience perceptions 
of C4 characteristics, 
viewer attitude & 
behaviour 
 
Channel reputations 
Audience perceptions 
of C4 characteristics 
 
 
 
Output measure  
Input measure  
Consumption measure 
Audience perceptions 
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The assessment of changes in viewer attitudes and behaviour represents a 
direct assessment of outcomes. Outcomes are primarily addressed in regard to citizen 
objectives, while consumer or more personal interests are also included. These direct 
assessments of citizen objectives are new measures as they have not traditionally 
been used. Both creative economy impact and audience perceptions of attitudes and 
behaviours are off-screen measures of outcomes and are non-traditional measures. 
PIAs hence comprise a mix of new and old measures, of which some had 
been applied internally or in C4’s reporting to Ofcom but which had not always been 
made publicly available (C4, 2009a, p. 77). 
Overall, it can be concluded that PIAs are divided between citizen and 
consumer objectives. The assessment of purposes addresses citizen objectives 
through direct considerations of outcomes and indirect proxy considerations through 
output measures. This is coherent with the purposes’ theoretical definitions in ‘Next 
on 4’ which focus more on outcomes and wider societal objectives than on personal 
interests and consumer value. The assessment of scale & impact measures however 
focuses more on consumption and economic considerations. PIAs thus seem to be an 
almost equal mix of both citizen and consumer objectives. 
In regard to this value-mix, PIAs reflect the definition of public value as 
consisting of individual, societal, and economic value, as provided in ‘Next on 4’ 
(C4, 2008b, p. 75). Individual or consumer value is addressed through consumption 
levels, output, and outcome in the form of individual, rather than societal, benefits. 
Societal value is addressed through outcome assessments related to wider citizen 
objectives and proxies such as consumption and output of genres related to wider 
societal objectives. Thirdly, economic value is assessed in the form of creative 
economy impact. A high degree of consistency thus exists between the discursive 
public value definition and the practical assessment of public impact, which is also 
true for the definition of the public purposes and their assessment. All three types of 
public value are represented in the assessment, even though citizen and consumer 
terminologies are not used explicitly. 
At this point it briefly needs to be emphasised that the analysis only 
focused on the discursive and practical definitions stated in ‘Next on 4’ and the 
measures applied in PIAs, with regard to how they can be classified as relating to 
either citizen or consumer interests. C4’s interpretation of these terminologies in 
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terms of which programmes these concepts comprise, has not been considered, i.e. 
how citizen objectives such as for example diversity are defined and which output is 
classified as citizen output has not been assessed here. An example for this would be 
the classification of Big Brother programming as diversity output, which is 
questionable from the standpoint of diversity as a citizen objective. 
This is of relevance as C4 generally pursues a mainstream approach 
through the provision of popular programming, for which it is sometimes criticised 
(Hobson 2008, p. 196), but which is inherent to its culture due to the need to 
simultaneously fulfil public service obligations and generate sufficient advertising 
revenue. This challenge of reconciling commerce and culture has been part of C4’s 
history since its inception and is a point of debate in terms of the viability of its PSB 
model (see Born 2003b, p. 777 et seq.).  
The focus on citizen objectives in the definition of the purposes and their 
assessment might seem at odds with the popular character of the actual programming 
output of C4. A likely explanation for this discrepancy is the possible receipt of 
public funding, which makes it necessary for C4 to demonstrate the fulfilment of 
citizen objectives and distinctiveness from other broadcasters to legitimise a change 
in funding arrangements. “It is becoming ever more important for public bodies to 
demonstrate the public value they deliver. For a creative institution like C4, finding 
appropriate metrics is not easy, but to secure our future we want to demonstrate more 
effectively our impact on society and citizens” (C4, 2009a, p. 5). Upon receipt of 
public funding, the distinction between citizen and consumers would become more 
important for C4. The receipt of public funding would also require higher 
accountability standards, which the PIA addresses as a newly introduced 
accountability tool.  
A further element in C4’s expanded accountability system is the 
improvement of the relationship with the audience in the form of increased audience 
research, which has informed ‘Next on 4’, the public purposes, and the PIAs. The 
question here is however how much focus lies on audience research addressing 
consumer or citizen objectives. A strong focus on audience expectations can lead to 
an overrepresentation of consumer value.  
The next section compares the findings from the C4 and BBC case studies 
to derive an ideological classification of the public value notion in UK PSB. 
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8.2 Comparison and Conclusion: Ideological Composition of the 
 Public Value Notion  
 
As addressed in the first research question, this and the previous chapter 
have analysed the ideological composition of the applied public value notion at the 
BBC and C4.  
For the BBC, it could be concluded that the assessment is overall 
consumer-focused, with the reach and value for money measures assessing consumer 
value, the quality & impact measure addressing both consumer and citizen aspects, 
while the impact measure, as the only designated measure to assess both citizen and 
consumer benefits, subordinates the former to the latter by focussing on scale (reach) 
rather than materiality (outcome) of impact. This stands in contrast to the practical 
public value definition which is based on five public values that inform the public 
purposes and focus on wider societal outcomes as citizen objectives. It could 
therefore be concluded that a discrepancy exists between the ideological composition 
of the practical and theoretical public value notions in the BBC case, as the practical 
definition is primarily consumer-focused and the theoretical definition is primarily 
citizen-focused.  
For C4, the findings were slightly different as the assessment framework 
was classified as much more balanced in terms of the consideration of citizen and 
consumer objectives. In the assessment, the public purposes focused primarily 
indirectly on wider societal outcomes and thus citizen benefits, and marginally on 
consumer value. In the second set of assessment components, the three scale & 
impact measures, two measures were consumer-focused, viewer impact and output & 
spend, while the third creative economy impact measure addressed both citizen and 
consumer objectives, focussing on the former. In regard to the theoretical definition 
of public impact or public value, the purposes represent predominantly citizen 
objectives in the form of societal outcomes, which is consistent with the assessment. 
A smaller discrepancy thus exists for C4, as the theoretical definition is overall 
citizen-focused while the practical definition reflects both consumer and citizen 
objectives, with a slight tendency towards the latter. 
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Table 8.3: Assessment Frameworks of the BBC and C4 
 
BBC  
Driver Reach Quality & 
Distinctiveness 
Impact Cost & Value 
for Money 
Overall 
Classification 
Practical 
Definition 
Consumer Consumer  
and citizen 
Consumer  
dominates citizen 
Consumer 
Overall 
Weighting 
Key Secondary Key Secondary 
Overall  
Classification 
Theoretical  
Definition 
  Public Purposes 
Citizen  
 
 
 
C4 
 
Assessment 
Component 
Public Purposes Impact & Scale 
 Nurture Challenge Champion Inspire Viewer 
impact 
Output 
& spend 
Creative 
economy 
impact 
Overall 
Classification 
Practical 
Definition 
Citizen Citizen Citizen  Consumer  
and 
citizen  
Consumer 
 
Consumer 
 
Citizen 
and 
consumer  
Overall  
Classification 
Theoretical  
Definition 
Citizen Citizen  Citizen  Citizen 
and 
Consumer 
   
 
In direct comparison, differences thus not only exist between the practical 
and theoretical definitions of public value at the BBC and C4 respectively, but also 
between the two cases. While the theoretical definition for both cases is dominated 
by citizen objectives in the form of wider societal outcomes, the cases differ in 
regard to the practical definition, which is strongly consumer-focused in the case of 
the BBC but more balanced between consumer and citizen objectives for C4. C4 
hence seems to have a more ideologically mixed assessment than the BBC, for which 
the discrepancy between citizen and consumer representation is more pronounced. 
The rhetoric thus seems to match the practice better in the C4 than the BBC case. 
The discrepancy between the cases in regard to the practical definition can 
in part be explained through structural differences of the assessments in terms of 
their ex-ante (BBC) and ex-post (C4) focus as well as the components assessed, i.e. 
the RQIV drivers of the BBC and the four purposes and three scale & impact 
measures for C4. The public purposes, and thus the consideration of wider societal 
outcomes, are much more prominent in C4’s assessment where the purposes 
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represent four out of seven assessment components. In the BBC’s PVAs the 
assessment of purposes only represents one eighth (one half of the impact measure) 
of the assessment. In addition, the weighting attached to the drivers in the BBC case 
further enhances the focus on consumer objectives. No weighting exists in C4’s 
PIAs. Generally, the assessment components – the RQIV drivers and the seven 
assessment components – are more clearly defined and also more consistently 
applied in the case of C4. In the PVAs, the measures applied change over time as 
does the scope of the assessment, which decreases over the course of the four PVAs. 
Based on the integrated case study findings, it can be concluded that 
discursively, public value or public impact creation is defined for both cases in the 
form of public purposes that predominantly reflect wider societal outcomes. The 
theoretical or discursive public value notion in PSB thus represents citizen 
objectives. In contrast to this, the practical public value definition is more 
representative of consumer objectives, according to the dominant consumer focus of 
the BBC’s PVAs and the more balanced representation of both citizen and consumer 
objectives in C4’s PIAs.  
With these findings, it is now possible to answer the first research question 
on the ideological composition of the public value notion in PSB as applied at the 
BBC and C4. It can be summarised that a discrepancy exists between the theoretical 
and practical understanding of public value in UK PSB, as the overall discursive 
composition is dominated by citizen objectives, while the practical definition is 
primarily representative of consumer objectives. 
A preliminary conclusion can also be drawn on the overall research 
question whether a paradigm shift has taken place in the ideological justification of 
UK PSB with the introduction of the public value notion.  
The analysis has shown that the assessment of public value, which informs 
decisions PSB provision, overall focuses more on consumer than on citizen 
objectives. This goes contrary to the initial research assumption that the public value 
notion prioritises non-economic citizen objectives over economic consumer 
considerations, as indicated through the notion’s origin in public administration 
theory a well as its use in PSB policy discourse.  
To draw a preliminary conclusion on a paradigm shift, these findings need 
to be considered in the wider PSB policy context of market failure turning from a 
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legitimising to a de-legitimising rationale in the transition from analogue to digital 
broadcasting, at a time when the media policy paradigm is more dominantly 
informed by economic than non-economic objectives (chapters 2, 5, 9).   
Even though market failure has never functioned as the only justification 
for PSB – rather justification has always been mixed, consisting of both economic 
and non-economic objectives – market failure always provided an economic 
justification for large scale PSB intervention in analogue broadcasting (which could 
also be used to assuage free-market critics of PSB).  
The general tendency towards free-market economic ideology in regulation 
and government in combination with reduced market failure put pressure on PSB 
providers to find an alternative justification for traditional universal, large scale PSB 
provision. Correspondingly, the initial research assumption was that the public value 
notion was devised as such an alternative notion to enable a shift to a non-economic 
concept that would allow to move away from narrow market failure justification of 
digital PSB, which threatens its scale and scope.  
As the previous two chapters have shown, the ideological composition of 
the public value notion prioritises consumer over citizen objectives and makes heavy 
used of economic assessment methodologies and concepts, effectively representing a 
cost-benefit analysis. A shift to non-economic objectives has therefore not taken 
place. While the public value notion is not a rationale of economic theory to justify 
market intervention, it is also not a non-economic rationale as it heavily focuses on 
consumer objectives as well as economic methods. 
The first research question can thus preliminarily be answered by 
concluding that no ideological shift has taken place in the form of a prioritisation of 
non-economic citizen objectives over economic consumer objectives with the public 
value notion in UK PSB justification. Only the discursive public value definition 
indicates a prioritisation of citizen over consumer objectives, while the practical 
assessment prioritises consumer over citizen rationales. The primary indicator of a 
paradigm shift in the form of an ideological shift is thus not given.  
A final conclusion on a paradigm shift is drawn in chapter 10 based on 
integrated findings from all three empirical chapters. 
The next chapter investigates the second research question with regard to 
the wider public value process, motivational and contextual factors that influenced 
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the development, as well as characteristics of the policy process that could be 
indicative of a paradigm shift.  
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9. PUBLIC VALUE PROCESS ANALYSIS: INFLUENCE 
FACTORS AND  PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
As stated in the second research question, this chapter addresses the wider 
public value process. The analysis focuses on (motivational and contextual) influence 
factors (chapter 4) that impacted the overall public value development and thus help 
to explain why it took place. In addition, the characteristics of the public value 
development are considered to see whether these are typical elements of paradigm 
shift processes (chapter 1).  
These two types of influence factors and paradigm shift characteristics 
represent secondary indicators that inform the classification of whether the public 
value developments represents a paradigm shift in PSB justification. The final 
conclusion is drawn in chapter 10 together with findings from the previous 
compositional analysis. 
In this chapter, the objective is to paint a picture of the wider developments 
prior and parallel to the application of the notion in relation to strategic motivations 
for its application at the BBC and C4. Based on these insights, conclusions can be 
drawn on interrelationships between more general and public value specific 
developments that explain the concept’s introduction and ideological composition. 
 
 
9.1 Phase One – Prior to the Institutionalisation of the Public Value 
 Concept at the BBC 
 
9.1.1 Nodal Point: The 1990s and the 1999 Davies Report  
The Davies report on the future funding of the BBC was identified as the 
first contextual or nodal point relevant to the consideration of the policy environment 
prior to the application of the public value notion in UK PSB. As the last government 
report on PSB, the Davies report as well as prior 1990s government and BBC 
documents are used in this section to addresses the incumbent paradigm at that time, 
before the public value notion was introduced.  
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The report was published more than a decade after the 1986 Peacock 
report, which expressed strong free-market ideology by emphasising consumer 
sovereignty and considering PSB as a temporary intervention to address market 
failures related to spectrum scarcity. The Davies report (1999) continued this 
emphasis on market failure as the guiding rationale by stating that “some form of 
market failure must lie at the heart of any concept of PSB” (pp. 10, 201). 
While the Peacock report stated that the end of spectrum scarcity in the 
digital age would remove the justification for PSB (Graham, 2005, p. 79), the Davies 
report concluded instead that (some) market failures would persist as rationales for 
PSB provision (Ofcom 2004a, pp. 70, 74). Even though both economists, Peacock 
and Davies, have different views on market failure justification of PSB, which 
becomes apparent in the different conclusions of their reports, both shared the view 
that market failure should be the starting point for intervention. As the last PSB 
reviews prior to the introduction of the public value notion, the reports represent the 
dominant economic and market-orientated thinking in media and PSB policy in the 
1980s/90s. 
Interview data supports this view. Interviewees generally agreed that 
economic concepts and terminologies were dominant in PSB policy and discourse 
since Margaret Thatcher took office. One interviewee said that in the Davies report 
and earlier developments, there was a sense that “there are positive externalities of 
broadcasting and that is how you talk about them”. This economic approach is also 
evident in government and BBC documents published in the run-up to the 1996 
Charter renewal.  
The 1992 green paper (DNH, 1992) for example states that “[t]he original 
justification for public service broadcasting – that a small number of services should 
be used for the benefit of the public as a whole – no longer exist” as spectrum 
scarcity has been removed due to technological developments (ibid., p. 15, also p. 
14). While the government believed the BBC should continue as a major PSB 
organisation (ibid., foreword), greater programme choice and technological changes 
raised “fundamental questions to be asked about what the BBC should do and how it 
should be financed and organised” as the “BBC cannot remain unchanged in a 
changing world” (ibid., foreword, also p. 10).  
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The paper opened the debate on the scale and scope of the BBC by 
pointing to possible options ranging from keeping its wide service range to 
narrowing it down to niche services which the market does not provide (ibid., pp. 15, 
18). The paper further states that key issues of consideration are the objectives and 
features of PSB that distinguish it from other broadcasters and whether these can be 
supplied by a “freely operating market” (ibid., p. 12). This shows that markets were a 
central concern in PSB justification. It is further clearly stated that the starting point 
for a debate about the BBC’s future must be the services the corporation should 
provide (ibid., pp. 18, 20, 30).  
While this market perspective is less emphasised in follow-up documents 
of the BBC and government, this initial way of framing the discussion in relation to 
market provision shows that economic considerations (such as market provision, 
consumer choice, efficiency and value for money) feature prominently in PSB 
justification – more so than non-economic objectives (such as quality, diversity, 
accessibility, editorial independence, accountability, national identity) (ibid., pp. 16-
18, 23-24, 30, 35). While non-economic arguments are also key elements in the 
argumentation, the core of the discussion of PSB justification is directly linked to the 
impact of technological change on markets and PSB’s role in relation to that. Such 
views represent a prioritisation of market over public service provision with public 
service supplementing markets when market failures apply. In contrast, a non-
economic perspective would be to provide the services that are of wider societal 
benefit independent of market conditions.  
The BBC adopts a similar narrative of PSB’s future role in its Charter 
review contribution ‘Extending Choice’ (1992), which it describes as a document 
about “adaptation and change” (p. 77).  
The BBC acknowledges that substantial (technological and socio-
demographic) changes justify a thorough reassessment of its future (ibid., pp. 18, 9). 
It however refutes that licence fee funded PSB would become an “anomaly” by the 
mid-1990s as the need for supplementing commercial broadcasting would have 
diminished (ibid., p. 18). Instead, the BBC’s view is that the rapid expansion of 
commercial broadcasting will not invalidate the need for PSB but it will serve more 
clearly to limit and define the specific role that it should play in pursuit of its public 
purpose that best complements the enlarged commercial sector (ibid., p. 19). The 
225 
 
BBC here justifies its scope in relation to the market and in particular by defining its 
role as complementing market provision by delivering clearly defined public 
purposes different from those of the market – namely extending choice by 
guaranteeing universal access to distinctive high-quality programmes that are at risk 
in a purely commercial market (ibid., pp. 18-19, 77, 84). 
The high-quality programmes listed by the BBC – informing the national 
debate, expressing British culture and entertainment, creating opportunities for 
education and stimulate communication between the UK and abroad (ibid., pp. 19, 
77) – represent typical PSB objectives related to wider societal benefits. Further 
aspects addressed are the BBC’s structure as a single organisation, continued licence 
fee funding supplemented by commercial revenue, value for money, advancing 
technology, accountability and performance monitoring (ibid., pp. 42, 55, 59, 77). 
The BBC states that it should evolve and adapt its services to deliver these 
objectives and should over time withdraw from programme areas where it is no 
longer able or needed to make an original contribution (ibid., p. 19). With such a 
statement, the BBC claims its role in the digital age but also signals that it will 
carefully consider which digital opportunities to pursue or which services to possibly 
reduce. This justification is one of complementing the market with possible future 
reductions in scale. The market is here the main point of consideration for PSB 
justification.  
The government’s 1994 white paper (DNH, 1994) continues the narrative 
of technological change and increased choice but adopts a clearer position on the 
BBC’s future role, informed by consultation findings. The consultation showed wide 
(public and stakeholder) agreement that the BBC should continue as a main PSB that 
provides a wide range of programmes with popular and niche appeal, which was 
endorsed by the government (ibid., pp. 6, 10).  
The programme policies set out in ‘Extending Choice’ – improving 
programme quality, broader choice and diversity, a clear and distinctive role – are 
viewed by government to be “broadly on the right lines, although the BBC should 
continue to adjust them to take account of its audiences’ needs and their reactions to 
programmes and of changing circumstance” (ibid., p. 10). The BBC should continue 
to inform, entertain, and educate, reflect the UK’s national identity, broadcast events 
of national importance, enrich cultural heritage, support the arts and high-quality 
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outputs, editorial independence, universal access and long-term investment in UK 
broadcasting, value for money and accountability (ibid., pp. 5-7, 14-15). The 
government (and the consultation) supports the licence fee and the expansion of its 
commercial activities overseas (ibid., pp. 29, 31, 2, 9, 21). No reduction in the 
number of BBC radio and TV services was planned (ibid., pp. 1, 10). 
The BBC’s 1996 document ‘Extending Choice’ (BBC, 1996), published 
after its Charter renewal, shows a confident and reinforced BBC that points to the 
widespread support for its dynamic digital future and purposes (set out in Extending 
Choice and later endorsed in the white paper) to increase choice by providing 
distinctive high-quality programmes of popular and specialist appeal that might be at 
risk in a commercial market (ibid., pp. 44-47). 
While the BBC has been confirmed in its role as the UK’s main PSB and 
has been given the mandate to pursue digital opportunities and expand (ibid., pp. 3, 
5-7, 28, 62), it reiterates the debate of service expansion vs. reduction in the context 
of risks in the transition from analogue to digital technologies. It states that while the 
digital age promises much more choice – uncertain consumption patterns, industry 
revenues, digital costs and risks of new monopolies forming at a number of stages in 
the value chain can impact competition, consumer benefit and slow down digital 
take-up (ibid., pp. 4, 17, 19, 22-23, 25-27). The BBC argues that these uncertainties 
in the transition to digital create an “even greater need” for PSB in the digital world 
(ibid., pp. 44, 45) to balance private and commercial provision and ensure greater 
choice and improved quality.  
While it is also stated that “extending choice was a vision of the BBC’s 
role in a more competitive, more commercial but still analogue market” and that the 
digital age will see further significant increases in commercial competition which 
makes it important to question whether the arguments for the BBC public purposes 
will remain robust in the digital age (ibid., p. 44), the BBC at this point is also 
convinced that the argument for a publicly funded BBC set out in extending choice 
will still apply and that it will continue to be a vital part of a balanced broadcasting 
marketplace (ibid., p. 69). 
The narrative in these documents shows a clear link between the 
technological change from analogue to digital, its impact on markets and the role of 
PSB in relation to that. While PSB is discussed with regard to both economic and 
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non-economic rationales, the overall discussion regarding its scope is directly related 
to the market. In later years of the 1990s, during which the BBC is clearly supported 
in its remit, the corporation still engages in the narrative of PSB becoming even more 
important due to the uncertainty of digital take-up and new potential risks of market 
failures. During the transitioning period, these arguments were used for PSB 
justification. While the market failure notion is not frequently cited, the discussion 
shows that technological change and corresponding market impacts are related to the 
discussion of PSB scale and scope. This can be viewed as a threat and reason to 
redefine the role of digital PSB, for which technological determinism in the form of 
spectrum scarcity no longer applies. 
 
9.1.2 Nodal Point: The 2003 Communications Act 
The next nodal point is the 2003 Communications Act. The Act continues 
to support large-scale PSB intervention and provides a PSB remit definition (clause 
264(4)). The Act is further of interest as it formulates the remit of the new 
communications regulator Ofcom, according to which Ofcom has to further the 
interests of citizens and consumers (clause 3(1)). The inclusion of the citizen notion 
seems to stand in contrast to the discourse of the previous two decades, which 
focused on consumer choice and market efficiency.  
The implied equal hierarchy of consumer and citizen interests could be 
interpreted as an indication that the citizen notion has been incorporated more 
prominently into the discourse and the wider objectives in media and 
communications regulation (chapter 5.3). 
A general consensus existed among interviewees that the inclusion of the 
notion resulted from concerns that wider societal considerations might be 
underrepresented in the new regulator Ofcom, as it merged five until then separate 
regulators of which the majority were concerned with consumer regulation.  
There was further consensus among interviewees that the inclusion of the 
citizen notion was viewed as a manifestation of something that has always been there 
in the sense that something implicit had been made explicit. A former employee of 
the ITC said that “the ITC never used the phrase consumer and citizen but most of its 
public service regulation was citizen-focused.”  
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Several interviewees, of whom some had been involved directly in these 
developments, further emphasised that a high degree of controversy surrounded the 
introduction of the citizen notion. Resistance to the term’s inclusion persisted due to 
legal challenges related to its meaning in immigration policy, its generally contested 
nature of being interpreted differently by different people, and concerns that the 
regulator’s responsibility for two conflicting duties would require value judgements, 
which would give the regulator too much leeway to make political decisions. 
The introduction of the citizen notion resulted from the passage of the Bill 
(chapter 5.3) through the House of Lords for pre-legislative scrutiny and lobbying 
efforts by the joint select committee of the two houses, chaired by Lord Puttnam, 
who – according to a senior civil servant involved in the development – coined the 
citizen phrase almost as a catch phrase that caught on in the House of Lords: “That is 
how we ended up with citizen in the Bill, and at that point the word citizen did really 
enter the vocabulary of broadcasting in the UK”. The majority of interviewees shared 
the view that the inclusion of the citizen interest into Ofcom’s remit was a point 
where the citizen notion entered the discourse. A senior DCMS official commented 
that “the notion of citizens and consumers became part of the vocabulary in the 
Communications Act” as a differentiation raised by Ofcom’s duty, which was quite 
helpful in a way but that there may also “be an issue that a lot of people actually 
don’t understand the distinction.”  
According to interview data, the inclusion of the citizen notion into 
Ofcom’s remit resulted from efforts of a small lobbying group rather than a wider 
shift to emphasise societal citizen objectives. Other interviewees stated that it was 
“only about semantics.” Independent of these reasons or intentions, it can be argued 
that the citizen notion became more prominent in discourse, if only due to the 
contestation and debate surrounding its introduction. 
 
9.1.3 Parallel development: Assessment of Wider Societal Benefits  
Parallel to the passing of the 2003 Communications Act, a further 
development took place in the regulatory context which concerned wider societal 
citizen values, in particular their assessment.  
With a shift from analogue to digital broadcasting, questions had begun to 
arise in regard to programming obligations of commercial PSBs such as ITV. The 
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ITC carried out research on the costs and benefits of PSB obligations on ITV1, in 
which a CBA was applied to assess the benefits foregone if ITV ceased its PSB 
obligations (Foster et al. 2004, pp. 6, 12; Ofcom, 2004c, p. 23). The objective “was 
to calculate, for the first time, detailed estimates of the opportunity costs incurred by 
ITV as a consequence of its PSB programming obligations, along with an assessment 
of the benefits of these programming obligations enjoyed by UK audiences in their 
capacity both as consumers and as citizens” (Foster et al., 2004, p. 12). 
Some interviewees who were involved in this study traced the development 
of assessing non-economic values in the context of media regulation back to this 
point. The study was developed further in a paper called ‘Measuring Public Service 
Broadcasting’ (Foster et al., 2004), which was included in a publication of the think 
tank IPPR and later reproduced by Ofcom in its first PSTB review. The paper “set 
out an approach to defining PSB, in terms of objectives and necessary interventions; 
to measure its delivery; and (more tentatively) to assess the value produced within a 
cost-benefit framework” (Foster et al., 2004, p. 24).  
A former ITC employee remembers that in the last year or two of the ITC 
in the run-up to Ofcom, the “impetus” for public value was there while the phrase 
was used only several years later. There was recognition that Ofcom was going to be 
“much more of an evidence-based regulator” and ITV was questioning its licence 
obligations in the digital age, which lead to the ITC considering the equation of the 
costs and benefits of ITV’s licence obligations. The benefits were for the first time 
assessed in the form of “quite simplistic audience research” that looked at the 
qualitative value people attached to different genres. “It was more information than 
the ITC has ever had in the past. And obviously, Ofcom over the following years 
developed the research side of this further.” 
Another policy insider, who was close to this development, sees a direct 
connection between the ITC study and the public value development with regard to 
measuring costs and benefits of ITV’s public service obligations as a “precursor to 
public value” and the need to measure PSB performance in the light of the up-
coming evidence-based regulator Ofcom.  
Several interviewees also referred to a more general trend in the early 
2000s regarding audience research such as WTP studies at the ITC, BBC and Ofcom, 
which assessed audience valuations of services in quantitative and monetary terms 
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(e.g. Barwise, 2006; Fauth et al., 2006; Ofcom, 2004c, p. 47; Mori, 2004; BBC, 
2004b). In this context, another former ITC employee speaks of a “move to take it to 
the next stage”. 
At the same time, the shift to digital made it more apparent that a clearer 
understanding was needed of the role of PSB in the digital age. In 1999, the Davies 
report had with a now famous quote stated that even though they could not offer a 
tight new definition of PSB, “we nevertheless each felt that we knew it when we saw 
it” (1999, p. 10). Similarly unspecific was the ITC’s definition of PSB as “all things 
to all people at least some of the time”, which was qualified by PSB being marked 
“with a strong emphasis on extending public knowledge, tastes and interests. It is the 
essence of social inclusion” (ITC, 2000, para. A3 citied from Cave et al., 2004, p. 
261). The PSB remits defined in the 2003 Communications Act were a next step in 
this development. A senior civil servant commented that the early thinking was pre-
Ofcom at the ITC, when it was recognised that the PSB framework was very loose, 
undefined and unquantified. 
 
 
9.2 Phase Two – The Institutionalisation of Public Value at the 
 BBC  
 
9.2.1 Motivational Aspects: Adoption of the Public Value Notion at the BBC 
 in 2004 
As described above, in the time running up to the 2003 Communications 
Act, a regulatory context was set in which wider societal considerations were 
emphasised more explicitly in the discourse, albeit only facilitated by a small 
minority. At the same time, wider societal objectives were also addressed more 
closely in regulatory analysis and measurement processes. The advent of Ofcom 
further led to the anticipation that an increased level of measurement and assessment 
procedures were going to be expected from the new sector regulator. Questions were 
also raised regarding the definition of PSB in a digital world and its relationship to 
the commercial sector. 
Interviewees close to the development of the public value idea inside the 
BBC cited similar reasons for the organisation’s adoption of the concept. A set of 
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different contextual aspects and themes emerged from the interviews which are 
presented below. Unless stated otherwise, information on developments inside the 
BBC, and later C4, are taken from accounts of interviewees who participated directly 
in these processes in the respective organisation.  
Internal preparations for Charter review, which commenced in December 
2003 (DCMS, 2003), had begun in 2002 in terms of thinking about a framework for 
positioning the corporation for Charter review. Different factors influenced the 
BBC’s Charter review strategy and adoption of the public value notion.  
The most prominent theme and external challenge were competition 
concerns of the commercial sector with regard to the scope and scale of the BBC due 
to the perception that its popular success was growing and crowding out the market: 
 “The origins of the idea of public value, I think it is hard to kind of weight these 
but there were probably two or three things going on. There was the sense that there was a 
lot of industry hostility to the BBC as being seen as unduly competitive and unduly 
aggressive. If you like, the problem the BBC was facing in 2002, 2003 was a nice problem 
for PSBs to have, which was that people saw it as being too successful in terms of audiences. 
[...] Under Greg Dyke, Director-General from 2000, the BBC had this new licence fee 
settlement, ITV was doing badly. The BBC was doing well. Its role in the market was more 
contentious. There was a sense that the BBC was succeeding with the audience in consumer 
terms but there was also debate going on about dumbing down and the suggestion the BBC 
was succeeding because the programmes weren’t good enough or too populist. [...] The BBC 
itself at that time I think would have resisted this suggestion but clearly that was one thing.”  
Wider technological and market changes in regard to multiplatform 
provision raised the question of the scope of the BBC in terms of its eligibility to 
expand into new digital services, which led to a wider questioning of the remit and 
the need to adapt the definition of PSB.  
A DCMS official at that time remembered that the Charter defined the 
BBC as a list of services it delivered and that quite early on the view existed that one 
needed to move away from that in a more fluid multiplatform world.  
“It sort of developed the debate and discussion that had gone on during the 
Communications Act, which had been passed just before as well, where there had been for 
the first time discussions about what is PSB for, how do you define it? There was an attempt 
in the Communications Act to write a definition but it wasn’t a public value based one. It 
was very much a genre based one. That was the first time that had been done. Trying to get a 
definition of PSB was then Ofcom doing in their PSB review and in discussion with the 
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department as well, starting to try to understand how do we define purposes and values that 
PSB delivers?”  
The need for a clearer remit definition had already been raised at the end of 
the 1990s by the European Commission in the context of a State Aid assessment. In 
‘Extending Choice in the Digital Age’, the BBC (1996) published its plan to 
introduce new digital services. This was supported by the licence fee settlement of 
the same year, which increased under the Conservative government. The proposed 
channel BBC News 24 was approved in 1997 by Secretary of State Chris Smith and 
launched later that year. The other two proposed services BBC Choice and BBC 
Knowledge followed in 1998 and 1999. 
In 1997, BSkyB filed a complaint with the European Commission against 
the UK and the BBC regarding the launch of BBC News 24, claiming it infringed 
articles (81, 82, 86, 87-88) of the EC Treaty (European Commission, 1999, p. 1). The 
Commission however concluded that no articles were breached (ibid.). 
While the launch and public licence fee funding of News 24, authorised by 
the Secretary of State (ibid., p. 3), represented State Aid (within meaning of article 
87(1) as funded by state resources), the Commission concluded that it allowed the 
provision of a ‘service of general economic interest’ which does not distort or 
threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or affect trade 
between Member States to an extent disproportionate to the common interest 
(compatible with the common market under the provisions of Articles 87(2), (3), 
86(2) European Commission, 1999, pp. 4, 6, 18).  
In its assessment, the Commission noted “that the legislative and 
administrative framework defining the public service mission and entrusting it to the 
BBC leaves some room for doubt as to what is defined as a public service and what 
is not” (ibid., p. 12). A clearer arrangement between the BBC and the UK 
government and a more straightforward definition of the remit would have facilitated 
the Commission's task of monitoring compliance with the conditions of Article 86(2) 
(ibid., p. 13). 
The European Commission’s proportionality approach tolerates a certain 
effect on trade and its development for a service of general economic interest if it 
does not distort competition to an extent that would be contrary to the common 
interest (European Commission, 1999, pp. 15-17).  
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The Commission’s approach towards media and public service 
broadcasting is primarily an economic one focused on competition and opening of 
markets (Schmidt & Radaelli 2004, p. 186). Under the EU treaty, PSB is regarded as 
a service in the general economic interests which the Commission approaches from 
the perspective of competition policy and State Aid regulation. Efforts of the 
Commission in the 1990s to confine analogue PSB to niche provision continued for 
digital broadcasting until 2006, when Commissioner Reding stated that PSB should 
be able to benefit from digital technologies – however in the confines of a PVT, as 
included in the Communication on State Aid for PSB in 2009 (Jakubowicz, 2011, pp. 
221- 222; European Commission, 2009).  
The State Aid assessment of the 1990s had thus pointed to the need to 
define a clear remit of PSB, which was particularly related to increasing concerns of 
commercial providers that the BBC was expanding into their territory, not in line 
with its public service obligations. In part, these developments influenced the 
adoption of guidelines for service approvals by the Secretary of State Chris Smith at 
the end of the 1990s.  
At the same time, the BBC feared that it was going to shrink and to 
become a smaller part of the whole market if it did not develop and expand into new 
digital media. In a more complicated world with increasing market provision, it was 
however becoming more difficult to justify large and expanded public service 
intervention. For Charter review it was thus considered necessary to find a concept 
and narrative, or as several interviewees described it a “philosophy of public service 
broadcasting”. According to several interviewees, the concern was not only the 
traditional scale of universal service provision but also the ability to develop and 
expand, rather than about “the right to get smaller”.  
Inside the BBC, a search for a framework began which was accompanied 
by a strong perception that a concept was needed which “chimed with the climate at 
that time”. The climate was influenced by upcoming Ofcom as an economic 
regulator coupled with a “strong Treasury orthodoxy which is very much about 
classic market failure, even among the doves, never mind the hawks in the 
Treasury”.  
This created the challenge for the BBC to justify its historical scope and 
digital expansion at a time when diminishing market failures indicated a reduction in 
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scope. According to several interviewees, there was a need to change the debate due 
to the way discourse was moving in regard to market failure: 
“We were charged with building not just a case for Charter renewal but trying to 
think hard what a bottom-up case for the institution could look like at a time when there was 
a very, actually a very market-orientated view of what the broadcasting landscape should 
look like. [...] There was a sense that, left to its own devices, the debate around the BBC 
would be wholly market-focused and would as a default position focus public discussion 
around the BBC’s role closer and closer to pure market failure concepts, which can be a 
complex and nuanced idea but none the less, at its simplest, could lead to a retreat by the 
BBC to merely an organisations that fills the gaps in a dynamic market, however you define 
that. And we, at an instinctive and theoretical level, felt that that wasn’t, didn’t speak 
accurately to what we felt the consensus around the organisation should be. In other words, 
historically that is not what the BBC has been. It does not seem an accurate reflection of the 
purposes or motivation or constitution of what it is. And so there was an active interest in 
finding a way to set the groundwork for the debate on slightly different terms. Because we 
felt that was the right thing to do. We genuinely felt there was a missing concept or a missing 
set of concepts in the debate. And at the time, the chair of BBC was an economist. Gavyn 
Davies thinks deeply about markets but also has a very intuitive sense of public service. 
Gavyn was actually quite influential.”  
Some of the BBC-interviewees felt that the decrease in market failures was 
a problem in terms of justifying the scope and scale whereas others stated that they 
believed that there wasn’t much difference between social value and market failure 
justifications as everything could also be summed up under the externality rationale. 
Despite these different views on how much impact market failure reduction had on 
the ability to justify multiplatform intervention, there was nevertheless consensus 
among BBC-interviewees that a new concept was needed to shift the focus away 
from market failure:  
 “What I think happened is that throughout the 1980s and 1990s market failure 
economics was all you needed in broadcasting. Because actually, as I said [on spectrum 
scarcity], the constraints to what PSB could do were confined. It wasn’t a controversial 
area. The controversy that there was, was far more about generically the scale of the BBC, 
efficiency, political bias, and if you look at the controversy, it wasn’t fundamentally about 
damage to the commercial sector. So the lobby groups against the BBC weren’t, were 
political, they were to do with values. They weren’t great big other commercial 
organisations like Sky, Virgin, newspaper groups and so on. Market failure economics was 
kind of ok. It kind of lived up to the job but the threats of it weren’t that great. Now you head 
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into this decade or the middle of last decade and suddenly the world completely changes. 
Huge legitimacy threats to the BBC because they were really starting to encroach through 
the internet, through lots of other business, able to branch out into digital television, 
threaten other businesses. Everyone reached for market failure economics as they had 
always done before and it wasn’t strong enough. That is what I think. It wasn’t inspiring 
enough, it wasn’t measurable enough, it didn’t fit the political messages well enough and 
they needed to invent something else.”  
Several BBC and non-BBC interviewees pointed out that market failure 
wasn’t an easy topic inside the corporation. The ultimate fear was a reduction in 
scope along the lines of PBS in the US, which a senior civil servant described as “the 
great spectre that haunts BBC”. It is hence not surprising that several, both BBC and 
non-BBC, interviewees said that the corporation had never quite accepted market 
failure justifications due to their limiting character through which the BBC saw itself 
shut out of producing popular programmes. In the previous Charter review, the BBC 
had however conceded to speaking the language of market failure and consumer 
choice in publications such as ‘Extending choice’ (BBC, 1992), ‘People and 
programmes: BBC radio and television for an age of choice’ (BBC, 1995), and 
‘Extending choice in the digital age’ (BBC, 1996). An interviewee who worked at 
the BBC in the 1990s remembered and explained the shift as follows:  
“It probably is a case of reacting to the prevailing political philosophy, at least as 
far as the BBC is concerned, which goes back to what I was saying about ‘Extending 
Choice’. The decision there was to restate the BBC purposes in the sort of economic terms 
and to focus on market failure as a way of demonstrating that the BBC was quite legitimately 
addressing some real concerns. What I guess happened was that, bubbling away under the 
surface, there had always been those who felt that was the wrong approach to take and after 
a time these things sort of break through. I don’t think there was any particular reason for it 
other than perhaps a worry at the BBC that as markets developed, became more competitive, 
that there was more consumer choices, it was becoming important to state something beyond 
market failure as being an important rationale. So that might have triggered the change.”  
In the search for a new philosophy of PSB, a framework and a language 
was needed which provided “a new way of thinking about the role of public 
services”. It was clear that “any new rationale for the BBC or new approach needed 
to deal with the advent of new platforms, needed to be connected with some kind of 
measurement system that was relatively simple”.  
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The public value idea came to the BBC in 2002 after someone who worked 
on the Charter review had been given a Cabinet Office paper on public value (Kelly 
et al., 2002). Several BBC-interviewees described the paper as the primary source 
and stimulus for thinking on public value as it created awareness and discussion 
around the notion as an interesting and potentially useful idea. Public value theory in 
itself was however described as not of much relevance.  
After the potential of the idea had been realised, it was “worked”, 
“moulded”, and “pushed quite a long way from what the Cabinet Office paper was 
saying”. The thinking centred on the question “how could this change the debate?” 
BBC-interviewees consistently said that the notion was very quickly taken on board 
as an idea which the BBC would make its own to address a particular set of 
questions.  
The concept was described as being particularly appealing and useful due 
to its focus on value creation “[...] one of the biggest use was trying to describe the 
value the BBC created and trying to define it in a way that it could be fairly 
objectively assessed what the BBC contributed.” The notion’s potential as an 
umbrella term was also pointed out: 
“In a world, in which PSB has to be clear about its value, finding a way of 
engaging with ideas of value becomes quite important and public value allowed us to do 
that. It also had the wonderful advantage, this is my reading of the Cabinet Office paper, 
that public value is something, which isn’t defined but which one can define and to which 
one can ascribe various components of value. If you are the BBC, this is quite useful to have 
a portmanteau which one can fill with the elements which you view appropriate to fill it with. 
As a piece of language and a pretty empty concept, which nonetheless tied back to our ideas 
about the ways that audiences think about the BBC and the intervention that is the BBC, it 
was a pretty helpful basket and not particularly defined, which was the reason for the 
attraction, of the concept.” 
The notion was viewed as more encompassing than alternative concepts 
that had been considered for Charter review, such as social capital (Brookes, 2004), 
which was later integrated into the public value idea. A DCMS official at the time of 
Charter review commented that in an environment, in which the question is whether 
it is legitimate for the BBC to be in an area where the market is, “they needed to 
make an argument what value they are adding, why we need public intervention in 
that area.”  
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The focus on value creation provided the opportunity to draw the 
comparison between commercial and public value creation, which not only allowed 
describing the BBC’s distinctiveness from the commercial sector but also evoking 
the appearance of measurability and thinking about value in comparative quantitative 
terms. The thought of considering not only the level of public value creation but also 
the impact public value creation can have on commercial value creation, i.e. the 
impact on the market, was relevant early on in the thinking:  
“And out of that came a very simple, almost in one afternoon, policy therefore to 
optimise public value generation and commercial value generation and it is, not that one 
cancels out the other, that you should be able to achieve a sweet spot of balance whereby 
you have liberated entrepreneurialism, commercial growth in the market but also sustained 
growth in public value creation. The idea of optimising became clearer for the overall 
debate. We were also clear very quickly that good commercial PSB and broadcasting 
contributed to public value but we also identified a very unique role for BBC, perhaps C4 as 
well, it would be the only organisation whose only mission is to optimise or maximise public 
value. That is what BBC is distinctive about, an institution entirely focused on maximising 
public value. [...] So in a very quick space of time, we realised this is an important idea. It 
was a debate about how much we wanted to focus the whole debate around it at that time. 
We know it was an important, valuable concept. We realised that public value would, we had 
some fairly rapid thought about it, that it would take many forms, different kinds of 
intervention, deliver different kinds of public value. We therefore needed to say what kinds of 
value are the kinds of value that the BBC could characteristically build, and that was what 
then began to fold back to the purposes, in other words, cultural, education, democratic, 
citizen, social. That is where the debate about social capital came in, as part of the public 
value offer [...].”  
Public purposes had emerged inside the BBC in 2002. A little later, 
research was conducted on how the purposes for the BBC had been expressed 
historically in the form of missions and statements of intents in Charter reviews and 
strategy documents. The task had been “to try and get a better, clearer, more durable 
language of purposes and a framework for thinking about purposes. That was the job. 
I can’t remember the exact sequence but we were in a frame of mind to try and find 
an active expression of the BBC’s role that went beyond simply correcting the 
market [...].” According to another BBC-interviewee, the objective had been to break 
the BBC’s role down and to develop a more coherent articulation in the Charter, 
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moving away from a set list of services to public purposes, which surfaced in 2002 
and were then linked into public value. 
The purposes were meant to be a clearer articulation of the BBC’s role at a 
platform-agnostic level. One interviewee, who was at the DCMS during Charter 
review, stated that there were discussions from the beginning around the need  
“to be able to put a definition around what the BBC is there for. Quite early on, 
certainly from our, government’s view there was the need to set broad public purposes for 
the BBC. From there comes also the sense, as I said, debate about the BBC’s impact on the 
market, and the sense from the BBC that we need to justify in terms of what we do the value 
of what we deliver to the public.”  
Public value functioned as a term to which the purposes could be linked by 
defining five value types. As interviewees commented, the first three, reflected the 
Reithian objectives to inform, educate, and entertain, implying that the purposes have 
not changed very much but that they had allowed for a more descriptive remit. 
“Basically, what the BBC did, to be perfectly honest, is that it said what do we do 
and how can we reflect that in a set of purposes? So, effectively, the public purposes 
reflected what the BBC did. So they did not put too much constraint around the BBC. [...] 
And critics will say that you can justify virtually anything the BBC does in terms of the 
purposes.”  
A new aspect of the purposes, emphasised by interviewees, was their 
definition as outcomes, which reflects a shift away from previous service-based 
definitions. As pointed out by several interviewees, the focus on outcomes chimed 
with the government of the day and was very much the consequence of a “political 
context where you get a government that is more interested in public services 
showing they make a difference.” Another interviewee commented that at the time, 
the debate about public service, which the Cabinet Office paper had started to open 
up, was around “how do you stop measuring inputs, outputs and start measuring 
outcomes.” In the past, when the BBC was asked to justify a BBC service, “the 
instinctive reaction to people in BBC News would be to say ‘We have more 
correspondents than anybody else’. It is inputs and outputs and public value is about 
outcomes.”  
Outcome-based purposes represent a focus on wider societal or citizen 
objectives. A further aspect which has been stressed in interviews as important for 
the BBC was to address the distinction between individuals as citizens and 
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consumers. With the market often being the starting point in government for 
considerations of intervention, the BBC argued that it “goes a long way beyond the 
market failure argument. We were looking at what does it mean to do more than 
market failure. We looked at the concept of value to individuals and then value to the 
society.”  
The distinction between citizens and consumers was also made because the 
need was felt to engage with the language of the 2003 Communications Act. One 
interviewee even suggested that the BBC would probably not have made the 
distinction had it not been for the Act with its centrality of the citizen and the 
consumer. On this topic, another interviewee said:  
 “There was another thing that, there was the Communications Act and the 
debate around the Communications Act which was saying: What is the purpose of future 
media developments in Britain? What is the regulatory structure? And there was generally a 
debate about giving more emphasis to the competitiveness in the economy I guess in the 
Communications Act. Then there was also the debate about citizens. So I think that is the 
context. The BBC is saying how do we set the agenda for the next Charter review? What is 
our purpose? Inform, educate, and entertain. Well, that is ok up to a point but it does not 
help decide what the BBC should really focus on, what it should not focus on and it didn’t 
deal particularly with the competitive issues. So there was a sense in which when people 
were reading the Gavin Kelly paper and thinking this was a new and interesting way in 
thinking about public services and how you think about the dual role of public services, their 
role in delivering to consumers and their role in contributing to society more broadly. [...] It 
wasn’t one vs. the other. It was rather that public value offered a new framework within 
which the BBC could think about what it was delivering to society, citizen, as well as to what 
it was delivering to audiences.”  
The shift from thinking about audiences to citizens and consumers was 
also emphasised by another BBC-interviewee, who said that “the language of the 
Communications green paper left us recognising that we needed to try and sort of 
find the right terminology for our audience and what we felt what we gave to them 
and what their stake was, and citizen is where we landed.” The view was taken that 
the BBC had to serve audiences as consumers, “if you don’t, they don’t watch”, and 
the idea was rejected that “consumers are just for commercial products or 
commercial broadcasters.” Even though public value allowed integrating citizen and 
consumer value, BBC-interviewees said that it was important to engage in particular 
with the citizen notion as 
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“[...] consumer value, certainly in the terms used, it was emerging around the 
Communications Act, was very much about commercial broadcasters and therefore to an 
extent slightly uncomfortable in particular at a time when there are concerns about the 
negative market impact of the BBC to say actually we not only deliver citizen value but also 
consumer value. So having a public value idea which can successfully incorporate the two 
into a single equation is a better frame than trying to simply add them up outside that. So to 
some extent that sounds like a silly marketing or PR exercise, to an extent it was. The 
engagement with the Communications Act is a political game and we were quite keen to find 
a way to speak the language that the others were speaking in a way that we felt meaningful.”  
The notion thus not only allowed integrating the citizen and consumer 
notions, it was “not just an integration, it is also prioritising the citizen over the 
consumer”. The purposes were “written to express primarily citizen value but related 
back to consumer value as well. So it is primarily about the citizen value that we 
bring and you get to that through the consumer value. It is almost a by-product of the 
consumer value”. One interviewee described the citizen notion as “the new bit”. This 
makes sense when considering that the discourse of the BBC in the 1990s focused 
very much on the extension of consumer choice. The outcome focus of the purposes 
can be seen as a way to reflect this prioritisation of the citizen over the consumer. A 
BBC-interviewee said that  
“the first insight that we had was that as a PSB, it was our job to serve [viewers 
and listeners] as citizens and the market was there to serve them as consumers. [...] We 
decided that our primary purpose was to serve viewers and listeners as citizens rather than 
as consumers, now obviously we still serve them as consumers and we want them to consume 
us, but that our services certainly taken as a whole had to be delivering something beyond 
what the market would straightforwardly deliver so we called that public value, essentially.” 
The next step in the development of the public value idea was the public 
value test (PVT). As briefly addressed above, early on in the process the view was 
formed that a Charter review framework needed to address the BBC’s impact on the 
commercial sector. It was widely agreed among BBC-interviewees that the PVT was 
a central element, “a cornerstone”, in the Charter review process to demonstrate to 
the commercial sector that the “BBC was mindful of its impact”. 
The impact notion and the possibility to distinguish between commercial 
and public value and trade-offs between them had been central to the development of 
the public value idea. As several interviewees emphasised, the biggest debate at that 
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time was the perceived BBC dominance, its crowding out of new markets and 
commercial competitors.  
The introduction of the first phase of the BBC’s digital services and the 
ensuing complaint at the European Commission by BSkyB about BBC News 24 had 
contributed to the development of approval guidelines by Secretary of State Chris 
Smith at the end of the 1990s. Approval processes were however conducted in a 
rather unstandardised and often protracted manner, which became apparent in 
approvals of the second phase of BBC digital services, in particular BBC3. 
The favourable licences fee settlement of 2000 (an increase of RPI+1.5% 
p.a. until 2006), supported the development of the BBC’s digital portfolio by 
endorsing the corporation’s second round of digital service proposals made in 
January 2001, which would replace BBC Choice and BBC Knowledge with BBC3, 
BBC4, CBBC and CBeebies and introduce five new digital radio services (1Xtra, 
BBC6 Music, BBC7, BBC Asian Network and Five Live Sports Extra).  
The BBC’s proposal, seeking the Secretary of State’s approval, highlighted 
the services’ distinctiveness, quality, their role in driving digital take-up, their public 
value appeal in the form of reach, value for money, and increased investment in the 
UK production sector. The BBC Governors had further assessed the proposals 
against the requirements of the Charter and the criteria published in the annual report 
that justify licence fee funding, such as upheld editorial values, contribution to 
BBC’s public objectives, demonstration of public value or appeal to licence fee 
payers, as well as free and universally access. The proposals also stated that the 
BBC’s role was to serve everyone and not only high-level audiences as a result of its 
licence fee funding (BBC, n.a. 1, n.a. 2, pp. 1-2, 5, 7).  
These service proposals show that a certain set of criteria existed that 
needed to be satisfied in order to justify service provision and public funding. As 
shown later in this chapter, several of these criteria became part of the BBC’s PVT. 
In 2001, Smith’s successor Tessa Jowell approved all new services but 
BBC3, which followed in 2002 after the Governors had submitted a revised proposal. 
In the case of BBC3, frustration had built up inside the corporation about a 
protracted and difficult approval process which lasted for years and was controversial 
due to strong opposition from the commercial sector. The BBC’s concerns addressed 
the lack of clarity of the approvals process inside the DCMS and what the BBC 
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needed to do to get a service passed, the varying length of the process, and the 
Secretary of State’s possible interference into programming and editorial decisions. 
The public service approval guidelines published at the end of the 1990s by 
the DNH were described by one interviewee as a “precursor” of and “first attempt” at 
the PVT, as the process was more transparent than anything before while it also “lead 
to quite a lot of rather arbitrary trade-offs”: 
“[...] the policy process was heading in this direction, but it wasn’t very 
structured. There wasn’t much of a clear rationale for it. And essentially what you see with 
the PVT or the notion of public value is you see the BBC saying we accept the direction of 
travel of the policy debate, but we would propose that we take on doing more of this 
ourselves and fit this as a framework within which one might think of the whole range of 
things the BBC does. So it doesn’t come from nowhere. I am saying you have got an 
intellectual approach in terms of the notion of public value and you have got a kind of 
political and regulatory approach in terms of trading-off market impact versus public 
service credentials. All of that is of course swilling around in the time from 2000 to 2003.”  
While the approvals process required the consideration of adverse market 
impacts and public consultations (see also Cave et al., 2004, p. 262), it had not been 
fully set or formalised, as pointed out by a DCMS official and several other 
interviewees. Further, limitations regarding professional skills and expertise inside 
the DCMS frequently created the need to commission research in particular from the 
ITC, as a former ITC employee remembered:  
“In my role at the ITC we were sometimes asked, or probably always asked by 
DCMS to provide some analysis which would allow the Secretary of State to reach a view. 
And of course you can, when you haven’t got a framework to apply, there was no framework, 
we had to start thinking about, what do we do, how do we think about it? So we wrote at the 
ITC a paper for DCMS on the BBC3 or one of the children’s digital channels that started to 
crystallise some of the things which the BBC then put into its PVT in looking at whether this 
would deliver something that the market wouldn’t otherwise deliver, whether it was central 
to the BBC’s public purposes, whether it would have a detrimental impact on commercial 
operators. All those sort of things which were floating around but hadn’t quite been 
articulated in any structured way. So if you look, you can probably find some of the 
assessments the Secretary of State made before the PVT, you see the sort of germ of the idea 
coming out of those.” 
The PVT can be viewed as a combination, formalisation, and structuring of 
separate existing and new elements into a standardised process. The test in itself was 
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developed inside the BBC in the context of the DCMS-commissioned Graf report on 
BBC online (Graf, 2004) published in July 2004, shortly after the BBC’s Charter 
review publication (2004a).  
The Graf review was one of four reviews of the BBC’s new digital 
services, launched by Tessa Jowell in 2002. All four reviews – the Lambert (2002) 
report of BBC News 24, the Graf (2004) report of BBC online, the Gardam (2004) 
report of the digital radio services, and the Barwise (2004b) report of the BBC’s 
digital TV services – followed a similar and by the Secretary of State requested 
pattern of assessing service performance against approval conditions in relation to 
impacts on commercial services.  
While this structure is least developed in the Lambert review, the last three 
reviews clearly display the assessment of proportionality in the form of positive 
benefits balanced against negative market impacts. This is related to the BBC’s 
internal development of the PVT, which was tested with the Graf report.  
The BBC’s Charter review team had been tasked to take the online review 
on after previous service approvals had been particularly difficult due to market 
impact concerns which arose again strongly for online services. Propositions which 
the BBC had made in a submission to the Graf report were later reflected in the 
report. The report focused on the potential market impact of the BBC’s online 
services. It recommended that new service approvals should be based on a 
comparison of the service’s costs and benefits (Graf, 2004, p. 14; Steemers, 2004, p. 
106), which was also later recommended by Ofcom in its PSTB review (2004c, p. 9).  
Graf further recommended that a precautionary approach should be 
adopted which means that if there is a “close call” between the public service 
benefits of a proposed service and the costs of that service, the proposal should not 
be taken forward (Graf, 2004, p. 14). The online review was described by one 
interviewee as the “test bed for seeding the way we were thinking about Charter 
review, partly because it kind of needed to be salvaged and structured and partly 
because it needed to be defended.” 
The Gardam (2004) and Barwise (2004b) reviews followed a similar 
assessment of positive benefits against negative market impacts. The Barwise report 
(2004b, pp. 55-56, 58, 63) adopted the public value notion to speak of positive 
citizen and consumer benefits and assessed public value as the extent to which a 
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service’s performance met its remit objectives/approval conditions (combined with 
direct consumer benefits, especially value for money, interactivity and digital take-
up). This was balanced against market impacts to see whether the BBC services 
provided net benefit, which would then function as a justification for service 
provision. The Barwise report was published after the BBC’s Charter review 
publication (2004a), which is one explanation for these direct terminological 
similarities to the PVT.  
Generally, it can be summarised that the reviews follow a similar pattern of 
assessing the services’ proportionality in terms of their performance against approval 
conditions (Lambert, 2002, pp. 3, 6, 9-15; Graf, 2004, pp. 17-29; Barwise, 2004b, p. 
4) balanced against their negative market impacts (Graf, 2004, pp. 41-63, 3-4; 
Gardam, 2004, p. 8; Barwise, 2004b, pp. 2-3).  
A central and recurring theme in the assessment of the performance against 
the approval conditions was the services’ distinctiveness and their often lacking clear 
remits, what complicated performance and market impact assessments and reduced 
the predictability of BBC services for commercial competitors (Gardam, 2004, pp. 6, 
96-97; Lambert, 2002, pp. 20-24, 2). 
Distinctiveness and remit definitions were also central to market impact 
assessments, which were described by reviewers as difficult and rather new 
assessments for which no agreed methodology existed (Gardam, 2004, pp. 102, 30). 
MIAs generally adopted an often qualitative and dynamic competition-based 
approach (commonly used in competition regulation) that addressed potential 
reductions in competitive pressures and commercial viability which drive innovation 
and investment (Gardam, 2004, pp. 33-35; Barwise, 2004b, pp. 63-64, 68-69, 80, 3). 
Further criteria considered in the reviews were value for money, digital take-up, and 
quality (Barwise, 2004b, pp. 7-8, 63; Lambert, 2002, p. 16), which are measures later 
found in the PVT. 
With regard to the scope of the BBC, several reviewers stated that the BBC 
should not be a niche service limited to providing market failure remedies but that it 
should instead compete with commercial services by providing different popular and 
distinctive programmes (Gardam, 2004, pp. 36, 39; Barwise, 2004b, pp. 19-20, 26). 
Based on this information it can be said that the development of the PVT 
very much resembles an evolutionary process, starting from the European 
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Commission’s State Aid and proportionality assessment (which however was not 
viewed as very influential by many interviewees), to the guidelines for service 
approvals of the Secretary of State and finally the internal development of the PVT at 
the BBC. Central to such assessments are the need for clear remit definitions and the 
standardisation of proportionality assessments in the form of the PVT. Most 
assessment measures later found in the PVT had been used before. The novelty of the 
PVT was however its standardisation and aggregation of these measures.  
Parallel to these developments, as one interviewee said, “there has been an 
ever continuing undercurrent of the need for accountability”, which reflected more 
general developments in the public sector. The Charter review correspondingly 
addressed the BBC’s accountability, regulation and the Governors’ role, which had 
further been emphasised through the Kelly Affair and Hutton report. This, however, 
as BBC-interviewees stressed, came later in the development and did not influence 
the early thinking on public value. 
The arrival of Ofcom, however, “undoubtedly created a new challenge”. It 
changed the dynamics and provided a central motivation for the development of the 
PVT. Ofcom would not only usher in a more evidence-based regulatory culture, it 
was also perceived as the first regulator with the scope and ability to take on the 
BBC’s regulation. The BBC’s objective was to keep the Governors, or something 
akin to it, to avoid regulatory oversight by Ofcom.  
The objective was to provide a standardised, rigorous, quantifiable 
framework to “offer up the quantifiable straw of PVT”. Early on, it had been clear 
that the notion would have to have a numerical component to it. This was however 
not without opposition inside the BBC. Some people noted with caution that this was 
a valuable idea which could create a narrative about value growth, expansion and 
scale but which might as well trigger a change in some of the institutional 
arrangements around the BBC. Some viewed this as creating obligations and 
difficulties which the BBC might not be able to fulfil, such as the contestable nature 
and assessment of outcomes. 
Since some “people felt it wasn’t quite right”, the concept was moved 
centre stage only towards the end of the internal development process, as a 
consequence of Hutton and the departure of Director-General Greg Dyke and 
Chairman Gavyn Davies. Several BBC-interviewees described that the Charter 
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review publication (BBC, 2004a) had been “toughened up” as earlier drafts had not 
had a similar focus on public value:  
“[...] there was a recognition, probably in the last six or nine months, that the 
mood at the time meant that the BBC needed to offer more than it had done in the past. 
‘Building Public Value’ couldn’t just be a thing about the wonders of the BBC. It also had to 
be a quite rigorous test for the BBC.”  
Other interviewees supposed that the development would have been 
different under Director-General Greg Dyke, who was supportive of the public value 
idea but interviewees suggested that he would not have wanted a PVT approach 
which he would have seen as too restrictive. He would instead have fallen out with 
the Governors and preferred an Ofcom relationship. The characteristics of both the 
public value notion and the PVT however fit well into the overall policy and 
regulatory environment. 
 
9.2.2  Parallel Development: Dissemination of the Public Value Notion and 
 Existing Procedures and Methods  
After the BBC’s publication of ‘Building Public Value’ (2004a), the notion 
was promoted more widely throughout the Charter review process. Supported by the 
BBC and other organisations, The Work Foundation (TWF) initiated a public value 
project which culminated in the development of a Public Service Performance 
Model. In its white paper, the government requested the BBC Trust to take TWF’s 
model into account as a basis for assessing public value (DCMS, 2006a, para. 
5.3.11). 
The BBC participated to share knowledge and to “look for ways to move it 
forward even further”, as a former TWF employee described it. TWF’s public value 
project in part facilitated the wider take-up of the public value notion in the public 
service and in particular the cultural policy discourse, which according to another 
interviewee “gave DCMS a convenient hook to say they weren’t just buying the 
BBC’s ideas about this”. In addition, the DCMS was itself rather welcoming of the 
public value idea as a senior DCMS official recalls:  
“Clearly, we did adopt the idea. It is one of these that had been around in various 
guises, the notion of trying to get a handle on broader public value, cultural creative 
activities and output delivery had been around a bit and had also been talked about in 
connection with arts policy.”  
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According to two other interviewees with knowledge of the matter, 
Secretary of State Tessa Jowell went to Warwick University on a sabbatical about 
public value in search for a framework to measure value, performance, and output for 
DCMS. Professor Benington of Warwick University had initially brought the concept 
from the US to the UK and later ran seminars that can be linked to the Cabinet Office 
paper (Kelly et al., 2002). The Secretary of State’s sabbatical resulted in a cultural 
value discourse and a DCMS pamphlet on the value of culture (Jowell, 2004). The 
cultural value notion was also picked-up by the Think Tanks IPPR (Kearns, 2004; 
Bend, 2004) and Demos (Hewison & Holden, 2004; Wilsdon et al., 2005; Holden, 
2004, 2006), of which the latter was linked to the sabbatical.  
One academic described public value as a “mobilising doctrine” which 
had, among the government institutions, been used most strongly by DCMS. He 
further commented that various mobilising doctrines had been used during the New 
Labour period, such as “creative economy” which increased the importance of media 
(see also Schlesinger, 2009, p. 11 et seq., 2007). It can thus be argued that these 
developments related to the wider dissemination of public value created and 
enhanced the acceptance and legitimacy of the concept.  
The public value notion did not only fit well with the political environment 
at that time, it did also reflect parallel developments in the regulatory context. Aside 
from the connection of the PVT to the DCMS’s approval process, a more general 
parallel can be established to wider “better regulation” developments which were 
initiated by the New Labour government. After coming into power in 1997, the 
Labour government made the terminological and philosophical switch from 
“deregulation” to “better regulation” with the set-up of a better regulation task force 
in 1997 and the publication of a set of principles of better regulation one year later 
(Baldwin, 2007, pp. 27-28). The regulatory impact assessment (RIA), as the core 
piece of this development, involves an assessment of the impact of policy options, 
covering the purposes, risks, benefits and costs of proposals (ibid., pp. 31-33). RIAs 
are a form of a quantitative ex-ante CBA. Intended to improve quality of decision-
making and regulation, RIAs have become best practice in UK and EU policy-
making (Prosser, 2006, pp. 364, 371). The HM Treasury Green Book (2003) also set 
out evaluation methods and standard valuations for outcomes which should be used 
to inform decision-making. Even though CBAs weren’t required by HM Treasury, 
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they were featured strongly in the Green Book and “pressure is felt across 
government and the evaluation community to employ ‘hard’ techniques that assign 
monetary values to policy outcomes” (Hills & Sullivan, 2006, p. 49).  
According to several BBC-interviewees, these developments were however 
not very influential aside from informing the development of MIAs. The general 
increase in public sector accountability requirements was however an overall theme 
for the BBC and C4. The principles of better regulation are for example taken into 
account in PVAs (BBC Trust, 2007a, p. 5).  
The PVT’s structure akin to a CBA evokes measurability of the value 
created. Even though the level of scepticism towards the public value notion 
remained fairly high at HM Treasury, a former Treasury official commented that 
there were special advisors who were very supportive of PSB and “who were very 
drawn to the idea that they could have some sort of way of proving and assessing this 
benefit”. On a more critical note, the interviewee stated also:  
“They [BBC] were trying to create a sort of wider economic legitimacy for 
interventions in the broadcasting markets and felt that we would be coming from a sort of 
CBA approach and what they wanted to do was create a CBA which sort of explained more 
of what they felt of the public good bit of it. I suppose they felt that the classic Treasury test 
of cost-benefit would underestimate the benefits because they were sort of wider spillovers. 
[...] In some ways I never really bought it because a decent CBA should take all these things 
on. And there is a sort of concept in the Green Book. The Green Book is a valuation tool that 
the Treasury has. It explains how you capture values, how you capture public value and 
concepts like the time theory of value. [...] From a principle basis, from an economic 
analysis basis, they weren’t doing anything particularly new by saying that you have to 
capture a thing called public value. What they were trying to do was to frame it in a different 
way than a classic CBA. In some way, what they are saying is this is how you price the 
benefits. And that is fine.” 
The drive towards measuring wider societal benefits was also reflected 
through a series of WTP studies which had been conducted during Charter review 
(Barwise, 2006 for BBC Governors; Fauth et al., 2006 TWF for DMCS; Ofcom, 
2004c; Mori, 2004). The BBC published an audience research based WTP study to 
measure the total value created for citizens and consumers, conducted by Human 
Capital Consultants (BBC, 2004b). One author of this study later stated that the 
valuation of public services was an area of growing interest and that the study was 
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the “first ever large-scale attempt to quantify the total value that the BBC is 
perceived to generate, not only as a service to individuals as consumers, but also to 
the population as a whole” (Terrington & Dollar, 2005, p. 60). Previous work on the 
BBC had tended to focus on its consumers rather than its total value (ibid., p. 61).  
 
9.2.3  Parallel Development: Ofcom’s 2004 Public Service Television 
 Broadcasting Review 
Interviewees consistently stated that evidence-based policy-making was 
something that had become increasingly important under the New Labour 
government, which manifested in particular in Ofcom as an evidence-based 
regulator. One interviewee commented that “under the Conservatives you hadn’t had 
this issue of evidence base”  
Shortly upon inception, Ofcom commenced its first PSTB review which 
ran from October 2003 to February 2005. Its phase one document was published in 
April 2004 (Ofcom, 2004a), shortly before the BBC’s (2004a) ‘Building Public 
Value’ publication in June. As parallel processes, the debates of the two reviews 
were interrelated. This becomes evident when considering Ofcom’s development of a 
new rationale and model of PSB over the course of the three review phases.  
In its phase one review, Ofcom outlined a new, sustainable future rationale 
for PSB (2004a, p. 70 et seq.; 2004b). Like the Davies report, Ofcom considered 
market failures as the starting point for intervention whereby Ofcom subsumed both 
citizen and consumer objectives under market failure rationales. Ofcom no longer 
viewed intervention as necessary to rectify consumer market failures (public good, 
monopoly, information asymmetries), as these were diminishing. Rather, a new 
rationale needed to be built, which was based on citizen rationales, as market failures 
such as externalities and merit goods still applied (Ofcom, 2004a, pp. 2, 71-74, 
2004b, 2004c, p. 108). In addition, equity arguments of free and universal access, 
plurality of supply and the potential of television to reach large numbers of people 
with great impact were listed as rationales (Ofcom, 2004a, pp. 75, 108-109, 2004b). 
Four rather broad outcome-based purposes were defined to reflect the enduring 
citizen market failures, accompanied by a set of six PSB programming characteristics 
(Ofcom, 2004a, pp. 9, 72-73, 2004c, pp. 109-110, 2005, pp. 7-8, 2004b). To account 
for the shift away from quota-based assessments to outcome-based purposes, a new 
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output-impact-value assessment framework was developed to measure public service 
delivery against purposes and characteristics (Ofcom, 2004a, pp. 4-7, 27 et seq., 
2004c, pp. 121). 
Aside from the ideological focus on market failure justification, Ofcom’s 
review shows similar characteristics to the BBC’s propositions made in ‘Building 
Public Value’ (2004a), in terms of the definition of outcome-based purposes and an 
output-impact-value assessment framework. Ofcom’s approach was in part a 
continuation of the ITC study of ITV’s PSB obligations, which informed the 
development of Ofcom’s measurement approach (Foster et al., 2004). Later, Ofcom 
itself pointed out that “there is a great deal of similarity between the BBC’s 
conceptual approach and the one we set out in our Phase 1 report where we 
distinguished between the value of PSB to consumers and its value to citizens. 
Ofcom, therefore, welcomes the BBC’s proposed use of the public value concept” 
(2005, p. 35). It further supported the approach put forward in the Graf review as 
well as the proposed PVT (Ofcom, 2004c, p. 9, 2005, p. 10).  
Ofcom hence took an economic, utilitarian approach towards PSB, 
expressed through the focus on market failure justification, the discussion of citizen 
objectives as residual market failures, the overall leitmotiv of ‘Competition for 
Quality’, as well as its reference to popular appeal as a rationale for PSB (Gibbons, 
2005, pp. 42-45; Helm, 2005, pp. 3-4; Prosser, 2006, pp. 367-368). Ofcom sees the 
BBC at the heart of PSB (2005, p. 9) and emphasises that “a publicly funded BBC 
needed to retain scale and viewer impact” (2004a, p. 3). As shown in chapter 7, this 
duality of reach and impact is featured strongly in the BBC’s PVAs.  
As three arguments for constant or higher real levels of PSB subsidy, 
Ofcom stated enduring citizenship benefits of PSB, public appreciation, and public 
desire to pay for PSB (2004c, pp. 40, 47-52). “This suggests that PSB is likely to 
have to deploy a creative approach which blends public purposes and popularity, that 
is serious in intent but accessible in style, and that finds new ways of leading 
audiences to interesting and challenging material” (Ofcom, 2004a, p. 10). PSB was 
defined as programming that is “both challenging and accessible, and which engages 
large numbers of viewers, rather than small minorities” (ibid., p. 75).  
The general view among interviewees was that the BBC’s Charter review 
document and Ofcom’s PSTB review were parallel processes where an exchange of 
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ideas had taken place in the wider debate. Some interviewees believed that it would 
be wrong to view this as the BBC reacting to Ofcom as it was rather a development 
coming from the BBC. On a more general note, one interviewee explained these 
parallel developments by reference to a “common sense” in the policy community: 
“Quite often, those things happen because the people are all part of those 
discussions and they sort of happen in parallel and one organisation will say it was ours and 
the other will say you are building on something we did before. If you look at the purposes of 
PSB that Ofcom developed, if you look at the initial consultation document that was 
published as part of Charter review in 2003 and also look at the notion of measuring public 
value that the BBC came out with in their document, there is a certain amount of 
commonality between them, partly because there is common sense.” 
Even though interviewees’ views remained rather vague on direct 
interrelationships between Ofcom’s PSTB and BBC’s public value approach, the 
obvious similarity in the approaches points to a further central aspect that merits 
consideration in the explanation of the overall development, which is that of personal 
relationships. 
 
9.2.4 Parallel Development: Personal Relationships  
A central and recurring theme in almost all interviews was the importance 
of personal relationships in the development and diffusion of the public value notion. 
One interviewee commented that “in that dynamic of individuals, institutions, and 
processes I would say individuals matter more than anything else”. 
Different phases can be distinguished in this development. The first one is 
the transition of the notion from US theory to UK practice, which was facilitated by 
Professor John Benington, who held public value seminars at the University of 
Warwick. One of them was attended by Geoff Mulgan, who wrote a piece on public 
value that developed into the Cabinet Office paper (Kelly et al., 2002), which was the 
first formal UK appearance of the public value notion. The paper did not go beyond 
the stage of a think piece, as it according to a senior civil servant “failed to persuade 
key figures then – including Gordon Brown and Tony Blair – to use it as a 
framework for government.” BBC-interviewees however described it as the stimulus 
for public value thinking inside the corporation.  
Beyond that, a more direct link may be established between the BBC and 
the earlier seminars at Warwick University. According to one interviewee with close 
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knowledge of the proceedings, BBC Chairman Gavyn Davies is said to have attended 
a seminar, together with Geoff Mulgan and Mark Moore, in search of an alternative 
framework for justifying public expenditure on the BBC. This would stand in 
contrast to the report Davies had written in 1999 on the future funding of the BBC as 
well as later publications during Charter review, which focused on market failure as 
the primary justification for PSB (Davies, 1999, 2005, p. 130). Independent of this 
claim regarding his attendance in Warwick, BBC-interviewees emphasised the 
importance and involvement of Gavyn Davies in the internal development of the 
notion. As described previously, they also stated that market failure wasn’t felt to be 
a strong enough rationale for Charter review.  
Several interviewees emphasised that there was a shared debate about the 
future of PSB and that a lot of cross-thinking was taking place between the different 
institutions and a small group of people, who were thinking about these issues. 
People from the ITC who worked on the study of ITV’s PSB obligations or on 
research for DCMS reviews of BBC services went on to consult the BBC on the 
development of a measurement approach or worked for Ofcom on the first PSTB 
review. A BBC-interviewee remembered: 
“The truth is, there were a lot of ideas going around and a lot of people worked 
across different organisations. I dare say there was a lot of cross-fertilisation of ideas and 
we happened to take them and run with them because we had got Charter review.” 
The dissemination of the public value idea after the BBC’s ‘Building 
Public Value’ (2004a) publication and throughout Charter review is similarly 
influenced by individual people and institutions, from Will Hutton at The Work 
Foundation, to Think Tanks like Demos and IPPR, of which the latter ran a series of 
seminars
18
 in 2002 and 2003 and later contributed a publication to the interrelated 
debates of Ofcom’s PSTB and BBC’s Charter review.  
A further context in which the role of individuals was emphasised was the 
final constitution of the BBC Trust as the BBC’s regulatory body. Giving away the 
BBC Governors was described by some interviewees as the price the BBC had to pay 
to get more power in the form of the PVT. Several interviewees described the PVT 
as a deal to keep Ofcom as an external regulator out while ensuring independence 
from government.  
                                                 
18
 http://89.234.45.165/research/themes/previousproject.asp?id=1657&pid=1657&tid=4271. 
253 
 
“The deal was, if we come up with something that is robust and Ofcom can do the 
MIA, we are fine with that but it fundamentally stays something that is done by the BBC and 
not by politicians.”  
A DCMS official commented that quite a lot new digital services were 
coming up and that the Secretary of State’s involvement in these decisions raised 
issues of independence. With the PVT, the BBC was given “the tools to do the job”, 
and the Trust was set up to be more independent from management. Another 
interviewee said that the decision against a regulator separate from the BBC was also 
influenced by the timing, the run-up to a general election and Chairman Michael 
Grade’s proposition that he would resign if the regulatory body wasn’t going to be 
part of the BBC. The interviewee further emphasised the importance of the political 
climate in these developments: “For any regulator, if you want hawks, you put hawks 
on it. If you want doves, you put doves on it. And we always put doves in the BBC 
because we like it. [...] Politically, there are people who like the BBC, and that is 
that. That is the thing that matters.” 
There was a strong sense among interviewees of a tightly knit policy 
community in which personal relationships and a shared sense about the future 
direction of policy coined the overall development. Frequently, interviewees stressed 
that there were “a lot of politics going on at that time”. These findings are supportive 
of similar conclusions drawn by Freedman (2005, 2006, 2008a), Schlesinger (2009), 
and Born (2008) on the range of policy actors participating in media policy.  
The pattern of a tightly knit policy community and the role of individuals 
continue with C4. Some of the individuals who had worked for the ITC, BBC, and 
Ofcom on the development of (public value) assessment frameworks were later 
involved in the take-up and development of the notion at C4.  
Interviewees generally saw the BBC’s application of the public value 
notion as a successful Charter review strategy since central propositions made in 
‘Building Public Value’ (2004a) had been incorporated into the Royal Charter, which 
left the corporation with an extended remit, increased strategic independence as well 
as an increased licence fee. Since its introduction by the BBC, the notion had 
“worked itself into the discourse”, from the BBC to TWF, Ofcom, the DCMS, and 
the wider cultural policy sector. This sets the context in which C4 adopted the notion. 
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9.3 Phase Three – After the Institutionalisation of the Public Value 
 Notion at the BBC 
 
9.3.1 Motivational Aspects: Public Value Take-up at C4 
Prior to the publication of its strategic review ‘Next on 4’ (C4, 2008b), C4 
was faced with uncertainty regarding its future funding. Interviewees from inside and 
outside the corporation saw a clear connection between the application of the public 
value notion and the corporation’s funding difficulties. A C4-interviewee described 
the situation as a “mutual coming together of thinking” between C4 and Ofcom on 
arising financial difficulties during Ofcom’s first PSTB review. Ofcom’s (2007b, 
2007c) following financial review identified a funding gap and highlighted questions 
regarding C4’s light governance and accountability framework, which would require 
adjustment if its funding model was changed. The possible receipt of public funding 
could also raise State Aid concerns at the European Commission. 
Historically, C4 focused little on governance and accountability and had 
been “fairly defensive about the depth of accountability” due to its commercial 
funding. Aside from possible direct public funding and corresponding increased 
accountability requirements, several interviewees pointed to a more general trend 
towards greater public service accountability that led C4 to recognise it hadn’t been 
sufficiently accountable.  
The realisation was that its accountability system had to change and C4’s 
public contribution had to be addressed if it requested public funding. The starting 
point was “the need and the recognition that we need to better articulate and measure 
what we were doing”. It was obvious that public support could only be considered “if 
we understand how much value we are getting back. So C4 had for the first time to 
think of the concept of public value.” A senior DCMS official had a similar view: 
“I suppose there was a feeling that we and Ofcom, and C4 as well, in order to 
really have a discussion about that you needed to understand a bit more concretely what is 
the real impact of changes in particular financial circumstances. And therefore you needed a 
set of tools to be able to understand what is C4 delivering now in terms of public value and 
how might that change in the case of different scenarios.”  
C4 first applied and defined public value in its ‘Next on 4’ publication 
(2008b), while public value thinking had started earlier in 2006 (Duncan, 2006). 
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Compared to the BBC, the notion was used much less frequently and ideological 
aspects such as market failure, consumer and citizen distinctions were described as 
not relevant for C4. C4-interviewees consistently said that citizen and consumer 
distinctions weren’t relevant as it focused on audience and individual viewer 
relationships: 
“Certainly, here we don’t talk about citizens and consumers. We just talk about 
the end user if you like. [...] It does not make sense for us to distinguish. We need our 
citizens to be consumers as well because they pay through ads. We could spend the whole 
time thinking of them as consumers to maximise revenue and not think about the public good 
at all but we do think about that all the time because we have a public mission. So the two 
things just sort of sit side by side at C4.”  
Another interviewee commented that “public value wasn’t a phrase used 
very much inside C4”. It was rather a “way of thinking” on top of which C4 put its 
own thinking: 
“When we talked about value, we not so much thought about public value used by 
BBC, in BBC terms. We meant additional societal value that would be delivered above and 
beyond the market by C4.” 
This is also reflected in the later renaming of the public value report to the 
public impact report, which according to C4-interviewees resulted from corporate 
strategic and communication reasons to express C4’s distinctiveness and avoid direct 
comparison with the BBC. Public impact was “used as a label that was slightly more 
distinct, slightly different. It captured the broader sense of economic as well as 
societal impact.”  
Despite the later shifting away from the public value terminology, some 
interviewees said that the initial impetus for its application was to be more closely 
associated with the PSB discourse developed by the BBC. One policy insider 
commented that due to its status as a commercially funded PSB, C4 had been riding 
two horses for most of the 1990s which had left it “in the middle, slightly 
uncomfortable, being neither the one nor the other. I guess as soon as they started to 
talk about the need for direct state support, that made the decision for them and they 
moved over to the BBC camp.” C4 would have to adopt “some of the same language 
and positioning as the BBC” and “roughly align their own processes with those of 
the BBC” as it became more visible in the discourse about the future of PSB. 
Similarly, another policy insider commented:  
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“If you look at the broader debate around funding at that time, in order to mount 
arguments for public subsidy, they had to find a philosophical, conceptual position, 
underpinning, which enabled them to make the same kind of public value arguments like the 
BBC but in a slightly different way. I think historically, the conceptual underpinning of the 
reason for C4 intervention was all about driving creativity and innovation. It was rather 
more supply side than demand side, building up the independent sector, what they have done 
very successfully. When you take the argument that you want to be the alternative provider 
in a pluralistic PSB economy and you maybe want to slice the licence fee and other public 
subsidy, you have to frame an argument what value you deliver back to the public much 
more in terms of the audience and the public who are helping to subsidize you than when you 
are basically driven by advertising.”  
The PSB model that emerged through the BBC’s public value application 
and Ofcom’s PSTB review consisted of purpose-based remit definitions against 
which performance assessments were conducted. Correspondingly, C4 defined a set 
of public purposes in ‘Next on 4’ and delivered a public impact assessment in its 
annual report.  
The main theme of ‘Next on 4’ was to “redefine the public role for the 
digital age”. Historically, C4’s remit, which only applied to its core channel, had 
been defined rather broadly in legislation and was “quite open for interpretation”. As 
all other services weren’t part of the remit and hence not considered public service 
content, their contribution was not recognised in its reporting to Ofcom. The 
difficulty of assessing C4’s performance against this broad remit also raised 
complaints from commercial broadcasters regarding the amount of public service 
content C4 was providing. A senior DCMS official remembered:  
“It was very hard to get a handle on how well C4 is doing against this broad 
remit that it has in the Act. There were quite a lot people saying this is quite nebulous, this 
remit, and there is no sense in which C4 accounts for how C4 is doing. It basically says it 
delivers its out of London quota and also great programmes. And that was where there was a 
push and it came through in the review that Ofcom did. And I think the C4 Board was 
recognising at the same time that there was a need to try to give a bit more clarity publicly 
how the board itself was trying to get a handle on how C4 was delivering against its public 
service purposes.”  
On this topic, a C4-interviewee commented:  
“In a way, that is what we tried to do with ‘Next on 4’. We tried to move away 
from a position saying everything C4 does is PSB and marvellous and begin to say some 
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aspects are highly valued by viewers and they are good but these are not the key things we 
are necessarily here to do as a public organisation. What are we here to do as a public 
organisation? What is the value we deliver to society? That is how we ended up with the four 
purposes.”  
The four purposes addressed these developments by trying to articulate the 
remit more clearly – rather than to replace it – on a multi-platform outcome basis that 
shifted away from service-based input/output definitions. A C4-interviewee involved 
in this process said the purposes resulted from a triangulation in which findings from 
deliberative audience research conducted for ‘Next on 4’ on C4’s PSB role were 
related back to the legislative remit and Ofcom’s PSB purposes.  
The public value report was seen as a continuation of ‘Next on 4’, which 
had “by defining the purposes created the first stepping stone on the way to the 
public value framework”. It had been clear at that time that it was necessary to 
develop a measurement framework structured around the purposes, in particular with 
regard to the bid for public funding. A C4-interviewee remembered:  
“As a public institution and intervention in the market place, it has to be able to 
demonstrate the positive role or value it creates for society through the intervention if it is to 
get any public support or benefit. It had to be able to say without C4 you wouldn’t get the 
following things, and that can’t just be a list of programmes. It has to be some kind of 
quantifiable value to society. Whether that is kind of to the audience, viewers, citizens, we 
were fairly vague on. It was never a detailed economic analysis. It was a broader sense of 
‘these are things society benefits from’.”  
The starting point was the need to “find a system of measurement that can 
inform our accountability, that builds on the public purposes and that captures that 
sense of value to society”. Even though the public value notion had been used in 
‘Next on 4’, not much attention had been paid to public value literature or its use in 
the UK public sector. The thinking about public value became however more 
relevant in the development of the assessment framework, for which BBC measures 
were considered. The measurement framework was of central importance and had to 
be “as economically robust as it can be. […] Without measurement underpinning it, 
it is just meaningless PR”.  
For its development, a public value literature review was conducted and 
the BBC’s RQIV framework was studied to identify relevant measures for C4. Value 
for money, for example, wasn’t relevant while more emphasis was put on broader 
258 
 
creative economy impact. As a market-funded public service broadcaster, impact was 
at the heart of the framework. “There is a combination of the way you reach people 
but also the number of people you reach. That is why we call that the public impact 
report.” One interviewee said: 
“The best we would be able to do is come up with a set of measures that painted a 
picture of value collectively. [...] It allowed us to go from a position of having very little 
measures of that to being able to say year-on-year one can begin to articulate a story of the 
role that C4 plays and how much value it is delivering in different ways. It was about 
creating a narrative that wasn’t definitive but gave a much more quantitative sense of the 
value C4 was contributing.”  
The framework used quantitative and qualitative assessments for the four 
purposes and three scale & impact measures (chapter 8). Measuring purpose 
outcomes on a cross-platform basis through audience research or qualitative case 
studies was new for C4 as it reported on Ofcom’s licence requirements for the core 
channel with input and output measures. Due to Ofcom’s fairly high level of 
scrutiny, C4 had “never really been under significant obligations to publish or make 
available a huge amount of information on its public role”.  
C4-interviewees described the PIA as an attempt to address competitors’ 
criticism of its broad remit and its own perception that it didn’t receive credit for 
contributions beyond its core channel. Described as a communications, 
accountability, and public relations tool, the PIA was viewed as a “very useful 
defensive tool when you are under attack for actually demonstrating the volume, the 
breadth, and the depth of public impact”.  
The 2010 Digital Economy Act included the purposes and expanded C4’s 
remit by recognising its status as a multi-platform network, including additional, 
loosely defined requirements which do not have public service privileges. These 
inclusions legitimise C4’s activity beyond its core channel and are thus in C4’s 
interest. 
Regarding the broader goal of demonstrating C4’s contribution to society 
and “winning the argument for public money”, the undertaking was less successful. 
As one interviewee pointed out, “there are all sorts of other reasons why they have 
not achieved these political goals”. 
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9.3.2 Parallel Development: The Diminishing Role of Public Value 
After the introduction at the BBC, the public value concept has enjoyed 
initial success with its adoption at C4, as well as in some other areas of the cultural 
sector (Keaney, 2006; Arts Council Public Value Projects 2008-2011
19
). The UK 
Film Council (Collins, 2006a, p. 11), English Heritage (Clark, 2006), and the Royal 
Opera House approached the concept. Interest also existed in the public sector with 
local governments (Scottish Government, 2008), the NHS (Levy, 2008) and 
leadership and education organisations (Mager, 2007; Grigg & Mager, 2005). The 
National Trust applied it in cooperation with the management consultancy Accenture 
(The National Trust & Accenture, 2006), of which the latter developed a Public 
Service Value Model that focuses on “defining, measuring and increasing the value 
delivered by public service” (Cole & Parston, 2006, p. xiv). 
Despite this initial diffusion of the notion, interviewees generally viewed 
the concept as something that was not going to last in the context of PSB, as it would 
quite quickly be replaced with a new policy idea. Irrespective of that, some 
interviewees were of the opinion that the notion had conditioned the debate and 
shaped the language around it. Others felt however that it was merely “switching 
semantics”.  
While the public value notion is still occasionally used in discourse at the 
point of writing in 2012, its presence has been considerably reduced over the years. 
This is also the case for the BBC, which began to speak of “public space” in its 2010 
strategy review (BBC, 2010; BBC Trust, 2010b), which according to interviewees 
was building on the public value notion, but was however not as well received as the 
‘Building Public Value’ (BBC, 2004a) publication. 
Following the new licence fee agreement in October 2010 and a strategy 
review initiated in July 2009, the concluding strategy review document ‘Putting 
Quality First’ published in December 2010 (BBC Trust, 2010c) established four key 
objectives of which the first one was to “increase the distinctiveness and quality of 
its output”, followed by the second one to “improve the value for money it provides 
to licence fee payers” (p. 4 et seq.). Content characteristics in the form of 
distinctiveness and quality have thus been set as a new priority. 
                                                 
19
 http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/about-us/research/public-value-programme/. 
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In contrast to its fate in discourse, agreement generally existed among 
interviewees that the notion would only prevail in practice, in the form of the PVT. 
The test or something akin to it that addresses the negative and positive impact of 
PSB on the market was viewed by almost all interviewees as something that was 
going to persist and be needed in the future. This is also related to the fact that the 
inclusion of the so called “ex-ante test”, modelled after the PVT, in the revised 
European Communication on State Aid for PSB (2009) has had the consequence, that 
similar concepts are used across Europe, of which some also use the public value 
notion.  
The public value development in the form of the PVT and the 
formalisation and increased transparency of the assessment process for new services 
was generally seen as a positive development among interviewees. With a 
Conservative party in power, the pressure on PSB is likely to increase as media 
policy is set to move towards a deregulatory framework (Martinson, 2010). In the 
light of the change in government, the public value approach, as a “Labour concept”, 
will not see a revival, while it remains very likely that a concept in the form of the 
PVT will prevail – with or without the public value terminology in use.  
 
 
9.4 Summary and Conclusion  
 
The chronological review of the public value process has shown how 
certain market, regulatory, political and strategic developments have created a 
context in which the public value notion was used by the BBC and C4 as a concept to 
address non-market threats and opportunities specific to the two organisations. 
Accompanied by wider support in the policy community, the notion became 
institutionalised at the BBC and C4 as a mechanism to define their remit and 
demonstrate positive contributions and market impacts to inform and justify service 
provision. 
In the following, key findings from the three phases of the public value 
process are summarised with regard to its similarity to paradigm shift processes as 
well as factors that influenced the overall development and take-up of the notion. 
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Influence factors and process characteristics were defined as secondary indicators in 
the paradigm shift classification framework outlined in chapter 1.  
The investigation of the public value process in this chapter was structured 
into three phases; before, at, and after the institutionalisation of the public value 
notion at the BBC.  
The first phase encompassed the 1990s as the time prior to the introduction 
of the public value notion. The focus lay on developing an understanding of the 
incumbent paradigm with regard to the ideology that dominated PSB justification 
and the wider policy and public management context.  
The Davies report (1999), as the last official government report on PSB, 
stated that “some form of market failure must lie at the heart of any concept of PSB” 
(pp. 10, 201). Earlier government and BBC documents of the 1990s related to the 
BBC’s Charter renewal process also showed that market considerations were a 
central concern in the discussion of the fundamental changes that lay ahead with the 
change from analogue to digital distribution and the role of PSB in relation to that. 
While the government’s green paper (DNH, 1992) opened up the 
discussion on the scope of PSB to the full spectrum of niche to universal service 
provision, its later white paper (DNH, 1994) much more clearly endorsed the BBC as 
the UK’s main PSB that was supposed to take advantage of the digital age. While 
market failure is not frequently cited, it is repeatedly stated throughout the 
documents that the BBC is supposed to complement the market and also withdraw 
from areas, in which it was not needed anymore in the future. In particular in BBC 
documents, the justification for sustained and extended PSB provision is related to 
the high level of risk and uncertainty of the digital switchover and new possible 
monopolies and market failures.  
While a range of economic and non-economic rationales informed PSB 
justification in these documents, the legitimisation of the scope of PSB is primarily 
linked to markets and increased consumer choice.  
These findings on the 1990s, as the reference point for the comparison of 
the public value notion, corroborate literature which describe the time since the 
1980s as more dominantly focused on neo-liberal economic than non-economic 
rationales in media policy (van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003; Born, 2008, 2004; 
Freedman, 2005, 2008a; Leys, 2001). Some authors even describe it as a rather 
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hostile policy environment which is dominated by economic rationales and is only 
“fine-tuned for public service ends” at its margins (Born, 2008, p. 693).  
In such an economic policy and regulatory environment, the reduction of 
market failures makes it more difficult to justify sustained or even expanded PSB 
provision from an economic perspective. As uncertainties and risks related to digital 
take-up however persisted in the early years of the transition, continued claims were 
made to justify large scale PSB provision and expansion into digital to drive digital 
take-up. This lead to complaints from commercial competitors, as addressed in the 
second phase.  
While BSkyB’s complaint to the European Commission about BBC News 
24 was rejected, it resulted in demands from the Commission to more clearly define 
PSB remits. In addition, difficult service approval processes conducted by the 
Secretary of State, such as BBC3, showed that a rationale was needed that provided 
remit definitions and market impact considerations. BBC-interviewees described this 
as the central concern during that time. It was also stated that a shift away from 
market failure was another reason for introducing a new rationale, as it was feared 
that market failure could be used to argue for a reduction of PSB. 
In the context of policy change and paradigm shifts, such a process of the 
dominant rationale, here market failure, turning into a de-legitimising concept is 
described as a crisis or anomaly in the incumbent paradigm, as it no longer justifies 
the desired policy objectives.  
In the case here, the objective of the BBC and of a supportive policy 
community, as later shown, was however to ensure universal service provision of 
PSB in the digital age. Such a crisis creates a window of opportunity to introduce a 
new rationale, such as the public value notion.  
As described by interviewees, the public value notion was considered 
particularly useful to address the remit of PSB in the form of the value created which 
could then be compared to the market impact of PSB services. The notion was 
described as useful since it was an undefined umbrella term that could be tailored to 
individual needs. In the case of the BBC, the notion was used to address various 
policy developments at one time, such as the more direct role of the citizen in media 
discourse as well as the need for an assessment framework and more general trends 
towards accountability and evidence-based policy-making. The public value notion 
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was thus interpreted by the BBC to address and anticipate a range of policy 
developments, which increased its acceptance in the policy community as it signalled 
understanding of stakeholder concerns.  
In the context of PSB justification, the sequence of developments from a 
crisis, to the introduction of a new rationale which was supported by a policy 
coalition that lead to the eventual institutionalisation of the notion, reflects steps 
typical of a paradigm shift process. The novelty of the public value idea, as a 
consideration of the fundamentality of change – other than with regard to its 
ideological composition – is however limited. The PVT is only partially new as it 
comprises several elements of previous service approval processes and reviews 
conducted and commissioned by the Secretary of State. Only some elements are new 
such as the focus on citizen and consumer distinctions, the institutional change of the 
Trust conducting the assessment, and the standardisation of the assessment.  
Overall, the changes that have taken place with the public value notion and 
in particular the PVT appear to be more path-dependent and evolutionary than 
radical and revolutionary. While both evolutionary and revolutionary processes can 
lead paradigm shifts, according to paradigm shift literature, the nature of the process 
here being only evolutionary supports the finding of chapter 8 that no ideological 
shift has taken place, as the primary indicator of a paradigm shift.  
This is further corroborated by the rather quick disappearance of the notion 
in discourse, after an initial phase of wider adoption at C4 and other areas in the 
cultural and public sector. While the PVT persists, it does not resemble a 
fundamental change but rather an evolutionary path-dependent process.  
As secondary paradigm shift indicators, the influence factors and 
characteristics of the public value development discussed in this chapter further 
support the findings from the ideological shift analysis, that no paradigm shift has 
taken place. A final conclusion is drawn in the next chapter. 
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10. CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
The thesis set out to investigate whether the adoption of the public value 
notion at the BBC and C4 represents a paradigm shift in the justification of UK PSB. 
This research interest was based on the observation that market failure had turned 
from a legitimising into a de-legitimising rationale in the transition from analogue to 
digital broadcasting.  
While distributional and content market failures justified both popular and 
niche provision in analogue broadcasting, the reduction to content failures in digital 
broadcasting limits PSB justification to niche content provision (see chapter 2). The 
public value notion – which in discourse and theory focused on wider societal and 
citizen objectives – appeared in the PSB context in this transition from analogue to 
digital broadcasting.  
This observation created the interest to investigate whether the wider 
adoption of the public value concept in UK PSB indicated a shift in the ideological 
justification from an economic, increasingly de-legitimising market failure rationale 
to a non-economic, citizen- and society-focused public value rationale.  
Empirically, this meant that the public value notion appeared to have been 
introduced as an alternative rationale to market failure to justify continued universal 
PSB provision in the digital age – which market failure no longer justified. 
While these observations did not imply that market failure was used as the 
only rationale to justify analogue broadcasting – the contrary view was taken that 
justification of PSB has since its inception been a mix of both economic and non-
economic rationales – the observation merely indicated that as long as market failure 
fully applied and thus fully justified large scale analogue PSB provision, it provided 
protection against free-market arguments to reduce public service intervention.  
As neo-liberal views became stronger in the 1980s/90s, the reduction of 
market failure in the transition from analogue to digital at exactly the same time 
meant that market failure justification was increasingly reduced as a protection 
against the then increasingly dominant free-market liberal views.  
The research objective was thus to investigate whether this shift to public 
value as a non-economic rationale for market intervention has taken place in order to 
provide an alternative rationale that justified universal popular and niche PSB 
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provision in the digital age. The research assumption was that the adoption of a non-
economic and much less clearly defined rationale like public value provided the 
opportunity to construct a much less constrained PSB rationale than market failure. 
The significance of this development, and therefore also of the research, is twofold: 
Firstly, it addresses the scale of PSB provision in the context of 
technological change and the ideological justification of public service provision.  
Secondly, it addresses the role of different ideologies in informing ideas 
and decision-making in (media) policy.  
Both aspects are of empirical and theoretical relevance. Empirically, they 
address the actual nature and process of decision-making in public policy as well as 
the scale and scope of PSB provision. Theoretically, they address the role and use of 
different ideologies in informing policy ideas and outcomes in the specific context of 
PSB policy.  
While the thesis heavily focused on the role of different ideologies in the 
form of economic and non-economic rationales – in particular their relationship and 
hierarchy in policy-making – other factors that influenced this development were 
also addressed in the research, however less prominently.  
For the investigation, the paradigm shift concept was chosen as the central 
analytical framework. A paradigm shift is defined as a change in the hierarchy of the 
component values of a policy paradigm. Here, this translated into the investigation of 
a change in the hierarchy of economic and non-economic component values of the 
public value notion. The paradigm shift notion is a widely accepted theoretical 
concept that refers to the most profound, permanent and influential form of policy 
change.  
To address existing shortcomings in media and public policy paradigm 
studies, an analytical framework was devised that centred on the investigation of an 
ideological shift in the hierarchy of component values as the primary indicator of a 
paradigm shift. To improve the evidence base and take developments in the wider 
policy process into account, the primary analysis of an ideological shift was 
supplemented by a policy process analysis that focused on influence factors and 
process characteristics.  
The overall research question of whether a paradigm shift had taken place 
with the public value notion in UK PSB justification was thus investigated in the 
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form of two research questions. The first research question addressed whether an 
ideological shift had taken place with the applied public value concepts at the BBC 
and C4 (chapters 7, 8). The second research question focused on the wider policy 
process of the public value notion, which was structured into three phases of before, 
at and after the institutionalisation of the notion at the BBC (chapter 9).  
While preliminary conclusions have already been drawn in the respective 
chapters, this concluding chapter integrates these findings to reach an overall 
conclusion on whether a paradigm shift has taken place with the public value notion 
in UK PSB justification (10.1). Based on these findings, the contributions of the 
thesis in the two fields of media and public policy studies are summarised (10.2).  
 
 
10.1 The Public Value Notion in UK PSB Justification – A Paradigm 
 Shift? 
 
As summarised in chapter 8.2, the detailed analysis of the ideological 
composition of the applied public value concept at the BBC and C4 has shown that, 
overall, the operationalisation of the concept in the BBC’s PVT and C4’s PIA puts 
more emphasis on consumer objectives than wider societal citizen value. This is 
combined with the application of economic methodologies and concepts, which 
address the quantification of individual consumer benefits much more prominently 
than qualitative considerations of wider societal outcomes.  
These findings provided the first step in answering the first research 
question as they showed that the assumed focus of the public value notion on citizen 
over consumer objectives had not taken place in the applied notion. In the assessment 
frameworks, the consumer focus was expressed through reach and thus scale of PSB, 
which was more pronounced for the BBC than C4. PSB performance is thus very 
much defined dependent on consumer demand. This leads to a bias towards popular 
programming and scale which puts PSB in more direct competition with commercial 
providers.  
It can be concluded that the rationale of (net) public value is overall 
focused more on consumer than citizen objectives as it draws mainly on economic 
concepts and accounts for market impact. The public value concept has thus been 
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subject to technocratisation, which according to several interviewees made it “more 
than just semantics” and thus increased its acceptance. Technocratisation decreases 
contestability and increases validity by “reach[ing] political closure” (Karppinen, 
2006, p. 59). Overall, (net) public value represents an economic rather than a non-
economic approach. 
The first research question can now be answered by drawing a comparison 
to the incumbent paradigm at that time, which functions as the reference point. With 
regard to the reference point, the question was not so much whether PSB was 
justified primarily by market failure or other non-economic rationales as both 
justified universal PSB provision in analogue broadcasting and thus never really 
created the need for PSB to clearly justify and define its scope. Rather, the central 
point of interest with regard to the reference point was the incumbent media policy 
paradigm as this impacts how much importance is given to a reduction in market 
failure in the transition to digital and thus as a threat to PSB.  
This approach was adopted at the outset of the study as the public value 
development was placed in the context of evolving media policy paradigms, which 
describe broader changes in media policy. The public value notion was contrasted to 
the third, incumbent and primarily economic paradigm of the 1980s/90s classified by 
van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003). Throughout the thesis, further evidence was 
collected to corroborate this classification by drawing on a range of secondary 
literature, primary interview data, and non-systematic analysis of PSB reviews, 
legislation, government and BBC documents of the 1990s. As could be shown, media 
policy and public service provision were more dominantly characterised by 
economic than non-economic ideology in the last two decades of the 20
th
 century. In 
this context, a reduction in applicable market failures creates a threat to PSB 
justification. 
Based on the previous findings from the ideological component analysis of 
the applied public value concept at the BBC and C4, the initially assumed shift from 
a general economic approach to a non-economic PSB justification has not taken 
place with the public value notion. With regard to the first research question, it can 
thus be concluded that the public value concept is a continuation of rather than a shift 
away from an overall economic paradigm.  
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As an ideological shift has been defined as the primary indicator of a 
paradigm shift, these findings strongly indicate that no paradigm shift has taken 
place. Findings from the second research question further corroborated this 
preliminary conclusion.  
The analysis in chapter 9 of the wider public value process investigated 
influence factors and process characteristics to provide further insights on the 
fundamentality of change that has taken place with the public value notion. The 
findings showed that market failure reduction was clearly identified as a threat to 
PSB and as one reason for the introduction of an alternative rationale. While these 
initial process steps are typical for paradigm shifts where the crisis in the incumbent 
paradigm is followed by the introduction of an alternative rationale, other factors 
such as the evolutionary path-dependent nature of the PVT and the quick 
disappearance of the discursive notion speak against fundamental policy change. 
While the applied (net) public value concept has persisted to date, it has not led to an 
ideological shift and is overall more evolutionary and path-dependent than 
revolutionary in nature. 
These combined findings lead to the overall conclusion that the public 
value development does not represent a paradigm shift. Rather, it represents a 
strategic change process, which was initiated by the BBC and supported by a wider 
policy coalition. As a strategic policy idea, public value was devised to provide an 
alternative rationale for universal popular and niche PSB provision in the digital age 
by focussing on consumer value maximisation and market impact minimisation. 
Universal PSB was justified by adopting a dominantly economic approach that 
chimed with the regulatory and policy environment, thus providing an alternative 
rationale to the much more restrictive market failure approach.  
So while no ideological shift has taken place as (net) public value is a 
consumer-focused approach structured in the form of an economic cost-benefit 
analysis (representing an economic investment decision), (net) public value is not a 
regulatory rationale for market intervention in economic theory like market failure. 
As a rationale, (net) public value means that public services should be provided as 
long as public value in the form of consumer benefits is larger than the negative 
market impact. The trigger for market intervention is here the objective of consumer 
benefit creation, which is corrected by – but not dependent upon or reactive to – the 
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market in the form of market impact. In the case of market failure intervention, the 
occurrence of a market failure is the trigger for intervention, whereby in a second 
step intervention is assessed and conducted when the benefits arising from 
intervention are larger than the cost of intervention. This comparison shows that with 
the (net) public value rationale the objective and thus trigger for intervention is 
public value creation defined as consumer benefit (rather than market failure) 
adjusted for market impact.  
It can be concluded that (net) public value is an economistic or moderate 
economic rationale, as it is overall an economic rather than a non-economic approach 
which is however not a traditional regulatory rationale from economic theory and 
beyond that takes citizen objectives more prominently into account than previously. 
In the case of UK PSB, a reregulation rather than a deregulation has taken place as 
the latter would have meant to stick with and enforce market failure justification in 
the form of niche service PSB provision.  
So while the public value development overall represents more continuity 
or stability through evolutionary change rather than a radical or fundamental 
paradigm shift, it does not represent a triumph of economics, which would have been 
the case if a reduced market failure perspective had been enforced. As a 
counterfactual to the public value notion, this would have resulted in PSB niche 
service provision akin to the US model of PSB.  
It can be summarised that no paradigm shift but merely a strategic policy 
change has taken place which led to the institutionalisation of (net) public value as a 
new rationale for digital PSB justification. As a strategic policy idea, public value is 
thus a ‘programmatic’ rather than a ‘philosophical’ idea, according to a distinction 
made by Schmidt (2011, p. 111).  
While these findings fit with the initial research assumption that public 
value is a strategic policy idea to continue large scale digital PSB justification, they 
however do not support the initial assumption that this would be achieved by 
adopting a non-economic concept.  
This rather peculiar development is the result of a changing technological 
context that posed a threat to the traditional and established PSB model of universal 
service provision, which was addressed by a strategic policy idea in the interest of 
the BBC, supported by a policy coalition and the government at that time. (Net) 
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public value was devised as a rationale to continue popular and niche universal 
service justification in the digital age.  
With regard to the role of ideologies in public policy this finding shows 
that rationales are employed by policy-makers to represent policy objectives. If, as in 
this case, contextual circumstances such as technological change impact the validity 
of incumbent rationales, a shift to alternative rationales is pursued to ensure the 
continued justification of desired policy objectives.  
What this shows, among other things, is that ideologies are important 
factors in policy-making as they help or provide a guide to frame and inform policy 
objectives and positions. They are however only one factor among many others in 
policy-making which however becomes more important with fewer other variables 
that influence the context.  
A recent example for this is how the hacking scandal of the Murdoch-
owned company News International will impact the degree to which a Conservative 
government will pursue its general free-market and deregulation objectives, as the 
scandal has improved the public perception of PSB.  
Another example is the high degree of public support that was shown 
against the proposed closure of BBC6 Music and the Asian Network (Sweney, 
2010). Public support for PSB constrains politicians’ behaviour in order not to lose 
votes. Large public support is therefore crucial for PSBs as it is possibly the best 
protection against major changes to their services. This is another factor which 
explains the consumer focus in PSB assessment frameworks.  
This also addresses a central point which needs to be raised and which was 
repeatedly emphasised by interviewees, who described these developments as “very 
political”. The point raised is that ideologies do inform general views and approaches 
towards policy objectives and problems, which makes ideologies central elements in 
policy processes. In order to understand how they inform decision-making, they 
however have to be viewed in the wider policy context. 
Decisions about PSB remain personal, subjective and political. In the end, 
ideologies and paradigms in the form of economic and non-economic rationales 
provide overall frameworks to guide rather than dominate decisions in a complex 
world, in which their importance increases with the decrease of other influence 
factors.  
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10.2 Contribution and Outlook  
 
This study highlighted the interrelationships between ideologies, policy 
ideas, policy change and paradigm shifts, which were investigated on the empirical 
case of the public value notion in UK PSB. These are factors which are of central 
relevance for understanding stability and change in policy-making. In particular the 
investigation of ideologies in policy-making is of significance as ideologies are 
central factors in informing policy outcomes. As a policy change analysis of the 
specific context of PSB justification, the findings provide contributions to the two 
fields of media and public policy studies.  
The primary approach for this investigation was rooted in and informed by 
media policy studies. Consequentially, the findings mainly contribute to this area on 
the two levels of media policy paradigms and economic and non-economic 
rationales, as both inform PSB justification; media policy paradigms provide the 
context while ideologies inform the composition.  
Aside from investigating the empirical public value development to 
understand what actually happened and what implications it had on PSB provision, a 
central objective was to address shortcoming of existing media policy paradigm 
studies. This encompassed the development of an improved understanding of what 
constitutes media policy paradigms with regard to different economic and non-
economic rationales as component values, and – more importantly – how the shift 
between paradigms takes place and how it can be identified. 
Media policy paradigms were defined as the dominant ideology that 
informs media policy-making, whereby policy paradigms consist of different 
ideological component values (rather than being ideologically pure) of which those 
that are more important than others in informing policy-making also inform the 
overall classification of the paradigm. A paradigm shift was defined as a change in 
the hierarchy of component values. 
While the thesis builds on the paradigm shift classification of van 
Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003), it also provides an extension to it as the public 
value development can be viewed as an extension of their third economic media 
policy paradigm for the specific context of UK PSB. As discussed in the previous 
section, the findings showed that the economic paradigm has continued in PSB 
policy with the public value notion. The however more moderate approach of 
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integrating both citizen and consumer objectives can be compared to a synthesis of 
economic and non-economic rationales. Resembling this pattern, one interviewee 
related the public value movement to “a story about the organisation trying to regain 
its equilibrium”, referring to the BBC’s different leadership periods under Director-
Generals Birt and Dyke.  
A second research objective and contribution was to provide a detailed 
review of economic and non-economic rationales, which are frequently but often not 
properly or coherently used in media policy. A detailed review was further of central 
importance as economic and non-economic rationales functioned as analytical 
categories for the ideological component analyses of the applied public value notion 
at the BBC and C4.  
Detailed reviews were conducted (chapters 2, 3) of economic and non-
economic rationales in theory and for the applied context of analogue and digital 
broadcasting with regard to the implications they have for the scope of PSB 
justification, such as the reduction in market failures. The reviews were approached 
from the theoretical definitions of the rationales in their respective academic 
disciplines.  
Central distinctions such as their focus on different roles of individuals as 
citizens and consumers with different sets of societal citizen values in the form of 
(paternalistically or deliberately defined) outcomes and consumer values in the form 
of individual utility, as well as different starting points for intervention, such as 
markets or wider societal benefits, were discussed. In welfare economics, social 
value is understood as the aggregate of individual utility, thus focussing on scale of 
service provision. In contrast, outcomes and thus the materiality of services provided 
is the focus of societal value in non-economic approaches. A further point of 
comparison was the much higher degree of standardisation of analytical and practical 
frameworks, definitions and methodologies for economic than non-economic 
rationales.  
The reviews showed the complexity of the relationship between economic 
and non-economic rationales, which is not clear cut. Bridging concepts such as merit 
goods were addressed as well. The central characteristics which inform the empirical 
analysis were summarised in table 3.2. 
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While it was emphasised that no clear cut distinction exists between these 
ideological rationales, their often conflated use in media policy would benefit from 
more coherent and shared definitions, which would reduce subjectivity and 
contestation. The thesis has provided a development in this direction.  
Even though the study focused on the use of ideologies in policy-making, 
other influence factors were not excluded from the analysis. The thesis therefore 
provides various smaller contributions in the more general study of media policy. 
This includes citizen and consumer distinctions (Livingstone, 2008; Livingstone & 
Lunt 2007; Livingstone et al. 2007b; Lunt & Livingstone, 2007a, 2007b; Needham, 
2003; Gibbons, 2005; Vick, 2006), public interest understandings and their different 
ideological underpinnings (Feintuck, 2004, 2005; Feintuck & Varney, 2006; Leys, 
2001), roles of different actors in the policy process and the influence of a tightly-
controlled community in UK media policy (Schlesinger, 2009; Freedman, 2005, 
2006, 2008a; Born, 2008; Smith, 2009). 
The second main area of contributions lies in the field of policy analysis. 
The public value development was investigated as a policy process in which the 
public value notion represented a policy idea that was informed by different 
ideologies with the purpose to achieve policy change – what it did successfully with 
its institutionalised in the BBC’s Royal Charter. The question which was investigated 
was whether the change achieved was a fundamental change in ideology which 
would represent a paradigm shift. These concepts of a policy process in which a 
policy idea can achieve policy change and possibly a paradigm shift are thus directly 
interrelated.  
The paradigm shift notion was used as the central analytical framework. As 
a paradigm shift is defined as a specific type of policy change in the form of a 
fundamental change in ideology, the analytical paradigm shift framework functioned 
to bring the three observed policy concepts – policy process, policy idea, and policy 
change – of the public value development together. 
With regard to the relationship between these three policy concepts, the 
thesis provides two theoretical contributions. A first and only minor contribution was 
made with regard to the interrelationship between policy ideas and policy change. 
The second and primary contribution addresses the relationship between a policy 
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change and a paradigm shift in the form of a devised paradigm shift classification 
framework. This analytical framework guided the analysis and structure of the thesis.  
With regard to the first minor contribution on the relationship between a 
policy idea and its ability to achieve policy change, a theoretical framework was 
devised which integrated sociological neo-institutionalism and non-market strategy 
to analyse the composition and success of a policy idea, like public value, which 
depends on its ability to integrate strategic objectives and contextual constraints. 
Empirically, this became for example evident in the technocratisation and 
depolitisation of the public value notion. 
With regard to the analysis of the public value notion as a strategic policy 
idea that achieved policy change, the thesis contributes to non-market strategy 
studies as it provides a so far understudied qualitative (rather than quantitative; 
Lindeque et al., 2007, p. 10; Hillman et al., 2004, pp. 850-851), public sector focused 
approach to the use of a policy idea as a specific non-market tactic (rather than NMS 
as a whole; He et al., 2007; Lindeque et al., 2007, p. 7; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; 
Bonardi et al., 2006, p. 1225; Baron, 2001, p. 47; Shaffer et al., 2000)  
The second and main contribution in the field of policy studies is the 
devised paradigm shift classification framework. The framework addresses the 
relationship between a policy change and a paradigm shift. 
A shift in ideology in policy-making is different from a mere policy 
change; ideological changes are much more fundamental as they inform the overall 
ideological objectives which trickle down to inform the outcomes, instruments, and 
methodologies used. Policy change in contrast to this can be a mere change in any 
aspect of policy-making. As paradigm shifts are fundamental types of policy change, 
it is relevant to improve our understanding of such processes with regard to why, 
when, and how they occur.  
An analytical paradigm shift classification framework was devised, which 
informed the research questions and guided the empirical analysis. Based on a review 
of paradigm shift studies, an extended classification framework of paradigm shifts 
was developed that consists of a primary change in ideology, reflective of Hall’s 
(1993) third order change, as the necessary condition, and a secondary change in the 
wider policy change process, in the form of paradigm shift process characteristics 
and influence factors.  
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While the investigation of paradigm shifts has evolved since Hall’s (1993) 
seminal study, only little development has taken place with regard to the 
classification of when a paradigm shift occurs. Recent paradigm shift studies had 
adopted both an ideological and a contextual perspective in the overall analysis, 
which however had so far not been extended into a classification framework. The 
thesis provides a contribution in this respect in the form of an extended classification 
framework that integrates both ideological and contextual paradigm shift indicators. 
Out of this approach arises as central finding of the thesis which is the 
recommendation to refine the paradigm shift definition beyond the level of ideology, 
as currently dominant in literature. The more recent literature on ideas in policy 
change and paradigm shift processes acknowledged that difficulties still exist with 
the concept of paradigm shifts. This addresses in particular difficulties of classifying 
when a shift has taken place (Carson et al., 2009, p. 170; Schmidt, 2011, pp. 110-
111).  
While this study takes the approach that a certain set of primary ideological 
and secondary procedural indicators should be considered in paradigm shift 
classifications, it is at the same time acknowledged that the complexity of policy 
change processes makes it difficult to develop a standardised framework with regard 
to the specific ideological and contextual indicators necessary for a paradigm shift 
classification. Instead, the view is taken that the shifting points need to be identified 
individually for each case study, while taking both ideological and contextual 
indicators into account. More generally, it would be beneficial to develop a 
systematic approach to the study of paradigm shifts which is not too simplistic but 
allows to represents the complexity of both ideology and context in paradigm shift 
processes. 
In addition, more research should be done with regard to the role and 
analysis of the reference point, which is rarely addressed in paradigm shift theory. 
Another point of interest for future research would be to investigate more generally 
which conditions support achieving a paradigm shift over a policy change.  
Finally, the study contributes to public value management literature as it 
provides a detailed analysis of the most prominent adoption of the public value 
concept in the UK to date. As the analysis has shown, the UK PSB public value 
concept consists of remit definitions and performance assessment frameworks, which 
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represents a departure from Moore’s (1995) original approach of public value 
management.  
Aside from a few interviewees and a recent BBC Trust publication (2010a, 
p. 78), there was general doubt that the notion had been used as a management 
concept inside the BBC. Instead, interviewees stated that Moore’s concept gave them 
only the idea to construct a concept for the BBC which was quite different from the 
original approach. This fits with Collins’ description of the notion being used in its 
loose, literal sense, and as a quasi-regulatory principle rather than Moore’s post NPM 
doctrine (Collins, 2006a, pp. 13, 56, 2007a, pp. 171-184, 2007b). With the BBC’s 
adoption, the concept was changed from a public service management to a quasi-
regulatory performance assessment framework in the style of a cost-benefit analysis.  
With its increasing popularity following the BBC’s use, a variety of 
interpretations appeared in literature and practice (Keaney, 2006; Alford & O’Flynn; 
2009), which led to criticism regarding the concept’s loose and rather undefined 
character (Crabtree, 2004, p. 2). Even supporters such as Benington were concerned 
that a less rigorous development of definitions, theoretical assumptions and testing 
created “a danger in the UK at least, of public value getting used loosely, as a broad 
portmanteau phrase expressing ideals and aspirations about public service, but 
capable of meaning many different things to different people” (2009, p. 233). Further 
criticism addresses the usefulness of the approach in parliamentary Westminster 
systems and conflated roles of politicians and managers (Rhodes & Wanna, 2007, pp. 
406-415; Alford & O’Flynn, 2009, pp. 180, 177, 174; Talbot, 2009, p. 169).  
While the concept was never successful in the US and also seems to have 
peaked in the UK with the BBC’s approach, more debate exists in academic 
literature on the role of public value as a successor to NPM (IJPA 2009a, 2009b; 
Moore, 2000, 2003, 2005; Moore & Khagram, 2004; Bozeman, 2002, 2007; 
Benington, 2005, 2009; Benington, & Moore, 2011; Talbot, 2009; Moore & Spencer, 
2006; Smith, 2004; Smith et al., 2004; Coats, 2006; Rhodes & Wanna, 2007; Alford 
& O’Flynn, 2009).  
Overall it can be concluded that the public value approach applied in UK 
PSB was a successful policy strategy that achieved its objectives at that time – which 
remains its largest success in public service to date. Its future remains uncertain.  
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A PVT must be applied to make any significant change to an existing or to 
introduce a new UK public television, radio or online service (DCMS, 2006c, article 
25(1)). After the BBC Executive has submitted a proposal to the BBC Trust for 
consideration, the Trust judges the significance of the proposal to decide whether to 
launch a PVT based on criteria such as impact, financial implication, novelty, and the 
duration of the activity (ibid., clause 25(2)(a)-(d), (3); BBC Trust, 2010, p. 69). 
When the Trust decides to launch a PVT, a PVA is prepared by the Trust 
Unit to assess the public value of the proposal (DCMS, 2006c, clause 28), while 
Ofcom prepares a market impact assessment (MIA) overseen by a joint steering 
group (ibid., clause 29(1)-(8)). 
The MIA addresses the likely positive or negative short- and long-term 
impact of the proposal on the market, market competition, development, and 
consumer welfare (ibid., clauses 30, 31; BBC Trust, 2010a, 73). 
Upon completion of both assessments, which should not take longer than 
three months (DCMS, 2006c, clause 31), the Trust considers both PVA and MIA to 
reach a provisional conclusion, which is published and open for public consultation 
for 28 days (BBC Trust, 2007b, p. 19; 2010a, p. 76). Based on the input from the 
public consultation, the Trust reaches a final decision to deny or grant approval with 
or without conditions (ibid.), depending on whether the likely adverse impact on the 
market is justified by the likely public value of the proposed services (DCMS, 2006c, 
clause 26(6)). The Trust’s decision on the PVT is final and comes into effect in the 
form of an amended or new service licence (BBC Trust, 2007b, p. 19). Proposal for 
the introduction of a new service are, however, subject to a procedural veto by the 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS, 2006c, clause 33).   
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Appendix B:  Piloting and Methodological Reflexions  
 
Piloting is a central procedural element in social science research to test the 
appropriateness of methodologies prior to the actual data gathering. One performance 
assessment document was selected randomly for piloting. Piloting proved very 
helpful as it showed that an initially devised, more formal process of content 
analysis, based on a coding frame, was not practical. A more formal coding process 
had originally been conceptualised as the belief was that assigning categories and 
being able to filter text according to these categories would make it easier to reduce 
and analyse the vast amount of data. This coding process was however rather work 
intensive and did not allow reducing the text to the desired degree as it was difficult 
to devise and assign coding categories that reflected the complexity of long and often 
ambiguous text passages. A less restrictive method of text reduction and analysis was 
thus developed, as described above, which allowed reducing the text while 
maintaining the complexity of the objectives under study (economic and non-
economic regulatory rationales). The amount of data was generally challenging but 
could be handled well with the effective text reduction process. Further, the work 
intensity and readily available information differed for the two case studies. An 
overview of the assessment methodology was for example available for C4 (2009b, 
2010b), which was used to supplement the analysis.  
The interpretative nature of the study required a high degree of specialist 
knowledge on economic and non-economic rationales, which can negatively impact 
intersubjectivity. This was addressed by providing transparency and detailing the 
analytical steps and interpretative reasoning of the ideological classification in the 
empirical chapters. In addition, commonly accepted distinctions between economic 
and non-economic rationales informed the analysis. Internal validity was created by 
following systematic procedures and making sure that the research design served to 
answer the research question. 
With regard to methodological reflections, a main challenge of the research 
design was to get access to the relevant interviewees. Triangulation was crucial in the 
process of reconstructing the developments, as it was also important to take into 
account that interviewees may have an agenda, in particular as the topic can be 
viewed as politically sensitive.  
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Another more analytical challenge was to find the right level of analysing 
something as highly theoretical as economic and non-economic regulatory rationales 
in their practical application, both in regard to document analysis as well as for the 
information gathered from interviews and desk research. An example here is the 
change in market failures, which was discussed in interviews on a fairly high level. A 
more detailed view on market failures, which explained why a shift in rationales had 
taken place, was derived from own analysis and was then blended into the discussion 
above. A further challenge was to make sure that even though the focus lay on the 
level of ideologies, the danger of over-interpretation was kept in mind in the sense 
that other central factors in these developments, such as political objectives and 
personal relationships which had only been marginally addressed in the analysis, 
were not forgotten when conclusions were drawn.  
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Appendix C:  BBC Case Study – Aggregate Tables  
 
Tables C.1 to C.5 are the aggregate tables for the RQIV drivers and the fit with 
public purposes for the four PVAs conducted by the BBC. This includes reach (C.1), 
cost & value for money (C.2), quality & distinctiveness (C.3), impact (C.4), and fit 
with public purposes (C.5). 
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Table C.1: Aggregate Table of the Driver ‘Reach’  
Reach  
(OD) 
Reach 
(HDTV) 
 Reach & Impact  
(GDS) 
Reach  
(LV) 
Reach 
Total reach, % TV HH viewing 
15min/week, % of HH downloading BBC 
content/week, for particular demographic 
groups (minority and underserved 
audiences) and content types (special 
interest content at margins of schedule), 
short/long-term, for proposal elements 
(different platforms), substitutive or 
additive to existing reach 
Reach  
Reach as primary indicator of usage, 
projected reach and share % of HD 
enabled / all TV HH, average weekly / 
total reach, reach by genre, audience 
group, platform, compared to BBC and 
non-BBC services, consumption volume 
behaviour, technology adoption / 
projected demand depending and market 
developments, role of BBC in developing 
the market (take-up and provision, HH 
penetration and likelihood to become 
standard), current rate of adoption (sale of 
indicative technology), offers of 
competitors, audience research on 
expression of interest in technology by 
audience group, reach drivers 
(substitution, content, scheduling, cost of 
access limits reach),  
Reach & Impact 
Reach, consumption levels, and impact 
for different audience groups (core, new 
audience, non-speakers), impact as new 
growth in use of language, potential 
increase of viewing, usage/week 
(quantitative audience research) (no 
projections given but evidence for 
increase/decrease), target audience size, 
reach as % of population (audience 
survey research), use and status of 
language (stakeholder views), reach and 
impact for total BBC and existing BBC 
services, impact by genre, BBC’s public 
purpose to “represent the UK, its nations 
and communities”, purpose remit 
priorities and purpose gap (difference 
between importance and delivery of 
purpose priorities derived from audience 
research), reach by platform (access, 
coverage, content range, appeal of 
platform features to audience groups, 
costs, linear/on-demand)  
Reach 
Reach projections (average weekly reach) 
for audience groups (demographics, 
underserved audiences, geography), total 
reach and consumption of BBC content, 
factors influencing reach (operational, 
social, market, content range and quality 
and appeal, platforms), broadband 
availability and take-up (socio-
economics, demographics, audiences, 
geography, costs, convenience of access 
and consumption for different audience 
groups), proposal’s ability to compensate 
for decline in reach 
Consumption Volume  
Volume of content consumed, total 
consumption, consumption of proposal as 
% of BBC TV consumption, for particular 
demographic groups (minority and 
underserved audiences) and content types 
(special interest content at margins of 
schedule), short/long-term, for proposal 
Risks 
Distribution risk (spectrum capacity 
limitations), market risks (decline in share 
and reach), technology adoption 
(technology becomes replaced/obsolete, 
wrong standard), access cost and adoption 
by demographic groups (inequities), free 
ride of competitors who enter market with 
Drivers / Risks 
Access to platforms for different audience 
groups, age, geography (stakeholder 
views), content appeal to audience 
groups, content characteristics (fresh, 
professional, contemporary), operations 
(coherence of strategy, time scale, 
production capacity, quality, content 
Evidence 
Reach projections model, third party 
reports, audience research on likely usage 
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elements (different platforms), 
substitutive or additive to existing 
consumption 
lower cost (risk is inherent in the digital 
purpose) 
range (stakeholder views), marketing & 
promotion, commissioning strategy, 
strategy to increase reach (leveraging 
BBC portfolio) 
Risks in forecast variables 
Market scenario and service usages 
assumptions and adjustments, technology 
and service provision, costs  
Counterfactual 
Long-term risk to reach due to audience 
expectations, reduced support for licence 
fee, slowed market development, public 
value foregone  
Evidence 
Quantitative and qualitative (deliberative) 
audience research, no reach forecast, 
qualitative evidence for increase/decrease 
weekly reach, deliberative research, 
expert opinion  
 
Counterfactual 
Total reach of BBC at risk due to changes 
in audience consumption patterns (linear 
to on-demand) 
Evidence 
Reach projections, audience research 
(deliberative research), technical expert 
advice, third party independent market 
research, no assessment of consumption 
here (since TV viewing assumed to 
remain constant short-term) 
  
Evidence 
Adjusted reach model, assessment of 
robustness of reach model, quantitative 
and qualitative audience research on 
likely usage, trials 
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Table C.2: Aggregate Table of the Driver ‘Cost & Value for Money’ 
 
Cost & Value for Money 
(OD) 
Cost & Value for Money 
(HDTV) 
Cost & Value for Money 
(GDS) 
Cost & Value for Money 
(LV) 
Cost per user hour 
CPUH: cost of service proposal/hours of 
output consumed 
output-based measure, for the BBC as a 
whole with, without proposal, relative 
CPUH of proposal compared to CPUH of 
BBC services and alternative investments, 
for different consumption scenarios 
Payback period 
Time it takes for the value to exceed the 
costs 
Consumer value measure 
Net consumer value or ICV: average 
value per HH* projected reach – costs 
Incremental value of viewing HD over 
SD (excludes content) 
Cost 
Cost estimates, current and future costs, 
cost per hour, content output (hours TV 
content broadcast p.a. by genre), 
production cost by genre compared for 
services, cost per person for different 
audience groups, spend on minority 
language and proportion to representation 
in population 
Costs 
Current local spend, predicted total local 
budget and investment increased by % for 
proposal, total cost, average annual cost, 
average headcount, efficiencies through 
reduction headcount vs. redeployment, 
production output/day, (regional) resource 
allocation, funding through efficiencies 
and savings within the existing budget, 
excess capacity, cost per hour, weekly 
cost per user hour (CPUH) to calculate 
the cost of proposal compared to BBC 
services, external spend for content  
Value Yield 
Value attributed to service/cost of 
providing service 
Consumer worth measure, perceived 
monetary value of the service to 
consumer/cost of providing service (value 
generated per £ spent), relative compared 
to other BBC services, alternative 
investments 
Value Yield 
Amount of consumer value generated for 
every pound of investment in service 
Consumer value measure 
Incremental consumer value (ICV)/cost, 
highlights ROI  
Value 
Linked to or indicated by drivers reach 
and impact (contribution to long-term 
survival of language), cost of the proposal 
compared to the predicted reach for 
audience target groups and impact 
(increased expenditure cannot be justified 
if provides only better coverage to 
existing audience, needs to drive reach to 
new users)  
Value 
Reach to key audience groups, access 
issues for non-broadband users, 
incremental production output for 
resources invested, content (genre range, 
output volume, multi-media, editorial 
perspective), content appeal 
(newsworthy), in context of existing 
commercial and BBC services 
Cost estimates  
For proposal as a whole and separate 
elements, marginal cost basis, costs by 
types (start-up, operating expenditure, 
rights costs, cost as % of BBC’s total 
expenditure and impact on existing BBC 
services, impact on current or future 
income streams, relative and opportunity 
Cost estimates 
For proposal and service elements, 
marginal cost (by platform/as a whole), 
total costs as % of total BBC expenditure 
and effect on provision of other existing 
services, relative cost p.a. (compared to 
other BBC services), cost types 
(distribution costs, spectrum constraints) 
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costs (cost proposal compared to cost of 
BBC services), content h/p.a. 
content related costs (connectivity, 
repeats, acquisitions), common costs 
(play out, marketing, team), platform 
specific costs, barker costs, capital 
expenditure, opportunity cost (alternative 
investment in original programming), 
comparison of HD channel cost with costs 
of output hours, indirect costs affecting 
other BBC services (cost of displaced 
channels, commercial return for BBC 
Worldwide), HD production budget and 
costs for different genre, cost 
infrastructure 
Efficiency  
Consideration of alternative methods to 
meet objectives more cost effectively 
Efficiency  
Consideration of alternative more cost 
effective delivery of objectives, efficiency 
vs. universality 
  
Counterfactual 
VfM measures under different scenarios, 
for BBC output as a whole assuming 
proposal a) goes ahead, b) does not go 
ahead, c) does not go ahead but 
alternative investment made in content on 
linear channels 
Counterfactual 
Threat long- and short-term to CPUH for 
BBC as a whole and HD production 
  
Evidence: Cost estimates, external expert 
advice, audience research on worth  
Evidence: Cost estimates, third party 
evidence, model for measuring value 
Evidence: Cost estimates (limited 
evidence) 
Evidence: Cost estimates, trial data 
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Table C.3: Aggregate Table of the Driver ‘Quality & Distinctiveness’ 
 
Quality & Distinctiveness 
(OD) 
Quality & Distinctiveness  
(HD) 
Quality & Distinctiveness 
 (GDS) 
Quality & Distinctiveness 
( LV) 
Quality  
User experience / interface technical 
features (picture quality, download speed, 
discounting effect of overlying content), 
viewing environment, content range and 
availability (% of BBC content available 
at launch, windows of availability), 
relevance and appeal to audience groups, 
qualitative audience research  
Quality 
Focus on additional benefit (discounting 
the quality of the underlying content) of 
receiving content in HD over SD 
(audience recognition and valuation of 
“quality uplift”) technical features such as 
access, picture, sound, technical 
robustness, for different delivery 
platforms, range of content offered and 
perceived differential benefit by genre 
(which genre benefit most from HD), 
indicative schedule, broadcast times 
peak/off-peak, scope and interest in 
getting access at different price points, 
appreciation indices for programmes in 
indicative schedule by audience, quality 
reduced by SD repeats, differential access 
/ three tier service may be perceived as 
negative (platform delivery proposal), 
impact on existing BBC services  
Quality 
Of current output (audience appreciation, 
winner at TV Festivals, stakeholder 
views), level of investment as proxy for 
high quality, origin of content 
(commissioned, archive, BBC content, 
news core BBC competence), quality 
controls and BBC editorial standards, 
commissioning process / independent 
production sector, appeal to target 
audience group 
Quality & Distinctiveness 
Seven distinctiveness criteria (developed 
by the Trust for the bbc.co.uk review)  
1) BBC editorial values (accuracy, 
independence, morality, taste and 
decency, fairness, independence, 
impartiality and accuracy) 
2) Non-commercial (free from advertising 
or subscriptions especially for news 
genre) 
3) Made for the UK (by definition) 
4) Clear link to television or radio 
programme brands (no plans to exploit 
the BBC’s television or radio brands) 
5) Level of creative and editorial ambition 
(breadth or depth of subject matter, 
production values, visual appeal, range, 
depth output level)  
6) Fresh and original approach (fresh 
proposal elements: partnership proposals, 
development of digital media literacy, 
encouragement of participation in local 
democracy, % of content on local 
democracy and public policy issues, 
producer-assisted viewer videos, role of 
the community producer) 
7) Uniqueness (no one else provides this 
content, UK-wide coverage ensuring 
plurality of provision). Further issue of 
distinctiveness is partnership (click-
throughs, R&D, content syndication, 
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support local production, citizen 
journalism), scale of investment as proxy 
for quality 
Distinctiveness 
Free at point of use and without 
advertising (compared to commercial 
offerings in emergent market), 17 key 
features to assess distinctiveness, online 
experience / accessibility, content range 
Distinctiveness 
Subscription-free and without advertising, 
content range and origin (UK-originated), 
from competitors and services offered in 
emergent market, % population with HD 
ready TV sets, HD subscriptions, long-
/short-term, platforms, audience 
perception of distinctiveness (trial) 
Distinctiveness 
Features of proposal are distinctive if they 
are not yet provided by the market 
(dedicated Gaelic TV channel, provision 
of daily television news in Gaelic, one-
stop-shop approach to BBC Gaelic 
content), not distinctive if only 
enhancement of current availability 
(increased level of originations), tone and 
‘feel’ of proposal (likely to be distinctive, 
stakeholder view) 
Evidence 
Audience research, public consultation, 
third party reports 
Counterfactual  
Lack of relevance among audience 
(audience expectations), lack of impact, 
risk to BBC reputation in regard to 
quality of content provision 
Counterfactual 
BBC could be seen to fall behind the 
market in technical progress and 
excellence (HD becoming standard) of 
quality and production values, damage to 
BBC’s reputation, universal availability 
of technology 
  
Evidence 
Quantitative and qualitative audience 
research on audience perception of 
quality & distinctiveness and general 
view on whether BBC should invest in 
proposal (trial data, questionnaires, 
statements) and on evaluation of benefits 
of proposal to citizens and consumers 
(deliberative jury), reports commissioned 
to consider proposals from wider new 
media perspective, to review proposal and 
its features  
Evidence 
Quantitative and qualitative audience 
research on perception of quality and 
principle of BBC providing service (trial, 
deliberative juries), narrative evidence 
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Table C.4: Aggregate Table of the Driver ‘Impact’ 
 
Impact 
(OD) 
Impact  
(HDTV) 
Reach & Impact  
(GDS) 
Impact 
(LV) 
Consumer benefit 
Consumption modus (control, flexibility, 
free from programming schedule, time 
and place shift qualities), potential for 
consuming more niche programmes, 
benefit reduced by cost of technology to 
access content 
Consumer benefit  
User experience, benefit of free and 
universal access to content in new 
technical quality, substitutional 
consumption and no new content limit 
benefit 
Reach & Impact 
Reach, consumption levels, and impact 
for different audience groups (core, new 
audience, non-speakers), impact as new 
growth in use of language, potential 
increase of viewing, usage/week 
(quantitative audience research) (no 
projections given but evidence for 
increase/decrease), target audience size, 
reach as % of population (audience 
survey research), use and status of 
language (stakeholder views), reach and 
impact for total BBC and existing BBC 
services, impact by genre, BBC’s public 
purpose to “represent the UK, its nations 
and communities”, purpose remit 
priorities and purpose gap (difference 
between importance and delivery of 
purpose priorities derived from audience 
research), public policy context, reach by 
platform (access, coverage, content range, 
appeal of platform features to audience 
groups, costs, linear/on-demand)   
Impact  
Local news content has valuable social 
currency 
1) Demand for local news: current market 
provision for different media/newspapers, 
interest in local news by age group, 
relevance is a determinant of reach, 
editorial agendas, content range and 
delivery platform  
2) Expansion of BBC local remit: 
audience view on importance of BBC to 
improve depth and breadth of local 
coverage, current local provision by the 
market for different regions, on support 
for BBC proposal, audience appeal of 
delivery platform 
3) Demand for broadband delivery 
platform: access and ease of use, demand 
for local news by delivery platform, 
audience group usage of delivery 
platform, demand by genre, cost, 
geographic coverage, active and passive 
consumption habits, role of delivery 
platform in provision of local news  
Citizens benefit 
Direct promotion of public purpose 6 
(digital purpose) 
Indirect promotion of public purposes 1-5 
(content purposes) through increased 
opportunity for niche content 
Citizen benefit 
Public purpose 6 (digital purpose) appeal 
to consumer justifies wide availability, 
stimulation of technology and markets 
through technology take-up and universal 
availability, enhance deliver platforms 
Drivers / Risks 
Access to platforms for different audience 
groups, age, geography (stakeholder 
views), content appeal to audience 
groups, content characteristics (fresh, 
professional, contemporary), operations 
Evidence:  
Quantitative and qualitative audience 
research, historical use data and survey 
data, consultation statements, third party 
reports, trials, narrative evidence  
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consumption, benefit reduced by risk of 
solitary consumption 
(Freesat), promotion of efficient spectrum 
use and standards stimulates markets, 
education of public on HD, prevent 
digital divide, universal access to 
consumer benefit 
Public purposes 1-5 (content purposes) 
production of HD content, UK creative 
industries competitiveness, educational 
benefit from immersive consumption 
experience, societal value major national 
events and shared viewing, potential 
consumption of special interest content 
(coherence of strategy, time scale, 
production capacity, quality, content 
range (stakeholder views), marketing & 
promotion, commissioning strategy, 
strategy to increase reach (leveraging 
BBC portfolio) 
Worth 
Worth to average person in terms of 
monthly monetary value (WTP study, 
deliberative jury) total worth, worth for 
proposal elements, relative worth 
(compared to other BBC services) 
Worth  
Relative monetary value HD over SD, 
value by platform by month, incremental 
consumer value (ICV) (consists of HD 
and scheduling value, discounts content 
value), compared to cost of proposal leads 
to net benefit for consumer 
Evidence 
Quantitative and qualitative (deliberative) 
audience research, no reach forecast, 
qualitative evidence for increase/decrease 
weekly reach, deliberative research, 
expert opinion  
 
Risks 
Solitary consumption 
Risks 
Impact on BBC services (public value 
foregone, reach, viewer hours, content 
type), alienation licence fee payers due to 
access costs, lack of interest, three tiered 
platform provision  
  
Counterfactual  
Lack of relevance  
Counterfactual  
BBC falling behind in technological 
development, output quality, holdup 
market development, consumer 
dissatisfaction, no universal access 
  
Evidence  
Quantitative and qualitative research on 
audience perception of consumer and 
citizen benefits (trials, questionnaires, 
deliberative juries) and worth  
Evidence 
Quantitative and qualitative audience 
research, deliberative juries 
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Table C.5: Aggregate Table of ‘Strategy & Fit with public purposes’ 
 
Strategy & Fit with Public Purposes 
(OD) 
Strategy & Fit with Public Purposes  
(HDTV) 
Strategy & Fit with Public Purposes  
(GDS) 
Strategy & Fit with Public Purposes 
 (LV) 
Strategy  
Maintain relevance and reach, audience 
expectations and demand, young 
audience, universality 
 
Strategy 
Maintain relevance and appeal of TV 
output due to consumer exposure to HD 
technology (sales of equipment, 
competitor offers) and corresponding 
consumer expectations  
HD production strategy irrespective of 
HD channel, since licence fee funds HD 
strategy, payers should have tangible 
benefit 
 
Strategy 
Minority language provision (Framework 
Agreement), supporting the future of the 
language as a case for intervention, public 
policy context  
BBC minority language provision 
proportional to representation in 
population, five factors for assessing the 
appropriate level of provision for 
indigenous minority languages (BBC 
Trust paper)  
Potential of proposal to generate 
sufficient value if it can reach wider 
audience (retain and recruit speakers) 
Strategy 
Rationales  
1) Shift from linear to on-demand content 
(audience expectations, gradual decline in 
reach due to long-term shift in 
consumption) 
2) Heightened interest in local issues and 
news, local markets, commercial pressure 
and economics of local TV  
Sustain reach and impact of BBC local 
news and safeguard delivery of the 
citizenship and community purposes 
 
Public purposes  
Public purpose 6 (digital purpose) direct 
contribution due to ability to encourage 
take-up of new products and technology  
Public purposes 1-5 (content purposes) 
indirect contribution due to potential to 
increase reach and consumption (new 
opportunity to access existing content, 
niche content, at margins of schedule), 
changes in consumption of linear TV and 
role of on-demand to mitigate change, 
reach and consumption for content types 
and genre, media literacy 
Public purposes 
Public purpose 6 (digital purpose) short-
term contribution (long-term less because 
then standard), consumer appeal as strong 
argument to make service as widely 
available as possible (Charter, Framework 
Agreement) 
Public purposes 1-5 (content purposes) 
long-term contribution (because short 
terms substitution of SD viewing) 
Public purposes  
Primary contribution to content purpose 
representing the UK, its nations, regions 
and communities, wider public policy 
landscape  
Secondary contribution to other content 
purposes, digital purpose 6 is reflected in 
the service's reach and impact  
 
Public purposes 
Content public purposes 1 and 4 
(citizenship and community) 
Purpose gap in local provision due to 
increased interest in local and shift to on-
demand news consumption  
 
Risk 
Greater social disconnection, audience 
fragmentation due to solitary 
Universality as fundamental principle, if 
proposal promotes public purposes then it 
must be provided free and as widely as 
Evidence 
Audience research (on importance of 
proposal to region, heritage, culture, and 
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consumption, risk of underage exposure 
to offensive, inappropriate material 
possible, platform neutral provision and 
ensuring long-term platform viability (due 
to audience expectations when technology 
is standard), public and private 
investments in platform, public policy 
context  
support for provision of proposal by 
BBC), academic expert advice on impact 
of proposal to support survival of 
languages, reach by target audience 
(existing, new speakers) 
Counterfactual  
Loss in reach and relevance (to particular 
audience group)  
Counterfactual 
Risk of long-term inferiority of platform 
(DTT) and thus risk to reach and 
promotion of public purposes 
  
Evidence 
deliberative research and quantitative trial 
data, consultation responses stakeholders 
Evidence 
Audience research on interest, valuation 
of proposal, WTP, trial 
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Appendix D: C4 Case Study – Aggregate Tables  
 
Tables D.1 to D.7 are the aggregate tables for each of the seven PIA assessment 
components. This includes the four purposes nurture (D.1), challenge (D.2), 
champion (D.3), inspire (D.4), and the three scale & impact measures viewer impact 
(D.5), output & spend (D.6), creative economy impact (D.7). The tables comprise the 
key measures used for each assessment component. In some cases, additional 
programme-specific research or other additional information is listed, which is not 
part of the key measures but is provided in the PIA texts for the assessment 
components. A colour code was devised to classify different measure types in the 
tables.  
Legend: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D.1: Aggregate Table of the Public Purpose ‘Nurture’ 
 
NURTURE 
New and one-off programmes 
 Number of new and one-off programmes in comparison to the main PSB channels (start time 
between 6pm and midnight, year-on-year) for individual episodes of non-continuous series  
New talent strands on C4  
 Number of hours (slot duration) of first-run originations in strands dedicated to talent (on-screen, 
presenters, actors, and off-screen, writers, directors) on C4 network (core and digital channels) 
Originations on E4 
 Number of hours of first-run originated programming on E4 focusing on new talent and ideas  
 Average viewing in 000s, year-on-year, excluding Big Brother related programming, (spin-offs of 
programmes that were originally shown on the core channel and programmes that were entirely 
originated by E4) 
Channel reputations  
 Audience perception against statements, people who believed C4 is the channel to which the 
following statements most apply:  
 “Always trying something new” (2005-2009)  
 “Trend setting” (2005-2009)  
 “Takes risks with programmes that others won’t” (2008-2009)  
 “Is experimental” (2008-2009) 
(C4, 2010a, pp. 18-19, 2009a, pp. 20-21, 2009b, pp. 4-5, 2010b, p. 5) 
 
 
 
 
Output measure  
Input measure  
Consumption measure 
Audience perceptions 
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Table D.2: Aggregate Table of the Public Purpose ‘Challenge’ 
 
CHALLENGE 
Commitment to long-form journalism 
 Number of (national) long-form (45min or longer) news and current affairs programmes in peak 
time between 6pm and midnight, in comparison to main PSB channels, year-on-year 
Audience reach 
 Reach of C4 news (in million per month) year-on-year, as percentage of TV news viewers (all 
viewers, by age group 16-34, by ethnicity) 
Independence of TV news 
 Audience research: viewer perception of news programmes on British TV (BBC news, ITV News, 
Channel4 News, Five News, Sky News), percentage of regular viewers to TV news programmes 
who agree with statements:  
 “Is independent from government”  
 “Is independent from the influence of big businesses”  
Commitment to documentary films 
 Hours (slot duration) of first-run serious factual documentaries on C4 and more4 (running wholly or 
partially in peak 6-10.30pm, year-on-year), serious factual programmes are documentaries, 
education (sub-sets: deaf and disabled, health, history, nature and environment, science)  
Range of international programming 
 Hours (slot duration) of first-run programmes covering international topics (core channel and more4, 
excluding news)  
 Genre (current affairs, documentaries, religion, history, science, other) covered by internationally 
themed originations on the core channel as percentage of total first-run hours, year-on-year  
 Hours of international film from countries other than UK and US on film4 (in 2008) 
Channel reputations 
 Audience perception against statements (old and new online survey), people who believed C4 is the 
channel to which the following statements most apply (C4 lead over average for other main PSB 
channels):  
 “Being provocative” (old measure, for 2005-2008, 2006-2009)  
 “Show programmes that make me stop and think” (new measure)  
 “Challenge prejudice” (new measure)  
Programme-specific research [from the introductory text] 
 Range and depth of news coverage on the main PSB channels 
 Average time devoted daily to international coverage by each news programme (minutes) (compared 
to BBC news, ITV news, C4 news, Five news, Sky news)  
 Percentage of viewers who say they trust the news programme they watch regularly to be accurate 
and fair  
 Number of unique viewers watched some or all of the programmes in the season  
 Number of unique visitors to the website in the first month 
 Number of people registered serious interest in adopting children featured in the season 
 Focus group statements  
 Percentage of viewers learned things they did not know before  
 Percentage of viewers talked about issues raised in the programmes 
 Percentage of viewers though the programme would encourage people to adopt hart-to-place 
children  
(C4, 2009a, pp. 32-33, 2009b, pp. 6-7, 2010a, pp. 34-35, 2010b, pp. 4, 10) 
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Table D.3: Aggregate Table of the Public Purpose ‘Champion’  
 
CHAMPION 
Diversity output on the core channel 
 Hours (slot duration) of first-run originations covering diversity issues (in peak-time) 
 Breakdown by genre (education, current affairs, religion, documentary, drama and film4, other) in 
percent of total first-run originations covering diversity issues, year-on-year, with examples 
Channel reputations 
 Audience perception against statements (old and new online survey), people who believed C4 is the 
channel to which the following statements most apply (C4 lead over average for other main PSB 
channels):  
 “Caters for audience other channels don’t cater for” (2004-2008, 2005-2009)  
 “Allows people an alternative point of view” (2004-2008, 2005-2009)  
 “Shows different kinds of cultures and opinions” (new measure, 2008, 2008-2009)  
 “Shows the viewpoints of different ethnic groups” (all viewers, by ethnicity, by PSB 
channels, year-on-year)  
 “Shows viewpoint of gays and lesbians” (homosexuals, heterosexuals, all viewers, by PSB 
channels, year-on-year)  
 “Shows the viewpoint of disabled people” (disabled viewers, all viewers, by PSB channels, 
year-on-year)  
Programme-specific audience research [from the introductory text]  
 C4 commissioned YouGov to survey 2000 people, Muslim and non-Muslim about their perception 
of the Islam Unveiled season programmes: 
 “The majority of TV programmes about Muslims focus on negative issues”  
 “It presented Islam in a different way than usually shown on television” 
 “I learnt something from this programme”  
 “TV generally represents Muslims as radical or extremists”  
 “It represented Islam in a balanced way”  
 “It changed my opinions” 
 C4 tracked (audience survey, small focus group) whether viewer attitudes to blindness changed 
during course of Big Brother series: 
Percentage of all adults agreeing (strongly or slightly) with the following statements about British 
society and British television in general: 
 “Britain is a society that respects and caters for blind people” 
 “There are very few blind people shown on TV” 
Percentage of Big Brother viewers agreeing (strongly or slightly) with the following statement at the 
end of Big Brother, Series 9:  
 “After a while I stopped thinking about Mikey being blind and just saw him as another 
housemate”  
Percentage of Big Brother viewers agreeing (strongly or slightly) with the following statements at 
the start of Big Brother, Series 9, and at the end:  
 “I believe that blind people are able to live independent lives”  
 “I am aware of the challenges that blind people face in their day-to-day lives”  
 “I feel sorry for blind people”  
 Survey on the portrayal of gays and lesbians on television, percentage of respondents who select 
each medium as influencing public attitudes towards gay men, lesbians and bisexuals (hetero, gay, 
by medium): 
 C4 is regarded by gay men and lesbians as being best for realistic portrayals 
 Gay men and lesbians regard C4 as being the channel that most helps people to be open 
about their sexuality and to come out 
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 Percentage of Asian and non-Asian viewers agreeing with the following statements about the 
programmes:  
 “I identify with the situation in the programme” 
 “My family shares similar dynamics, issues”  
 “The programme reflects modern life”  
 “The programme challenges prejudice”  
 Percentage of non-Asian viewers agreeing with the following statements about the programmes:  
 “I have learned something about Asian culture”  
 “The programme has changed my opinion about how Asian families in Britain live”  
(C4, 2009a, pp. 44-45, 2009b, pp. 7-8, 2010a, pp. 46-47; 2010b, p. 11) 
 
 
 
 
Table D.4: Aggregate Table of the Public Purpose ‘Inspire’  
 
INSPIRE 
Programmes covering leisure, life skills and hobbies 
 Hours (slot duration) of originated programmes covering leisure interests, life-skills and hobbies (on 
core channel, on main PSB channels, between 6pm and midnight, year-on-year) 
UK and foreign-language films 
 Number of British and foreign language films on C4, on main PSB channels (year-on-year, UK film 
council numbers) 
Diversity of Film4 channel schedule 
 Percentage of output on Flim4 channel devoted to British, other European, and international films, 
year-on-year 
 Percentage of output on Film4 channel by region of origin (UK, rest of Europe, US, rest of world, 
year-on-year) 
Engaging viewers online 
 Number of comments on C4 hosted online forums, list of 10 busiest forums on channel4.com (by 
number of comments posted, 2008 metric only)  
 Programmes with most submitted comments on channel4.com and e4.com (2009 metric) (top 10 by 
number of comments)  
 Number of page views generated by top 10 highest-converting TV programmes (2008 metric only), 
C4 programmes with the highest conversion rate from TV audience to website visits (list of 10, 
visits in 000s, conversion from TV in %)  
 Average conversion rate from TV to online across the top 10 programmes converted programmes 
(2009 metric), focus on programmes in peak from 6pm to midnight, year-on-year 
Channel reputations 
 Audience perception against statements (old and new online survey), people who believed C4 is the 
channel to which the following statements most apply (C4 lead over average for other main PSB 
channels):  
 “Gives me new ideas” (new measure)  
 “Makes me think about things in new and different ways” (new measure)  
Programme-specific audience research [from the introductory text]  
 Percentage of Embarrassing Bodies viewers agreeing with the following statements (teenage and 
adult viewers):  
 “Programmes like this provide a useful opportunity for parents and teenagers to discuss 
important health issues”  
 “I learnt some things I didn’t know”  
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 User engagement with websites Embarrassing Bodies, Embarrassing Teenage Bodies and 
Sexperience:  
 page views, visits, video views, user contributions 
 Percentage of people saying they would self-check in the next month (viewers and non-viewers, 
men, women) 
 Percentage of Embarrassing Bodies viewers agreeing with the following statements (strongly, 
slightly):  
 “It offers an important service to the public”  
 “It was entertaining as well as informative”  
 “It’s a good series for C4 to do”  
 How Embarrassing Bodies has changed its viewers’ attitudes to health (a lot, a little, not at all, I 
already take an interest, don’t know)  
 Percentage of viewers of the Big Food Fight season who agreed with the following statements:  
 “It’s a good thing for C4 to do”  
 “TV programmes are a good way to raise awareness of food and health issues”  
 “The Big Food Fight season has changed the way I think about food”  
 “The Big Food Fight season has changed how I will buy food in the future”  
 Percentage of viewers of Jamie’s Fowl Dinners and Hugh’s Chicken Run who agreed with the 
following statements: 
 “It is very important that we make a stand to improve animal welfare”  
 “These programmes made me think about how I shop”  
 “The programmes were highly informative and taught me a lot about poultry farming”  
 “I will change my chicken purchasing as a result of watching these programmes”  
 Percentage of viewers who agree that over-fishing is one of the greatest issues facing the world (pre, 
post screening)  
 Percentage of viewers who agree with the following statements regarding the intention to purchase 
sustainable fish (pre, post screening)  
 Percentage of young adults who think Hollyoaks is the best soap for issues relevant to them  
 Percentage of binge drinkers agreed the storylines made them likely to consider whether they should 
drink differently  
 Percentage of viewers who agree that they have learnt about a topic from watching Hollyoaks  
 Percentage of viewers of Hollyoaks: The Morning After The Night Before who agree that the 
storyline (for less than monthly and monthly binge drinkers):  
 “Was good showing the consequences of excessive drinking”  
 “Showed the type of mistakes people my age make when they drink too much”  
 “Made you realise how easily a good night can turn bad” 
 “Made me likely to consider whether I should drink differently”  
 For different programmes: games played and videos viewed, comments made, time spent on site, 
page views, page visits  
 Programmes‘ off-screen initiatives: registered users, video views, page views, page visits, games  
(C4, 2009a, pp. 56- 57, 2009b, pp. 8- 9, 2010a, pp. 58-59, 2010b, pp. 10-12) 
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Table D.5: Aggregate Table of the Assessment Component ‘Viewer Impact’  
 
VIEWER IMPACT (Television, Portfolio) 
TV viewing share 
 Viewing share across TV channel portfolio, year-on-year 
 C4 portfolio (core and digital channels) share as percentage of total TV viewing (5 year comparison) 
 Viewing share of digital channels (E4, film4, more4, 4musix/the hits) as a percentage of total TV 
viewing (5 year comparison)  
Audience reach 
 Average monthly reach of public service broadcasters’ TV portfolios (BBC, ITV, C4, five, over 5 
years) 
 Percentage reach of individual TV Channels in C4 portfolio (E4, More4, Film4, 4music) 
Viewing to network originations  
 Percentage of total TV viewing accounted for by network originations on C4’s TV channels (core 
and digital channels, for originations and acquisitions, year-on-year, new measure)  
Medium-term viewing trends 
 Percentage change in TV Channel portfolio viewing share (5 year period, for PSBs) 
 Percentage change in viewing to main PSB channels (5 year period) 
Average daily TV viewing  
 Average daily minutes of viewing to the PSBs’ TV channels (all viewers, age group 16-34, year-on-
year) 
Medium-term viewing trends amongst young audiences 
 Percentage change in viewing share of the PSB’s channel portfolios as a percentage of total viewing 
amongst 16-34 year olds (5 year period) 
Viewing by ethnicity 
 PSBs’ portfolio viewing share amongst white and black, Asian, minority ethnic audiences as a 
percentage of total TV viewing by those audiences, year-on-year 
Making programmes available on demand [on demand viewing, streaming and download data] 
 Average monthly number of full-length programme views initiated on demand (in million, year-on-
year) 
 Average monthly number of video-clip views initiated on demand (2008 metric only, year-on-year)  
Engagement with C4 content online  
 Average monthly visits to channel4.com, e4.com in millions (big brother separate, year-on-year) 
 Average monthly page views in millions (big brother separate, year-on-year) 
Channel reputations 
 People who believe C4 is the channel to which the following statements most apply: 
 “Covers ground that other channels wouldn’t” (5 year period)  
 “Takes a different approach to subjects compared to other channels” (5 year period)  
 “Is youthful” (new measure)  
 
Section on top ten…  
 Most viewed programmes on C4 (2008, in 000s)  
 Highest quality shows on C4 (2008) (score, % of viewers who agree strongly with the 
statement “this was a high-quality programme”)  
 Most original and different shows on C4 (2008)  
 Most complimented individual C4 programmes based on viewer enquiry contacts (2008)  
 Shows that people would most “talk to other people about” on C4 (2008) 
Most criticised individual C4 programmes based on viewer enquiry contacts (2008) 
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Section on on-demand viewing  
 Number of views of full-length C4 programmes initiated across TV and online  
 Number of episodes on 4od at year end 
 % growth in views to 4od website year-on-year 
 % of 16-34 olds who say that they use 4od on a weekly basis 
(C4, 2009a, pp. 60-65, 2009b, pp. 9-12, 2010a, pp. 62-67, 2010b, pp. 14-18) 
 
 
 
 
Table D.6: Aggregate Table of the Assessment Component ‘Output & Spend’  
 
OUTPUT & SPEND 
Volume of first-run originations 
 Average daily hours (slot duration) of first-run originations across C4’s TV channel portfolio (year-
on-year, excluding Big Brother related live streaming) 
Programming mix on core channel 
 Percentage of output on the core channel accounted for by originations and first-run programmes (in 
peak, all day, originations first-runs and repeats, acquisitions first-runs and repeats, year-on-year)  
 Network originations in C4’s TV schedules as a proportion of total broadcast hours (C4, More4, E4, 
in peak, all day, year-on-year, new measure)  
Expenditure on originated content  
 Total expenditure (in £ million) across network on originated content, year-on-year 
 Digital TV and online expenditure (in £ million) on originated content, year-on-year 
Originations by genre on core channel 
 Genre: entertainment, drama, education, sport, other factual, news, documentaries, current affairs, 
quiz & game shows, arts & music, religion 
 Total expenditure (in £ million) on first-run originations in key PSB genre, year-on-year                       
 Output (hours of programming based on slot duration) by genre for first-run originated commissions 
on the core channel (for year only) 
 Year-on-year changes in first-run originated output transmitted on the core channel (hours and 
spend) 
(C4, 2009a, pp. 66- 67, 2009b, pp. 12-13, 2010a, pp. 68-69, 2010b, pp. 19-20)  
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Table D.7: Aggregate Table of the Assessment Component ‘Creative Economy 
Impact’  
 
CREATIVE ECONOMY IMPACT 
Broadcasters’ expenditure on UK originations 
 Investment (in £ million) by broadcasters (BBC, ITV, C4, five, other) on first-run UK-originated TV 
programming, year-on-year  
 Total gross value added in the creative economy in £ million, year-on-year  
 Number of jobs supported across UK by C4 investment  
Broadcasters’ investment in the independent sector 
 Investment (in £ million) by PSBs on first-run external commissions (core, digital channels, year-
on-year) 
C4’s investment in the nations and regions 
 Proportion of C4’s first-run originated output on the core channel made in the nations and regions, 
volume of output hours (in, out of London), investment in output in £ million (in, out of London), 
percentage of the value of first-run originations sourced outside London 
Broadcasters’ investment in the independent sector outside London 
 Spend on production companies based outside London (in £ million, year-on-year) 
 Percentage of C4’s expenditure on the core channel outside London (by region, year-on-year) 
 Percentage of total investment in independent production companies based outside London for main 
PSB channels (2008 measure) 
Diversity of supply base 
 Number of independent production companies supplying the PSB channels, C4 (BBC portfolio, 
ITV1, C4 portfolio, five, other, year-on-year)  
Contribution of Film4 to UK film production 
 Total production budget (in £ million) of UK feature films supported by Film4, year-on-year 
 Funding sources (in £ million) for Film4 productions released theatrically (investment by film4 
feature film released in cinemas and other funds makes total budget) 
Additional considerations 
 4iP: Digital innovation (digital media fund established at the end of 2008):  
 % of investment in talent new to C4, in companies based outside of London  
 Investment since launch in number of companies 
 Number of projects in development and currently live 
 Regional partnerships and regional funds (money from regional funds leveraged) 
 Investing in creative Talent: 
 Initiatives of 4talent, the learning and skills development arm of C4  
 Spend (in £ million) on talent initiatives (examples: interaction with schools, work 
placement, partnerships) 
 Total investment in 2009: Types of support (dedicated on-screen talent strands, online talent 
strands, film, off-screen) funding (in £ million) 
(C4, 2009a, p. 68-71, 2009b, pp. 13-14, 2010a, pp. 70, 75, 2010b, pp. 21-22) 
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Appendix E: List of Interviewees  
 
Table E.1: List of Interviewees (33) 
 
Group membership Organisation  
(former or current) 
Expertise 
Group 1)  
Government departments 
and agencies  
HM Treasury  Charter Review 
DCMS  Charter Review, Public Value, C4, BBC 
ITC, Ofcom  PSB Regulation 
 Ofcom  PSB Regulation UK, EU 
Group 2)  
Case study organisations 
BBC Trust  PVT, Public Value 
BBC Trust PVT, PVA 
 BBC Trust  PVT, RQIV Framework 
 BBC  Public Value, Charter Review, 2003 
Communications Act 
 BBC  Public Value, Charter Review 
 BBC  Public Value, Early Charter Review 
 BBC  Public Value, Early Charter Review 
 BBC  Public Value, Early Charter Review 
 BBC  Public Value, Charter Review 
 BBC  Public Value, Charter Review 
 BBC  Public Value, Charter Review 
 BBC  Public Value, Charter Review 
 BBC  PSB Regulation UK, EU 
 BBC  Public Value, Charter Review 
 C4  Public Value, PIA, Financial Review 
 C4 Public Value, PIA, Financial Review 
 C4  Public Value, PIA, Financial Review 
 C4  Public Value, PIA 
Group 3) 
Public and private 
stakeholders 
Policy Insider  2003 Communications Act, Public 
Value 
Academic  BBC, PSB Policy and Regulation 
Academic  Public Management 
 Academic  PSB Regulation UK, EU, PVT 
 Academic  BBC, PSB Policy and Regulation 
 Consultant  BBC, PSB Policy and Regulation 
 The Work Foundation  Public Value Project 
 Public Interest Group  PSB Policy, BBC 
 Commercial Broadcasters’ 
Interest Group  
PSB Regulation UK, EU 
 Commercial Broadcasters’ 
Interest Group  
PSB Regulation UK, EU 
 European Commission EU PSB Regulation 
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E.2: Contacting Interviewees via email 
 
The initial contact with individuals was established via email. The email 
was structured into four sections (see next page).  
The first paragraph briefly introduced the research and outlined the 
research project.  
The second paragraph addressed the specific contribution they would make 
to this project by pointing to relevant positions they had held, work they had done, 
events and developments they had been involved in as well as referrals from third 
parties. It concluded by stating that all information from interviews would remain 
confidential and anonymous.  
The third paragraphed asked for possible dates for the interview.  
The final paragraph offered to contact the researcher or the researcher’s 
supervisor, who was cc’d in all emails, for further information. Referring to the 
supervisor as an additional contact person was helpful to establish credibility and 
legitimacy (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001, pp. 306, 312). 
The response time was usually one day, in most cases less than one week. 
The interviewees were generally very polite and stated that they were happy to 
contribute. Some interviewees requested a more detailed outline of interview topics 
or a phone call to discuss the interview.  
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E.3: Email text 
 
Dear Mr / Ms, 
I write in order to request an interview with you as part of a PhD research project 
based at the London School of Economics. The interview will form part of my 
research into the notion of public value in UK media policy. The research examines 
the development of the public value notion in the UK. 
As part of my research, I plan to conduct interviews with the 15 leading experts in 
this area, including those involved in the key decisions around the notion. (X, who I 
interviewed for this research, recommended that I contact you.) I am particularly 
interested in your (former) role at X and your work on X. I would thus very much 
appreciate the opportunity to hear your views on this. All information from 
interviews will be anonymous and treated confidentially. 
Could I ask you to let me know if you would be available for a short interview (less 
than one hour) in month X / week commencing X? 
My advisor on this PhD project is Dr Tambini. He is cc'd on this message. Both he 
and I would be happy to provide any further information on the project or the 
interview that you may require.  
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
Eva Marie Knoll 
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Appendix F: Interview Questionnaire 
 
The semi-structured interviews addressed three main interview blocks: 
Block 1 focused on specific and more general developments in the PSB and media 
policy environment. Block 2 addressed the two case study organisations BBC (2.1) 
and C4 (2.2). Block 3 related the public value application to the media and PSB 
policy context.  
The sequence in which blocks and questions were asked was adjusted for 
each interviewee. In addition, interviewee-specific questions were developed. Below 
listed are general questions from the three interview blocks. 
The questions functioned as guidelines on topics for the interviews. Their 
formulation was often adjusted to suit the interview situation. The information listed 
behind the questions in brackets is for the interviewer only and addresses possible 
answers or points of interest for follow-up questions.  
The development of the questionnaire was informed by a set of different 
documents, which included legislation (2003 Communications Act, Royal Charters, 
Framework Agreements, European Communications), institutional publications 
(press releases, public speeches, mission statement, strategy reviews, annual reports 
and accounts), policy and regulatory process documents (reports, reviews and 
consultation documents, draft legal documents, consultation responses, government 
records and meeting minutes). These documents were used to establish an 
understanding of the conditions in the policy environment and at the case study 
organisations. They were not analysed systematically but rather served to gather, 
collate, and corroborate information.  
The interviews usually commenced with introducing the research project, 
explaining the focus of the interview and relating the interviewee’s role to the 
research interest. Not all questions were asked to all interviewees. 
The review of evolving media policy paradigms in chapter 5 provided the 
foundation for the development of research questions for the first block, which 
addresses characteristics of the policy environment. A chronology was compiled 
which shows developments in UK PSB policy (see Appendix I). Compiling 
chronological events is a frequent technique and major strength in case studies to 
trace events over time (Yin, 2003a, pp. 125, 127). Questions were devised to inquire 
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about interviewees’ views of the media policy environment with regard to general 
trends and developments as well as more specific events, so called nodal points, 
which were viewed as having played a central role in the public value development 
and the use of different regulatory rationales. 
The second block consisted of questions on two cases BBC and C4. They 
addressed motivations for the take-up of the notion with regard to policy and market 
developments, strategic objectives, and economic and non-economic rationales. 
Questions also addressed the notion’s application in remit definitions and 
performance assessments.  
The third block addressed questions on the interrelationship between the 
public value notion and the policy environment. These questions also tended to 
develop out of the conversation. In almost all cases, the block was addressed at the 
end of the interview to bring previous questions on the policy environment and the 
notion’s application together. 
Each block consisted of two sets of questions; general questions, which 
applied to all interviewees, and interview- or group-specific questions. The order in 
which blocks and questions were asked varied depending on the interviewees’ 
expertise.  
The advantage of semi-structured interviews is that a non-standardised 
agenda allows collecting a rich array of personal insights as questions can be adapted 
throughout the conversation. Interviewees often stated that their memory was coming 
back as the conversation progressed. An open interview structure provided flexibility 
for the exploration of these thoughts, while the interviewer had to decide when to re-
direct the conversation without cutting off the thought process.  
Generally, open questions were formulated to avoid interviewer bias, 
which can result from leading questions (Johnson et al., 2001, p. 293; Yin, 2003a, pp. 
90-91). Phrasing was neutral to convey a professional, academic, and objective 
position. Effects of the order of questions on the reliability and validity of answers 
were also considered in that complex, very specific or sensitive topics, which might 
cause an interviewee to close-up or to terminate the interview, were left to the end 
(Johnson et al., 2001, p. 284).  
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Block 1: Regulatory rationales and developments in the policy environment 
1) The distinction between the individual as consumer and as citizen was 
emphasised in the definition of Ofcom’s remit in the 2003 Communications 
Act. How important was and is this distinction in media and PSB policy 
(2003 Communications Act as turning point after Davies report)? 
2) Why was this distinction made during the passing of the 2003 
Communications Act? 
3) Did the citizen terminology become more important through the inclusion in 
the 2003 Communications Act? 
4) How does the emphasis on the citizen relate to the market failure discourse 
and economic, NPM concepts of the 1990s, emphasised in the 1999 Davies 
report (did a shift take place, point when shift took place)?  
5) It also seems as if the assessment of citizen value became more important (if 
so, when / where did it start, ITC studies, Foster et al. paper on CBA-style 
assessment and remit definition of PSB, WTP)? Can you see or trace a 
development here? 
6) How has policy- or decision-making in media policy and regulation changed 
over the last years (with the advent of Ofcom etc., evidence-based, changes in 
PSB governance, policy actors and groups, tools and methods)? 
 
Block 2: BBC and C4 Case Studies  
2.1) BBC 
7) Why did the BBC adopt the public value (PV) notion in the Charter review 
process (justification, market failures, remit expansion, language, LF 
settlement and Treasury)? 
8) What is the BBC’s understanding of PV (equivalent to public interest, way to 
define benefits to society and deliver, assessment framework PVT)? 
9) How was PV used by the BBC (remit, public purposes definition, PVT)? 
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10) How does PV relate to remit definitions (such as the definition of public 
purposes, 5 types of value creation on three levels, the individual, society, and 
economic/value for money, first time public purposes defined)?  
11) Why was it felt necessary to develop something like the PVT (competition 
concerns, EC State Aid)? 
12) In terms of the PVT, what is new about it (methodology, PVA measures used, 
RQIV, trade-off with MIA)? 
13) How are consumer and citizen interests represented or assessed in the four 
RQIV drivers of the PVA (impact the only one that directly addresses citizen 
interests)? 
14) How is the integration of different economic, quantitative and 
incommensurable, qualitative measures handled in the PVT (value 
judgements, difficulty of adding-up RQIV assessments and final PVA to low, 
medium, high)?  
15) How is the weighting of the RQIV drivers established? 
16) How is the fit with the public purposes assessed? 
17) How is the PVA compared to the MIA (difficulties)? 
18) Why are measures such as impact or outcome included when it is so difficult 
if not impossible to assess, compare or add them up with other quantitative 
measures (effect on decision-making)? 
19) In how far are market failures taken into account in PVT assessments? 
20) Did the BBC benefit from adopting the PV idea (objectives achieved, 
expansion of scope, Charter review)? 
21) Why did the PVT spread beyond the BBC in PSB (C4, EU)? How? 
22) Why was the decision about the introduction of new services given to the 
BBC with the PVT (away from Secretary of State)? 
23) How are the PVT and its process different from or similar to the previous 
process and decision-making under the Secretary of State?  
24) Why was the PVT not given to an external body (Ofcom)? 
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25) Ofcom seems to have developed a similar model of PSB in its first PSTB 
review as the BBC, with its focus on a purpose-based remit and a 
corresponding measurement framework. What is the relationship between 
these two developments (Charter review and PSTB review, BBC PV 
development prior to or parallel with Ofcom, joint work, ITC studies)? 
26) How did PV come to the BBC (Benington seminars, Cabinet Office paper)? 
27) How influential was PV management theory (Moore, BBC, PMSU, TWF)?  
28) How is the BBC’s understanding of PV different from or similar to PV theory 
/ these approaches? 
29) With PV, the BBC seemed to focus more on the distinction between the 
citizen and the consumer (if true why, prioritising citizen over consumer, 
reduction in market failures, policy discourse 2003 Communications Act)? 
30) The PV concept according to Mark Moore is a management approach. Is PV 
also used as a management tool at the BBC (beyond remit definition, PVT 
assessment, if so how, example, co-production, deliberation, stakeholders)? 
31) Were any other alternative concepts to PV considered (social capital)? 
32) How are the PVT and the use of the PV notion going to develop in the future? 
 
2.2) C4 
33) Why did C4 adopt or turn to the PV notion? 
34) What features of the notion or its use in the PSB context (public discourse, 
measurement, BBC) seemed useful for or relevant to C4?  
35) What was the motivation for C4 to use the PV notion in ‘Next on 4’?  
36) How important was PV in informing ‘Next on 4’? 
37) What is C4’s understanding of PV (equivalent to public interest, way to 
define benefits to society, consumer, economy, public purposes)? 
38) What are the central characteristics or core features of C4’s PV notion (public 
purposes, assessment framework)?  
39) How does PV relate to the definition of the public purposes (first time PP)? 
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40) How do the four defined public purposes (nurture, challenge, champion, 
inspire) relate to C4’s statutory remit (little change since inception, inclusion 
in Digital Economy Act 2010)? 
41) What is the relationship between the public purposes (remit definition) and 
the assessment framework (in practice, in their development)? 
42) How was the notion used in the public value assessment framework? 
43) In the assessment framework, how is PV or public impact assessed? How are 
difficulties related to the assessment of outcomes addressed (measures, value 
judgements)? 
44) How does the measurement framework relate to existing reporting obligations 
to Ofcom (licence requirements) and measures used inside C4 (new 
measures)?  
45) How is C4’s understanding of PV different from or similar to the BBC’s 
approach (why)? 
46) Why was no alternative concept to PV used, something different from BBC?  
47) The BBC’s use of PV focused on scope and new services (PVT). For C4, 
what was the main issue (show what)? 
48) How is the adoption of the notion related to funding difficulties of C4 and 
Ofcom’s Financial Review of C4 (parallel developments, Ofcom’s PSTB 
review, definition of PSB purposes, output-impact-value model)?  
49) Did you work with any institution (BBC, TWF, Ofcom, etc.) to develop the 
notion or assessment framework?  
50) How influential was PV management theory (Moore, BBC, PMSU, TWF)?  
51) How important is a distinction between citizens and consumers for C4? In 
relation to public value?  
52) How are the PIA and the PV notion going to develop in the future (now that 
C4 did not receive public funding)? 
 
 
342 
 
Block 3: Public value and PSB policy 
53) How did the PV concept come to the UK (PMSU paper, Warwick seminars)? 
54) How did the PV notion relate to the general developments and trends in PSB 
and media policy (better regulation)?  
55) Is PV an isolated development or part of an overall development in media and 
PSB policy (key steps in development)? 
56) It seems as if the PV notion was supported more widely beyond the BBC in 
PSB and also in the cultural policy context. Which institutions did play a role 
(DCMS, TWF, Ofcom, EC, think tanks)? 
57) What impact did the PV notion have on the understanding and justification of 
PSB (in discourse and practice, impact on remit definition – from genre-based 
input/output measure to broader, outcome and purpose-based definition)? 
58) How does PV relate to market failure (economic, non-economic rationales)? 
59) How does PV relate to consumer and citizen interests? 
60) How would you evaluate the PV development so far?  
61) PV seems to be a successful, almost hegemonic concept in PSB - why 
(umbrella term, pseudo-economic)?  
62) Why did the PV movement take place? 
63) How important is the measurement aspect (PVT, PIA) in the PV development 
(PV reduced to measurement in context of PSB)? 
64) European Commission: Why did the PVT seem useful or necessary to the DG 
Competition to propose it for inclusion in the revised communication? 
65) What do you think is the future of the PV notion (in PSB, at BBC, C4)?  
66) What do you think is the future of PV performance assessment frameworks, 
PVT and PIA (as practical tools)?  
67) How would you define PV? 
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Appendix G: Interview Transcript 
 
Prior to asking for permission to record the conversation, interviewees 
were assured that all information was treated confidentially and anonymously 
(Johnson et al., 2001, p. 273). This was important due to the politically sensitive 
topic and interviewees’ ability and willingness to speak openly. The research project 
and the focus of the interview were briefly outlined at the beginning to signal 
preparation and background knowledge by referring to specific aspects which 
conveyed the level of interest and insight. It is generally important for interviewers to 
establish a certain level of authority by subtly communicating expertise (Odendahl & 
Shaw, 2001, p. 311), neutrality, and professionalism to obtain relevant, frank, and 
insightful information beyond the level of standard public relations.  
Except for one interviewee, who requested that the interview was not 
recorded, all interviews were taped. For the unrecorded interview, notes were taken 
during the interview and written up immediately afterwards. Some interviewees 
requested to check quotations from their interviews prior to publication. 
In order to ensure the anonymity of the interviewee (all interviews were 
conducted off the record), it is not possible to provide a full interview transcript. 
Instead, excerpts from one interview are shown below. The transcript sections shown 
here were chosen deliberately to address general rather than interviewee-specific 
topics. 
 
 
Interviewer EK 
Interviewee I (redacted) 
Group Case study organisations, BBC Trust 
Date 30.10.2009 
Duration 52:01 (full interview, below only excerpts) 
Location Interviewee’s home  
Notes Specifics on PVT, PVA, relationship of RQIV drivers to each other 
and purposes, public value concept and motivations for its 
application, regulatory rationales and the policy environment 
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EK: The thesis looks at the application of the public value notion at BBC and C4, 
how the public value notion was introduced at the two organisations. I look at it 
primarily from the perspective of how citizen and consumer interests are represented 
in the public value idea, not so much from the perspective of public value 
management theory. The main area of questions I am interested in addresses the 
process and methodology of the PVT. But I would like to start off with a more 
general question: Why was the public value idea useful to the BBC in 2004 in the 
context of Charter review? 
I: Well, clearly it was a time of crisis for the BBC and the new framework had to not 
only be but appear to be very rigorous. So I think having any kind of formal 
framework for new services was going to be essential. The change of governance at a 
time of crises like that was inevitable. And this was a framework that spoke to the 
values that the BBC wanted to make sure were sustained. It was consistent with BBC 
values, it would fit in with the BBC purposes and at the same time it would give 
people outside of the BBC the insurance of a much more rigorous process.  
EK: So it was mainly in regard to governance and regulatory aspects?  
I: Yes, definitely important as part of the new governance framework. But I wouldn’t 
say it was unimportant in itself. It was an evolution or it incorporated measures that 
the BBC was already starting to use for its own internal performance measurement so 
as an internal performance measurement tool it is also useful. But at that time the 
formalisation was very important because of the governance issues.  
[...] 
EK: Do you think for example that developments such as in the 2003 
Communications Act in regard to the incorporation of the representation of citizen 
interests for Ofcom in contrast to the previous Davies report, that there is a shift from 
market failure to citizen aspects?  
I: I think there is a shift and I think that the shift is continuing.  
EK: So do you see a connection between theses?  
I: Yes. I think you can say it is part of a wider intellectual shift. The tide has been 
turning against extreme free-market arguments for some time, I think. It is not just 
very recent. And if you think the high tide of the free-market approach was 1980s, 
then a decade later that had already started to shift quite substantially and is still 
continuing of course because of the failures of free markets. And I think it quite 
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likely that we see the concept of public value diffuse more widely. It has been used 
mainly in the cultural sector so far and I think there is a revival of interest in it. 
Perhaps even the banking sector could use the concept.  
EK: Some people say that public value is going to disappear as quickly as it arrived 
but it seems to have become stronger, also with the inclusion on the European level 
in regard to Communication on State Aid. 
I: The debate has become very acute in broadcasting about whether. It is a real 
divergence of ways, isn’t it? For a while now we have not had to make a decision 
between the kind of free-market argument that James Murdoch put in his recent 
speech and the kind of civic space created by PSB. And I think we are coming to a 
point where actually societies are going to choose one or the other. And the US has 
clearly gone free-market route and won’t change but in Europe and especially the 
UK it is still an open debate. And there is also a link to the technological changes, a 
debate about what you mean by market failure anyway because the market failures 
have become different in nature and much more pervasive anyways because of the 
characteristics of online technology.  
EK: Which market failures still apply?  
I: Well, it is no longer just about genres of programming. Classical music isn’t 
provided and therefore BBC should carry on providing BBC3. And that old 1980s 
debate looked at services and tried to narrow the BBC down to certain quite narrow 
genre.  
EK: Everything that is a merit good? 
I: Exactly. Now I think there are more subtleties in the market failure argument. In 
one of the chapters of the document I sent you, the nature of experience goods in 
general but also the dynamics of new markets and is there a role for a large state 
broadcasting in creating new markets, providing education, not in a narrow sense but 
in a wide sense of media literacy. 
EK: Does the PVT in that sense address whether proposed services address any type 
of market failure or just whether the value created is greater than MIA?  
I: MIA can look at positive impact as well. It can look at the evolution of the market.   
EK: What were the main improvements of the PVT compared to the previous 
assessment under the Secretary of State? 
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I: I think it was partly the formalisation of the procedure that we spoke about earlier. 
I think it was part of the general trend under the Labour government to take decisions 
out of the political arena if they were not obviously political. So tax policy is 
obviously political and you are not going to hand that to an independent body but in 
competition and monetary policy there are now independent bodies of experts. I 
think it was part of that same trend as well that this was considered not inherently 
political decision-making. And having Ofcom involved was part of the guarantee of 
an objective evidence-based process. 
EK: Was that proposed by the BBC? 
I: I don’t know but I very much doubt it.  
EK: In regard to the PVT and non-service proposals, there, the BBC does 
everything?  
I: Yes. 
EK: But before the launch of a PVT, there is internal communication between BBC 
Management and the Trust because not all strategic ideas come with a proposal? 
I: The test is based on clause 25 of the Charter, the significance of what management 
wants to do needs to be assessed so they have to look at that. Elements are 
permanence, cost, impact, if they think the proposal is significant. 
EK: But the Trust decides whenever it wants to do a PVT? 
I: Yes. 
EK: So a PVT launch is not dependent on a submission of a proposal from 
management to launch a new service?  
I: No. 
EK: So have all the submitted proposals by management so far resulted in a PVT 
launch?  
I: No, for example the children service reviews that we did resulted in some changes 
in service licences and some extra changes to TV programming and we put that 
through clause 25 and concluded that PVT is not needed. 
EK: And management did not submit a proposal in that case? 
I: No, they didn’t. The wording is that there is presumption that they will do a test for 
a service. There are a lot of things that we put through the clause 25 process and 
decide that a PVT is not needed. 
EK: So the Trust has guidelines on clause 25 and the Executive as well? 
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I: It is a shared understanding.  
EK: The proposal submitted seems to be the same as the assessment later done by the 
Trust. Why was the decision made that it is necessary to do it twice, because the 
Trust reviews whether the assumptions made by BBC Executive were right?  
I: That is part of that pitch. They look at it under the same headings to make their 
case. They look at RQIV and MIA and then we have to scrutinise the assumptions. 
EK: Are the guidelines on the assessment still based on the interim rules? I found 
them online.  
I: I make sure you have got the right ones. They might still say interim but they are 
not.  
EK: In regard to the assessment of the fit with public purposes, they are assessed 
under impact. Then, in addition it is said that fit with the purposes is a prerequisite. 
So are only services considered which fit with the purposes in the first place or could 
the PVT also yield that they don’t fit the purposes at all? So I am not sure which 
comes first, that is the question.  
I: It is a prerequisite. I try to make it clearer over time that that is a first hurdle and 
that a proposal can fall at that hurdle before we even go on to make any further 
assessments.  
EK: So before launching a PVT you could say we don’t see a fit so we don’t launch a 
PVT? 
I: That would be exceptional. We don’t try to shape what the Executive proposes in 
order to get it through the test because it is a regulatory process but the first question 
is always if it fits with the public purposes. In theory, it could be that we say no to 
that, tick all the other boxes but then turn it down.  
EK: Would that then be an assessment under impact? 
I: No, it is the first step, supposed to come before the assessment.  
EK: In regard to the four PV drivers, they are the core performance measurement 
framework which is used in the PVT and the service licences. Where else are they 
used?  
I: They are now used across the BBC for everything.  
EK: Only these four?  
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I: Yes. And it has become much more widely used over the past three years. There 
has been a spillover effect from their use in the formal process, from their use as a 
management tool.  
EK: Some of the measures have been used before. Which ones are new or came 
along with public value? 
I: We have always looked at reach, always implicitly looked at quality, in the end 
impact. And of course they are not independent of each other. Reach will always 
affect value for money because the value for money measure is always per user or 
per user hour.  
EK: In regard to the relative importance of the drivers and the low, medium, high 
contribution to public value, in the end, a value judgement needs to be made on this. 
There is no guideline other than you look at the methodologies attached to the four 
drivers, get the information and evidence and then make a decision? 
I: You can’t get away from the judgement in the end. 
EK: But isn’t that a point of critique? If you try to give evidence and then ideally 
make a quantitative judgement, then you have qualitative elements and how do you 
reconcile these different evidence bases? How does the Trust deal with that? 
I: Well, the justification comes in publication. We publish every single piece we look 
at and people can track back from the judgement that we make in the final document 
to the reports, forecast and other evidence that we reference. But there is no escaping 
having to do that. Somebody might come up and say personally I would come up 
with a different judgement. But all regulatory decision-making is judgement in the 
end. It is true of competition policy as well. It is a quite similar process, collecting a 
lot of evidence of profit, sales, consumer choices, how they react to price changes. 
After you collect evidence you then have to make a judgement whether there is a 
reduction of competition or not. All regulatory processes are judgemental. The 
guarantor is being incredibly transparent about that. 
EK: So is transparency part of the value creation process then as well?  
I: Transparency is very important. Mostly people have accepted the judgements we 
have made in past PVTs with some exceptions. One exception was the restrictions on 
downloads of classical music in the iPlayer. 
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EK: In the [...] paper it says that developing metrics would refer back to strategic 
aims of the corporation. Which are these? The public purposes or do the metrics try 
to operationalisation public purposes so that it is possible to assess them?  
I: I am not sure I understand the question. The RQIV metrics try to assess the six 
public purposes.  
EK: I meant how the metrics relate to the strategic goals and what are these strategic 
goals? 
I: I think it just means that the metrics differ depending on what kind of organisation 
you are talking about. I don’t think it is trying to say that RQIV are linked to 
stimulating creativity or sustained citizenship. 
EK: So they don’t try to measure the remit and break it down? How would you then 
otherwise say whether the public purposes are met or reached? That is the connection 
I am missing.  
I: There can’t be a connection. I don’t think between something as broad as 
sustaining citizenship and a specific metric in a test like what is the forecast audience 
for a particular service. So at the first step, you would think about would the service 
serve a public purpose? If you are thinking about new services, would this service 
serve purposes, it looks like it would, news is very important for citizenship and then 
you go on to the four RQIV drivers and the individual metrics that come underneath 
these headings. You would look at those then, having assessed the strategic fit as a 
first step. And then the feedback comes separately, purpose remit services every 
year. So it is a slow and indirect feedback loop. I think it is impossible to have any 
direct assessment about how a particular element or service effects something as 
general as one of the public purposes.  
EK: I am particularly interested in the distinction between citizen and consumer 
interests and their representation in the test. Is it correct that impact is the only driver 
which addresses citizen benefits? 
I: Impact always does a lot of the work but reach is also going to be important. Reach 
and the relevance of the audience is always going to be important as well for serving 
citizen interest.  
EK: But isn’t reach more about consumer value in the end? In the reach methodology 
individuals are never asked as citizen, it looks at how they use it for themselves, not 
about whether programmes contributed to better educated society.  
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I: I agree that impact is bound to be the most important one. I still think that for 
citizenship in particular, high reach amongst the relevant audience is important 
because you want it to be a shared experience. We are talking about shared space. It 
might be that it is programming for young people in low socio-economic groups and 
who have not been consumers of television and when they do it is not public service 
television, it is much more football on Sky, so in that particular example. I think 
reach would also do quite a lot of work.  
EK: Ok, so not only impact is relevant in regard to citizen interests but also reach? 
I: Mainly impact but also reach.  
EK: And in regard to assessing citizen interest, there are a lot of different opinions 
about different methods, WTP, conjoint analysis. Which methods does the Trust use 
to assess citizen interests and how are problems in these methods addressed? 
I: We tend not to do that kind of empirical assessment. I am sceptical about them 
because you get the answers entirely depending on how you framed the question. 
When we have money to spend on research that is not what we do.  
EK: So how are citizen interests then assessed? Do you have an example of how it is 
done? 
I: There is not an independent assessment apart from looking at the metrics and 
making the judgement. It is part and parcel of the judgement that we make.  
EK: So in regard to deliberation, how is the public included into assessments as 
citizens? 
I: Certainly qualitatively, we always do market research and often there is a 
qualitative element but not WTP and these kinds of studies.  
EK: So citizen assessments are primarily qualitative? 
I: Yes.  
EK: In regard to making a decision on the PVA, if for example all four drivers would 
have medium value, is there a point where you decide this is enough or this is not 
enough value creation? 
I: Yes, I mean, I think that is evident by the fact that we turned one down. And there 
was another one where in the provisional conclusion we said we have not had 
enough evidence that there is public value created here. So we need to get that from 
the consultation because we can’t give it a go ahead.  
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EK: In the end, the decision is not only how much public value has been created but 
how that adds up with positive and negative market impact. How are these decisions 
made? How do you compare the public value created and the MIA?  
I: It is a highly judgemental one.  
EK: Ok. So there is, you look at both documents in that sense and then... 
I: Yes, we definitely don’t try to get a pounds million figure out of public value and a 
pounds million figure out of MIA and then compare them. We definitely don’t do 
that approach. You could think about that in theory. You could actually suggest to do 
WTP assessments and you could get a figure for producer and consumer surplus out 
of the MIA and then you get numbers. But I think that is less meaningful than 
thinking about the evidence that goes into the two parts of that equation and making 
a judgement about that, because the figures are bogus, really. Calculating producer 
and consumer surpluses from a market based on new technology where we have no 
idea how consumers are going to use them, what the take-up will be and combining 
that with WTP assessments, which depend entirely on how questions are framed, you 
get a nice number that would look very authoritative but it would not be very 
meaningful.  
EK: Who makes the final and the provisional decision?  
I: It is a decision of the full Trust.  
EK: It is not the Trust Unit? 
I: No, they can make a recommendation but this is definitely the Trustees. 
EK: In regard to the development that the PVT is much more evidence-based than 
before, before the PVT the evidence base, at least from what I have read, was much 
more limited in that sense. Why is that, do you think this is a more general 
development?  
I: I think so. I think it is part of a wider public policy dependence of it, on evidence 
base. With the limitations that we were just talking about, that there is a limit about 
what evidence can actually tell you in these kind of decisions. I certainly think there 
is much more use of evidence than in the past when the BBC would make a pitch to 
the Secretary of State, he would think about it for either a short or a long time and 
make essentially a political decision about it.  
EK: There are different elements to the public value idea the way the BBC has 
applied it. Which elements of it are most important or successful at the BBC? 
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I: Well, I think it has been helpful externally in starting to break down the barriers 
between the BBC and the rest of the, the BBC is so big and it has always been rather 
inward looking and I think the fact that this process has forced a dialogue with other 
stakeholders for the first time has started to change that relationship and that is a very 
positive development because the BBC makes a very strong contribution to the wider 
creative economy in the UK but it has done it by accident in the past but it would be 
nice if we could help it on purpose. So that is one positive benefit. Another is the fact 
that a decision has gone through this kind of process, which gives it a kind of 
robustness and it doesn’t stop people complaining about BBC activities by any 
means but at least we are able to say there was this process, stakeholder had a lot to 
say about it, we took accountability of what they had to say. For the iPlayer, for 
example, it really diffused the potential criticism that there might have been if it 
hadn’t happened with the PVT. So that is another benefit. The third kind of benefit is 
the realisation that this is actually a useful management tool as well. It is helping to 
prioritise and shape decisions within the BBC that don’t come anywhere near the 
formal regulatory processes.  
[...] 
EK: Can you explain what the non-service approvals would be and who makes the 
decisions. What is a non-service approval or a non-service launch of a non-service 
PVT?  
I: The Charter is pretty vague about it. So we decided that we would do the same 
process as the PVT analytically. So we look at the same four drivers, the strategic fit 
first, and the market impact. We do the same analysis. In reality there is very little 
difference between a non-service approval and the PVT because in either case, 
whether Ofcom does the MIA or the Trust Unit, a lot of it is given to external 
consultants. So the market research is done in the same way. The forecasts have been 
done and validated in the same way. There is very little practical difference between 
the two. You will see that when we publish the Canvas documents. They look the 
same as the PVT. The other area of approval that we have is commercial approvals, 
which have a completely different framework set out in the Charter. But actually, 
there is quite a lot of analytical similarity between how we think about commercial 
positions as well.  
EK: But they are not being assessed in the same way? 
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I: It is not the same machinery of assessment but we still think about does it fit the 
public purposes, what does it do for RQIV, what is the MIA of that decision? So the 
analysis actually is the same. So what I am saying is whichever channel of approval 
something needs, is it commercial, is it non-service or a service and therefore needs a 
PVT, the thought process that we put into the assessment is the same.  
[...] 
EK: The Conservative party has criticised the Trust, what might lead to changes if 
they come into power. What do you think would...  
I: If the Trust is abolished, either there will be a new governing body, which seems to 
be highly unlikely because this was the debate that we had at the time of Charter 
renewal, or Ofcom will do it. If we are abolished, Ofcom will do it.  
EK: Do you think the public value notion or PVT would persist? 
I: Yes, because what would they do? They would have to make an assessment. So 
suppose we are abolished, Ofcom takes over and the educational software companies 
complain about the BBC is developing new online educational services. What is 
Ofcom going to do? They will do an MIA but it will also have to assess the fact that 
BBC has an educational purpose, the fact that education is considered to be 
something that is sensible to spend public money on. So anyway it has to do a public 
value assessment. So I think they will do the same thing because it is a good 
machinery. 
EK: So the public value notion, even if used or assessed differently, has become a 
concept that will remain in PSB? 
I: Yes, and I think, as I have said earlier, I think it can grow outside of the 
broadcasting sector because it is a really useful way to think about the conflicting 
aims of public intervention and the impact of public intervention.  
EK: The BBC’s take on public value was new. It doesn’t reflect the elements of 
public value theory necessarily. So it is something the BBC has created which has 
now become something more permanent in this context? 
I: I think it, the BBC’s approach isn’t all that different from the approach developed 
by consultants who also... 
EK: Which ones do you mean? The Accenture book? 
I: Yes, I think they are both implementations of the original Mark Moore idea.  
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EK: I heard different views on this. Some people say they are different and that only 
a few Moore elements have been taken in the BBC approach. 
I: What do people say has been left out? 
EK: Co-production, for example. 
I: I haven’t read his book for so long, I can’t remember. 
[...] 
EK: In regard to the inclusion of the PVT-style ex-ante test in the EU 
communication. I know from other interviews that there have been exchanges 
between the BBC Trust and representatives from the Commission. Can you tell me a 
bit more about that? Has there been an exchange about the methodologies and the 
conceptualisation of the PVT?  
I: Yes, my colleague [redacted] has been involved. I don’t know the detail. But he 
and the Chairman have been to Brussels a couple of times and explained the PVT 
and what we do and have sent documents about it. And there was a seminar in 
London that we hosted for the Commission two years ago, I think. I wouldn’t say 
there has been a huge amount of exchange but there certainly has been.  
EK: So the idea goes back to the BBC’s approach? 
I: I think so. I think it stemmed from [redacted] and the Chairman’s first visit to 
Brussels when they explained the process and they said, by the way we had 10,000 
people participation in the public consultation and that apparently struck them as 
very good validation of the process. If people were interested to take part on this 
scale it looked like a good process.  
[...] 
EK: Could you maybe say in one or two sentences, how you would define PV?  
I: The benefit that citizens would derive from a public service both in their role as 
consumers and in their wider role as citizens, which is a distinction which survey 
evidence shows people do very clearly understand. They do understand the 
difference between individual preferences and wider benefits to society.  
END  
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Appendix H: Analysed Documents (for chapter 9)  
 
The documents listed in the table below were subject to a non-systematic document 
analysis, as described in chapter 6. The findings were used to inform and supplement 
the analysis of the wider public value process in chapter 9. 
 
 
Document Title 
DNH (1992) The Future of the BBC. A Consultations Document (green paper) 
DNH The future of the BBC: Serving the nation, competing worldwide (white 
paper) 
BBC (1992) Extending Choice: The BBC’s role in the new broadcasting age 
BBC (1996) Extending Choice in the Digital Age 
BBC (n.a. 1) Proposed New Services from the BBC 
BBC (n.a. 2) BBC Proposed New Services. Additional information supplied by the 
BBC 
European Commission 
(1999) 
State Aid No NN 88/98 – United Kingdom. Financing of a 24-hour 
advertising-free news channel out of the licence fee by the BBC 
Davies (1999) The Future Funding of the BBC. Report of the Independent Review 
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Appendix I: Chronology  
 
The chronology focuses on central policy developments, documents such as Acts, 
Bills, policy and regulatory reports (DNH, DCMS, and Ofcom), and case study 
publications (BBC, C4) in the historic and contemporary context of the UK 
broadcasting ecology.  
 
Year Document  Reference 
1869 Telegraph Act  
1904 Wireless Telegraphy Act  
1922 BBC incorporated  
1926 Founding and licensing of British Broadcasting Company, BBC 
established through a Royal Charter 
 
1927 First Royal Charter  
1935 Selsdon Report of the Television Committee  
1936 BBC One starts broadcasting  
1936 Ullswater report Ullswater, 1936 
1951 Beveridge report Beveridge, 1951 
1954 Television Act 
ITV and ITA introduced 
 
1955 ITV starts broadcasting  
1962 Pilkington report Pilkington, 1962 
1964 Television Act  
1964 BBC Two starts broadcasting  
1972 Sound Broadcasting Act 
IBA replaces ITA  
 
1977 Annan report Annan, 1977 
1980 Broadcasting Act  
1982 Telecommunications Act  
1982 C4 starts broadcasting 
Launch of satellite TV 
 
1983 First cable franchises awarded   
1986  Peacock report Peacock, 1986 
1987 Green paper (on radio)  
1987 BBC Strategy Paper: The next five years  
1988 White paper (on TV)  
1989 BBC Strategy Paper: Funding the Future  
1989 Sky TV begins satellite subscription broadcasting  
1990 BSkyB formed (merger of BSB and Sky)  
1990 Broadcasting Act 
ITC replaces IBA  
 
1992 The Future of the BBC: A Consultation Document  
(green paper) 
DNH, 1992 
1992 BBC Strategy Paper: Extending Choice BBC, 1992 
1994 The Future of the BBC: Serving the nation, competing 
worldwide (white paper) 
DNH, 1994 
1995 BBC Programme Strategy Review: People and Programmes – BBC, 1995 
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BBC Radio and Television for an age of choice 
1996 Royal Charter DNH, 1996 
1996 BBC Strategy Paper: Extending Choice in the Digital Age BBC, 1996 
1996 Broadcasting Act  
1997 Channel 5 starts broadcasting  
1998 Regulating Communications: Approaching Convergence in the 
Information Age (green paper) 
DTI & DCMS, 1998 
1998 BBC Strategy Paper: BBC Beyond 2000  
1998 BBC Choice starts broadcasting  
1999 Davies Report on the Future Funding of the BBC Davies, 1999 
1999 BBC Knowledge starts broadcasting  
2000 A New Future for Communications (white paper) DTI & DCMS, 2000 
09.2001 Approval of digital BBC services BBC FOUR, CBBC, 
CBeebies and digital radio channels 
 
02.2002 CBeebies and CBBC launch  
03.2002 BBC FOUR starts broadcasting  
2002 Draft Communications Bill DTI & DCMS, 2002a 
2002 Cabinet Office Publication ‘Creating Public Value’  Kelly et al., 2002 
2002 BBC licence fee settlement  
09.2002 BBC three approved by DCMS  
2002 Lambert report: Independent Review of BBC News 24 Lambert, 2002 
02.2003 BBC THREE starts broadcasting  
2003 Communications Act 
Ofcom formed 
 
2003 Review of the BBC’s Royal Charter DCMS, 2003 
04.2004 PSTB Review 1, Phase 1 Ofcom, 2004a 
06.2004 BBC Charter Review Document ‘Building Public Value’ BBC, 2004a 
07.2004 Graf report: Independent Review of BBC Online Graf, 2004 
09. 2004 PSTB Review 1, Phase 2 Ofcom, 2004c 
10.2004 Gardam report: Independent Review of the BBC’s Digital 
Radio Services 
Gardam, 2004 
2004 Barwise report: Independent Review of the BBC’s Digital 
Television Services 
Barwise, 2004b 
02.2005 PSTB Review 1, Phase 3 Ofcom, 2005 
03.2005 A Strong BBC, Independent of Government (green paper) DCMS, 2005 
03.2006 A Public Service for All: The BBC in the Digital Age (white 
paper) 
DCMS, 2006a 
2006  Royal Charter DCMS, 2006b 
2006 Framework Agreement DCMS, 2006c 
01.2007 BBC Trust: PVA On-Demand Service Proposal BBC Trust, 2007a 
04.2007 C4 Financial Review Ofcom, 2007b 
 LEK Submission  LEK, 2007 
 C4 Submission: C4’s Unique Contribution to Public Service 
Broadcasting 
C4, 2007  
06.2007 C4 Financial Review  Ofcom, 2007c 
09.2007 BBC Trust: PVA HDTV Proposal  BBC Trust, 2007c 
11.2007 BBC Trust: PVA Gaelic Digital Service BBC Trust, 2007d 
03.2008  Strategy Review Publication ‘Next on 4’ C4, 2008b 
04.2008 PSB Review 2, Phase 1 Ofcom, 2008a 
11.2008 BBC Trust: PVA Local Video  BBC Trust, 2008 
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12.2008 PSB Review 2, Phase 2 Ofcom, 2008b 
01.2009 PSB Review 2, Phase 3 Ofcom, 2009 
2009 Annual Reports and Account for 2008 C4, 2009a 
03.2010 BBC Strategy Review: Putting Quality First BBC, 2010 
2010 Annual Reports and Accounts for 2009 C4, 2010a 
2010 Digital Economy Act DEA, 2010 
2010 BBC Trust: The BBC’s Strategy: Putting Quality First BBC Trust, 2010c 
 
 
